A friend of mine, Blake Ostler, has noted something interesting on mind not being physical which is what I was getting at with the thoughts idea of not being physical.
It seems to me that what we need is not matter with mind (panpsychism) , but a solid form of emergentism where the properties of mind emerge from a certain function and organization of material neural states. Thus, mind is not panpsychic per se, but inherently such that a certain function and organization of matter gives rise to the properties of mind. The best anlaogies we have for the properties of mind are the function of computer software programs which organize the hardware in certain ways to produce outcomes. It also seems obvious that the properties of mental subjectivity (self awareness) and ability to think increase and become more complex as the underlying organization of the neural network of the brain becomes more complx e(e.g., dendrytes that branch from axons). Thus, a snail has more properties of mind than a rock, and a dog more than a snail, and a chimpanzee more than a dog largely because of the neural complexity of the respective central nervous and brain systems of the animals. However, it is still difficult to account for what Chalmers refers to as the "tough problem," the problem of explaining subjective awareness that we have awareness.
The result of this observation is that the properties of mind supervene on material states but are not identical to material states. It may be a form of epiphenomenalism except that there is a feed-back loop that then makes the material states of the brain subject to the downward casusation of the mind. It is admittedly this downward causation that is the toughest part of any mind-body theory to explain -- but the theory of emergent properties does a better job than any other in my view. So what I propose is close to panpsychism in the sense that matieral inherently has the capacity to create the properties of mind when organized in certain ways. However, mere matter sans the functional orgainzation doesn't have properties of mind.
This view is also dualist in a certain sense but strongly materalism because mind supervenes on material states. Mind is not identical to matter, but it is necessary for matter to give rise to the properties of mind.