Just a note: B and C are matters of veracity of premises, and thus speak to soundness, right?
But if Jan at least confirms them as premises within the argument then we will know what needs examining when we get on to such matters.
Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God
- Thread starter James R
- Start date
But if Jan at least confirms them as premises within the argument then we will know what needs examining when we get on to such matters.
Yes, that's right. We should leave them until we have at least a logically complete and valid argument.
No. The totality is the totality.
Since things come into and out of being, or begin to exist, then not exist, being must be the totality.
God is either a part of the totality, or the totality.
God cannot be a part, as to be a part, there has to be something to be a part of.
All things is everything, and everything begins to exist.
God, as per definition, and description, fits the totality which must be conscious in order for us (living entities) to be conscious.
No. The totality does not begin to exist.
Things begin to exist from the totality.
Yes, the totality from which things can, and do begin to exist.
The totality encompasses the will to cause all things to come into being.
God and the totality are synonymous. The totality is impersonal, but the personal aspect is what we term God.
Non things, aren't things.
Things are what exist, so that we can know, or predict their existence.
It is pointless to talk of non things existing in the same way we talk of things existing.
We don't know of any non existent things, we can only create concepts or ideas of things that do not exist.
From the premises you listed?
I don't know that I could.
The totality must cause at will, as there are no time restraints.
A will, indicates a personality, and a personality indicates a person.
Hence we get a personal God.
jan.
I'm okay with KCA. It seems that folks are trying desperately, to find some fault with it.
If they bring in other ideas to do their bidding, than so can I.
jan.
It's a long discredited and obsolete argument. I'm not very surprised you find it convincing.
Jan Ardena is using slightly different definitions than everyone else and is either unaware of this or using the different definitions to slip away from hard questions.
I think their position is best presented in terms of mereology. For a super detailed account, you can go here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/ A slightly less detailed account is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereology I mean to use "mereological sum" to talk of a collection of things as the aggregate of things and their assigned properties, not as some distinct entity with its own properties.
The Oxford Reference's quick reference definition is pretty good: "The mereological sum of two elements is the whole that consists of both of them, regardless of their spatial or other distance. The notion is not the same as that of the set whose members are the pair of objects: a mereological sum of two spatial objects is itself a larger spatial object, whereas a set is not."
Here, in direct English terms, is what I believe the best representation of their position is:
All the distinct entities that we can identify in the world are things that come into being and pass out of being.
We can, however, consider the mereological sum of all distinct entities, the collection of all the beings as themselves.
This collection is not a distinct entity and there is no evidence that it came into being or will pass out of being.
All the distinct entities come in to being from some other part of the collection (and so too they pass away to become another part of the collection).
In this sense, the collection is the cause of every distinct being.
As consciousness is part of some of these distinct entities, so too it is part of the properties of the collection.
(Note that as a mereological sum, the properties are not parts of the collection as an entity, but merely an attribution to parts of the collection.)
Unfortunately, at this point, the argument to a personal divine being breaks down. (As arguably, it should.) Because we are doing mereology, we can say that the collection has consciousness, but this is very different from saying that a new entity, the collection, has its own consciousness. So too the merological sum takes actions merely through the actions of its parts, not as an entity considered in itself.
This argument simply fails because it relies either, at best, on a mistaken attribution to the set itself or, at worst, equivocation of the word, "will" or merely circular reasoning: "The totality must cause at will, as there are no time restraints. A will, indicates a personality, and a personality indicates a person."
(I do appreciate that the poster's name is a clever kind of anagram of "Arjuna".)
I think their position is best presented in terms of mereology. For a super detailed account, you can go here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/ A slightly less detailed account is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereology I mean to use "mereological sum" to talk of a collection of things as the aggregate of things and their assigned properties, not as some distinct entity with its own properties.
The Oxford Reference's quick reference definition is pretty good: "The mereological sum of two elements is the whole that consists of both of them, regardless of their spatial or other distance. The notion is not the same as that of the set whose members are the pair of objects: a mereological sum of two spatial objects is itself a larger spatial object, whereas a set is not."
Here, in direct English terms, is what I believe the best representation of their position is:
All the distinct entities that we can identify in the world are things that come into being and pass out of being.
We can, however, consider the mereological sum of all distinct entities, the collection of all the beings as themselves.
This collection is not a distinct entity and there is no evidence that it came into being or will pass out of being.
All the distinct entities come in to being from some other part of the collection (and so too they pass away to become another part of the collection).
In this sense, the collection is the cause of every distinct being.
As consciousness is part of some of these distinct entities, so too it is part of the properties of the collection.
(Note that as a mereological sum, the properties are not parts of the collection as an entity, but merely an attribution to parts of the collection.)
Unfortunately, at this point, the argument to a personal divine being breaks down. (As arguably, it should.) Because we are doing mereology, we can say that the collection has consciousness, but this is very different from saying that a new entity, the collection, has its own consciousness. So too the merological sum takes actions merely through the actions of its parts, not as an entity considered in itself.
This argument simply fails because it relies either, at best, on a mistaken attribution to the set itself or, at worst, equivocation of the word, "will" or merely circular reasoning: "The totality must cause at will, as there are no time restraints. A will, indicates a personality, and a personality indicates a person."
(I do appreciate that the poster's name is a clever kind of anagram of "Arjuna".)
Yazata
Valued Senior Member
You just seem to be going back-and-forth with Jan endlessly. More than half the posts in this thread are about Jan and Jan's ideas, and Jan doesn't seem to even be discussing Craig's version of the first-cause argument.
I'm undecided whether it's valid or not. The way you presented it in your first post is obviously invalid, since 4. doesn't follow from 1., 2., and 3 (which seems to be a lemma, not a premise). But if we accept the truth of Craig's additional premises in his' ontological analysis', then it may or may not be valid. 4. might arguably follow from 1.,2., 3., and Craig's additional premises. (In his 'ontological analysis' he argues that the universe's first cause must have certain characteristics, call them A., B., and C.)
I haven't put much effort into trying to decide whether that's so. My initial suspicion is that his ontological analysis leaves out the most important premise, that anything with characteristics A, B, and C. must be God. If 1., 2., 3., A., B., and C. were true, and if the additional premise identifying all those characteristics as God was true as well, then 4. might arguably follow.
The thing is, in order to make a decision about the validity of Craig's argument, people will have to examine Craig's premises. But everyone is arguing about Jan Ardena's ideas instead of Craig's.
Soundness is where Craig's argument becomes unpersuasive in my opinion. His conclusion may or may not follow logically from his premises, but is there any convincing reason to believe that all the premises are true? The additional premises in his 'ontological analysis' are especially doubtful, particularly the one about uncaused personal agent-causation.
Last edited:
JamesR: In that case I must ask you, whether there is any "thing" that did not begin to exist?
Therefore, according to you: the totality is a "thing" that does not begin to exist, but since everything begins to exist, the totality must begin to exist.
Voila!
As for Hibert's Hotel paradox, this seems to be an argument for the impossibility of physical things being infinite, not necessarily events. It also relies on an understanding of "infinite" as somehow being a determinable number, and plays to the absurdity of there being an apparent multitude of these "infinities", all apparently of the same size.
But once you understand that infinities are not all of one absolute size, surely Hibert's Hotel is no longer a paradox, nor is it counter-intuitive, you simply have different size of infinities - the infinity of even numbers is smaller than the infinity of Real numbers, for example. Why is that counter-intuitive?
Perhaps, Jan, you could explain why you think it supports your position? In your own words, though?
The rest of your post, though, seems to have not much to do with the KCA rather than your own attempt (and I use the word loosely) at a logical argument?
So the totality is a "thing", and this "thing" did not begin to exist.Jan Ardena said:
So God is the totality and, as per above, the totality is a "thing" that did not begin to exist.Jan Ardena said:
So all "things" is what we call "everything", and "everything begins to exist... And since the totality is a "thing" it must be included within "everything" since "everything" is all "things".Jan Ardena said:
Therefore, according to you: the totality is a "thing" that does not begin to exist, but since everything begins to exist, the totality must begin to exist.
Voila!
As for Hibert's Hotel paradox, this seems to be an argument for the impossibility of physical things being infinite, not necessarily events. It also relies on an understanding of "infinite" as somehow being a determinable number, and plays to the absurdity of there being an apparent multitude of these "infinities", all apparently of the same size.
But once you understand that infinities are not all of one absolute size, surely Hibert's Hotel is no longer a paradox, nor is it counter-intuitive, you simply have different size of infinities - the infinity of even numbers is smaller than the infinity of Real numbers, for example. Why is that counter-intuitive?
Perhaps, Jan, you could explain why you think it supports your position? In your own words, though?
The rest of your post, though, seems to have not much to do with the KCA rather than your own attempt (and I use the word loosely) at a logical argument?
Jan Ardena:
I'm having trouble sorting through all the mystical mumbo jumbo you posted. From what I can gather, you are now equating your "totality" with "God", and also with "being" (which is something you've just introduced for the first time).
You assume from the start that "the totality" exists, and therefore that God exists, since they are one and the same.
Hence, you have thrown away the pretense of making an argument for the existence of God, in favour of simply assuming that God exists from the start.
Do you want to discuss the Kalam Cosmological Argument at all? If not, I think we're done here.
All that fluff about whether God is a "thing" or a "non-thing" is irrelevant, because now you are claiming that God is the totality. Your "argument" for the existence of God reduces to:
1. The totality exists and it is God.
2. Therefore God exists.
This is not actually a logical argument at all. It's just a definition of God.
The problem with this definition of God is that it is not the way that most people or religions think about God. It's all very well to claim that you are God, I am God, that tree over there is God, the clouds and the beetles and the dust particles are all God. But that doesn't begin to approach the idea that God is a separate, personal, supernatural being who created things.
Is it too much to ask of you that you be consistent in your own arguments, at least?
Do you want to discuss the Kalam Cosmological Argument?
Do you intend to reply to that objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument, or not?
I'm having trouble sorting through all the mystical mumbo jumbo you posted. From what I can gather, you are now equating your "totality" with "God", and also with "being" (which is something you've just introduced for the first time).
You assume from the start that "the totality" exists, and therefore that God exists, since they are one and the same.
Hence, you have thrown away the pretense of making an argument for the existence of God, in favour of simply assuming that God exists from the start.
Do you want to discuss the Kalam Cosmological Argument at all? If not, I think we're done here.
For the record, this confirms that you regard God and "the totality" as the same thing.
All that fluff about whether God is a "thing" or a "non-thing" is irrelevant, because now you are claiming that God is the totality. Your "argument" for the existence of God reduces to:
1. The totality exists and it is God.
2. Therefore God exists.
This is not actually a logical argument at all. It's just a definition of God.
The problem with this definition of God is that it is not the way that most people or religions think about God. It's all very well to claim that you are God, I am God, that tree over there is God, the clouds and the beetles and the dust particles are all God. But that doesn't begin to approach the idea that God is a separate, personal, supernatural being who created things.
Since the totality is equated with God, this is simply begging the question of where the universe came from.Jan Ardena said:
Begging the question still.
So there are no "non-things" after all? Then why did you waste so many words arguing with Sarkus that God is a "non-thing"?
Is it too much to ask of you that you be consistent in your own arguments, at least?
Do you have any argument for the existence of God? If so, maybe you should post in in a separate thread.
Do you want to discuss the Kalam Cosmological Argument?
Yes, but you haven't responded to Barker's objection that I raised in the opening post yet.
Do you intend to reply to that objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument, or not?
Last edited:
PhysBang:
Thanks for your post. That's an interesting distinction to make between sets and mereologies.
I don't for a moment think that Jan is anywhere near that level of sophistication in terms of awareness of what he is arguing. In fact, it is because he is so imprecise and waffly that the rest of us are constantly struggling to recast his words into some kind of defensible and coherent form. What ends up happening is that we come up with versions of an argument that are actually amenable to discussion, whereas if we just dealt with what Jan writes at face value we'd realise that there's actually nothing of substance there. It's all smoke and mirrors with Jan, and attempts to distract.
Yazata:
When you think about it, the first premise of Craig's KCA is exceedingly curious in form. This whole business about "things that begin to exist". Obviously, I think there's a strong argument to be made that this is a sneaky attempt to try to wedge God in as an unspoken assumption right at the start of the argument. My initial question remains unanswered: Is there anything other than God that does not begin to exist?
Thanks for your post. That's an interesting distinction to make between sets and mereologies.
I don't for a moment think that Jan is anywhere near that level of sophistication in terms of awareness of what he is arguing. In fact, it is because he is so imprecise and waffly that the rest of us are constantly struggling to recast his words into some kind of defensible and coherent form. What ends up happening is that we come up with versions of an argument that are actually amenable to discussion, whereas if we just dealt with what Jan writes at face value we'd realise that there's actually nothing of substance there. It's all smoke and mirrors with Jan, and attempts to distract.
Yazata:
That is true. I think the window has more or less closed on the possibility of having any fruitful discussion with Jan here. Probably I'll concentrate on discussing this with people who actually want to address the thread topic from now on.
What do you think of the argument regarding begging the question that I put in the opening post? Do you think the KCA begs the question or not?
Yes. All this side-tracking by Jan is a distraction from the main game. I could list about 10 separate objections to the KCA, some on the grounds of validity and others on the grounds of the soundness of the premises. But I wanted to try to deal with them one at a time rather than flooding everybody with all of them up front. So far, we're stuck on just the first one that I raised, and there's been no progress from there - at least not from anybody who claims the KCA is a valid argument.
I agree. But the issue of validity that I raised (following Barker) is one I think is interesting and a less obvious objection to the KCA than the usual questions of soundness, such as the question of whether the universe actually needs a cause and so on.
When you think about it, the first premise of Craig's KCA is exceedingly curious in form. This whole business about "things that begin to exist". Obviously, I think there's a strong argument to be made that this is a sneaky attempt to try to wedge God in as an unspoken assumption right at the start of the argument. My initial question remains unanswered: Is there anything other than God that does not begin to exist?
How about this version of Kalam's argument:
I'm not at all sure what 2. is about. It appears to depend on what they mean by "necessary", perhaps.
I'm not at all sure what 2. is about. It appears to depend on what they mean by "necessary", perhaps.
arfa brane:
Thanks for the link. That article is written by Craig and seems to be quiet a good presentation of his Kalam Cosmological Argument. Probably he has slightly modified it from his original version in an attempt to address some of the objections that have been raised.
For completeness, I'll post all steps and conclusions from the bottom of that article:
Specifically, premise (2) creates a distinction between "whatevers" that "begin to exist" and "whatevers" that do not begin to exist. And before we start arguing about "whatevers" vs "things" vs "totalities" and the like, I note that clearly Craig includes God in the "Whatever" in (1) and (2).
The same question arises: is there anything apart from God (Craig's "Personal Creator") that did not begin to exist?
If so, then premise (3) needs to be modified to include the possibility of some other thing that did not begin to exist being the "external ground of existence" for the universe.
If not, then premise (2) begs the question by implicitly assuming the existence of God, which is what the entire argument is supposed to prove.
---
In (2), by "necessary" I think Craig is asserting that anything that "begins to exist" could conceivably either exist or not exist. This is so as to exclude the possibility raised in Craig by (1) that the universe exists by reason of its own nature. On the other hand, Craig wants to do the opposite with God. He wants to claim that there can be no "external ground" for God, and that God exists due to his own nature (and thus is "necessary"). Note that Craig also sneaks in the "necessity" of God in his most dubious premise (3).
For now, I would still like to concentrate on the validity of the argument rather than addressing the huge problems of the soundness or otherwise of the various premises.
Anyway, the main point with this is that nothing has fundamentally been added or changed about the Kalam Cosmological Argument as I originally presented it. The above argument is equivalent, only slightly more explicit. Its assumptions are in there more clearly that the version (also from Craig) that I originally presented. Note that premise (3), in particular, still relies on other arguments that Craig does not make explicit here (although he does refer to them in the linked article).
Thanks for the link. That article is written by Craig and seems to be quiet a good presentation of his Kalam Cosmological Argument. Probably he has slightly modified it from his original version in an attempt to address some of the objections that have been raised.
For completeness, I'll post all steps and conclusions from the bottom of that article:
1. Whatever exists has a reason for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external ground.
2. Whatever begins to exist is not necessary in its existence.
3. If the universe has an external ground of its existence, then there exists a Personal Creator of the universe, who, sans the universe, is timeless, spaceless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful.
4. The universe began to exist.
5. Therefore (from 2 and 4), the universe is not necessary in its existence.
6. Therefore (from 1 and 5), the universe has an external ground of its existence.
7. Therefore (from 3 and 6), there exists a Personal Creator of the universe, who, sans the universe, is timeless, spaceless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful.
In the context of the objection I raised in the opening post of this thread, above, the same issue is found in premise 2 here.2. Whatever begins to exist is not necessary in its existence.
3. If the universe has an external ground of its existence, then there exists a Personal Creator of the universe, who, sans the universe, is timeless, spaceless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful.
4. The universe began to exist.
5. Therefore (from 2 and 4), the universe is not necessary in its existence.
6. Therefore (from 1 and 5), the universe has an external ground of its existence.
7. Therefore (from 3 and 6), there exists a Personal Creator of the universe, who, sans the universe, is timeless, spaceless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful.
Specifically, premise (2) creates a distinction between "whatevers" that "begin to exist" and "whatevers" that do not begin to exist. And before we start arguing about "whatevers" vs "things" vs "totalities" and the like, I note that clearly Craig includes God in the "Whatever" in (1) and (2).
The same question arises: is there anything apart from God (Craig's "Personal Creator") that did not begin to exist?
If so, then premise (3) needs to be modified to include the possibility of some other thing that did not begin to exist being the "external ground of existence" for the universe.
If not, then premise (2) begs the question by implicitly assuming the existence of God, which is what the entire argument is supposed to prove.
---
In (2), by "necessary" I think Craig is asserting that anything that "begins to exist" could conceivably either exist or not exist. This is so as to exclude the possibility raised in Craig by (1) that the universe exists by reason of its own nature. On the other hand, Craig wants to do the opposite with God. He wants to claim that there can be no "external ground" for God, and that God exists due to his own nature (and thus is "necessary"). Note that Craig also sneaks in the "necessity" of God in his most dubious premise (3).
For now, I would still like to concentrate on the validity of the argument rather than addressing the huge problems of the soundness or otherwise of the various premises.
Anyway, the main point with this is that nothing has fundamentally been added or changed about the Kalam Cosmological Argument as I originally presented it. The above argument is equivalent, only slightly more explicit. Its assumptions are in there more clearly that the version (also from Craig) that I originally presented. Note that premise (3), in particular, still relies on other arguments that Craig does not make explicit here (although he does refer to them in the linked article).
Considering I'd already defined the usage, continued confusion is your own problem.
- Physical existence requires a cause.
- God is not physical.
- Therefore, god has no cause.
- Therefore, god is the only available uncaused cause.
(2) If god were physical, we would expect to have access to some physical evidence for god. This premise does not assume god to exist. It merely makes the assumption that if one did, it could not be physical. I think you'd agree with that, as an uncontroversial assumption.
Earlier in this thread I posited that nothingness is the only 'other' non-physical (entity?...abstract object?). Nothingness shares all the necessary qualities of a creator god. Nothingness being the only non-physical is another uncontroversial assumption. Granted, the equivalency of god and nothingness does warrant further argument.
- Physical existence requires a cause.
- Nothingness is not physical.
- Therefore, nothingness has no cause.
- The universe can possess a net zero total energy.
- Therefore, nothingness can be an uncaused cause.
- The universe began a finite time in the past.
- An uncaused cause requires volition.
- Therefore, nothingness and god are equivalent in being volitional cause.
No need to get defensive. I've already told you that premises need not be exhaustive. Validity only requires that premises, if true, lead to the conclusion, not that ONLY those true premises lead to the conclusion. IOW, there's no requirement in logic to dismiss all possibilities.
Ah, ok ,I think I get premise 2. He's saying the universe itself isn't necessary to (explain) the beginning of the universe . . .?
Hmm, maybe not
This from his article:
But I think the problem is really with the universe having a beginning, is a "cause of the beginning of time" possible or even logical?
Hmm, maybe not
James R said:
This from his article:
Or in other words, since the universe had a beginning it is not eternal, hence the universe doesn't have the "essential properties" of necessary existence.
But I think the problem is really with the universe having a beginning, is a "cause of the beginning of time" possible or even logical?
Last edited:
Yazata
Valued Senior Member
I'm inclined to say 'yes'. But my reason for saying that isn't Barker's argument, which doesn't move me a whole lot.
From the first post:
I don't perceive anything "curious" about that one. I read it to mean anything with a temporal origin, a t=0 before which the object of discussion didn't exist and after which it did. My house was constructed in the 1950's. The Earth is said to be about 4.5 billion years old. Before it accreted, it didn't exist. When I look around the room I'm in, I see books, furniture, a TV and various things, all of which came into existence during the last 50 years or so and didn't always exist.
Ok.
I don't think that anyone can produce a complete and exhaustive list.
I don't think so, and I'm not convinced that Craig thinks so either.
I posted a reply to that question in post #20 at the bottom of page #1. (It seems to have been lost in all of the battling with Jan.)
I wrote:
"Arguably, mathematics and logic. The 'laws of physics' perhaps.
Of course I don't believe that God exists. Anything that doesn't exist and has never existed can be said to have never come into existence."
Craig seems to have been thinking along the same lines when he included premise #5 in the analysis of what he thinks must be responsible for causing the existence of the entire physical universe that's included in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology:
1. A first state of the material world cannot have a material explanation and must originate ex-nihilo in being without material cause, because no natural explanation can be causally prior to the very existence of the natural world (space, time and its contents). The cause must be outside space and time (timeless, spaceless, immaterial and enormously powerful).
2. Even if positing a plurality of causes prior to the origin of the universe, the causal chain must terminate in a cause which is absolutely first and uncaused, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise.
3. Occam's razor maintains the unicity of the first cause should be assumed.
4. Agent causation, volitional action, is the only ontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions. Therefore only personal free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a changeless cause.
5. Abstract objects, the only other ontological category known to have the properties of being uncaused, spaceless, timeless and immaterial, so not sit in causal relationships nor can they exercise volitional causal power.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_cosmological_argument
I'm not convinced of the truth of any of these additional ontological premises, including #5, which is most relevant to Barker's argument.
It seems to me that these premises are designed to conform to what Craig apparently thinks of as traditional theistic attributes and that's where I see the circularity and question-begging slipping in. Craig is loading his premises (especially #4) so that God (as Craig want to conceive of 'him') pops out of the argument at the conclusion end.
Last edited:
Yazata:
For example, you say your house was constructed in the 1950s. Does that mean it "began to exist" in the 1950s? All of the materials that make up your house existed prior to 1950. Ultimately, your house is built from matter and energy that all existed at the big bang. Since the big bang, all that has happened is that some of that matter and energy has been rearranged to enable the eventual construction of your house.
It could therefore be argued that, in fact, only one thing "began to exist" in the relevant sense, namely the universe as a whole. In that case, premise 1 "everything that begins to exist has a cause" reduces to "The universe has a cause". That is, now "the universe has a cause" is a premise rather than a conclusion from a logical argument.
Also, it does not follow that just because things in the universe "began to exist" that the universe as a whole began to exist. Matter, for example, came into existence a little after the big bang. There was no "before the big bang", so arguably it doesn't make sense to talk about the big bang (i.e. the universe as a whole) "beginning to exist". Things begin to exist in time. If there's no time, there can be no beginning of something.
You say that neither you nor Craig think God is the only thing. What does Craig list, apart from God?
As for you, you suggest "mathematics and logic. The 'laws of physics' perhaps." These are inventions of human beings, aren't they? There was no mathematics prior to the existence of human beings.
As for the "laws of physics", we could make the same argument as for the "laws of mathematics". Alternatively, you might be suggesting that there are some kind of natural processes that operate outside the bounds of space and time and the universe. If that is the case, couldn't those processes cause the universe rather than God?
The term "began to exist" is itself problematic.
For example, you say your house was constructed in the 1950s. Does that mean it "began to exist" in the 1950s? All of the materials that make up your house existed prior to 1950. Ultimately, your house is built from matter and energy that all existed at the big bang. Since the big bang, all that has happened is that some of that matter and energy has been rearranged to enable the eventual construction of your house.
It could therefore be argued that, in fact, only one thing "began to exist" in the relevant sense, namely the universe as a whole. In that case, premise 1 "everything that begins to exist has a cause" reduces to "The universe has a cause". That is, now "the universe has a cause" is a premise rather than a conclusion from a logical argument.
Also, it does not follow that just because things in the universe "began to exist" that the universe as a whole began to exist. Matter, for example, came into existence a little after the big bang. There was no "before the big bang", so arguably it doesn't make sense to talk about the big bang (i.e. the universe as a whole) "beginning to exist". Things begin to exist in time. If there's no time, there can be no beginning of something.
Can you name one thing other than God that did not begin to exist?
You say that neither you nor Craig think God is the only thing. What does Craig list, apart from God?
As for you, you suggest "mathematics and logic. The 'laws of physics' perhaps." These are inventions of human beings, aren't they? There was no mathematics prior to the existence of human beings.
As for the "laws of physics", we could make the same argument as for the "laws of mathematics". Alternatively, you might be suggesting that there are some kind of natural processes that operate outside the bounds of space and time and the universe. If that is the case, couldn't those processes cause the universe rather than God?
I have many objections to these additional "ontological" premises of Craig. But I really don't want to get into those just yet. Suffice it to say that I, like you, similarly skeptical about the soundness of these premises. And I agree that Craig's whole argument is loaded in order to try to support the conclusion he wants - i.e. the traditional God of Christianity.
Ok so we have
1. The universe began to exist.
2. The universe is not eternal, so doesn't have a necessary existence.
3. God is eternal and does have a necessary existence, as anything eternal must do.
4. Only God can have created the universe.
Or something
1. The universe began to exist.
2. The universe is not eternal, so doesn't have a necessary existence.
3. God is eternal and does have a necessary existence, as anything eternal must do.
4. Only God can have created the universe.
Or something
Totality: 1. The quality or state of being total:
Being: The state or quality of having existence
If something comes into being, it begins to exist.
If something goes out of being, it ceases to exist.
Do you get it now?
I am still discussing the KCA, but there is an obstacle that has arisen (Barker's reformulation), which make you convinced that the argument is invalid for that reason. It claims that the first premise contains 2 claims, as opposed to the 1 claim it does make. It supposes that the claim makes reference to things that don't begin to exist. This is false.
Everything that begins to exist, has a cause, is merely describing the reason why things exist in the way that we can objectively experience their existence. We don't see, or have experience of things that do not objectively begin to exist.
I contend that the scriptural definitions, and descriptions of what we term as God, is synonymous, at a basic level, with the definition I stated, of the term totality.
God is a non thing in relation to things. And it neither irrelevant, or fluff.
You don't have to call it God. I'll do that.
You only need to comprehend how the definition, and description of God, from any scripture is non different from the totality.
I'm happy to not mention G-O-D, and call it the totality if you like.
You don't have to equate it with God, but it has 'to be', and it is the same as the definitions and descriptions of what we term a personal God.
How is the totality assumed in the first premise 'everything that begins to exist has a cause' if it is a fact that everything that we can observe beginning to exist has a cause. That information merely draws attention to our natural observations.
What does begin to exist without a cause?
Not what does begin to exist, but we don't know if it has a cause or not.
God is a non thing, in relation to things.
How many times do you need me to say it?
I am only replying to KCA, and I believe I have responded to Barkers objection in this response.
jan.