Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

[Sarkus]

You were claiming, there and in many places, that free will in a deterministic system would be defined as an "appearance" (you have posted "mere appearance" as well).

"In many places"... care to cite others?
And I stand by the claim that what others (such as yourself) define as "free will" could be defined by those using other definitions of "free will" as mere appearance. E.g. "free-will_1" is (per those who might argue such) can be considered an illusion of "free-will_2" in a process where "free-will_2" can be logically concluded not to exist.
But as said, I am not here to put forth any definition of my own, but to discuss with those that wish to put forth their own definition to run with. So why keep pushing this??

That is a view of your own, derived from the assumption that freedom in a deterministic system would have to be supernatural to exist.

FFS. That is not an assumption by me. It is not an assumption by anyone I know who has put forth such an argument. It might well be a conclusion of their argument, however.
But as stated, I am not here to rehash my views of free will. Why can't you grasp that? Put forth a working definition of your own and let's have an actual discussion. Can you do that? Are you capable? Or are you so threatened by the very thought that there is someone posting here who may hold a view that they're not actually discussing, that you - and others - have to try to derail the thread to bring that person's views into the mix, when they are NOT part of the discussion. They haven't been introduced by me for discussion, only by way of suggesting that people can have different definitions, thus the preference to have a working definition up-front.
Is this forum so twisted up in reactionary bullshit that it is now deemed impossible, and seemingly unwanted, to allow a person (A) to discuss with another person (B) that person's (B's) view with them without others bringing in A's own views that are not even under discussion? Is this site not better than that? Are you not? If you wish to discuss my view then go to a thread where I have articulated it and have discussed it. Here I'm trying to discuss other people's views, using their own definition (should they ever provide). Get used to it. Deal with it.

There is no
...
comes confusion.

Ignored as irrelevant here.

 

[iceaura]

FFS. That is not an assumption by me.

It's right there, right in front. And not just you - Bowser, Dave, it's a familiar feature of the general argument.

"In many places"... care to cite others?

Already did, several times over multiple threads. To the point of tedium. Another cite appears at the end of this post.

Put forth a working definition of your own and let's have an actual discussion. Can you do that? Are you capable?

I have suggested an interesting and workable approach to arriving at a definition - expanding and extrapolating from the engineering concept of degrees of freedom - several times. I believe your response was to claim that since bricks could have no freedom of will on that basis, neither could anything else.

And I stand by the claim that what others (such as yourself) define as "free will" could be defined by those using other definitions of "free will" as mere appearance

Not without assuming actual free will must be supernatural (those "other definitions"), and then getting confused about "appearances", they can't.
But you take that assumption and confusion for granted.

 

[river]

Free-will is as evolutionary as life is .

Free-will , is about environment understanding , from tracking animals , and farming

To cities

To innovations

Then to abstract thinking .

Then from understanding ourselves to understanding other Intelligent Living Beings live in this Universe as well as us .

 

[C C]

I consider myself a compatibilist. I think that I would say that physics places constraints on how we should best conceive of free will. That's assuming that our current understanding of physical causation and of how physical systems evolve over time is indeed accurate. I'm kind of inclined to think that both sides make metaphysical moves, if 'metaphysical' refers to speaking about the most basic features of how reality really is as opposed to speaking about our models of that reality.

Perhaps "free will" might as well regressively pertain to aspects of autonomy having an occult provenance if it's going to continue to be conflated with or have ties to metaphysical matters like determinism, indeterminism, philosophy of time, etc. Since issues in the latter turf will probably never be perpetually settled. (Even surrendering to a fallacy like appeal to the majority would still feature a "popular vote" that's vulnerable to future fluctuations and changes in consensus.)

Free will either needs to be semantically uncomplicated slash crouched in everyday context or it has to be described in a way where it can somehow satisfy / cohabitate with all the dominant metaphysical possibilities. (I guess that would be compatibilism with a mega-bent and ambition, at least whenever it is oriented toward defending itself on that landscape of speculative ideas.)

~

 

[river]

Free-will , is about Understanding this Universe and ourselves within in it .

Free-will , our Free-will then thinks because of our awareness of environment(s) .

 

[Sarkus]

It's right there, right in front. And not just you - Bowser, Dave, it's a familiar feature of the general argument.

Until you can grasp the difference between an assumption and a (possible) conclusion (that depends upon other assumptions) there is little left to respond to on that matter. Furthermore, no one has here defined, for discussion purposes, freewill as an illusion. When someone does, feel free to raise this with them.

I have suggested an interesting and workable approach to arriving at a definition - expanding and extrapolating from the engineering concept of degrees of freedom - several times. I believe your response was to claim that since bricks could have no freedom of will on that basis, neither could anything else.

And you have offered this definition in this thread? And I have responded to it in the way you suggest... in this thread?
Or are you perhaps simply using this thread, a separate thread, to continue the argument from another, and in doing so no longer actually responding to what is posted here?
So, again, if you want to put forward a definition for discussion, have at it. Put one forward so that everyone knows what you are actually talking about.

Not
...
granted.

Ignored for continued irrelevancy stemming from your continuing inability to recognise the difference between an assumption and conclusion.

Now, are you going to stop drawing in things from other threads that have not been stated here, or are you perhaps going to put forth a definition of freewill so that others can understand what you mean when you use the term. Or are you going to continue to spout what are irrelevancies here (while being relevant to a different thread)?

Until such time as you post something actually relevant, we're done.

 

[Yazata]

Deleted. Messed up this one. See the next post for the correct version.

 

[Yazata]

Perhaps "free will" might as well regressively pertain to aspects of autonomy having an occult provenance if it's going to continue to be conflated with or have ties to metaphysical matters like determinism, indeterminism, philosophy of time, etc.

That might be so if we persist in the tradition of conceiving of 'free will' as meaning choices and decisions that are totally uncaused. As Patricia Churchland puts it:

"A rigid philosophical tradition claims that no choice is free unless it is uncaused: that is, unless the "will" is exercised independently of all causal influences - in a causal vacuum. In some unexplained fashion, the will - a thing that allegedly stands aloof from brain-based causality - makes an unconstrained choice. The problem is that choices are made by brains, and brains operate causally..."

http://patriciachurchland.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2006_Do_We_Have_FreeWill.pdf

That 'causal vacuum' view of "free-will" is something that I want to argue against. I want to promote a view of "free-will" that's consistent with physical causation, with brain science, neurophysiology and all that.

I'm sure that CC knows who Patricia Churchland is. (But CC has drunk deeply from Chalmers' intoxicating wine-bottle and probably disagrees with Churchland about her 'eliminative' materialism, though perhaps not about free-will.) For the rest of Sciforums --

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patricia_Churchland

Free will either needs to be semantically uncomplicated slash crouched in everyday context or it has to be described in a way where it can somehow satisfy / cohabitate with all the dominant metaphysical possibilities. (I guess that would be compatibilism with a mega-bent and ambition, at least whenever it is oriented toward defending itself on that landscape of speculative ideas.)

So if we move away from this hard free-will concept (totally un-caused actions) outlined above, then what remains of free will? This brings us to the point that Sarkus seems to be beating to a pulp. Patricia Churchland again:

"Think about what we mean by "free will". As with all concepts, we learn the meaning of this from examples. We learn what to count as fair, or mean-spirited, or voluntary by being given sterling examples of people doing things that are fair, or mean-spirited or voluntary... Our understanding is balanced by contrasting cases - actions that are obviously not freely chosen... From such prototypes, brains manage to extract enough meaning so that we can talk about free will tolerably well."

So to respond to Sarkus, it's a pattern recognition thing, like so much of the rest of human cognition. (Neural networks are very good at pattern recognition.) It isn't so much a matter of deduction from hard fixed axiomatic definitions. We think that we detect a pattern in how various words and concepts are used and throughout life continually work to perfect our understanding with ambiguous problem cases.

For the rest of us who want to avoid grasping either horn of the seeming dilemma (un-caused and seemingly supernatural will as opposed to free-will just an illusion entertained by puppets) and instead espouse compatibilism, the idea that free-will needn't be inconsistent with causation at all, the task is to arrive at an understanding of free-will that's consistent with our understanding (which is also a work-in-progress and might very well be wrong) of how causality functions in physical reality and in brain physiology.

That's what I've tried to argue in earlier posts in this and other threads (most recently that one in physics). And it seems that my own views parallel Patricia Churchlands' rather closely. She talks about "self-control", I talk about "inner process". (The Buddhist in me makes me want to avoid the metaphysical difficulties surrounding the word 'self'.) But I think that we mean pretty much the same thing. (I think that she uses "self-control" much as we would say that a self-driving car drives itself. It needn't possess a soul in order to do that.) Churchland:

"To begin to update our ideas of free will, I suggest we first shift the debate away from the puzzling metaphysics of causal vacuums to the neurobiology of self-control. The nature of self-control and the ways it can be compromised may be a more fruitful avenue...

So is anyone ever responsible for anything? Civil life requires it be so. Very briefly, the crux of the matter is this: we are social animals and our ability to flourish depends on the behavior of others. Biologically realistic models show how traits of cooperation and social orderliness can spread through a population, how moral virtues can be a benefit, cheating a cost and punishment of the socially dangerous a necessity."

 

[C C]

[...] For the rest of us who want to avoid grasping either horn of the seeming dilemma (un-caused and seemingly supernatural will or free-will just an illusion entertained by puppets) and instead espouse compatibilism, the idea that free-will needn't be inconsistent with causation at all, the task is to arrive at an understanding of free-will that's consistent with our understanding (which is a work-in-progress and might very well be wrong) of how causality functions in physical reality and in brain physiology.

That's what I've tried to argue in earlier posts in this and other threads (most recently that one in physics). And it seems that my own views parallel Patricia Churchlands' rather closely. She talks about "self-control", I talk about "inner process". (The Buddhist in me makes me want to avoid the metaphysical difficulties surrounding the word 'self'.) But I think that we mean pretty much the same thing. (I think that she uses "self-control" much as we would say that a self-driving car drives itself. It needn't possess a soul to do that.) Churchland:

"To begin to update our ideas of free will, I suggest we first shift the debate away from the puzzling metaphysics of causal vacuums to the neurobiology of self-control. The nature of self-control and the ways it can be compromised may be a more fruitful avenue...

"Suggest". Yah, it's arguably a major task still in progress just to get the ball rolling -- in the overall narrative or discourse about it -- that free will should be updated or rehabilitated. Once that's done and run, maybe the concept won't be as much the muddled stomping ground it usually seems to be.

So is anyone ever responsible for anything? Civil life requires it be so. Very briefly, the crux of the matter is this: we are social animals and our ability to flourish depends on the behavior of others. Biologically realistic models show how traits of cooperation and social orderliness can spread through a population, how moral virtues can be a benefit, cheating a cost and punishment of the socially dangerous a necessity."

As something that may be essential to or entailed by social organization, it had to arise first as a functioning component in the practices of cultures. Regardless of whatever metaphysical ideations formally propped it up later in scholarly circles and religious / political propaganda. Or maybe it's the other way around -- the critical affairs falling out of some the latter is what introduced threats to it, spurring intellectual meanings and defenses in turn.

~

 

[iceaura]

So is anyone ever responsible for anything? Civil life requires it be so.

The nature of the concept "anyone" requires it to be so. The objections that remove agency remove identity.

 

[iceaura]

Furthermore, no one has here defined, for discussion purposes, freewill as an illusion

No one here has defined free will at all. And nobody said they did - except you, trying to say I did on alternate days from demanding that I do.

Bowser, you, and Dave, have all stipulated to the validity of the argument that in physically determined systems any perceived existence of free will is an illusion. You posted the term: "illusion".

Until such time as you post something actually relevant, we're done.

Sounds good. Don't forget.

 

[Write4U]

So to respond to Sarkus, it's a pattern recognition thing, like so much of the rest of human cognition

I agree it is a pattern recognition thing. But cognition itself is but a "best guess", a controlled hallucination (illusion) and the brain can easily be fooled into believing it recognizes something when in reality it is a wrong guess.

The brain can be fooled into assimilating an inanimate object as part of the body.
https://www.ted.com/talks/anil_seth_how_your_brain_hallucinates_your_conscious_reality

 

[Quantum Quack]

The brain can be fooled into assimilating an inanimate object as part of the body.
https://www.ted.com/talks/anil_seth_how_your_brain_hallucinates_your_conscious_reality

Indeed. Humans are masters of self deception. It is a key function that allows us to escape reality, with fiction, movies, video games and other .
But there is an old saying worth considering. "You can fool some of the people some of the time but not all of the people all of the time" and in most cases a healthy person will know the difference between self allowed deception and reality. Trauma and stress are all things that can distort our perception. Fear especially is most pervasive. Thus effecting our ability to discriminate between fiction and reality.

I believe you are making way too much of relatively rare exceptions to the rule.

There is ample evidence of self determination, even if achieved via self deception. In fact deliberate self deception, is a significant part of idealism and hope for the future and is fundamentally necessary when dealing with unknowns (future) and actually aids in the case for freewill rather than disputing it.

This fact can be easilly demonstrated by those who play fictional characters in video games, making decisions and self determining outcomes even though it is entirely virtual.

 

[Write4U]

I believe you are making way too much of relatively rare exceptions to the rule.

How do you know you are experiencing a sensory illusion, unless someone else is there to correct you?

 

[Sarkus]

No one here has defined free will at all.

Never said they have, hence my preference that the term is given a working definition for purposes of discussion.

And nobody said they did - except you, trying to say I did on alternate days from demanding that I do.

You simply can't help yourself, can you! Please stop lying! Where have I said that you have defined freewill? Let me save you the trouble... I haven't. I have suggested that whatever definition you do have might be viewed in a certain way by someone with another definition. So stop lying. Stop trying to argue ad hominem. Stop bringing in irrelevant matters from different threads.

Bowser, you, and Dave, have all stipulated to the validity of the argument that in physically determined systems any perceived existence of free will is an illusion.

Where in this thread have any of us done that? Or is your only pathetic recourse to try to bring in irrelevancies from other threads, to try to extend discussions from other threads into this one? As you have stated, no one has yet provided a definition (Yazata has since offered up something for discussion), so why are you bleating on about definitions that haven't been put forward for discussion?
In the context of this thread, your attacks are nothing but fallacious ad hominems. Do you honestly have nothing of relevance?

You posted the term: "illusion".

I use a lot of words, in this and many other threads.

Sounds good. Don't forget.

Defending against your blatant falsehoods I consider to be outside of that.
Now, are you going to drop the whole bullshit that you've brought with you into this thread? Will it help if I say "please"?

 

[Sarkus]

So to respond to Sarkus, it's a pattern recognition thing, like so much of the rest of human cognition. (Neural networks are very good at pattern recognition.) It isn't so much a matter of deduction from hard fixed axiomatic definitions. We think that we detect a pattern in how various words and concepts are used and throughout life continually work to perfect our understanding with ambiguous problem cases.

Okay.
So, you're standing in front of train tracks and a train is approaching. Is it free will that stops you jumping in front?
Is, for many of us, the option of jumping in front a genuine option?
We often say "I chose to do X, I chose not to do X" but how many of these are genuine choices rather than false choices, given status as a choice simply because we can articulate them as such?

 

[iceaura]

Defending against your blatant falsehoods I consider to be outside of that.

Kinda saw that coming.

"Bowser, you, and Dave, have all stipulated to the validity of the argument that in physically determined systems any perceived existence of free will is an illusion."
Where in this thread have any of us done that?

Seriously?

You simply can't help yourself, can you! Please stop lying! Where have I said that you have defined freewill?

Where you have tried, you mean. Where you have described my definition, and attributed various features to it, and contrasted it with some other possible.
Here:

That's what I said: defining them by appearance. If you want to think of it as having a "more spohisticated, less naive, conception of the nature of freedom, and the nature of the will" then go for it. But it's still defining by appearance.

and here:

But you're still missing the point... you are applying your notion of free will to the term "free will" when those who deem it an "appearance" use their notion. You can not say that it is not an appearance if you use a different meaning entirely.

We're up to what, page 3 of one thread?

I use a lot of words, in this and many other threads.

And they have meanings. So that when these meanings add up to an incoherent and self-conflicting muddle, that can be observed. Your ascription of "illusion" and "appearance" to an observation of an act of will with degrees of freedom in a physically deterministic system is incoherent, muddled, self-conflicting, under all circumstances except one:

it makes sense if - and only if - you assume any freedom of the will must be supernatural.

 

[iceaura]

kk

Is, for many of us, the option of jumping in front a genuine option?

Yes. One can observe the decision being made, with the right gear.
For example, if you suddenly see a small child wander unto the tracks, you may exercise the option almost by reflex - as if you had no choice but to jump in front of the train.

We often say "I chose to do X, I chose not to do X" but how many of these are genuine choices rather than false choices,

Depends on the person and the choice. Drug addicts are famously deprived of "genuine" choice in some matters.

 

[C C]

How do you know you are experiencing a sensory illusion, unless someone else is there to correct you?

Good question for the public in general, and QQ will of course still speak for himself.

In modern times, probably largely due to rejecting anything that's not coherent with what the individual has accumulated over the years in terms of "facts" and generalizations about how the world works, how it is regulated (in addition to seeking consistency with the patterns and knowledge of one's own personal memories of the past). There was much less institutionalized knowledge available in the past (that was effective or accurate, anyway), so a bogeyman apparition might be more easily accepted in earlier times. But of course, any mentally ill person formerly accredited as a scientist or renown skeptic who goes bonkers in terms of believing psychotic hallucinations would demonstrate that dependence wholly upon the epistemological coherence which one carries around internally is not always sufficient.

~

 

[Sarkus]

Where you have tried, you mean. Where you have described my definition, and attributed various features to it, and contrasted it with some other possible.
Here: "That's what I said: defining them by appearance. If you want to think of it as having a "more spohisticated, less naive, conception of the nature of freedom, and the nature of the will" then go for it. But it's still defining by appearance."

I see nothing in there that says that you have provided your definition of free-will. You were talking about "if...", and I was responding to that "if...". No assumption that you had defined, rather that you merely offered a possible alternative.

and here: "But you're still missing the point... you are applying your notion of free will to the term "free will" when those who deem it an "appearance" use their notion. You can not say that it is not an appearance if you use a different meaning entirely."

You can have a notion without having defined it. You hadn't, and haven't defined it. That is not to say you don't have a notion of what it entails. Referring to something, as you did, as "not an illusion" and "an observed reality, underlying many appearances" may count as a definition in your books, but not mine.

We're up to what, page 3 of one thread?

We are, out of 5 so far, and you haven't as yet managed to put one valid example forward.
So how about you just stop trying, stop bringing in crap from other threads, and, you know, be relevant?

And they have meanings. So that when these meanings add up to an incoherent and self-conflicting muddle, that can be observed. Your ascription of "illusion" and "appearance" to an observation of an act of will with degrees of freedom in a physically deterministic system is incoherent, muddled, self-conflicting, under all circumstances except one:

it makes sense if - and only if - you assume any freedom of the will must be supernatural.

Once again, learn the difference between assumption and conclusion.
If you can't, just don't bother responding. To me or anyone, actually. You're really doing yourself no favours.