Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God

[Baldeee]

Now to address the rest of your post:

If X is necessary for Y, then X is required for Y.
If Y is sufficient to assume X, then Y requires the assumption of X.

Hopefully this shorthand is fully understood now. Sorry if my impatience seems condescending, but harping on a point already raised and addressed seems an unnecessary attempt to poison the well, or something. If it wasn't, so be it, but you cannot expect a criticism to go unanswered just because you may not like the tone.

You are the only one still belabouring the matter, and with your unwarranted attitude.
I accepted your definition the second time, yet here you are still trying to assert a superiority.

'Proven as true'? Premises do not need to be 'proven true'. You keep asserting this as if you think it is somehow relevant. Premises are simply assumed to be true. Axioms are self-evident or well-established. 'Proven true' would fall into the latter category. So we can either dispense with continuing to rehash that, or I can be justifiably condescending.

Maybe you missed the point where I said I wasn't yet getting into issues of veracity of the premises?
And maybe you don't acknowledge that the veracity of the premises speaks to the soundness of an argument?
I am currently still trying to review the validity of the argument - which indeed do not require the premises to be proven, merely accepted, which is why I am not yet going to expand on any discussion down the path of whether they have veracity or not.
To that end, and which should have been apparent from what I previously wrote:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
...​

If this is a controversial assumption, please explain how.

2. God is not physical.
...​

If this is a controversial assumption, please explain how.

Ignored for the time being while we address validity.

I've already addressed your 'only' criticism.

See above post about your misunderstanding of validity.

Infinite regress, in this case, is effectively circular reasoning.

Circular reasoning is a specific form of infinite regress, true, but that does not make infinite regress necessarily circular and thus can not be disregarded on the basis of circular reasoning until shown to be just such a form.

Trying to explain the ultimate cause of the universe utilizing causes within the universe is logically invalid.

I have not mentioned any such explanation utilising causes within the universe?
Have you?

And there is no evidence that our universe has a closed timelike worldline. These require more support than the premises I've given, thus parsimony favors mine.

What does parsimony have to do with logical form?
You are still arguing for acceptability of premises, yet that is a matter of soundness, not validity.
Furthermore, parsimony does not bestow veracity upon a premise.
It may merely inform our judgement of what we accept as true for practical reasons, e.g. when comparing competing theories.

Again, for the umpteenth time, premises are not required to be exhaustive. If you insist on making this assertion, you need to support it. Otherwise, quit pretending you understand logic. You don't even seem to understand what you are writing. A valid conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true, but that says nothing about any other set of premises. You are making up nonsense.

Please come back to this when you have learnt what validity entails.

Again, already addressed your 'only' criticism. If the premises in an argument are true and support the conclusion, the premises are part of the conclusion. Ergo, if physical existence requires a cause AND there is only one available cause THEN that cause must exist. You seem to have a serious inability to infer anything not explicitly stated. No wonder logic gives you such a hard time.

I see you have now inserted the word "only" into your argument here.
Huh. Go figure.
If you do intend to restate your argument to show the lack of a need for only one solution to be considered valid, perhaps you best not reword it so that you do that to very thing you are complaining about?

How many times are you going to repeat your 'only' criticism? Infinite regress requires the premise to be the conclusion, since any infinite causality would have to first assert causality as a premise. That is begging the question AND circular reasoning, BOTH logically invalid.

You mean asserting causality as a premise such as: "Physical existence requires a cause"?
As for your assertions of infinite regress, please show how an infinite series of causes is logically inconsistent with the premises given.
Don't just reassert your claim but set it out, please.

Find me one credible reference on logic that says anything akin to ' show[ing] how it is not possible for ... some other explanation that possibly fits the premises'. You know, that a logical conclusion must be exhaustive. This is what you keep asserting.

You mean other than the wiki article that states it?
Or do I have to find one that is in English that you will be able to interpret correctly?
Let's see:
"The second argument is not valid because there are plenty of possible situations where the premise is true but the conclusion is false.... The fact that these situations are possible is enough to show that the argument is not valid..."
"To test whether an argument is valid, you should first imagine that the premises are true - whether or not they actually are - and then ask yourself, without appealing to any other knowledge you have, could you still imagine the conclusion being false? If you can, the argument is invalid."
(Theses do link to the source, but on my iPad it's not obvious.)
I doubt you will accept either of these, however, as they do not conform to your understanding.
Most sources simply use the same wording as wiki (as do these sources I have given) and seem to assume that most would understand what it means.

Did I assert nothingness to be an entity? No.

Again with your unwarranted hostility and your seeming overriding desire simply to score points.
It is tiresome.
Did you assert nothingness to be an entity?
Yes, in as much as you offered up the term "entity" as a means of referring to it...
To quote you: "Earlier in this thread I posited that nothingness is the only 'other' non-physical (entity?... abstract object?)"
And now you criticise me for using one of the terms you offered.

Is it controversial that an empty hand is holding nothing? It has a phenomenologically ontological existence because you can recognize it. Do you refute Alan Guth's inflationary model of cosmology and its supposition of the universe as the ultimate free lunch? Do you refute virtual particles or the Casimir effect? Then explain exactly why you find nothingness a controversial assumption. You cannot make the assertion 'that it is controversial' and then immediately claim you are 'not putting this forward'. As Tiassa has grown fond of saying, make a positive statement and argue it.

As stated previously, I am interested in the validity of the argument at present, not the veracity of the premises.
Further, and as an aside for the time-being, why do you automatically assume that the contention would be with regard the supposed existence of 'nothingness'?

But let's concentrate on the issue of validity, okay, as I feel there is little point in assessing the veracity of the premises if the argument is invalid.

And just to clarify, in case others had picked up on it, while not strictly a matter of validity, I'm including informal fallacies in my scope such as circular reasoning, question-begging etc.
So apologies if I suggest that these alone make an argument invalid, when validity is a matter of form only.

 

[PhysBang]

Which is ''everything'', unless you know of something begins to exist without a cause.

That may be the case. Many people claim that there is such a being, e.g.: god.

''Everything that begins to exist'' is a description of everything (unless you can show otherwise).

As the KCA purports to show. In the KCA as actually used, the KCA is supposed to show that there exists a being that always existed.

You are adding premises to the argument from the start.

I maintain that God is a non thing in relation to things.

Sure, but you maintain that god is a being that we can talk about using the English language. You even used the word "thing" to refer to god. So you should, if you want to be honest, allow us to include gods when we use the word "everything" to refer to the scope of the category of beings that begin to exist. Not "every thing" but "everything that began to exist", that is, the totality of all beings that began to exist.

I think it could be that you are simply forced to agree with others.

Yes, logic forces me to agree that you are adding premises to the KCA and misrepresenting the logical argument.

 

[Jan Ardena]

There's a third possibility, of course: things that don't ever exist at all. So, if we want to be very careful we should really write:
1a. Everything that exists has a cause.
1b. Everything that exists that begins to exist has a cause.

How can ''things'' not have ever existed at all?
What would you say these ''things'' are?

For (1b) this isn't a big problem because I think it's safe to assume that anything that begins to exist exists, at least until such time as it no longer exists. So, let's not add unnecessary complexity. I think we can agree to take it as given that the KCA is only talking about things that putatively exist (universe, God, etc.) and not about things that never existed.

Okay.

Ok. Here's the KCA one more time:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

It sounds like you would be content to replace (1) with this:

1. All items that do not exist eternally have a cause.

To avoid possible confusion on your part, I use the words "all items" rather than "everything", on the understanding that "all items" includes both items that exist eternally and those that exist for a finite time only.

Thanks for your concern, but I'm okay with ''everything'', it describes perfectly what we're talking about. All items is not the same as ''everything'', unless you say that it means ''everything''. Then you may as well just use the term ''everything'', like you said, to avoid confusion.

It is possible that you will object that "all items" does not include God, but rather than "all items" is equivalent to God. That is, "all items" includes the universe and everything in it, as well as anything eternal that exists. But that is unworkable because then the term "all items that do not exist eternally" would be rendered meaningless in the case that God turns out to be eternal. That is, "All items that do not exist eternally" would be an empty set if God is eternal, and (1) would then become "Nothing (no item) has a cause."

But if you replace ''all items'' with ''everything'', then we have something we can work with.

So, hopefully we agree that "all items" includes the universe, which is not eternal, and potentially God as a separate "item", which may or may not be eternal.

I'm not convinced all items can be replaced with everything.

Following your usage, we might choose to use the label "things" as a synonym for "All items that do not exist eternally". With this understood, the KCA becomes:

1. All things (i.e. all items that do not exist eternally) have a cause.
2. The universe is a thing.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

This is clearly a valid logical argument, although it still remains to examine the soundness of premises (1) and (2).

The problem is that the argument in this form does not help us to determine whether any "non-thing" (such as God) exists, where a "non-thing" is understood to be an "item that exists eternally". There is no argument here that shows that any eternal item (such as God) can or must act as a cause for a "thing" (a non-eternal item). In short, the argument does nothing to support the existence of God.

If ''all things'' have a cause, then the cause cannot itself be a thing.
If it was a thing, then the first premise is invalid.
So while it may not appear to point to God, ultimately it does. Or something like God.
But something like God, would be God.

Again, the question arises as to whether there are any "eternal items" other than God. If such items do exist, then one or more of them could conceivably cause the universe. If, on the other hand, no other such items exist then our latest version of premise (1), above, can be re-written as:

You assume that there are ''eternal items'', just like there are items we experience, but with the label ''eternal''.
Is there any reason for this?

This is a question about the soundness of the premise rather than the validity of the argument as a whole. However, I have raised some objections to this in a previous post, here:

http://sciforums.com/threads/kalam-...-existence-of-god.154797/page-14#post-3356498

The term "began to exist" is itself problematic.

That's your problem James. It's not problematic.

For example, you say your house was constructed in the 1950s.

The construction is a part of the cause, and the cause is the intent. Without intent, there can be no structure.

Does that mean it "began to exist" in the 1950s?

No. It began with the intent.

All of the materials that make up your house existed prior to 1950.

I also believe that all the materials that make up this universe existed prior to the universe.

Ultimately, your house is built from matter and energy that all existed at the big bang. Since the big bang, all that has happened is that some of that matter and energy has been rearranged to enable the eventual construction of your house.

Yes I agree. All that matter and energy existed prior to the house, but it was not manifested, it was not perceived as the finished product which we now call a house. But without the intention, there could never have been a house. If it was even possible that natural forces alone could build Yazata's house, it would be highly improbable.

I agree with you that God or "the totality", by your definition, includes both things that are not eternal (things that begin to exist) and at least one thing that is eternal (that portion or aspect of God that is eternal). Whether it also includes other eternal things is an open question because you have not specified.

I have specified matter/energy, as being eternal.

I agree that according to your usage, eternal items such as God are not "things". That is an idiosyncratic usage of yours, but I can work with it. In my opinion, it would be more convenient to use the word "everything" in its conventional sense to mean "all that exists", which would include all eternal and non-eternal items and thus would include God. But we can go with your usage if you want to insist on making the distinction.

There's your problem again. You want things designed so they fit into your world view.
''Every thing'', means all things, and a thing is described as an inanimate material object. So Everything means every inanimate object, or all inanimate objects. So ''everything'' meaning all that exists means, every THING that exists. If God was a thing, then a) He wouldn't be God, and we wouldn't be having conversation, and b) we would be able to see if God existed or not. So God is not a thing, and if you wanted to not use the word God, the totality which includes everything, coming into and out of being, cannot be a thing. The other conclusion is that everything is eternal, or something (totality/god) can come out of nothing (whatever that really means).

We have agreed that "the totality" is just another word for God, so that doesn't count.

I haven't agreed to that.
The totality is not another word for God, but it has the basic attributes of God.
There must be a totality even if you don't believe in God.

You mention "matter" as something that does not begin to exist. Do you agree, then, that the Kalam Cosmological Argument does not require a cause for matter?

Do you also agree that it is open for us to conclude that matter caused the universe?

To your first question, I don't think it does. It requires a cause for its manifestation.

To your second question, it is open.
Let the games begin.

jan.

 

[Yazata]

It's true that the valid conclusion must be implied by the premises, but the conclusion can not merely state that which is implied within one of the premises.

A circular proof certainly wouldn't be informative since it would just repeat what we already know, but it would still be valid in the sense that the premises imply the conclusion.

1. A
2. therefore A (from 1. and identity)

The law of identity is that every proposition implies itself, if A, then A.

JamesR asked us whether we think that Craig's argument is logically valid.

"The reason petitio principii is considered to be a fallacy is not that the inference is invalid (because any statement is indeed equivalent to itself), but because the argument can be deceptive. A statement cannot prove itself."

http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/circular.html

I would argue that a statement can prove itself, in the same sense that any logical proof can prove anything, namely by demonstrating that the conclusion is a logical consequence of whatever the premises are. If the conclusion is already given as a premise, then the "proof" will be trivial, uninformative and pointless, but it will still be formally valid. (I'm not convinced that Craig's argument is that crude.)

I'll add that while I do think that Craig has carefully chosen his premises so as to imply what he takes to be traditional theistic attributes from Christian theology, I don't think that the primary problem with his argument is its formal validity. (Barker's objection doesn't particularly move me or persuade me otherwise.) I perceive the problem to lie more in the plausibility and truth value of Craig's premises.

 

[PhysBang]

''Every thing'', means all things, and a thing is described as an inanimate material object. So Everything means every inanimate object, or all inanimate objects.

This is simply not how the English language works.

You might want to bully us into using language your way, but that won't work.

You are doing a poor job of evangelizing.

 

[Sarkus]

A circular proof certainly wouldn't be informative since it would just repeat what we already know, but it would still be valid in the sense that the premises imply the conclusion.

Very true - me bad. I discuss quite a bit with Baldeee off-line and we've recently realised we both do this - confuse informal fallacies with making an argument invalid rather than simply less persuasive.

I would argue that a statement can prove itself, in the same sense that any logical proof can prove anything, namely by demonstrating that the conclusion is a logical consequence of whatever the premises are.

Indeed - a logical truth, for example, is necessarily valid yet often a trivial circular argument due to simple definition: all husbands are married, etc.

If the conclusion is already given as a premise, then the "proof" will be trivial, uninformative and pointless, but it will still be formally valid. (I'm not convinced that Craig's argument is that crude.)

It's not that crude, and the OP concentrated on Barker's reformulation which considered the argument without Craig's ontological argument that bridges the gap between 3. the universe was caused, and 4. the cause is God. That argument, without the missing links, I think is still invalid - as there is no reason to conclude God as the only possible cause.

I'll add that while I do think that Craig has carefully chosen his premises so as to imply what he takes to be traditional theistic attributes from Christian theology, I don't think that the primary problem with his argument is its formal validity. (Barker's objection doesn't particularly move me or persuade me otherwise.) I perceive the problem to lie more in the plausibility and truth value of Craig's premises.

With regard the KCA as formulated by Craig, I'm tending to agree now that I've reminded myself not to include question-begging in the realm of formal fallacies.

 

[Jan Ardena]

This is simply not how the English language works.

You might want to bully us into using language your way, but that won't work.

You are doing a poor job of evangelizing.

Firstly I am not evangelizing, and secondly I am not trying to forcea ny lanuage down anyone's throat.

How would you define "everything"?

Jan,

 

[PhysBang]

How would you define "everything"?

I and others have explained multiple times how the word is used in context.

 

[gmilam]

So, there's no "Crazy Little Thing Called Love"?

 

[Syne]

How about an example?

1. All quadrupedal animals have four legs.
2. This table has four legs.
3. Therefore, this table is a quadrupedal animal.

The aim here is prove that this table is a quadupedal animal. However, the logic fails because the possible existence of things with four legs that are not quadrupedal animals has not been logically excluded in the argument.

The argument as presented doesn't exclude the possibility that this table is a quadupedal animal, but neither does it converge on that possibility as the only available solution. Therefore, the argument is logically invalid.

Sorry, James. Baldeee seems to have moved the goalposts without me noticing. He started by attacking the soundness of premises and seemingly demanding that the premises exhaustively exclude all other possibilities. Now he is arguing the validity instead. You are right. The conclusion must follow from true premises, and I've not refuted that fact. I have told Baldeee that premises need not be exhaustive, they need only be true and support the conclusion. He seems to demand that new premises be added until all other possibilities are exhaustively ruled out. That is impractical and not a requirement of a logical argument.

 

[James R]

Syne,

I have told Baldeee that premises need not be exhaustive, they need only be true and support the conclusion. He seems to demand that new premises be added until all other possibilities are exhaustively ruled out. That is impractical and not a requirement of a logical argument.

I think it depends on what you are trying to show with the argument.

For example:
1. Some ducks are black.
2. Trevor is a duck.
3. Therefore Trevor is black.

This is a logical argument, but the conclusion is too strong for the given premises. The argument is technically not valid, but it can be made valid. There are two ways to fix the problem. One is to keep the same premises but downgrade the conclusion, to something like "Therefore, Trevor could be black." Another option is to strengthen the premises and keep the original conclusion, for example by changing (1) to "All ducks are black."

If the aim of the above argument is merely to support the logical possibility that Trevor is black, then it does the job well enough, but to be honest the conclusion should be weakened. On the other hand, if the aim of the argument is to establish beyond all doubt that Trevor is black (so that the conclusion could be written as "Therefore, Trevor can only be black, and there is no other possibility" then the premises must be strengthened or additional premises added in order to exhaustively rule out all other possibilities, as Baldeee has said.

In the case of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, if the aim is to prove that God created the universe and there is no other possibility, then we'd better make sure that there are enough watertight premises to lead to that conclusion and to exhaust all other possibilities. On the other hand, if the aim is only to show that God or something else caused the universe, then the premises can be somewhat weaker.

 

[Syne]

1. Physical existence requires a cause.

• Physical existence necessitates a cause, and a cause is sufficient to assume physical existence.
  • This is a simple assertion of causality.
    • "Causality is the relationship between causes and effects. It is considered to be fundamental to all natural science, especially physics." - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality_(physics)
  • This implicitly rules out an infinite causal regress.
    • Infinite causal regress is begging the question. No argument that assumes causality as a premise can assert causality (here, infinite causation, i.e. more causality) as a conclusion.
  • This implicitly rules out causal loops.
    • Causal loops are circular reasoning. No argument that assumes causality as a premise can assert any cause, assumed by such causality, to be the conclusion as well.

2. Nothingness is not physical.

• Tautological

3. Therefore, nothingness has no cause.

• Syllogism

4. The universe can possess a net zero total energy.

• Soundness of Alan Guth's supposition of an 'ultimate free lunch' in his inflationary model of cosmology.

5. Therefore, nothingness can be an uncaused cause.
6. The universe began a finite time in the past.

• Causality logically excludes infinite regress.

7. An uncaused cause requires volition.

• No other assumption accounts for a beginning a finite time in the past.

8. Therefore, nothingness and god are equivalent in being volitional cause.


​

This is a valid logical argument, where the premises, if true, cannot lead to the conclusion being false.

 

[James R]

Syne:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.

• Physical existence necessitates a cause, and a cause is sufficient to assume physical existence.
  • This is a simple assertion of causality.
    • "Causality is the relationship between causes and effects. It is considered to be fundamental to all natural science, especially physics." - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality_(physics)
  • This implicitly rules out an infinite causal regress.
    • Infinite causal regress is begging the question. No argument that assumes causality as a premise can assert causality (here, infinite causation, i.e. more causality) as a conclusion.
  • This implicitly rules out causal loops.
    • Causal loops are circular reasoning. No argument that assumes causality as a premise can assert any cause, assumed by such causality, to be the conclusion as well.

There's a lot of explanation built into that premise.

I'm not sure what you mean by "physical existence". That's an abstract concept. So, for that matter, is "cause". Is your argument about things (objects, people, God and the like), or about abstract concepts? Is the "cause" you speak of necessarily the effect of a thing?

I'm not convinced that (1) by itself rules out infinite causal regress. I think you need to introduce an extra premise:

1b. Infinite causal regress is impossible.

Of course, the question of whether this is a sound premise is separate from the question of validity which we are discussing.

You claim that infinite causal regress is begging the question. I don't see how. Doesn't the Kalam argument itself contain causality both as a premise and as a conclusion? Are you saying the Kalam argument begs the question?

A causal loop would presumably be an example of a kind of infinite regress (A causes B, B causes C, C causes A, etc.), so I don't see why that has to be considered as a separate matter.

2. Nothingness is not physical.

• Tautological

Ok.

3. Therefore, nothingness has no cause.

• Syllogism

No. This does not follow from the previous premises.

Premise (1) takes the form "A implies B". From this you are trying to draw the conclusion "not A implies not B", but that is a not a valid inference. The logical equivalent to "A implies B" is "not B implies not A", which is different to what you're arguing.

You assert in (1) that physical existence requires a cause, and in (2) that nothingness is not physical. But (1) says nothing about not-physical things. (1) only talks about physical things, so it can't help us when it comes to "nothingness" as defined. The most we can conclude from (1) is that any causeless thing cannot be physical. But you want to assert that any non-physical thing is causeless. I hope you can see this isn't the same thing.

Your argument therefore is invalid at this point.

4. The universe can possess a net zero total energy.

• Soundness of Alan Guth's supposition of an 'ultimate free lunch' in his inflationary model of cosmology.

Ok. But I don't see how this premise about energy is relevant to "nothingness".

5. Therefore, nothingness can be an uncaused cause.

Let's assume you can fix the problem mentioned above so that you can conclude (3). That establishes half of (5), that nothingness is uncaused, but it's just a repeat of (3).

I can't see that you have established that nothingness can be a cause. You'll need to explain in more detail.

6. The universe began a finite time in the past.

• Causality logically excludes infinite regress.

Even if we accept your premise that an infinite chain of causes is impossible, it does not follow that an infinite time period is impossible. That would require an extra premise. So, (6) is not a derived conclusion from what has gone before, but an additional premise. Whether it is sound or not is a separate question.

7. An uncaused cause requires volition.

• No other assumption accounts for a beginning a finite time in the past.

Again, this is a premise assumed to be true, so it may not be sound. It is not a derived conclusion from what went before.

8. Therefore, nothingness and god are equivalent in being volitional cause.

If (5) and (7) can be established, then it follows logically that nothingness is a volitional cause.

But (8) is the first mention of "god" in the argument. There's obviously a whole bunch of hidden assumptions about this "god" that do not appear in your argument as presented.​

 

[Baldeee]

Sorry, James. Baldeee seems to have moved the goalposts without me noticing. He started by attacking the soundness of premises and seemingly demanding that the premises exhaustively exclude all other possibilities. Now he is arguing the validity instead.

I have been concentrating on validity throughout, as can clearly be seen in my posts.
I have been at pains not to sidetrack onto issues of soundness until the argument has been shown to be valid.
James will attest to that.
Sarkus as well.
Even others if they have been following the exchange.
Yes, I have briefly responded to issues of soundness but always with the intent (implicit if not explicit throughout my posts) of concentrating on the validity.
Yes, I and others have erroneously included within validity the notions of question-begging etc, but there has been no goalpost shifting away from soundness.
That you perceive such is more likely due to your unwillingness to concede your own misunderstanding of what validity entails: you've been shown your understanding is wrong and now wish to concentrate instead on soundness.

You are right. The conclusion must follow from true premises, and I've not refuted that fact. I have told Baldeee that premises need not be exhaustive, they need only be true and support the conclusion. He seems to demand that new premises be added until all other possibilities are exhaustively ruled out. That is impractical and not a requirement of a logical argument.

It is if the conclusion wishes to be considered valid.
As explained.
As exampled.
As supported by the quotes (which were written in language that even you should be able to understand, given your misunderstanding of the usual way of describing the principle of validity).
But rather than that you simply now want to ignore validity and move onto whether the argument is sound.

So please quit your whining, Syne, and stop lying that I have in any way shifted the goalposts.
But just so you are clear:
Your understanding of validity remains suspect.
I am not intending to discuss issues of soundness until an argument is valid.
And until you can demonstrate that you actually comprehend what validity actually entails, you will probably be claiming validity of your argument long after the lights are turned off and everyone else has left the room.

So, are you going to address the issues perceived with your notion of what validity entails?
Or are you going to continue making the same mistakes?

 

[Baldeee]

No. This does not follow from the previous premises.

Premise (1) takes the form "A implies B". From this you are trying to draw the conclusion "not A implies not B", but that is a not a valid inference. The logical equivalent to "A implies B" is "not B implies not A", which is different to what you're arguing.

You assert in (1) that physical existence requires a cause, and in (2) that nothingness is not physical. But (1) says nothing about not-physical things. (1) only talks about physical things, so it can't help us when it comes to "nothingness" as defined. The most we can conclude from (1) is that any causeless thing cannot be physical. But you want to assert that any non-physical thing is causeless. I hope you can see this isn't the same thing.​

Just so you are aware, James: Syne has defined "requires" as meaning "necessary and sufficient", even though he is aware of the confusion that this leads if people are not made aware of that specific definition (such as yourself).
So if physical existence "requires" a cause then being caused is sufficient to state that it must be physical.
Thus the non-physical has no cause (per he premise).​

As for his premise 6, that the universe began a finite time in the past, this does not logically exclude infinite regress.
It only excludes it within our universe.
The cause of our universe (U) may have been physical (P1), which in turn may have have a physical cause (P2) etc.
An infinite regress of physical causation, of which our universe is but one link, possibly the last.

So the bullet-point that follows the premise seems invalid.
And if the argument does not rule this possibility out then, as explained to him by you as well as me, any conclusion that does not allow for this possibility is not valid.

 

[James R]

Just so you are aware, James: Syne has defined "requires" as meaning "necessary and sufficient", even though he is aware of the confusion that this leads if people are not made aware of that specific definition (such as yourself).

Thanks. So, if I understand correctly, then according to Syne, when he writes:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.

he is not saying "Physical existence implies a cause", which would be the common-sense interpretation of "requires", but rather "Physical existence is equivalent to a cause". That's a rather idiosyncratic usage of "requires".

Broken down to it's basics, the difference is between "A implies B" and "A is equivalent to B".

Consider the negative forms of these statements.
"A implies B" has negative "Not B implies not A", but not "Not A implies not B" (which is the point I made above).
"A is equivalent to B" has negative "Not B implies not A" and also "Not A implies not B".

In terms of "necessary" vs "sufficient" conditions we have:
For "A implies B", if A is true then that is sufficient to establish B, but it is not necessary for A to be true in order for B to be true.
For "A equivalent to B", it is is necessary for A to be true if B is to be true.

 

[Sarkus]

Sorry, James. Baldeee seems to have moved the goalposts without me noticing. He started by attacking the soundness of premises and seemingly demanding that the premises exhaustively exclude all other possibilities. Now he is arguing the validity instead. You are right. The conclusion must follow from true premises, and I've not refuted that fact. I have told Baldeee that premises need not be exhaustive, they need only be true and support the conclusion. He seems to demand that new premises be added until all other possibilities are exhaustively ruled out. That is impractical and not a requirement of a logical argument.

While I wouldn't otherwise wish to get involved in the debate between you and Baldeee, I must call you out on several things:
The idea that Baldeee has moved the goalposts:
His first post was #237, in which he states: "Since when does logical form make assumptions not within the premises?"
and
"The form of logic doesn't care about the soundness, it merely cares about what can logically follow from what is stated."
Without wishing to repeat the entirety of his post, and using the above as example of focus, it is abundantly clear from the content that issues of validity were the prime direction of his discussion.

His next post, #246: "Until I move onto the soundness of the premises, I'm concentrating on the validity of the argument, otherwise no matter how true the premises, the argument will remain unsound."
and
"No, I'm discussing validity - I haven't even begun to discuss the veracity of the premises."
At this point, his second post to you, he is having to explicitly state that he is concentrating on validity and not soundness.

His post #260 is also mostly with regard to validity.

His post #284: "If you don't mind I'll brush over the veracity..." and continues mostly about validity.

Post #299 (and continuation into #301): "Im concentrating on matters of validity, not soundness..."

So please do point out exactly where Baldeee has moved the goalposts?


Secondly, your understanding of what a valid logical argument is still wrong.
You state that all other possibilities do not need to be ruled out, yet anyone who has had even a basic lesson in logical form will tell you that that is precisely what a valid argument must do: if the premises are true and there exists any possibility of another conclusion other than the one reached then the conclusion reached is invalid. It might not be wrong but it is an invalid conclusion, and thus the argument is necessarily unsound.
Simply put, such a conclusion, if it is just one possibility, does not satisfy the requirement that an argument is valid if, and only if, it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion reached to be false.
If there exists an alternate solution to the one you reach then by definition it is invalid argument.


It remains ironic yet frustrating that you are so obnoxious and arrogant in your tone, so desiring to assert a self-perceived authority, yet you would not actually be wise enough to be sure you built your pedestal on solid ground. Baldeee used the analogy of you standing in quicksand while someone tries to throw you a rope, but that metaphor breaks down if no one can any longer be bothered to help you. Give them reason to, Syne.

I suppose at this juncture it would be too much for you not only to apologise to Baldeee for besmirching his name but also actually address the criticism he, I and others have put before you with regard your incorrect understanding of what validity actually means?

 

[kx000]

The word god is magnenemous. It needs to be defined. It can generally be used as a verb, adjective, and a noun.

 

[James R]

The word god is magnenemous. It needs to be defined.

What does "magnenemous" mean? The closest I can think of is "magnanimous", but that's a completely different thing.

You don't mean "ambiguous", do you?

It can generally be used as a verb, adjective, and a noun.

As a verb? Can you give an example please?

 

[kx000]

What does "magnenemous" mean? The closest I can think of is "magnanimous", but that's a completely different thing.

You don't mean "ambiguous", do you?


As a verb? Can you give an example please?

I was thinking of the wrong word I guess. I'm trying to say he's encompasingly large and had generally large perimiter to him. That he's great.

A verb for God would be nomnialized but not necisarily concious. It needs an entity. Maybe to die, or to kill. The angel of death as nomnialized verb. It can be holy, just kind of comes up short as a conciousness.