Now this is what I'm talking about, a clean philosophical discussion on the morality of abortion, none of that tripe about sonograms, striping women of ALL fundamental human rights, god fearing religious fanatics, etc, etc
Personhood is not a definite concept: a being does not go from not a person to a person with all rights bestrode instantly. As a matter of fact we grant children less rights then adults, ergo children are not fully "people". Now does that mean a child does not have a right to life, of course not, we might not grant children the right to drink, vote, drive, choose sex with adults, independents from parents (baring some special circumstance) but we do hold dear to the concept that they should not be killed, a fetus on the other hand could be classified as something even less than a child.
Nice to see someone else here who appreciates something other than pure hyperbole.
I agree, personhood itself is a much debated term. Here we are primarily concerned with right to life (which does seem to be an instant bestowal proposition), so that is the only attribute of personhood really relevant to this debate. When does an organism have a right to life? Does it take a certain recognition of similarity before we find it morally/philosophically objectionable do destroy an organism like we would unthinkingly quash an ant? Why is it we can anthropomorphize pets to an extent greater than what many would an organism that will become a person? "Personality"? I would suggest that a highly subjective cognitive similarity is a very poor criteria. After all, many would not have such a feeling of similarity until a child can, or almost can, speak.
The typical criteria offered by one side is independent physical existence, but human babies can hardly be said to be physically independent, as they rely heavily upon others for their survival. So this "independence" is only about
bodily separation. As long as it is
physically attached it has no rights. Both sides generally agree that abortion is excusable in cases of grave threat to the mother's life. The first "independent" organism taking precedence. But then what of conjoined twins? If that argument generally holds, then the first to, what, breath air technically has the right to end the others life. Why is that not a consideration when estimating the risk to one or the other when undertaking a separation surgery?
What if two people are pinned under the same wreckage in such a way that a choice must be made of which to save? Does the oldest automatically take precedence? In the case of a child, it seems that our instincts are to save the child at the cost of the adult. So it seems that
vulnerability incurs a definite moral/philosophical obligation.
A fetus unlike a child is a endoparasite that needs to feed off its mother to live, it can't be transferred to another mother or to an orphanage, it can't live independently in anyway. Unlike a child or an adult this complete dependences on the mother could grant a mother the special right to choose the fate of the fetus. Birth imbues independence or the ability for it, thus the special privilege of the mother ends. Of course this would mean very late term abortions could be immoral because the fetus could be at that point capable of independent life. Also paradoxically unimplanted embryos in a cryofreezer are also not dependent, so who exactly who has the right to "kill" them?
Okay. So the distinction of "feeding off" the host would seem to exclude my wreckage example above, but that does not necessarily solve the conjoined twin dilemma. After all, one could be completely dependent upon the shared stomach, lungs, heart, etc. with the other. Nor does that necessarily preclude considerations of vulnerability which definitely does accrue to children and would perhaps further accrue to a more vulnerable organism.
What about a direct, emergency blood transfusion? During such the donor is being "fed off". If they initially give their consent, should they then have the right to revoke their consent (without any risk to the donor) even if that should mean the recipient dies? Is this just a risk/benefit analysis of moral/philosophical obligation?
So what birth may imbue may not be quite so clear cut, including the matter of viable premature births you mention. Which is why even pro-choice proponents generally agree that
some limit should be imposed. How does this limit not infringe on the rights of the woman? How is it justified? Do the rights of the fetus grow over time until they overtake the rights of the woman?
Somewhat odd notion that rights can be grown.
Just add water.
I think that a little unfair, the very act of abortion its self is certainly a consequence, an often painful and emotionally damaging one at that.
Abortion is the termination of pregnancy. Anything terminated is quite literally avoided. Kind of a question of whether "should" need only be justified by "can".
I completely agree, rape is a non-issue, the mother should have the right to abort regardless of the nature or claimed nature of the conception. The issue of rape though is brought up by both sides as a wedge issue, many who are pro-life are open to an allowance for rape and many who are pro-choice pounce on that allowance and ask "why stop at rape?". The problem is likely that these people have not thought up a detailed system of ethics for abortion if they had they would have come to a conclusion further along on either side of the debate, either all out pro-choice or all out pro-life.
I agree, both sides lack a consistent and robust ethical guideline.