Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God

Does the Kalam Cosmological Argument convince you that God exists?

  • Yes.

    Votes: 1 3.7%
  • No.

    Votes: 25 92.6%
  • I'm not sure that I properly understand the argument.

    Votes: 1 3.7%
  • No opinion or would rather not answer.

    Votes: 0 0.0%

  • Total voters
    27
P1: All physical things require a cause.
P2. Only the physical exists.
C1. Infinite regress of physical causation.

This is an example of a valid logical argument.

Your conclusion does not follow from the premises given, but it doesn't need to because the conclusion is a tautology. So it doesn't matter than you are missing a premise about time, whereby you can deduce or infer any infinite anything, or that the second premise can be false because it has no bearing on the conclusion. Your conclusion basically says 'physical causation', since 'infinite regress' just means more 'physical causation'.

So your argument boils down to:
(cowbell) because more (cowbell)
It is a vacuous validity because the conclusion is simply a restatement of the first premise.

Please outline the circular reasoning in the above argument?
If you do deem it circular, or question begging, then you will probably see such in every conclusion that is merely consistent with the premises.

The conclusion is a restatement of the first premise. The second premise is superfluous, so consistency in a tautology is trivial.

Do you disagree with P1 above?
P2 - this seems rather parsimonious, wouldn't you agree?
Or should we start positing the non-physical?
Is it sound?
Well, you come up with something that is non-physical and we'll see.
Now, if the conclusion is not what we'd like, or goes against observed data / knowledge, then we can say that either P1 or P2 must be unsound.
But as an argument it is valid, and does lead to infinite regress with no question-begging and no circular reasoning.

FYI - this is not an argument I adhere to, it is simply an argument to make a point, to answer your questions.

P2 is not parsimonious because it is unnecessary. Something non-physical could exist and the conclusion still be true. And as you so fervently claimed, your premises don't even rule out other possible conclusions, like a causal loop. Granted, I don't think they need to, but I'm holding you to your own claim.

And god forbid you assert an argument you might actually believe, rather than just rhetorical examples.

The conclusion of everything is a simple tautology if phrased like that.
God exists if, and only if, it is true that God exists.
God doesn't exist if, and only if, it is true that God doesn't exist.
Infinite regress is a solution to the premises in the same way that any other conclusion is, and is as open to question begging and circularity as any other argument - but is not in and of itself question-begging or circular - as shown above.

That's exactly why mine has no mention of god until the conclusion. You can call it begging the question (an informal fallacy) or tautology (vacuously valid), whichever one sounds better to you.

If this is the case then you are not ruling out infinite regress of the non-physical either.
Your premise "physical existence requires a cause" says nothing about the non-physical - whether it needs a cause or not.
And there may also be other non-physical whatevers other than nothingness and/or God.
So the validity of your argument starts to break down even more if you wish in your conclusion to limit the non-physical to just those.

You need to find some way to exclude the other possibilities, as you have been informed previously.


And you still haven't acknowledged that you comprehend validity yet.
Do you accept your previous understanding was incorrect?

The possibility of 'non-physical whatevers' would be a matter of soundness, not validity. And my C3 is a syllogism concluding that nothing needs no cause. I've already excluded all alternatives, go back and read my response to James.


Now, if you wish to fix your infinite regress argument, you'll need to find some universally crucial contingent process, other than causation, and explain that in terms of infinite regress.
 
I'm not sure that you understand the term "validity". ... It could be that there is not enough evidence to reach a valid conclusion on the issue.

You have demonstrated your misunderstanding of validity. Evidence is a matter of soundness, not validity.
 
You didn't quote me.

Why not?

C'mon

I'm right here.
 
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You have demonstrated your misunderstanding of validity. Evidence is a matter of soundness, not validity.
Exactly. And you are claiming that, in order for an infinite causal chain to be taken seriously, one has to create a valid argument with an infinite causal chain as a conclusion. That's not what validity is about.
 
Your conclusion does not follow from the premises given, but it doesn't need to because the conclusion is a tautology. So it doesn't matter than you are missing a premise about time, whereby you can deduce or infer any infinite anything, or that the second premise can be false because it has no bearing on the conclusion. Your conclusion basically says 'physical causation', since 'infinite regress' just means more 'physical causation'.

So your argument boils down to:
(cowbell) because more (cowbell)
It is a vacuous validity because the conclusion is simply a restatement of the first premise.
If this is your honest assessment then you're struggling with the basics of logic, I'm afraid.
You honestly think that the conclusion is simply a restatement of the first premise?
The first premise is that physical existence requires a cause.
This cause can be physical or non-physical.
The only thing the premise rules out is that physical existence can be causeless.
The second premise then rules out the non-physical as a possible cause, as it states that only the physical exists.
The conclusion can not be validly reached from either the first or second premise in isolation but is the valid implication from combining both.
The conclusion thus states that the physical has a cause, and the second says that this cause can not be non-physical, and thus the cause must also be physical.
There is no tautology: the first premise does not say that the cause must be physical, the second premise does not say that the physical needs a cause.
There is also no need to have a premise about time.
If you wish to insert one in your argument, that's fine, do so.
But you asked for a valid argument that results in infinite regress, and I have provided one (accepting that I actually would have to rule out self-causation as an option).
The conclusion is a restatement of the first premise. The second premise is superfluous, so consistency in a tautology is trivial.
While the conclusion is a possibility given the first premise, one can not conclude it until the introduction of the second premise (and ignoring self-causation).
This should be clear from the above, since the first premise does not limit the cause to either the physical or non-physical.
Only when the possibility of non-physical involvement is removed via the second premise can we conclude as it does.
If you can not follow this and accept it then we are at an impasse due to your ignorance: one can not have a meaningful discussion on matters of logic if the person you are discussing with is unable to understand such relatively simple concepts.
P2 is not parsimonious because it is unnecessary. Something non-physical could exist and the conclusion still be true. And as you so fervently claimed, your premises don't even rule out other possible conclusions, like a causal loop. Granted, I don't think they need to, but I'm holding you to your own claim.
First, a causal loop is a type of infinite regress, so is covered under the term.
Second, P2 is required specifically to rule out the non-physical.
In the absence if P2 the non-physical could logically exist and the conclusion could still be true, but the conclusion in that scenario would not be valid as there would exist other possibilities.
Thus P2 is required for the argument to be valid (again, ignoring self-causation).

This continuing misunderstanding by you of what constitutes a valid argument is frustrating given the numerous times that people have tried to explain it to you.
You simply refuse to listen, refuse to acknowledge that you were wrong, and refuse to learn up from your mistake.
Such behaviour is bordering on the troll-like, and I sincerely hope you don't go down that path.
But it is frustrating nonetheless.
And god forbid you assert an argument you might actually believe, rather than just rhetorical examples.
Is there a need to?
We are discussing the KCA in this thread, and principally the validity of the logic, not my beliefs.
We have moved on to your own version, but again there is simply no need for me to put forth an argument of my own.
But none of that detracts from the flaws identified in the argument you presented, and the fact that you have not yet grasped what validity entails, despite numerous attempts to explain it to you.
That's exactly why mine has no mention of god until the conclusion. You can call it begging the question (an informal fallacy) or tautology (vacuously valid), whichever one sounds better to you.
My point is that if you want to phrase the conclusion in a tautological manner then it will be a tautology.
That you only bring god into your argument at the end is irrelevant to the criticism in this regard.
This rephrasing you used can apply to every conclusion: if it is true then it is true.
I.e. The criticism is with your attempt to rephrase the conclusion in such a manner, that effectively ignores any argument that leads to it, and then you claim it to be a tautology simply on the way you have phrased it.
The possibility of 'non-physical whatevers' would be a matter of soundness, not validity.
The veracity of their existence or not, sure, that would be a matter of soundness.
But within the form of the argument, they exist as a logical possibility until ruled out - through premise or axiom or simply by logical impossibility.
And unless you can logically rule out those other possible conclusions, the conclusion you reach will be invalid.
And my C3 is a syllogism concluding that nothing needs no cause. I've already excluded all alternatives, go back and read my response to James.
Sure, but that in itself does not logically rule out the existence of other non-physical 'whatevers', does it.
Thus your conclusion is invalid as you conclude on a specific possibility when others logically remain.
Now, if you wish to fix your infinite regress argument, you'll need to find some universally crucial contingent process, other than causation, and explain that in terms of infinite regress.
Alternatively you need to understand the he basics of logic.
You asked for an example and I have provided one (with the addendum of a premise that rules out self-causation).
Please do not blame me for your inability to understand it.

If JamesR, Sarkus, Yazata and others are reading this, please feel free to confirm or deny that the example I gave is a logically valid argument that results in infinite regress (with the addendum of a premise that rules out self-causation), and also that there is no question-begging, and nor is it a tautology.
 
If JamesR, Sarkus, Yazata and others are reading this, please feel free to confirm or deny that the example I gave is a logically valid argument that results in infinite regress (with the addendum of a premise that rules out self-causation), and also that there is no question-begging, and nor is it a tautology.
Baldeee, once you remove the possibility of self-causation as you have identified (e.g. Insert a premise P3: self-causation is not possible) then your initial argument appears valid in the conclusion of infinite regress of physical causation. I honestly have no idea what Syne is trying to pull by claiming that the conclusion doesn't follow, and that it's somehow tautological, since it is quote clearly the only logical conclusion: if physical existence requires a cause, is the only thing that exists, and you rule out self-causation, then the only conclusion is that physical existence is caused by other physical existence, and that that physical existence is in turn caused by another physical existence etc... A valid conclusion of infinite regress if ever I encountered one. The conclusion does not follow from either of the premises taken on their own, and is only reached through the combination of premises. Thus it is neither tautological nor begs the question.

Next he'll be trying to argue that in the syllogism:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore Socrates is mortal

also begs the question since you're assuming in the conclusion what is stated in the 2nd premise. And the first one.
Or that it's tautological because the conclusion can be rephrased: Socrates is mortal because Socrates is mortal.

Simply put, every time he responds he adds to the evidence that he hasn't really got a clue about logic. And if you're feeling frustrated about it, perhaps best not feed it. Syne's argument as given appears invalid for the reasons already stated (once you get past the murkiness of his "requires" debacle) but since he doesn't actually understand what it means for an argument to be valid, he'll only disagree and claim it fits his understanding of validity.

And that's before we get onto issues of soundness.
 
The key point in begging the question is that the conclusion is assumed in one of the premises. In contrast, a valid logical argument relies on more than one premise in combination to deduce the conclusion.

1. All men are mortal
2. Socrates is a man
3. Therefore Socrates is mortal


We can't conclude anything about Socrates from (1) alone, because for all we know Socrates could be an immortal god. Similarly, we can't conclude anything about the mortality of Socrates from (2) alone, because for all we know it is possible that men can be immortal. But put (1) and (2) together and suddenly we deduce (3).

Now, is this argument tautological? It is in the sense that there is no "new" information in (3) that wasn't already there in (1) and (2). The argument doesn't generate new facts out of nothing. What it does is that it unpack the reasoning process that leads to a deduction that throws new light on the situation.

Now look at the Kalam cosmological argument.

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

The argument I put in the opening post of this thread is that this argument potentially begs the question in its first premise. Why? Let's go through it one more time.

Premise (1) talks about "Everything that begins to exist". I asked "Is there anything other than God that does not begin to exist?" If the answer to that question is "No", then premise 1 says "Everything other than God has a cause". Premise (2) just notes "The universe is not God". And (3) follows.

There's no problem with this as a logical argument, by the way. The problem comes when we tack on:

4. Therefore the cause of the universe is God.

along with Craig's initially unstated "ontological" arguments that are tacked on to justify his equating of the "first cause" with God. Craig wants God to be the sole possible "causeless cause". But look what out re-written premise (1) says. It assumes, by itself, that God is the only uncaused cause. So the conclusion is built into the premises from the start and the argument begs the question.

One possible way to salvage the argument is to claim that something else, apart than God, did not begin to exist. But then we have trouble stepping from (3) to (4), because we have acknowledged that there might be causes of the universe other than God.
 
Now look at the Kalam cosmological argument.

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

The argument I put in the opening post of this thread is that this argument potentially begs the question in its first premise. Why? Let's go through it one more time.

Premise (1) talks about "Everything that begins to exist". I asked "Is there anything other than God that does not begin to exist?" If the answer to that question is "No", then premise 1 says "Everything other than God has a cause". Premise (2) just notes "The universe is not God". And (3) follows.

In your Socrates argument does the the first premise force, or even suggest the question "Are there any men that aren't mortal. The answer would be no, as no one has raised it. So why raise the question in the KCA?

Secondly, lets assume there are other phenomena that does not begin to exist, and that phenomenon isn't what you would call God. So what? Having logically concluded that that the cosmos (which it seems we have) is caused by an uncaused causal agent, would be an entirely different discussion. Wouldn't you agree, in all honesty?

It assumes, by itself, that God is the only uncaused cause. So the conclusion is built into the premises from the start and the argument begs the question.

No it doesn't, it makes no assumptions. It concludes that the the universe, like all other things began to exist, based on empirical evidence.

One possible way to salvage the argument is to claim that something else, apart than God, did not begin to exist. But then we have trouble stepping from (3) to (4), because we have acknowledged that there might be causes of the universe other than God.

That is simply a get out clause, much like the ''There is no evidence for the existence of God clause.
No matter what, you will always use that as an excuse, just like you will always use this as an excuse to no accept the KCA. Quibble all you like but we can see what is going on.

jan.
 
In your Socrates argument does the the first premise force, or even suggest the question "Are there any men that aren't mortal. The answer would be no, as no one has raised it. So why raise the question in the KCA?
Because the KCA specifically refers to a subset of everything, notably everything that begins to exist, and thus raises the question of the subset of things that do not begin to exist.
The Socrates example makes no reference to a subset of all men.
Had it said "All men in Greece are mortal" then we would rightly raise the question of the subset of "all men" who don't live in Greece.
If you qualify a subdivision of the whole then it is acceptable to raise the question of what is outside that subdivision.
If you don't agree then insert another premise such as "everything begins to exist" and this logically closes off the possibility of things not having a beginning.
Secondly, lets assume there are other phenomena that does not begin to exist, and that phenomenon isn't what you would call God. So what? Having logically concluded that that the cosmos (which it seems we have) is caused by an uncaused causal agent, would be an entirely different discussion. Wouldn't you agree, in all honesty?
You would have to show how the causal agent of the universe was uncaused, rather than possibly being itself caused.
Assuming you can give valid logic that does that, you then move on to discussing the soundness of the premises, not the validity.
As such you would discuss the veracity of the premises.
No it doesn't, it makes no assumptions. It concludes that the the universe, like all other things began to exist, based on empirical evidence.
Empirical evidence is a matter of soundness, not validity.
The valid conclusion to the premises is simply "therefore the universe was caused".
But this conclusion of the argument is not reached from empirical evidence but on the validity of the conclusion from the premises.
It simply means that if the premises are true then the conclusion can be nothing but true.
If you wish the argument to be sound, that is when you start introducing issues of empirical evidence.
That is simply a get out clause, much like the ''There is no evidence for the existence of God clause.
No matter what, you will always use that as an excuse, just like you will always use this as an excuse to no accept the KCA. Quibble all you like but we can see what is going on.
We can indeed see: we can see that you don't fully grasp the concepts of logic being discussed.
Your dismissal of James' comment as "simply a get out clause" is thus only to be expected since you seem unable to formulate a cogent response.
 
If JamesR, Sarkus, Yazata and others are reading this, please feel free to confirm or deny that the example I gave is a logically valid argument that results in infinite regress (with the addendum of a premise that rules out self-causation), and also that there is no question-begging, and nor is it a tautology.

I don't see any problems with it.

P1: All physical things require a cause.
P2. Only the physical exists.
C1. Infinite regress of physical causation.

While your version looks ok to me, and certainly has the merit of simplicity and brevity, I might restate your P1.

P1: All physical things require a physical cause.

And rewrite P2.

P2: Only physical things enter into physically causal relationships with other physical things.

Now look at the Kalam cosmological argument.

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

I think that Craig's 1 and 2 do validly imply 3 (by modus ponens).

The argument I put in the opening post of this thread is that this argument potentially begs the question in its first premise. Why? Let's go through it one more time.

Premise (1) talks about "Everything that begins to exist". I asked "Is there anything other than God that does not begin to exist?" If the answer to that question is "No", then premise 1 says "Everything other than God has a cause".

Only if we introduce an additional premise that answers the question you asked:

P1a: God is the one and only thing that doesn't begin to exist.

Craig's P.1 and my new P.1a would produce your 'Everything other than God has a cause'.

Otherwise the question remains open. Craig suggests elsewhere that he believes that what he calls 'abstract objects' don't begin to exist. By that I suppose that he means Platonic-style forms such as numbers, mathematical and logical relationships and perhaps things like the laws of physics. Then he introduces yet another new premise in his 'ontological analysis' that claims that abstract objects don't enter into causal relations.

Premise (2) just notes "The universe is not God". And (3) follows.

P2 reads "The universe began to exist." It doesn't mention God. Craig's talking about the 'big-bang' apparently.

Your 'The universe is not God' would seemingly be the conclusion of an argument that takes as its premises my P1a and Craig's P2.

There's no problem with this as a logical argument, by the way. The problem comes when we tack on:

4. Therefore the cause of the universe is God.

along with Craig's initially unstated "ontological" arguments that are tacked on to justify his equating of the "first cause" with God.

Yes. I'm doubtful about the validity of Craig's argument when 4. is the conclusion and his additional premises are included. Having said that, I'm reasonably certain that the entire expanded argument leading to 4. isn't sound.
 
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I don't see any problems with it.

While your version looks ok to me, and certainly has the merit of simplicity and brevity, I might restate your P1....
Bear in mind that the argument exampled was not intended as a version of the KCA or indeed of anything I might believe, but simply an example of an argument that leads validly to the conclusion of an infinite regress, as requested by Syne.
 
Jan Ardena,

In your Socrates argument does the the first premise force, or even suggest the question "Are there any men that aren't mortal. The answer would be no, as no one has raised it. So why raise the question in the KCA?
Baldeee already responded to this, but I'll have a go too.

Suppose we had this:

1. All men who have blond hair are mortal.
2. Socrates is a blond-haired man.
3. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

Premise (1) introduces a subset of "all men", namely "All men who have blond hair". We might well ask "Are there any men other than Socrates who have blond hair?" If not, then (1) could be re-written as:

1. Socrates is mortal.

In this case, the argument would beg the question, because hidden in premise (1) is the assumption that Socrates is mortal, and this is what the entire argument is supposed to establish. By hiding that assumption in (1), the rest of the logical argument is rendered redundant - useless. It tells us nothing that wasn't originally assumed. It's no longer a logical proof that Socrates is mortal, but just a statement about an assumption we're making.

If, on the other hand, there are (potentially) other blond men, then the argument no longer begs the question, because from (the original) premise (1) alone we can deduce nothing about Socrates. (2) is needed as well, in order for us to arrive at (3).

One more thing. Consider the original Socrates argument:

1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore Socrates is mortal.

We might well ask: Are there any men other than Socrates, or is Socrates the only man? If there are no other men, then this argument begs the question; we could re-write (1) as "Socrates is the (only) mortal man", which would render the rest of the argument tautological.

Secondly, lets assume there are other phenomena that does not begin to exist, and that phenomenon isn't what you would call God. So what? Having logically concluded that that the cosmos (which it seems we have) is caused by an uncaused causal agent, would be an entirely different discussion. Wouldn't you agree, in all honesty?
Yes. We'd conclude that the cosmos is caused by an uncaused causal agent different from God. So the argument would no longer be a proof that God exists, which is what it purports to be.

Jan Ardena said:
James R said:
But look what out re-written premise (1) says. It assumes, by itself, that God is the only uncaused cause. So the conclusion is built into the premises from the start and the argument begs the question.
No it doesn't, it makes no assumptions. It concludes that the the universe, like all other things began to exist, based on empirical evidence.
You're obviously not carefully following what I wrote, which was this:

Premise (1) talks about "Everything that begins to exist". I asked "Is there anything other than God that does not begin to exist?" If the answer to that question is "No", then premise 1 says "Everything other than God has a cause". Premise (2) just notes "The universe is not God". And (3) follows.​

I've bolded the relevant condition that qualifies my statement that you quoted. I'm dealing there only with the situation in which God is the only contemplated thing-that-does-not-begin-to-exist.

Regarding premise (2) of the KCA generally, bear in mind that it is another premise and not a conclusion. You are free to argue that there is empirical evidence that the universe began to exist, but that is a matter of soundness of the premise, not a matter that goes to the question of the validity of the KCA argument.

Jan Ardena said:
James R said:
One possible way to salvage the argument is to claim that something else, apart than God, did not begin to exist. But then we have trouble stepping from (3) to (4), because we have acknowledged that there might be causes of the universe other than God.
That is simply a get out clause, much like the ''There is no evidence for the existence of God clause."
You're right. It's a get out clause that you need in order to avoid the KCA collapsing on the grounds of begging the question. If you don't accept this "get out clause" and insist that God is the only thing that did not begin to exist, then the KCA begs the question and the argument fails.

This is not at all like the statement "there is no evidence for the existence of God". That might be a premise in a logical argument. Whether it is true or false is a question of the soundness of the premise. It does not go to the question of the validity of the argument, at least not in any obvious way that I can see.

No matter what, you will always use that as an excuse, just like you will always use this as an excuse to no accept the KCA. Quibble all you like but we can see what is going on.
We're about 350 posts into this thread and you're barely beginning to grasp the logical objection to the KCA that I raised right back up there in post #1. In fact, I still don't think you understand the point. You keep confusing issues of validity and issues of soundness. You don't seem to follow the explanation that has been clearly presented to you by at least three different people a number of times now.

And most importantly, you have raised not a single substantive response to the argument that I put in post #1. Right here, you're reduced to bluff and bluster about how the objection is an "excuse" and a "quibble". But you have written nothing that refutes the objection to the KCA that I have raised.

You might do well to carefully review Yazata's various posts on the matter from earlier in the thread. He has raised substantial points that might work in your favour, if only you understood them.
 
What's more likely, that Jan still doesn't understand even after pages and pages of explanation, or that Jan is just pretending not to understand so that s/he can evade and ignore like s/he always does?

Seriously James, by this point I'm conviced that you're just encouraging this type of behaviour for shits and giggles.
 
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What's more likely, that Jan still doesn't understand even after pages and pages of explanation, or that Jan is just pretending not to understand so that s/he can evade and ignore like s/he always does?

Seriously James, by this point I'm conviced that you're just encouraging this type of behaviour for shits and giggles.

No dude :leaf:

This logic is AWESOME!


My cat has hair.
I have hair.
Hence, I am a cat.
 
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