Sarkus said:
But all these are merely the sum of material / physical interactions and through entirely material processes.
You're getting ahead of yourself. Let us
arbitrarily define two categories of phenomena, according to empirical criteria:
A. Phenomena of type A are those that do not fall within one's direct experience; that is to say, one's perception of these phenomena is fully mediated by the senses. One
sees an apple (the apple is a type A phenomenon) by perceiving its image with the sense of sight.
B. Phenomena of type B are those that
do fall within one's direct experience. The apple is type A, but the mental
image of the apple is type B. The compression waves propagated through the air from a falling tree are type A, but we shall call the
sound itself of these waves type B.
This description of reality, you will agree, is at least consistent with the actual state of affairs inasmuch as it describes phenomena that actually exist, without describing any phenomena that don't. Your main point of contention with such a description is that "what you see as non-material I seem to see as merely the sum of interactions of the material - not a seperate realm of existence." In other words, the way you see it, one of these categories is ultimately reducible to the other, because the two categories are actually one and the same.
It is now our task, then, to either reconcile these categories as one (and therefore their division meaningless) or show that they are irreconcilable. To reconcile them would be a simple matter of finding a phenomenon that falls under both, or perhaps neither, of the categories. This could be seen right away as evidence that our two-category model is not respected by nature and is indeed entirely arbitrary.
Another way of saying this is to describe a phenomenon of one category completely in terms of the other. In other words, you could show that a phenomenon of type A is actually directly available to our perception without the aid of our senses. Or, you could show that a phenomenon of type B actually
isn't directly perceivable, and must be experienced second-hand, via sensory data.
You would try to falsify our two-category model in vain, however. Its definition, as it turns out, is only as arbitrary as the definition of
pi or the square root of two. As they are logical opposites, the distinction between categories A and B is actually
a priori. Something cannot simultaneously be and not be. Therefore, as long as the notion of sensory perception (from the perspective of the one
doing the perceiving -- i.e. from
your perspective) is meaningful, dualism is a logical necessity.