Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

[Quantum Quack]

How do you know you are experiencing a sensory illusion, unless someone else is there to correct you?

This question is currently unable to be answered conclusively from a mainstream perspective. They don't know.
One theory I have read about over the years, suggests:
However when you consider that all of the major senses are employed at all times, you can see that experience validation is possible.
For example if you focus on visual information, this is supported by all the other non-focused senses, including logical, rational senses ( mental capacity etc)
If what you see is not supported by what you can touch for example then the conclusion of "hallucination" could be the result.
If you can smell but not taste the salty air near a beach for example, then you will automatically raise a question mark.
Those sorts of sensory feedback mechanisms and other allow us to establish truth or objectivity in what we experience.
Fear, paranoia and fatigue are incredibly influential in how this feedback functions and can lead to further fear, paranoia and fatigue leading on to eventual collapse of the sensory validation system. ( psychotic episode)
So the worst thing you can tell a paranoid schizophrenic is that he is hallucinating, as this further exasperates the situation regarding fear.

Essentially is it theorized that by having multiple sources for validation purposes one sense will either be supported by the other senses or not. Thus a validation and confirmation process can exist.

Hallucinogenics consumed will over ride all sensory validation in extreme circumstances.

...just thoughts.

 

[Sarkus]

Yes. One can observe the decision being made, with the right gear.

I have no doubt we can observe patterns that might correspond to a "choice" being made, but how can we know from the observation whether there was a genuine ability to do other than the decision reached. I, for one, could not choose to jump in front of a train for no reason.

For example, if you suddenly see a small child wander unto the tracks, you may exercise the option almost by reflex - as if you had no choice but to jump in front of the train.

Reflex and instinct is not exactly what I would consider a great example of exercising free will, so would avoid trying to describe actions in that manner if the intention is to show "choice".
Furthermore, I'm sure we could all come up with situations where the notion of choice is more obvious, but I deliberately picked the more extreme. Simply whether or not the option, for most people, to jump in front of a train - for no particular reason - is a genuine option. We can think about it. We can intellectualise about what might happen. But how many of us could actually do it? We might say we could. But could we actually do it? (Some may take that course, and some alas do. But I am talking about the majority of people.)
I don't think most people could. I couldn't. There's just no choice to be made. At least not for me. So it shows, to me at least, a difference between what we might initially take to be genuine options and what are probably not.
And if there is a difference, how less extreme does the example have to be before there is a genuine option?
Do we have a genuine choice when picking between box A and box B, for example? And if we do, what is the difference between that and the extreme case?

Depends on the person and the choice. Drug addicts are famously deprived of "genuine" choice in some matters.

I think we are all deprived of it in many matters. What we might perceive as genuine choice I am unconvinced always are. Yes, brain patterns might suggest "choice", but that might also only be a matter of how we have opted to identify "choice" within those readings.

 

[iceaura]

I see nothing in there that says that you have provided your definition of free-will.

I see where you tried. I see specific comparisons between features of my supposed definition and somebody else's, and an argument that rests on that supposition.

Referring to something, as you did, as "not an illusion" and "an observed reality, underlying many appearances" may count as a definition in your books, but not mine.

That would be referring to acts of will, not freedom of them.
You were talking about the freedom of them, and bouncing between their reality and their freedom as being alike "appearances" and "illusions". That is a confusion. One likely source of that confusion is your assumption that there is no "genuine" freedom of choice in a deterministic physical system, which leads to some difficulty in acknowledging the reality of an act of will.

Once again, learn the difference between assumption and conclusion.

The specific reference in my posts is to a specific assumption you make in drawing a specific conclusion from specific premises. That presents a clear distinction between assumption and conclusion - an explicit one, no less. Nowhere have I ever even hinted that you have ever concluded that freedom of will in a deterministic system must be supernatural - quite the opposite: I have everywhere recognized that you deny even making the assumption.

 

[river]

I'll leave you two , to it

Interesting discussion

 

[iceaura]

I, for one, could not choose to jump in front of a train for no reason.

But you could choose to do so for a reason.

Reflex and instinct is not exactly what I would consider a great example of exercising free will,

It is an example of changing one's mind and choosing to jump in front of a train - as many here would.

Simply whether or not the option, for most people, to jump in front of a train - for no particular reason - is a genuine option.

So? We are talking about having reasons - acting according to one's will.

Do we have a genuine choice when picking between box A and box B, for example?

Sure. That can be easily demonstrated, by providing reasons and changing people's minds - if they had no choice, how could you persuade them to choose differently?

 

[Write4U]

Good question for the public in general, and QQ will of course still speak for himself.

In modern times, probably largely due to rejecting anything that's not coherent with what the individual has accumulated over the years in terms of "facts" and generalizations about how the world works, how it is regulated (in addition to seeking consistency with the patterns and knowledge of one's own personal memories of the past). There was much less institutionalized knowledge available in the past (that was effective or accurate, anyway), so a bogeyman apparition might be more easily accepted in earlier times. But of course, any mentally ill person formerly accredited as a scientist or renown skeptic who goes bonkers in terms of believing psychotic hallucinations would demonstrate that dependence wholly upon the epistemological coherence which one carries around internally is not always sufficient.

~

I like Anil Seth; "When our controlled hallucinations agree, we call it reality"

 

[James R]

However, it still remains that if the system is built from deterministic components, and the whole is thus deterministic, then any sense of free will (and I do agree that we all have this sense of free will) does not match its non-free nature, other than through appearance by our conscious selves.
In this way I, and others, consider it illusory.
Even if others dislike the term, it adequately describes what it is (in my view).

For me, this is the crux.

How can it be real and illusory at the same time?

I'm coming late to this thread, and everything I say here has already been said above by others, including iceaura and Yazata, in particular.

There are (at least) two positions one can take on the subject of what it means for the will to be "free":

1. Freedom requires that the will not be determined by physical laws. This is the incombatibilist view. If the supernatural is permitted, then under this view free will is still possible, since strict physical determinism need not apply. If, on the other hand, the supernatural is not permitted, then under this view "free will" is impossible.
2. Freedom only requires that the will be "unforced". That is, the choices made by a person are their own choices, and not those of somebody or something else. Since this can happen according to accepted physical laws, this is called the combatibilist view. This view says that even though physical laws restrict how atoms interact, for example, the resulting configurations of atoms and their effects still produce outcomes that are choices willed by the person acting.

From the discussion above, it seems to me that DaveC, Baldeee and Sarkus all regard "free will" as an "illusion" because they are incompatibilists who do not countenance supernatural explanations. On the other hand, iceaura, and probably Yazata as well, appears to be a compatibilist. That's certainly my position.

 

[Write4U]

I believe you are making way too much of relatively rare exceptions to the rule.

How many wrong decisions are made each day worldwide. The exception to the rule is "agreement", even in the face of overwhelming evidence. It is a rare commodity.....

Ants have 100% agreement. They never ask "why"?

Is there a qualitative difference in the exercise of "will" between ants and humans?

 

[James R]

How does one determine that something is exhibiting free will?
Contrary to Iceaura's claims, free will does not show up on scans.

iceaura has never claimed that free will shows up on scans. He has only claimed that will shows up on scans. Your main argument is about what you each require for the will to be "free". A subsidiary argument is the one about at what physical level the "will" manifests. Do we need to concern ourselves with all the individual quarks as a conglomerate to see this "will" taking place, or is it enough to look at the patterns in an MRI scan, for example?

 

[James R]

Baldeee:

I'd like to comment explicitly on your formulation in post #130:

P1: if something is determined then it can not do other than it must.
P2: systems built from determined interactions are themselves determined.
P3: the mind and will are systems built from determined interactions.

Conclusion: the mind and will can not do other than they must.

Is this valid?
Are any of the premises disputed?

I think this is all valid. But...

If it is valid, and the premises not disputed, where is the freedom, other than in veiled illusion only, masking the determined nature of our actions?

Like iceaura, I think that P1, P2, P3 and the conclusion that follows those premises does not address the issue of "freedom". All you have established here is that the will has causes. But that doesn't mean it isn't "free".

You make the point that the "same inputs always lead to the same ... outputs". So we have determinism. But we haven't yet touched on the question of "freedom".

I think what you need to do is to decide what "freedom" means for you.

It is possible, of course, that you have already decided that the only thing that could ever make the will "free" would be for it to be non-deterministic. One way to do that would be to allow the supernatural in, but I don't think you want to do that. Allowing randomness in (perhaps in the form of quantum indeterminacy, for example) doesn't help either, because a random choice is not a willed choice. So, if you have decided that determinism fundamentally rules out the possibility of "freedom", then you are an incompatibilist and you must accept that "free" will does not exist.

The only thing that then remains is for you to explain why we all feel like we have "freedom" in this regard. If our feelings are inconsistent with the conclusion that freedom exists in reality (i.e. if the perception of freedom is truly an illusion) then it seems strange that the strict definition of "free" used to reach this conclusion is at such odds with our "working" definition of "free". It would seem that we need to revise one or other (or both) definitions.

 

[river]

Reality is now a hallucination ? Is that it , is this how we view the Universe ?

I don't

How many wrong decisions are made each day worldwide. The exception to the rule is "agreement", even in the face of overwhelming evidence. It is a rare commodity.....

Ants have 100% agreement. They never ask "why"?

Is there a qualitative difference in the exercise of "will" between ants and humans?

Yes there is ;

Humans execerise of will is to evolve faster than Nature can provide . Our Intellect .

Ants evolution is restricted by its environment , its brain

 

[Quantum Quack]

Is there a qualitative difference in the exercise of "will" between ants and humans?

Yep.... Humans have the freedom to lie. Ants do not ( nor the need to)

 

[James R]

And again....

All you have accomplished is assert that anything with a cause is determined by that cause - which is ok if you have some idea of what these things are, and what you mean by causation, so that it all makes sense in a world in which the meanings of words cause behavior.

Why does one need an idea of what those things are?
It is simply enough to say that it is determined.

The bottom-line question for you, Baldeee, is this: does the fact that the will is "determined" or caused necessarily ("by definition", perhaps) rule out the possibility of the will nevertheless being "free"?

If you think it does, then you're an incompatibilist, and you might well conclude that "free" will is an "illusion" on the basis that the supernatural does not exist.

If, on the other hand, you think that the will can be caused but still "free" in some relevant sense, then you could be a compatibilist like me. To see things this way, you have to understand that the definition of "free" need not coincide with the definition of "non-deterministic".

 

[geordief]

And again....



The bottom-line question for you, Baldeee, is this: does the fact that the will is "determined" or caused necessarily ("by definition", perhaps) rule out the possibility of the will nevertheless being "free"?

If you think it does, then you're an incompatibilist, and you might well conclude that "free" will is an "illusion" on the basis that the supernatural does not exist.

If, on the other hand, you think that the will can be caused but still "free" in some relevant sense, then you could be a compatibilist like me. To see things this way, you have to understand that the definition of "free" need not coincide with the definition of "non-deterministic".

"compatabilist" ,"incompatabilist" ..... it gets murkier


(no, I agree. A great idea to cross our bridges when we come to them.)

 

[James R]

Sarkus:

This from you to iceaura:

No, you have specifically and explicitly stated that "supernatural free will" does not exist. You then try to argue that "free will" should instead be viewed as "freedom of will" which you then say has been observed. You are therefore distinguishing between "free will" and "supernatural free will".

It sounds like you think that such a distinction is untenable.

Is that your position?

If it is, then it be fair to say that you believe free will would only be possible if it was supernatural. Right?

 

[James R]

Iceaura, I really have no more time for this to-ing and fro-ing. This entire time you have wanted to move the discussion away from the issue of determinism, and given your inability to consider the logical argument in what I see as good faith (or perhaps you really can't fathom the argument without introducing assumptions that you are unaware of) I am starting to see why.

The discussion is supposed to be about "free will", not just determinism. See it there in the thread title?

You seem to be stuck on determinism, which is not really in dispute here.

 

[C C]

I like Anil Seth; "When our controlled hallucinations agree, we call it reality"

Yah, it's a very old realization dating back to arguably the earliest days of ancient disciplined philosophy in both the East and West. That experience is either an imperfect representation of an archetypal world or the latter is not the case at all. (With respect to the latter, there would supposedly be a provenance for our exteroceptive manifestations, but with what qualifies as an eventually agreed-upon or worked-out "reality" existing for the first time as those experiences of ours, rather than their having the status of being an inferior copy or ectypal world.)

~

 

[James R]

Sarkus:

A. I'm walking down the street. I realize that I'm running late and might not arrive on time where I'm headed, so I increase my pace.

So, based on this, how are you defining free will? As a conscious thought process that arrives at one of at least two theorised futures?
Assuming so - or at least something along those lines - a question: how do you know that the options you consciously rejected, e.g. to not increase pace, were something that you could actually have done, other than being merely something you thought at the time that you could do?

Here's the crucial question, in my opinion:

If you thought at the time that you could choose to do something other than what you actually did, why would you describe the choice that you actually made as anything other than a "free" choice?

So, you're standing in front of train tracks and a train is approaching. Is it free will that stops you jumping in front?

The first question is: is it an act of will not to jump in front of the train? If no, then we don't need to worry about whether the will was free or not. We can just say that what caused you to not to jump in front of the train was something other than your will.

Supposing we get past that and decide that there actually was an act of will involved in this case. In other words, you considered whether or not to jump in front of the train, and you decided not to. Then the question is: was your decision a "free" choice?

The answer to that question will depend entirely on how you want to define "free". So, tell us, Sarkus. When is a choice free, and when is it not free?

Is, for many of us, the option of jumping in front a genuine option?

What do you mean by "genuine"? Obviously, it's an option. We could jump, or we couldn't. Either the jumping in front happens or it doesn't. Prior to the event itself, both outcomes are "options" and we can't be sure which will occur.

Are you asking whether jumping in front is a physical possibility? Clearly it is, so I assume this is not what you mean by a "genuine option".

So, what are you going to look at to decide whether it was a "genuine option" or not?

Assume a Newtonian, deterministic universe. In that case, it was destined from the big bang that you would either jump in front of the train or you wouldn't. But the moment before the event itself, no individual human being could say which event would occur, with certainty. That's only due to lack of knowledge, of course. Would this determinism rule out it being a "genuine option" to jump in front, then, in your opinion?

Perhaps we need to decide who or what has or does not have this "option" you speak of, and what an "option" consists of anyway. Is anything an "option", willed choice or otherwise? If you're a strict determinist, I would suppose there are no "options" - not really.

Was there are feeling of being able to choose? I imagine there was. Does that amount to a "genuine option", then?

It's really up to you to take a position on what makes the grade for you and what does not.

We often say "I chose to do X, I chose not to do X" but how many of these are genuine choices rather than false choices, given status as a choice simply because we can articulate them as such?

What distinguishes a "genuine" choice from a "false" choice, in your opinion?

 

[James R]

Admin note:

Two threads have been running concurrently on the topic of free will and determinism, one in the Physics forum and one in General Philosophy. Both discussions have converged on the same issues, so I have merged them into one.

This thread sits in General Philosophy, but I have left a permanent link to it in Physics & Math.

 

[DaveC426913]

Freedom requires that the will not be determined by physical laws.

Until now, I had not heard it expressed in quite such a succinct fashion.

I guess this is what Iceaura was trying to say, but kept skipping over the how it has to be so (literally, that it must not be determined by physical laws) in a sort of short-hand. I gotta say, the putting words in other people's mouths - insisting that other people were literally the instigators of the supernatural invocation - was quite a distraction from that point.

I can see the dots connecting, now that the middle dot has been inserted.

Free will (1) cannot emergent from physical laws (2), since those laws - even if blurred by such things as quantum uncertainty - still result in pre-determined outcomes, or at least predetermined probabilities. (One cannot say the roll of a die is "free", since it's still pre-determined probabilities).

Since (1) can't come from (2), then the only possibility - if free will exists at all - is something supernatural (3).

I do not not believe in the supernatural, so I suppose my stance is that true "philosophically ideal" free will does not exist. While we may still control our lives, it is really an emergent property of a truly vast number of inputs - both externally and internally (memory, experience).