LightGigantic's Defense Thread

You said that LG's beliefs, particularly his dualism, are irrational because there is no evidence to justify dualism. I have taken issue with the assertion that there is no evidence to justify dualism, and I have presented what I believe constitutes the wanted evidence. It's not a red herring; it is directly and clearly relevant to the thread. My attack on materialism, which is a defense of dualism, proposes a rational, evidential basis for dualism. That is what you wanted, no?
An attack on materialism is not a defense of dualism.
Both could be wrong!

Where is the evidence for dualism such that you claim it is not irrational?

To argue for/against materialism is a red-herring.

If I posit two theories for why things fall downwards - one being that God PULLS things down and the other being that God PUSHES them down - if you argue against one it does NOT mean that the other holds more credence. To provide the credence you need to provide arguments FOR the theory/idea/concept you support.

A lack of evidence in A is not evidence for B - to think otherwise is a logical fallacy.
If you think it does then you need to go back to elementary debating.


Now then - where is this evidence for DUALISM that would stop LG's beliefs being irrational?
 
Woah!!

RED HERRING and STRAWMAN LOGICAL FALLACY!!

Where have I stated this - and what does it have to do with YOUR beliefs / claims - which is, after all, what is under scrutiny in this thread???

Please stick on topic.


PJ claimed your beliefs, as he saw them, where not irrational.
I have given why I thought they are.
Now either dissect those arguments - or counter them - but preferably not with a logical fallacy.
My beliefs (or lack thereof) are NOT under scrutiny - especially when you try and assign beliefs to me and then try to knock them over.



if this isn't material monism (the idea that the ultimate aspect behind phenomena is a singular aspect represented by matter) you had better explain your self

Originally Posted by Sarkus
This IS irrational.
There is no evidence to support this claim - and thus must be irrational in that it is being accepted above and beyond any simpler "theory" (i.e. that there is just matter.
 
if this isn't material monism (the idea that the ultimate aspect behind phenomena is a singular aspect represented by matter) you had better explain your self
I refer you to my post above. You are still driving along the Red-Herring Highway. :rolleyes:
 
Sarkus said:
Now then - where is this evidence for DUALISM that would stop LG's beliefs being irrational?
Any old attack on materialism is not necessarily a defense of dualism, but mine happens to be. It states, as you will find if you care to read it, that materialism is not simply wrong but inadequate. It does not comprehensively describe things we find in living reality; in addition to material, we need something else which is not material. Appropriately, it is usually called mind or "spirit."

But, instead of reiterating the claim that there is insufficient evidence for this, please feel free to read my justification just a few posts back. Even better if you can read the essay I mention, which is more thorough in its explanation.
 
I refer you to my post above. You are still driving along the Red-Herring Highway. :rolleyes:

Its still not clear why dualism is irrational.

many philsophers advocate it.
I even referenced a nobel prize winning nerologist who gives rational explanations of it.

Rationality applies to the sphere of logic.
It seems you are talking more about dualism not being truthful, since you are clamouring for proof rather than testing the expediency of ideas
 
Any old attack on materialism is not necessarily a defense of dualism, but mine happens to be. It states, as you will find if you care to read it, that materialism is not simply wrong but inadequate. It does not comprehensively describe things we find in living reality; in addition to material, we need something else which is not material. Appropriately, it is usually called mind or "spirit."
I have read the essay - and can find little in it to support dualism - just an argument against a purely objective world - based on the inability of someone/thing to fully explain a subjective experience to someone/thing else.

His key comment seems to be: "...it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it.

This hardly seems to be someone providing EVIDENCE of dualism - rather just a hypothesis that there might be this dual state.
Afterall, he hardly states that the physical theory of mind can NEVER be achieved - or is IMPOSSIBLE.

And I am in agreement with him - the general problem of subjective and objective does noeed to be considered - but to go from this (or any other lack of actual evidence) to "I believe in DUALISM" (LG's apparent position) is irrational.

Dualism remains a possibility - but one currently without evidence (beyond the inability of an alternative to fully explain everything - which is not in or of itself evidence for dualism).

Nice try, though. ;)
 
Its still not clear why dualism is irrational.

many philsophers advocate it.
I even referenced a nobel prize winning nerologist who gives rational explanations of it.

Rationality applies to the sphere of logic.
It seems you are talking more about dualism not being truthful, since you are clamouring for proof rather than testing the expediency of ideas
Dualism IS a rational concept in and of itself.
God IS a rational concept in and of itself (assuming it is an entirely consistent God).

What is IRRATIONAL is the "belief" that it is the truth.

Also what is IRRATIONAL is the preference of Dualism, or God, that requires the existence of some as-yet-unevidenced phenomena, over an alternative theory.

But again - IRRATIONALITY does not equate to WRONG.
 
And I am in agreement with him - the general problem of subjective and objective does noeed to be considered - but to go from this (or any other lack of actual evidence) to "I believe in DUALISM" (LG's apparent position) is irrational.
Phenomena not classifiable as material must definitively be something other than material. (This is an a priori identity; it is true for the same reason that all bachelors are single.)

If such phenomena can be demonstrated, a belief in their existence is evidentially supported and thus rationally justified.

Nagel's essay, while it may be argued that it explicitly makes no positive claim for dualism, does demonstrate the existence of such phenomena. That is, he points out a phenomenon that cannot be described materialistically.

Therefore, LG's dualistic belief is rationally justified. QED

I would further argue that the crux of the matter is the binary nature of the question. Logically, reality must be either singular or plural. If it is not singular, then it must be plural.

One might put forth the proposition that reality is singular but not material (monistic idealism). However, such a theory would inevitably run into the same problem of relating mind to matter as materialism, and the only way around it for idealism is, much as materialism with mind, to deny the existence of matter outright. Here we run into the very same issue -- that unaccounted for material phenomena are constantly observed.

Dualism does not solve the mind-body problem, but it does offer a neat one-to-one correlation between evidence and theory, and that makes it not only rationally justifiable but, by appearances, favorable to the alternatives.
 
Phenomena not classifiable as material must definitively be something other than material.
This is the flaw in your argument - and it is a vast one.

Just because we can not currently classify the phenomena as material is merely because we either as yet do not fully understand that phenomena (such as with consciousness / subjectivity / objectivity etc) or we do not yet fully understand the material realm. Afterall - we only discovered quarks and whatnot in the last century - yet material existence went on existing without this knowledge.

But to classify it, and to believe it, as anything other than material - with no other evidence other than "well, our current understanding of materiality just doesn't cover it yet so it must be this" is IRRATIONAL.

The rest of your post is thus irrelevant - and dualism appears nothing other than a sister of the God of the Gaps.
 
Sarkus said:
This is the flaw in your argument - and it is a vast one.

Actually, it is an a priori identity dependent upon the definition of materiality. What you are saying is that, since our understanding of materiality may be incomplete, it would be irrational to call anything not material. This is fallacious and self-contradictory, as it implies that all phenomena should ultimately reduce to the material while simultaneously positing that the extent and nature of materiality are not fully known. Truly, if materiality is not fully known, then it could just as well turn out that nothing is material.

Ultimately, if you are unwilling to work with current understanding of what makes something material, then the whole argument, together with both our limited perspectives, are rendered moot.
 
Actually, it is an a priori identity dependent upon the definition of materiality.

Actually "identity" is one thing that god does not possess. For even the fundamentalist thiest claim god to be unknowable, incomprehencible, inmaterial, but a spirit. Thus rendering the belief on an entity with no identity and call it truth, because of ancient documents written by slave dogmatic desperate dessert dwelers, is nothing more than delusional.

Considering the mass schizophrenia througout history, what we have here is nuts talking with their altered consciousness, and calling it god!

The platonic ideas of a connection between madness and prophecy recur in the ancient Israel. The highly esteemed religious prophets were often regarded as mad because of their odd utterances and deviant clothes and behavior. The same conceptions later appear in the Koran in the Islamic countries. The Koran uses the word majnoon to describe mad persons as well as prophets.
http://www.hubin.org/facts/history/history_schizophrenia_en.html
 
Actually, it is an a priori identity dependent upon the definition of materiality.
But these are only valid if you can supply evidence to support ANYTHING which is NOT MATERIAL.

If other phenomena have previously been identified as non-material - then to accept the possibility of anything else that doesn't fit the realm the material as being non-material is a valid proposition.
But ALL evidence that exists is material.
There is currently no deviation from this.

Therefore, until we eliminate all POSSIBILITY of it being material (i.e. until we either discover some non-material phenomena that proves itself non-material, or until we fully understand the material plane) it is irrational to believe that anything is other than material.

Baumgarten said:
What you are saying is that, since our understanding of materiality may be incomplete, it would be irrational to call anything not material.
Yes - until such time as we can conclusively prove that it can not be material.

Do you KNOW what "matter" is with sufficient depth and detail, beyond the level of quantum particles, to be able to eliminate it as the only possibility?

Baumgarten said:
This is fallacious and self-contradictory, as it implies that all phenomena should ultimately reduce to the material while simultaneously positing that the extent and nature of materiality are not fully known.
This does not make it fallacious - the implication is that you should first eliminate ALL possibility of it being a KNOWN before assigning it as a new thing. To do otherwise is irrational.
And I am positing that the extent and nature of materiality might not yet be fully known.
Afterall - we have as yet only reduced the atom down to the quantum level. There remain many more mysteries to resolve before we can say "We KNOW what matter is."

Baumgarten said:
Truly, if materiality is not fully known, then it could just as well turn out that nothing is material.
It could - but for the time being it is irrational to BELIEVE THAT IT IS NON-MATERIAL until such time as there exists evidence for anything that is non-material.

Baumgarten said:
Ultimately, if you are unwilling to work with current understanding of what makes something material, then the whole argument, together with both our limited perspectives, are rendered moot.
I am fully willing to. The issue is not "what is material" but providing a suitable definition of "subjectivity" or "conciousness" (or whatever else it is that is being discussed) with which to determine whether or not it is material / non-material.
But it is irrational to jump to "it is non-material" before you eliminate all possibility of it being material - and this can not be done until we KNOW what matter is.
 
Godless said:
Actually "identity" is one thing that god does not possess.
We aren't currently discussing God...

Sarkus said:
Do you KNOW what "matter" is with sufficient depth and detail, beyond the level of quantum particles, to be able to eliminate it as the only possibility?
Yes. However, the level of quantum particles needn't be touched.

Here are a couple crucial traits of material objects not shared by their subjective counterparts:
Mass/energy
Extension in three-dimensional space

And here are a few examples of things that material objects alone do not possess:
Color (not wavelength)
Meaning
Sensation
Emotion
Thought

You could continue for quite a while. Properties that could be ascribed to objects outside of one's direct conscious experience would fall under the material category, and everything else -- that is, properties that are a part of direct experience, one's primary informers about the environment, one's thoughts and impressions -- would go under the second category. We know what to call the totality of one's thoughts and impressions; it is called the mind.

Now, if a member of one category was able to adopt the properties of the other, that would be evidence that the separation between the two is meaningless, and all phenomena are of the same nature. For example, if you could measure the mass or energy of a thought, that would be evidence that thoughts are actually material phenomena. Conversely, for a rock to enter my direct experience, the experience must come unmitigated by the senses. Therefore seeing, feeling, or tasting a rock does not constitute direct experience. In actuality, in order to show that the material rock is actually a phenomenon of the mind, the entire rock would have to become part of the totality of my thoughts and impressions. That is, I would have to be the rock.

These two examples illustrate an important property of monism. It predicts a wider range of behavior and interaction between, as it would have it, two fundamentally arbitrary categories of phenomena; and more importantly, such behaviors have never been observed. Even the mere notion of measuring a thought's mass, or becoming a rock, comes across as patently absurd. It simply does not make sense.

So even though monistic theories posit one less realm of existence than dualism, they run into more, bigger problems. Dualism is, perhaps unexpectedly, a simpler, more elegant philosophy that accounts for the phenomena that observably occur in life; no more, no less. Although incomplete, hardly irrational, it is the most economic model of reality available.
 
And here are a few examples of things that material objects alone do not possess:
Color (not wavelength)
Meaning
Sensation
Emotion
Thought
But all these are merely the sum of material / physical interactions and through entirely material processes.

The fact these seem to be abstract properties is irrelevant as they are only brought about through entirely physical and material interactions and processes.
The sum of these various processes and interactions is what we give these abstract words to - is what you refer to as the non-material????

A interacts with B interacts with C, D, E which interact with... to an end point that is the result of a vastly complex array of interaction. We use a convenient word - e.g. BLUE - to describe the end result (being the brain's interpretation of the wavelength of light hitting the eye from the object in question).

Colour is due to the interaction between the eyes/detectors and the light.
Emotion is due to the vast self-referential interactions within the brain, as is thought and "meaning".

Just because you do not see a particle called "meaning" does NOT mean that it is not just an emergent property of a purely physical / material process.


Properties that could be ascribed to objects outside of one's direct conscious experience would fall under the material category, and everything else -- that is, properties that are a part of direct experience, one's primary informers about the environment, one's thoughts and impressions -- would go under the second category.
But when you can't actually provide the evidence that the two ARE utterly separate categories rather than one merely being an abstract we assign to emergent properties of the other, then your dualism falls over as something to "believe" in.

We know what to call the totality of one's thoughts and impressions; it is called the mind.
And yet you can provide no evidence to support it not being a purely material process. Go figure.

So even though monistic theories posit one less realm of existence than dualism, they run into more, bigger problems. Dualism is, perhaps unexpectedly, a simpler, more elegant philosophy that accounts for the phenomena that observably occur in life; no more, no less. Although incomplete, hardly irrational, it is the most economic model of reality available.
It's a philosophy that splits the MATERIAL in to two categories - one being the atom, the molecule, etc - the other being nothing more than an emergent property of the interaction between the atoms/molecules.
Both categories are material.
Philosophically you can feel free to split them apart - and you are possibly right in that it offers a simpler view, and easier to work with - but a simpler view of what is still nothing but matter/physical/energy. This second "realm of existence" is still material.



Maybe this is all a result of us understanding the terms differently - from what you/LG and I see as being physical/matter/energy etc.

What you see as non-material I seem to see as merely the sum of interactions of the material - not a seperate realm of existence.
 
Sarkus said:
But all these are merely the sum of material / physical interactions and through entirely material processes.
You're getting ahead of yourself. Let us arbitrarily define two categories of phenomena, according to empirical criteria:

A. Phenomena of type A are those that do not fall within one's direct experience; that is to say, one's perception of these phenomena is fully mediated by the senses. One sees an apple (the apple is a type A phenomenon) by perceiving its image with the sense of sight.

B. Phenomena of type B are those that do fall within one's direct experience. The apple is type A, but the mental image of the apple is type B. The compression waves propagated through the air from a falling tree are type A, but we shall call the sound itself of these waves type B.

This description of reality, you will agree, is at least consistent with the actual state of affairs inasmuch as it describes phenomena that actually exist, without describing any phenomena that don't. Your main point of contention with such a description is that "what you see as non-material I seem to see as merely the sum of interactions of the material - not a seperate realm of existence." In other words, the way you see it, one of these categories is ultimately reducible to the other, because the two categories are actually one and the same.

It is now our task, then, to either reconcile these categories as one (and therefore their division meaningless) or show that they are irreconcilable. To reconcile them would be a simple matter of finding a phenomenon that falls under both, or perhaps neither, of the categories. This could be seen right away as evidence that our two-category model is not respected by nature and is indeed entirely arbitrary.

Another way of saying this is to describe a phenomenon of one category completely in terms of the other. In other words, you could show that a phenomenon of type A is actually directly available to our perception without the aid of our senses. Or, you could show that a phenomenon of type B actually isn't directly perceivable, and must be experienced second-hand, via sensory data.

You would try to falsify our two-category model in vain, however. Its definition, as it turns out, is only as arbitrary as the definition of pi or the square root of two. As they are logical opposites, the distinction between categories A and B is actually a priori. Something cannot simultaneously be and not be. Therefore, as long as the notion of sensory perception (from the perspective of the one doing the perceiving -- i.e. from your perspective) is meaningful, dualism is a logical necessity.
 
Dualism IS a rational concept in and of itself.
God IS a rational concept in and of itself (assuming it is an entirely consistent God).

What is IRRATIONAL is the "belief" that it is the truth.

Also what is IRRATIONAL is the preference of Dualism, or God, that requires the existence of some as-yet-unevidenced phenomena, over an alternative theory.

But again - IRRATIONALITY does not equate to WRONG.


You are not talking about rationality - you are talking about the nature of truth, which is something entirely different

here is an eg of something that is rational but not truthful

All pigs have wings and all horses are pigs therefore all horses have wings.

Here is an eg of something that is truthful but not rational

I am sitting down and today is thursday therefore I am hungry.

and here is an example of something that is neither rational or truthful.

The spaghetti trees orbit the cream cheese moon therefore I should drive my car to work.

Prince james makes the point that my arguments are rational, although being an atheist he contends whether they are truthful - because he can acknowledge this distinction, we both have the facility for discussion, despite advocating different suppositions on the nature of truth
 
here is an eg of something that is rational but not truthful

All pigs have wings and all horses are pigs therefore all horses have wings.
But this statement is also irrational if there is no evidence to support the initial premise that all pigs have wings etc.

Maybe a different idea of what constitutes being irrational...?

To me (and to the mainstream) - if the initial premise is unproven then it is irrational to believe it as true. It is as simple as that.
 
You're getting ahead of yourself. Let us arbitrarily define two categories of phenomena, according to empirical criteria:....

I can see where you're going - and as I have said, on a philosophical basis it is a useful tool (I don't know enough to state it as a necessity, though).

BUT both phenomena are still material.

A: You have the known matter (atom, particle, apple etc)
B: You have the sum of interactions of these within the brain (emotion etc).

It might still be dualistic but it is STILL all matter.

X and Y are atoms - type A
Interaction between X and Y are "sound" - type B.

If you want to claim type B as "non-material" then feel free - but to me it is ALL material due to B being nothing but interactions between type A.

And if this is all type B is to you then there really is little debate to be had - and it is merely the dressing up of a philosophical separation as a theistic notion.
 
But this statement is also irrational if there is no evidence to support the initial premise that all pigs have wings etc.

Maybe a different idea of what constitutes being irrational...?

To me (and to the mainstream) - if the initial premise is unproven then it is irrational to believe it as true. It is as simple as that.
this indicates how people commonly use terminology very cheaply - to say something is untruthful requires the examination of general principles - an inability to procure general principles is the symptom of irrationality.

So many an atheist starts an argument by saying things to the effect of "Before we begin lets just establish the facts - god does not exist" - alternatively you could also get theists bereft of a sense of philosophy that say the exact opposite " Before we start lets state the obvious - god exists" - Both of these are mere confidence statements - hopefully its obvious that statements of truth are unappealing if they are bereft of supporting general principles that establish their authenticity (like why or how something is true/false).

The common atheist response to god is that "there is no evidence", to which the common reply is "evident to who?", which brings in the analogy of the high school drop out vs the electron (ie a statement of the general principles - perceptability requires qualification)
 
Back
Top