"Family", as a singular unit, is a dynamic definition. Were it not, our daughters would still be baubles to be traded away for influence. Stephanie Coontz, for instance, in
Marriage: A History, noted:
In the 1970s anthropologist Ernestine Friedl pointed out that most of the functions of marriage could in theory be performed by a group of brothers and sisters. "Procreation," she wrote, "could be accomplished by irregular sexual encounters with men and women of other sibling groups, with each set of brothers and sisters supporting the children of the sisters only." The only thing such a system could not do, she said, was allow individuals to acquire in-laws. She suggested therefore that the effort to acquire in-laws was as vital purpose of marriage as the organization of reproduction or the enforcement of incest taboos.
Friedl's comments were mere speculation before the recent publication of a huge and fascinating study of the Na, a society of about thirty thousand people in the Yunnan Province of southwestern China. Among the Na, the only society we know of in which marriage is not a significant institution, brothers and sisters live together, jointly raising, educating, and supporting the children to whom the sisters give birth ....
.... The Na are a startling exception to what otherwise seems to be the historical universality of marriage. But this society makes one thing clear: Marriage is not the only way to impose an incest taboo, organize child rearing, pool resources, care for elders, coordinate household production, or pass on property to the next generation. It is, however, the only way to get in-laws. And since the dawn of civilization, getting in-laws has been one of marriage's most important functions.
(32-33)
And throughout history, this has largely held true. Coontz also notes that in 1556, marriage required parental consent until the age of thirty for women, and twenty-five for men.
Elizabeth Pallier and Pierre Houlbronne, for example, had lived together for eight years, had children together, and eventually, though belatedly, were married in church. According to traditional canon law, this was a perfectly valid marriage. But when Pierre got a job at the Palais de Justice, a post that suddenly made him a very desirable marriage partner, his parents petitioned to have the marriage declared invalid because he had not received their consent. In 1587 the court upheld the parents. After eight years with Pierre, Elizabeth instantly became an unwed mother. Her children were suddenly illegitimate, with no claim on their father's property. Pierre, on the other hand, was free to contract a more advantageous marital alliance.
(137)
Interestingly, societal and family decay have long been popular political arguments:
Traditionalists of all political stripes were horrified by the ferment. "The social order is entirely overturned," wrote two defenders of the right of wealthy families to disregard their daughters and leave their property to whichever of their children they pleased. Another family's lawyer argued that forcing families to recognize the rights of "natural" children "seems to chase man out of civil society and push him back into a state of savagery." Another French lawyer declared: "All families are trembling."
In 1799 the British conservative Hannah More predicted that the agitation for "rights" would undermine all family ties. First there was "the rights of man," she said. Then came the "rights of women." Next, she warned, we will be bombarded by "grave descants on the rights of youth, the rights of children, and the rights of babies."
(152)
And have you ever heard of "coverture"? We don't use the word much these days, though it might come back into fashion if advocates of traditionalist families have their way:
There was a remarkable continuity in the legal subjugation of women from the Middle Ages until the end of the nineteenth century. In the thirteenth century the English jurist Henry de Bracton declared that a married couple is one person, and that person is the husband. When Lord William Blackstone codified English common law in 1765, he reaffirmed this principle. Upon marriage, he explained, "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended." Blackstone noted that "a man cannot grant anything to his wife, or enter into any covenant with her, for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence." This doctrine of coverture, in which the legal identity of a wife was subsumed ("covered") by that of her husband, was passed on to the colonies and became the basis of American law for the next 150 years.
(186)
The twentieth century was a difficult time for these wannabe philistines:
Women had to adjust their expectations and desires to the reality that they had few rights in marriage and few options outside it. The main reason nineteenth-century marriages seem so much less conflicted than modern ones is that women kept their aspirations in check and swallowed their disappointments. The English domestic advice writer Sarah Ellis put it bluntly. A wife, she said, "should place herself, instead of running the risk of being placed, in a secondary position".
Such ideas still have their proponents. In 1999 the neoconservative William Kristol, who has made a lucrative career out of rehashing nineteenth-century ideas, argued that modern woman must move "beyond women's liberation to grasp the following three points: the necessity of marriage, the importance of good morals, and the necessity of inequality within marriage".
(187)
Of course, maybe the traditionalists think this is all something to hold onto:
A wife must "cease to take pride" in "outgrown maidenly reserve," scolded sociologist Ernest Groves. She should accept her husband's sexual initiative and follow his lead, because "his attitude toward sex is less likely to be warped" than hers. Physicians and marriage counselors came to believe, in the words of one contemporary, that women "have to be bluntly reminded that one main source of prostitution is the selfish and unsurrendered wife." Women who failed to find physical satisfaction in such surrender were told that they were not "fully adult" in their sexuality.
(209)
Which, incidentally, grants us a moment to circle back to the beginning of this thread, and consider something about societal attitudes.
I mean, wow. A woman is not fully adult until she is willing to be raped by her husband because his sexuality is less warped than hers?
See, there is a reason why people are wary of calls to traditionalism in family.
The most common traditional notion of family in the United States seems to hearken back to the Long Decade (1947-62), which can in its most positive depiction be described as a "Cleaver" marriage. And, in the early twentieth century, the notion of a marriage based on love and choice was considered detrimental to the traditional family.
The World Wars, in a way, were the worst thing that could happen to the traditional patriarchy.
Fears about women's political and personal emancipation were compounded by the surge in women's employment between 1900 and 1920. William Sumner wrote in the 1924 Yale Review that this had produced "the greatest revolution" in the history of marriage since the invention of the father-headed family many millennia earlier. It gave women "careers and ambitions which have dislodged marriage from its supreme place in their interest and life plan."
(201)
To the other, though, those fears both failed to come true, but also set the stage for even greater fears:
Nor, contrary to the fears of William Sumner, did the greater acceptance of women's work and social activities outside the home after World War I dislodge marriage "from its supreme place" in women's lives. Most people believed that women should retire from work after a few years. And such a course of action became possible for wider segments of the population as men's wages rose in the unprecedented prosperity of the 1920s. It was during this period that for the very first time in U.S. history, a majority of American children lived in families in which the man was the primary wage earner, the wife was not involved in full-time labor outside the home or alongside her husband, and the children were in school instead of in the labor force.
(209)
Which, of course, was the run up to World War II, which called women back to the workplace, and that's when things went south for the traditionalists. As
I noted last year:
The social-issues conservatives really do have the appearance of trying to return us to the Long Decade, which was an incredibly prosperous time for the United States; history, however, is beginning to show that this was not a particularly healthy time for women. That is, the whole June Cleaver and Harriet Nelson outlook on the family that led to the Sexual Revolution did so for a reason. As the Greatest Generation dies off, historians are finding in some of the personal papers—letters, diaries, &c.—of women from that period a growing sense of ennui that demanded some manner of relief.
To use a more recent, and admittedly superficial notion, did you ever see The Simpsons 3F23, "You Only Move Twice"? The episode where Hank Scorpio hired Homer away from SNPP to Globex? The James Bond episode? That one.
Marge is very much a traditional housewife, yet as she looked around their technological wonder of a home, she found everything she needed to do was taken care of. Bored, she sat down at the dining table and started drinking a glass of wine.
It's a very subtle analogy, but that's what happened to the Long Decade. Women's work, such as it was, suddenly became a whole lot easier, and allowed the June Cleavers and Harriet Nelsons of American society too much free time.
Isn't that a dangerous sentence? Women's work? Too much free time? Of course, it's all how you measure things; as a resource-allocation question, women suddenly had more free time to think and reflect, and the ennui became inevitable. The Sexual Revolution emerged in no small part because of the difference between stoking the range and turning a dial, wringing and pinning clothes or throwing the laundry into the dryer and pushing a button.
This is hardly the only thing that pushed women toward a liberation movement, but it is the sort of thing that cannot be ignored. It's a hard sell to women in general, just on the sentimental point of going back to what is widely seen as a subservient societal valence. But it's also a hard sell practically. No matter how much the social right wants to stuff this genie back in the bottle, nobody really knows how to do that.
So here's the thing: I
know what version of "family" Parmalee is referring to—
"I'm more apt to place the family unit--as it's conceived in the affluent and developed nations ...."
What is less apparent, though, is what notion of "family"
you are referring to. The Cleaver/Nelson idyll is a product of the mid-twentieth century; romantic, chosen marriage evolved through the nineteenth century.
And the English, for instance, blew "traditional" marriage in 1891:
In England, the case of Emily Hall and Edward Jackson spurred a radical transformation in traditional marriage law. Hall and Jackson had married in 1887 but lived together for only a few days before she returned to her family. In 1889 Jackson got a court order against Hall for "restitution of conjugal rights." Emily simply ignored the order because five years earlier Parliament had abolished penalties for spouses who refused to grant conjugal rights. In 1891 the frustrated Jackson kidnapped his erstwhile wife on her way home from church. Emily's family immediately took Edward to court to win her freedom. A lower court ruled in Jackson's favor, on the traditional grounds that a husband was entitled to custody over his wife. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision, holding that no English subject could be imprisoned by another, even if he was her husband.
(193-194)
So ... which "family" notion are you referring to? The decay of parental consent? The decline of coverture? The rise of love and choice? Women out of the workplace? The sexual-slave marriage of Ernest R. Groves? The Long Decade, June Cleaver/Harriet Nelson family?
The importance of the family unit is well established; indeed, it is an anthropological and evolutionary outcome, not a political slogan. But there remains the question of how one
defines family.
Parmalee has offered identifiable boundaries to the critique of the family, but we have no such markers from you.
It would behoove you, LG, to take some time to consider what your slogans and quips actually mean.
No, really. It would help you
make a point if you
had one to make in the first palce.
____________________
Notes:
Coontz, Stephanie. Marriage, A History: From Obedience to Intimacy, or How Love Conquered Marriage. New York: Viking, 2005.