Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?
- Thread starter M.I.D
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DaveC426913:
In other words, there's a very wide category of possible "freedom" which all of you seem determined not to discuss. Indeed, some of you have been quite irate with iceaura because he refuses to agree with you that the the only possible freedom is supernatural freedom. You insist that iceaura must be denying determinism, because you will not recognise the possibility of freedom and determinism coexisting.
As far as I can tell, iceaura has spent most of this thread trying to point out to you and a few other participants that your stance is an incompatibilist one. That is, you admit no possibility that the will could be simultaneously determined and "free". Since you don't believe in the supernatural, you necessarily conclude that free will is an "illusion". But you have all made a very significant unstated assumption in reaching that conclusion: that your personal definition of "freedom" demands that a choice can only be "free" if it somehow suspends or bypasses natural laws.
In other words, there's a very wide category of possible "freedom" which all of you seem determined not to discuss. Indeed, some of you have been quite irate with iceaura because he refuses to agree with you that the the only possible freedom is supernatural freedom. You insist that iceaura must be denying determinism, because you will not recognise the possibility of freedom and determinism coexisting.
At least your position is clear enough. Free will is supernatural, for you. Noted.
DaveC426913
Valued Senior Member
No, we have been quite irate with Iceaura because - apart from asserting no less than seven times that every one else is invoking supernaturalism - he was the only one invoking it. He would have done much better to lay out the steps as to how it is the implication of what we were asserting, without actually jamming the words in our mouths as if we actually said it. That would have saved about fifty posts of "I never said that. Stop saying I did." But that never seemed to bother him, nor could we cajole him into explaining himself.
Anyway, water under the bridge now. You've clarified it in your inimitable way. I'm ready to move on.
Free-will is about Life
Universe has not only matter in it , non-living , but also Life .
Call Life " supernatural " if you like . But no matter what you call Life , Life in this Universe exists , period .
DaveC426913:
iceaura's posting style can be abrupt and abrasive at times, but he's often right about stuff nonetheless.
As far as I can tell, he did explain himself, quite a few times. Maybe you would have been better thinking about the content of his posts rather than the personalities involved.
iceaura's posting style can be abrupt and abrasive at times, but he's often right about stuff nonetheless.
I'd be interested to know what you have concluded about free will before you move on.
Freedom of will:
"It's My Will and I am free to use it as I see fit"
The important point that is rarely addressed is that the issue of free will can not be separated from the owner of that will. The one that makes use of that will, the willer, regardless of theoretical deterministic factors has a will to do with as HE pleases.
Therefore unless proven that the self is not the self, the I is not the I, the ME is not the Me, I fail to see how or why I would agree that my freedom to use my will as I see fit is unavailable to me or an illusion.
"It's My Will and I am free to use it as I see fit"
The important point that is rarely addressed is that the issue of free will can not be separated from the owner of that will. The one that makes use of that will, the willer, regardless of theoretical deterministic factors has a will to do with as HE pleases.
Therefore unless proven that the self is not the self, the I is not the I, the ME is not the Me, I fail to see how or why I would agree that my freedom to use my will as I see fit is unavailable to me or an illusion.
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The problem with this is that one needs no consensus to "call" it reality.
Example:
Living in a tent in isolation in a forest with an ocean beach nearby. ( no consensus available)
Claiming only those who can reach a consensus can know what is real or not is uneccesarilly limiting the conscious experience beyond what is actually the case.
I believe this was originally addressed to Yazata. But let's say that I got tired of seeing it waiting at the train stop. (Could have missed it being picked-up elsewhere, though.) Just to get it rolling somewhere, even if another person has to come along to give it further legs (including Yaz).
Most people at the subway are probably usually running zombie-like through habituated routine (their mind is on getting to their destination, looking at or talking to their smartphone, etc). They aren't consciously focused on the tracks or the possibilities they and an approaching "train" present. So we need an example where deliberating attention is actually in play.
For the sake of just speedily using it as a model rather than exploring every potential possibility detouring away from that, I'll assume the superficial information below was indeed the case or all that need be considered.
Two people killed after jumping in front of Brooklyn subway train: "Witnesses told police the pair appeared to intentionally leap in the path of the Manhattan-bound C train at Broadway Junction station around 4:45 p.m."
The following pertaining to both individuals, but described singly for sake of convenience.
During the time before the incident, there was surely a lingering self-preservation narrative transpiring in the head which was reluctant or did not desire to leap. Despite another narrative in the same head which obviously did. One of the internal dialogues eventually did not get what it wished. Which is to say: a particular, competing, internal thought process having the liberty to put into action what it wants is contingent rather than applicable to all situations. But the proposal finally selected is still the choice or behavior of the overall brain/body system. Because only one result was outwardly witnessed does not mean multiple possibilities were not mulled over.
~
Write4U
Valued Senior Member
True, but that does not guarantee accuracy.
No guarantee you are not living in a dream, lots of recluses with very strange ideas of reality.
Not really. We can still experience the illusion of say, a fata morgana. The difference is we know it's a reflection and not real, it's true nature. In days of old that's where the gods dwelled, even by consensus, which by all accounts, has skewed our perspective of Nature itself for centuries.
Religion anyone?
Is consensus not why science demands proofs (falsification, verification, physical proof) of apparently non-explainable phenomena and what causes them?
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Context, JamesR. Context.
If someone is arguing a psosition, and the other says "you're wrong..." and then starts spieling away about things irrelevant to that argument as if it in some way rebuts it, with a clear agenda to discuss a different matter, then I feel the response I gave is fair.
Second, the discussion at the time, in the thread that you have now merged, was focussed on the argument from determinism. It is disingenuous of you, the one who merged the threads, to then raise the issue that I was, in that thread, focusing on determinism.
No. I just want to be sure that one does not mix and match between arguments. As was the case in the previous thread, and hence my desire in the second to get a working definition / understanding for purposes of discussion. And it settled on the compatabilist view.
Note how this is a conclusion, not an assumption.
Further, the argument is only valid if the properties of the universe are deterministic (or probabilistically so), or are something else that fulfill the "since (1) can't come from (2)". There may be (not that I have heard of any) natural laws that allow (1) to come from (2), but deterministic laws don't seem to be one.
I don't understand what you're referring to when you talk about the "argument from determinism". Do you mean the incompatibilist view of free will?
Disingenuous? For starters, you have the time-line wrong there. I posted that reply to you before I had even decided to merge the threads.
I don't see that by merging the threads I have conflated two separate issues at all.
Either you think that determinism rules out the possibility of free will, or you don't. If you don't, you can can do so for one of two reasons, as far as I can tell: you can believe that the exercise of free will is an inherently non-deterministic process (possibly supernatural), or you can understand "freedom" in such a way that it is compatible with determinism.
I'm not aware that any other alternatives being raised in either of the two merged threads.
The only other point that came up was the original question in the Physics subforum as to whether the laws of physics somehow "disprove" free will. That question was quickly answered with a "no", and the thread moved on.
DaveC426913:
Suppose I decide that I'm going to make a choice about something - whether to eat corn flakes or wheaties for breakfast, say - based on whether a particular atomic nucleus undergoes spontanteous radioactive decay within a specified time period. Let's say the probability of decay in that time period is exactly 50%. The decay itself is truly random.
So, the atom decays - or not - and I act accordingly. But where did my free will come into this? If my free will didn't exist at the point where I decided to choose based on whether the nucleus decayed, then the randomness of the decay itself couldn't magically create any new act of will that wasn't there before. Having the corn flakes or the wheaties was not, in the end, my choice at all, and so not an application of my will. It was merely an outcome delegated to a different physical process. The choice was in deciding to rely on that random process in the first place. If there is any freedom of will to be found, it is at that decision point, not after it.
Maybe my brain actually has quantum processes going inside, just like the decay process. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it does. Then, on any particular day, my choice of wheaties over corn flakes might ultimately be determined by a random process in my brain. But if so, is that an exercise of will at all (never mind "free will")? Did I really choose the wheaties at all or were they chosen for me?
My point is: if the will is slave to some random quantum process, then it's no more "free" than if it is slave to Newtonian deterministic process. The notion of "free will" surely requires some kind of agency on my part. It must be I who does the choosing, or else there's no act of will at all.
An analogy: we all have certain reflex actions. Shine a bright line in your eyes, and you have a blink reflex. Nobody would describe that blinking as an act of free will. Clearly, it is caused by the light. So, why would we think the quantum collapse of a thingy in a microtubule in the brain (for instance) amounts to an act of free will? If it's not even willed, it's certainly not free will.
Randomness - even true quantum randomness - can't save the day if you're an incompatibilist.
Suppose I decide that I'm going to make a choice about something - whether to eat corn flakes or wheaties for breakfast, say - based on whether a particular atomic nucleus undergoes spontanteous radioactive decay within a specified time period. Let's say the probability of decay in that time period is exactly 50%. The decay itself is truly random.
So, the atom decays - or not - and I act accordingly. But where did my free will come into this? If my free will didn't exist at the point where I decided to choose based on whether the nucleus decayed, then the randomness of the decay itself couldn't magically create any new act of will that wasn't there before. Having the corn flakes or the wheaties was not, in the end, my choice at all, and so not an application of my will. It was merely an outcome delegated to a different physical process. The choice was in deciding to rely on that random process in the first place. If there is any freedom of will to be found, it is at that decision point, not after it.
Maybe my brain actually has quantum processes going inside, just like the decay process. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it does. Then, on any particular day, my choice of wheaties over corn flakes might ultimately be determined by a random process in my brain. But if so, is that an exercise of will at all (never mind "free will")? Did I really choose the wheaties at all or were they chosen for me?
My point is: if the will is slave to some random quantum process, then it's no more "free" than if it is slave to Newtonian deterministic process. The notion of "free will" surely requires some kind of agency on my part. It must be I who does the choosing, or else there's no act of will at all.
An analogy: we all have certain reflex actions. Shine a bright line in your eyes, and you have a blink reflex. Nobody would describe that blinking as an act of free will. Clearly, it is caused by the light. So, why would we think the quantum collapse of a thingy in a microtubule in the brain (for instance) amounts to an act of free will? If it's not even willed, it's certainly not free will.
And kept making the same mistakes each time.
Not this time, for reasons repeatedly given.
I probably wouldn't, colloquially. But it doesn't necessarily mean that it is.
Define what you mean by "free" when you say "free choice" and it will most likely be driven by how it appears to be, not necessarily by what is actually going on. And if one argues that it is not defined by appearance but by things that are actually going on then they are simply not looking at fine enough detail, and are still looking at mere appearance.
But that's okay. Colloquially no one would dispute that we have free will, that our choices are free. But when you start to turn any basic notion of what it means for something to be free to the question of how things actually work, you get a different story. And to resolve it you need to define what it means for a conscious entity to be "free" differently from how you might define what it means for an inert/mundane object to be free.
Once you have redefined it, explicitly or implicitly, context of discussion takes care of the rest. Other than in philosophical discussions when both/all meanings can come into play.
Define "will". While you may think this is me trying to be evasive, it is actually me trying to ensure you are not simply sweeping issues under a carpet of wave-handery.
[qupte]Supposing we get past that and decide that there actually was an act of will involved in this case. In other words, you considered whether or not to jump in front of the train, and you decided not to. Then the question is: was your decision a "free" choice?
The answer to that question will depend entirely on how you want to define "free". So, tell us, Sarkus. When is a choice free, and when is it not free?[/quote]Two possible answers I can think of: one is when we define "free" along the lines of when it appears to ourselves that we have weighed up the options, thought that we could do either, but ended up doing one. A non-free choice under this notion would be when there is only one option available.
The other answer is that it never is free.
Using the term "genuine" is to try to differentiate between what simply appears to ourselves to be a choice, and what actually isn't a choice. To not introduce this distinction would be to a priori assume that we judge entirely by appearance, of how it feels to us. Again, if this is what someone wishes to define as freewill then the question of "genuine" or not disappears.
Assume a Newtonian, deterministic universe. In that case, it was destined from the big bang that you would either jump in front of the train or you wouldn't. But the moment before the event itself, no individual human being could say which event would occur, with certainty. That's only due to lack of knowledge, of course. Would this determinism rule out it being a "genuine option" to jump in front, then, in your opinion?[/quote]Yes, unless we define words like "option" and "free" in terms of how it appears/feels etc.
If I was, and if I was defining those words for purposes of discussion with reference to that determinism, then no - not really.
If one wishes to define it as such.
I can argue from both sides. I am an incompatibilist when one defines words in reference to that determinism (or probabilistic determinism etc), and I am a compatabilist when using terms that are defined according to feeling / appearance etc.
I don't think the world operates any differently in either view. It is just perspective, based upon how words are defined.
Definition/focus of the word.
That said, even in the purely compatabilist realm there are undoubtedly occasions when one believes they had a choice, but really they didn't. As raised by others, addiction etc. And possibly even more mundane examples.
For me, it might be argued that jumping in front of a train to end my life is a choice I have. But it really isn't.
No, I mean specifically the argument from determinism. Not just the incompatibilist view but that specific argument. DaveC raised it, Baldeee then summarised it quite well. Others then bleated on about the supernatural.
Then my apologies.
One thread was primarily a discussion of an argument from determinism.
The thread in the philosophy forum (this one) was seemingly becoming a discussion about the compatabilist view, exploring that without reference to the incompatibilist view. But with the threads now merged it will likely once again revert to simply a incompatibilist v compatabilist debate, rather than what it was becoming.
If you don't see that as a loss, or the merging of two separate issues, fair enough. But not all threads about freewill need be simply the argument between incompatabilist v compatabilist. Your merging was too hasty, in my view. But we are where we are
Sarkus:
First things first. When you say "argument from determinism" are you talking about the argument from Baldeee that I explicitly addressed in the following linked post?
http://www.sciforums.com/threads/do...ence-of-free-will.161342/page-18#post-3551918
As I said there (and iceaura said much earlier in the thread), that only establishes that there are reasons for the will. The choices we make are inevitably impacted (determined, if you prefer) by prior causes. But understanding that fails to tackle the issue of whether the choices that are made are nevertheless "free", or in what sense they might be said to be "free".
It seems to me that when we make choices, we really make choices. If I decide to eat wheaties for breakfast, that's me making the decision. Nobody is making it for me. Nothing other than me is making it. I don't see how you could say it only looks like I'm choosing to eat the wheaties. I really am choosing that. If I chose instead to eat the corn flakes, that would also be me choosing.
I get it that your argument is that you think that, in actual fact, my choice of wheaties over corn flakes is in some important way predetermined. All the atoms that make up my body, not to mention the very existence of the wheaties and all that, have come together in a particular historical way and under particular historical influences such that, on this particular morning, they all converge on the action of my choosing the wheaties. You would argue, presumably, that it is, in fact, impossible that I could have chosen the corn flakes at that particular time.
Nevertheless, is it merely "appearance" that I choose the wheaties? Is there any meaningful distinction you can make between the act of "actually" choosing the wheaties and the act of merely "appearing" to choose them? All of the surrounding circumstances would appear to be identical, as far as I can tell. I believe I chose freely. It looks to outsiders that I chose freely. The outcome is the same as if I chose freely. All this being so, in what sense is this not a genuine exercise of my free will, but rather a mere "appearance" or "going through the motions" or "pretense" of free will?
What's your "basic notion" of what it means for something to be free, if I may ask?
will (n.): the capability of conscious choice and decision and intention.
How's that?
What would "actual" free will look like, if it were to exist? In your opinion.
Of course, you could also argue that science is nonsense, the universe isn't deterministic anyway, so there's no conflict to be addressed.
First things first. When you say "argument from determinism" are you talking about the argument from Baldeee that I explicitly addressed in the following linked post?
http://www.sciforums.com/threads/do...ence-of-free-will.161342/page-18#post-3551918
As I said there (and iceaura said much earlier in the thread), that only establishes that there are reasons for the will. The choices we make are inevitably impacted (determined, if you prefer) by prior causes. But understanding that fails to tackle the issue of whether the choices that are made are nevertheless "free", or in what sense they might be said to be "free".
What same mistakes do you think iceaura made each time?
I'm a little confused about this idea about "what is really going on" when a person makes a conscious choice.
It seems to me that when we make choices, we really make choices. If I decide to eat wheaties for breakfast, that's me making the decision. Nobody is making it for me. Nothing other than me is making it. I don't see how you could say it only looks like I'm choosing to eat the wheaties. I really am choosing that. If I chose instead to eat the corn flakes, that would also be me choosing.
I get it that your argument is that you think that, in actual fact, my choice of wheaties over corn flakes is in some important way predetermined. All the atoms that make up my body, not to mention the very existence of the wheaties and all that, have come together in a particular historical way and under particular historical influences such that, on this particular morning, they all converge on the action of my choosing the wheaties. You would argue, presumably, that it is, in fact, impossible that I could have chosen the corn flakes at that particular time.
Nevertheless, is it merely "appearance" that I choose the wheaties? Is there any meaningful distinction you can make between the act of "actually" choosing the wheaties and the act of merely "appearing" to choose them? All of the surrounding circumstances would appear to be identical, as far as I can tell. I believe I chose freely. It looks to outsiders that I chose freely. The outcome is the same as if I chose freely. All this being so, in what sense is this not a genuine exercise of my free will, but rather a mere "appearance" or "going through the motions" or "pretense" of free will?
Some of them do! How often do we hear that "free will is an illusion"? We've heard that in the current thread.
Any basic notion? Really?
What's your "basic notion" of what it means for something to be free, if I may ask?
Inert objects don't make choices, so the question doesn't really arise, as far as I can tell. We're talking specifically about freedom of the will here, not some other kind of freedom.
A dictionary definition should suffice:
will (n.): the capability of conscious choice and decision and intention.
How's that?
If you start with the premise that the will is never free, you shouldn't be surprised when you end up with that as a conclusion.
Do you think the "feeling" or "appearance" of free will is inferior to "actual" free will, then? That's the impression I get from you.
What would "actual" free will look like, if it were to exist? In your opinion.
The supernatural is one way to jump out of the strictures of naturalistic determinism. Another way would be to put the will in a special category of things that are not bound by deterministic natural laws (for some reason), whichs amount to the same thing. Either way, this allows you to have your cake and eat it too: sure, the world may be deterministic, but free will is beyond such petty concerns.
Of course, you could also argue that science is nonsense, the universe isn't deterministic anyway, so there's no conflict to be addressed.
That was a summation of it yes, and the post you have linked was addressed to Baldeee. Did you want me to respond to it?
It's not just a matter of "reasons". Causation does not equate to determinism. Strict determinism is merely a type of causation. So to equate determinism to "cause" or "impact" or "influence" is a mistake. Strict determinism states that the same inputs to a system will always give the same outputs. Probabilistic determinism is, while inherently deterministic, the notion that the same inputs always give the same probability function as the output.
A discussion between Baldeee and NotEinstein considered whether the randomness within the latter is sufficient for something to be considered free.
Another sense of "free" was offered along the lines of degrees of freedom in Engineering, but this only offers "free" if an object in space is free to choose its orientation. After al, it has degrees of freedom.
The argument from strict determinism very much tackles whether choices are free: if a system can only ever give the same output to the same input, how can the output be classified as free. Unless, of course, one alters the perspective and ignores the actual workings of the system at the fine-grain detail, and thereby redefines what it means to be "free" for conscious choice.
To accuse DaveC, Baldeee, myself, of assuming from the outset that "freewill" must be supernatural. We don't. It is simply a conclusion of the logic offered up by Baldeee that IF a system built from deterministic interactions is also deterministic, and IF there a deterministic interaction is not "free" THEN the system is also not "free". There is no assumption in here that freewill must be supernatural. Sure, if you also assume that all physical laws are deterministic, and that it is possible for free will to nonetheless exist, then you could conclude that any existent freewill would be supernatural.
My conclusion from the logic, however, ends with free will not existing within a deterministic system. That's all the logic says. Anything else requires additional assumptions. But "supernatural freewill" would still only be a conclusion, not an assumption as iceaura claims.
Or maybe that was not the issue you were referring to?
Define "choice". That is where the answer lies.
The meaningfulness of the distinction is context driven. In a philosophical discussions, it seems to be of significance. In casual parlance, not so much.
A thread in a philosophy or physics forum is not exactly what I would consider colloquial. Colloquial is the way you would talk to the man in the street, not to someone while discussing and arguing the nature off reality, for example.
To offer one: not restrained or confined.
So you are advocating a different notion of "free" when applying it to one thing rather than another. Okay. That's what I've said is done. Thanks for confirming my point.
I'm okay to work with that.
Where in the premise is the notion that the will is never free? Point out the premise that states this, please. I do hope you're not suffering the same confusion over what is an assumption and what is a conclusion?
Not inferior. Just different. We live our lives according to the feeling or appearance, irrespective of whether it is "actual" or not. It is just another way of looking at the exactly the same things. No one is proposing that freewill is supernatural. No one so proposing thathat the universe operates in ways that it doesn't. If anything it is the compatabilists who feel threatened. Me? I just see it as different. My thinking started with the argument from determinism, and thus what I might consider "actual" is based on the notions within that argument. If I change the notions to only look at conscious activity, the compatabilist view, then in those terms free will exists and is genuine.
I have no idea what it might look like. Possibly no different than the "illusion". Possibly very different. If our universe operates in a manner that can not give rise to "actual" free will then you're looking at a completely different set of physics for it to arise. So what that might look like is anybody's guess.
Free will is necessarily bound by natural laws if it is to exist, though, whatever they may be, and if not deterministic then probabilistic/random etc. The physics thread, being the physics thread, one would think would be above recourse to notions of the supernatural. If it was concluded that it had to be supernatural to exist then the only conclusion would be that it doesn't exist. The supernatural had no place in that forum. Only those who were assuming freewill existed ever mentioned it.
I don't need to have my cake and eat it. I will happily follow where the argument validly and soundly lead. If that is to the non-existence of freewill then that is okay, as long as I also understand the applicability of that conclusion, the meaning of terms it uses etc. If someone puts forth another argument that uses different meanings, then great, let's see where that one goes.
You could. You could then move this thread into the religion forum.
And the conflict, if indeed there is one (and really there's isnt once semantic issues are resolved - although that is the bulk of the apparent difference), would seem to hold for non-deterministic universe as we'll, if that non-determinism is merely random, I'd say.