The universality of some concepts as possibly explained in the context of embodied cognition:
George Lakoff: "The postmodernists were right that some concepts can change over time and vary across cultures. But they were wrong in suggesting that all concepts are like that. Thousands are not. They arise around the world in culture after culture from our common embodiment. [...] Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, based on metaphors that make use of our sensory-motor capacities to perform abstract inferences. Thus, abstract reason, on a large scale, appears to arise from the body." ()
- - - - - -
Concerning Lakoff's take on embodied cognition, further extracts:
[...] This startling collection of results [in research] pointed toward the idea that mind was not disembodied - not characterizable in terms of the manipulation of meaningless symbols independent of the brain and body, that is, independent of the sensory-motor system and our functioning in the world. Mind instead is embodied, not in the trivial sense of being implementable in a brain, but in the crucial sense that conceptual structure and the mechanisms of reason arise ultimately and are shaped by from the sensory-motor system of the brain and body. [...] There is a huge body of work supporting this view.
[...] Colors and color categories are not "out there" in the world [...] Color concepts and color-based inferences are thus structured by our bodies and brains.
Basic-level categories are structured in terms of gestalt perception, mental imagery, and motor schemas. In this way the body and the sensory-motor system of the brain enters centrally into our conceptual systems.
Spatial relations concepts in languages around the world (e.g, in, through, around in English, sini in Mixtec, mux in Cora, and so on) are composed of the same primitive "image-schemas", that is, schematic mental images. These, in turn, appear to arise from the structure of visual and motor systems. This forms the basis of an explanation of how we can fit language and reasoning to vision and movement.
Aspectual concepts (which characterize the structure of events) appear to arise from neural structures for motor control.
Categories make use of prototypes of many sorts to reason about the categories as a whole. Those prototypes are characterized partly in terms of sensory-motor information.
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, based on metaphors that make use of our sensory-motor capacities to perform abstract inferences. Thus, abstract reason, on a large scale, appears to arise from the body.
These are the results most striking to me. They require us to recognize the role of the body and brain in human reason and language. They thus run contrary to any notion of a disembodied mind. It was for such reasons that I abandoned my earlier work on generative semantics and started studying how mind and language are embodied. They are among the results that have led to a second-generation of cognitive science, the cognitive science of the embodied mind.