Baldeee:
I'd like to comment explicitly on your formulation in post #130:
I think this is all valid. But...
Like iceaura, I think that P1, P2, P3 and the conclusion that follows those premises does not address the issue of "freedom". All you have established here is that the will has causes. But that doesn't mean it isn't "free".
This is not an argument from causation.
This is an argument from determinism.
Determinism is a specific form of causation that states, effectively, if A then B - in that if A you will only ever get B.
Causation merely states if A then something.
If the premises are accepted (and I'm not saying that you should - but if you don't I would like to know which you disagree with) then the conclusion is not just that the will has causes but that the will is a deterministic system - i.e. that if it is confronted with state A then the following state will always be B.
If B then always C, if C then always D.
You make the point that the "same inputs always lead to the same ... outputs". So we have determinism.
Correct.
But we haven't yet touched on the question of "freedom".
I think what you need to do is to decide what "freedom" means for you.
Something along the lines of being able to do more than one thing, and to have control over what is done, would suffice.
It is possible, of course, that you have already decided that the only thing that could ever make the will "free" would be for it to be non-deterministic.
In as much as I don't see freedom in any system that is fundamentally a case of "if A then you must do B", then yes.
One way to do that would be to allow the supernatural in, but I don't think you want to do that.
I don't, and I haven't.
Others have, though.
Allowing randomness in (perhaps in the form of quantum indeterminacy, for example) doesn't help either, because a random choice is not a willed choice.
While I concur in principle, I'm not sure one can beg the question by using the term "willed" as that is what is in question.
Lack of control, something like that might be better.
So, if you have decided that determinism fundamentally rules out the possibility of "freedom", then you are an incompatibilist and you must accept that "free" will does not exist.
That is the conclusion of the logic I offered, arguing from determinism.
The conclusion, however, is only true if the premises are sound.
I don't know if they are or not, although I suspect they might be.
So "free" will might exist if, for example, a system built from deterministic interactions is not itself deterministic, or if the will itself is not such a deterministic system (i.e. is not built from deterministic interactions).
But if one accepts the premises then the conclusion is what it is.
The only thing that then remains is for you to explain why we all feel like we have "freedom" in this regard.
To be honest that is like asking how consciousness works.
I could offer a guess that the illusion is necessary for consciousness itself, that consciousness only arose above the level of mere machine when it could convince itself it was more than a mere machine.
Perhaps it is because we are only ever aware of fairly macro "causes", the dreams that iceaura keeps referring to, and we are simply not aware of, not capable of being aware of, the lack of "freedom" we actually have, and that according to what we are aware of we
appear to have freedom.
But we're getting into pure speculation as far as I am concerned.
I find it a fascinating question of why we feel the way we do, why we feel as if we have freedom.
But it is not a question I can answer.
If our feelings are inconsistent with the conclusion that freedom exists in reality (i.e. if the perception of freedom is truly an illusion) then it seems strange that the strict definition of "free" used to reach this conclusion is at such odds with our "working" definition of "free". It would seem that we need to revise one or other (or both) definitions.
I don't agree.
We just need to be aware of where the various definitions are applicable, and abide by the context.