And God is always "He".
Yeah, whatever...
Don't indicate this is a psychological dependance to your dad.
Yeah, whatever...
Don't indicate this is a psychological dependance to your dad.
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1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. Nothingness is not physical.
That looks like an example of a formal fallacy to me.3. Therefore, nothingness has no cause.
- Syllogism
It would be if you used "requires" in the normal sense, but Syne uses it to mean "necessary and sufficient".That looks like an example of a formal fallacy to me.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denying_the_antecedent
If P, then Q
Not P
therefore not Q
Male human beings are examples of Homo sapiens.
Mary isn't a male human being.
Therefore Mary isn't an example of Homo sapiens.
Why do evangelists insist on using such deceitful tactics?It would be if you used "requires" in the normal sense, but Syne uses it to mean "necessary and sufficient".
I quote myself...God, or whatever, created themself.
Something from nothing.
Syne:
There's a lot of explanation built into that premise.
I'm not sure what you mean by "physical existence". That's an abstract concept. So, for that matter, is "cause". Is your argument about things (objects, people, God and the like), or about abstract concepts? Is the "cause" you speak of necessarily the effect of a thing?
I'm not convinced that (1) by itself rules out infinite causal regress. I think you need to introduce an extra premise:
1b. Infinite causal regress is impossible.
Of course, the question of whether this is a sound premise is separate from the question of validity which we are discussing.
You claim that infinite causal regress is begging the question. I don't see how. Doesn't the Kalam argument itself contain causality both as a premise and as a conclusion? Are you saying the Kalam argument begs the question?
A causal loop would presumably be an example of a kind of infinite regress (A causes B, B causes C, C causes A, etc.), so I don't see why that has to be considered as a separate matter.
No. This does not follow from the previous premises.
Premise (1) takes the form "A implies B". From this you are trying to draw the conclusion "not A implies not B", but that is a not a valid inference. The logical equivalent to "A implies B" is "not B implies not A", which is different to what you're arguing.
You assert in (1) that physical existence requires a cause, and in (2) that nothingness is not physical. But (1) says nothing about not-physical things. (1) only talks about physical things, so it can't help us when it comes to "nothingness" as defined. The most we can conclude from (1) is that any causeless thing cannot be physical. But you want to assert that any non-physical thing is causeless. I hope you can see this isn't the same thing.
Your argument therefore is invalid at this point.
Ok. But I don't see how this premise about energy is relevant to "nothingness".
Let's assume you can fix the problem mentioned above so that you can conclude (3). That establishes half of (5), that nothingness is uncaused, but it's just a repeat of (3).
I can't see that you have established that nothingness can be a cause. You'll need to explain in more detail.
Even if we accept your premise that an infinite chain of causes is impossible, it does not follow that an infinite time period is impossible. That would require an extra premise. So, (6) is not a derived conclusion from what has gone before, but an additional premise. Whether it is sound or not is a separate question.
Again, this is a premise assumed to be true, so it may not be sound. It is not a derived conclusion from what went before.
If (5) and (7) can be established, then it follows logically that nothingness is a volitional cause.
But (8) is the first mention of "god" in the argument. There's obviously a whole bunch of hidden assumptions about this "god" that do not appear in your argument as presented.
he is not saying "Physical existence implies a cause", which would be the common-sense interpretation of "requires", but rather "Physical existence is equivalent to a cause". That's a rather idiosyncratic usage of "requires".
OK. We can accept that as a premise for the sake of argument. (I'm not convinced that it's true though.)
Again, we can agree to accept that as a premise for the sake of argument, even though I'm not entirely prepared to agree to its truth. (Holes have physical existence, even though they represent the non-existence of whatever they are holes in. My intuition is that there's a deeper metaphysical problem lurking there.)
That looks like an example of a formal fallacy to me.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denying_the_antecedent
If P, then Q
Not P
therefore not Q
Male human beings are examples of Homo sapiens.
Mary isn't a male human being.
Therefore Mary isn't an example of Homo sapiens.
From my perspective, a force is always an effect of a thing. No things; no forces. Also, I don't believe that energy has any meaning independent of things. Fundamentally, energy is a convenient number that can be assigned to a thing or some combination of things. (And by "thing" here I mean a physical object such as a particle, for example.)No, cause is not necessarily the effect of a thing. Forces and energies can be causes, as well as any ultimate, first cause.
I disagree with you that you can rule out infinite regress as some kind of matter of validity of the logical argument. To claim that infinite regress is impossible is an assumption, so it should be included as a premise. The possible lack of soundness of such a premise is one objection to any kind of Cosmological argument, including the original and Kalam versions.Logical validity rules out both infinite regress and causal loop. Introducing either as a premise begs the question in an argument about causal origin. If you assume physical existence necessitates and is sufficient to assume a cause, then you cannot conclude that the ultimate cause is physical. Concluding that the ultimate cause is physical just feeds back into the first premise, meaning it never reaches a valid conclusion.
Suppose we accept that "every physical effect requires a cause". Then there are two possibilities for the cause of any suggested physical effect. The first is that there is a finite chain of causes that ends with some kind of ultimate cause which started the whole thing off. The second is that their is an infinite chain of causes - one physical effect causing another, causing another, causing another, ad infinitum. In the second case there is no ultimate or first cause because the chain never terminates. You can keep tracing back the causes forever.Now if you want to construct a valid logical argument to support either of these as a conclusion, I would invite you to do so.
I agree with you and this invalidates my objection.If you read the post you quoted, then you would find I already explicitly specified (1) as both necessary and sufficient. At the very lease, 'requires' is a synonym of 'necessitates'. This does, indeed, conclude that 'not A implies not B' because the premise is 'A only if B'. So I assume you'd now agree that the argument is valid to this point
I'm familiar with Guth's model of inflation. The "ultimate free lunch" part is an add-on assumption to that. The fact is that nobody knows what is required for a big bang to occur. Personally, I suspect that "nothing" won't be sufficient to do the job. But I could, of course, be wrong.If you'll familiarize yourself with Guth's model of inflationary cosmology and his supposition of the universe as possessing a net zero total energy and being the 'ultimate free lunch' from nothing, i.e. requiring neither a creator god nor previous physical existence, then you may understand the conclusion of (5). Quite frankly, I'm surprised you're not already familiar with it. Are you making some rhetorical point?
Ok.(6) is not a conclusion at all, derived or otherwise. .... (6) is a premise, and can only be evaluated for soundness.
Once you're dealing with infinity, all kinds of weird stuff is possible. There could be a single cause an infinite time in the past, then nothing more until some finite time in the past, which would imply a finite chain of causes and yet infinite time.But how is an infinite time period not an infinite regress, in this context? Assuming causation, an infinite time period necessitates an infinite chain of causes.
That's fine as far as validity goes, if you only want to define God as "an uncaused volitional first cause". I doubt the soundness of your premise requiring a first cause to be volition, but that's another issue for exploration.Syne said:A creator god need only have the property of volitional cause.
Syne:
Thanks for your reply. With your further explanation, I agree that your argument may be valid as a matter of logic. The soundness of the many premises (or otherwise) is a completely separate issue, of course. I am not at all convinced that your argument is sound, even though it may be valid.
From my perspective, a force is always an effect of a thing. No things; no forces. Also, I don't believe that energy has any meaning independent of things. Fundamentally, energy is a convenient number that can be assigned to a thing or some combination of things. (And by "thing" here I mean a physical object such as a particle, for example.)
I disagree with you that you can rule out infinite regress as some kind of matter of validity of the logical argument. To claim that infinite regress is impossible is an assumption, so it should be included as a premise. The possible lack of soundness of such a premise is one objection to any kind of Cosmological argument, including the original and Kalam versions.
Suppose we accept that "every physical effect requires a cause". Then there are two possibilities for the cause of any suggested physical effect. The first is that there is a finite chain of causes that ends with some kind of ultimate cause which started the whole thing off. The second is that their is an infinite chain of causes - one physical effect causing another, causing another, causing another, ad infinitum. In the second case there is no ultimate or first cause because the chain never terminates. You can keep tracing back the causes forever.
To rule out an infinite causal chain, you need to postulate that such a chain is impossible, and preferably give justification for why such a chain is impossible. Obviously the question here is to soundness rather than validity.
I agree with you and this invalidates my objection.
I still think it is an idiosyncratic usage of the word "requires". When we say "A requires B", we do not ordinarily mean, in addition, that B requires A. And yet this is the usage you are insisting on.
An example is probably unnecessary, but let me provide one just in case. If I say "My watch requires a battery in order to operate", most people would not assume that "a battery requires my watch in order to operate". If you want to use the word "necessitates" instead of "requires", the same applies.
I'm familiar with Guth's model of inflation. The "ultimate free lunch" part is an add-on assumption to that. The fact is that nobody knows what is required for a big bang to occur. Personally, I suspect that "nothing" won't be sufficient to do the job. But I could, of course, be wrong.
Lawrence Krauss in his book A universe from nothing considers the meaning of "nothing" in physics in some detail. I would say that his version of "nothing" is somewhat different from yours.
Once you're dealing with infinity, all kinds of weird stuff is possible. There could be a single cause an infinite time in the past, then nothing more until some finite time in the past, which would imply a finite chain of causes and yet infinite time.
Infinite time is an actual infinity, of course. Most versions of the cosmological argument (including the Kalam) assume that an actual infinity of anything is impossible. But that's a premise, not a conclusion.
That's fine as far as validity goes, if you only want to define God as "an uncaused volitional first cause". I doubt the soundness of your premise requiring a first cause to be volition, but that's another issue for exploration.
P1: All physical things require a cause.Could you form a valid logical argument for such an infinite regress? One we can test for validity?
Please outline the circular reasoning in the above argument?Assuming a premise of 'every physical effect requires a cause', how do you avoid circular reasoning or begging the question in your conclusion?
Do you disagree with P1 above?Are the necessary premises as sound or parsimonious as assuming a finite regress?
The conclusion of everything is a simple tautology if phrased like that.I would imagine that the first serious question raised of such an argument would be 'why does the universe exist'. If everything in the universe is contingent (assumed by that first premise), then why wouldn't the entire universe be contingent? Doesn't any infinite regress argument collapse to:
P if, and only, it is true that P
IOW, the conclusion is a simple tautology.
If this is the case then you are not ruling out infinite regress of the non-physical either.We are not assuming cause necessitates physical existence, but that physical existence is sufficient to assume a cause:
C is necessary for PE
PE is sufficient to assume C
Don't expect him to acknowledge it, Baldeee, as that would require him admitting he was wrong. And someone so sure of their intellectual superiority as him would never allow themselves to admit such a thing. Heaven forbid! Rather he will simply ignore that which shows him to be wrong, continue on his path of ignorance in the matter, and tell himself that he is right.And you still haven't acknowledged that you comprehend validity yet.
Do you accept your previous understanding was incorrect?
And then:Syne said:If X is necessary for Y, then X is required for Y.
If Y is sufficient to assume X, then Y requires the assumption of X.
as one of his premises (stated in #294).Syne said:Physical existence necessitates a cause, thus a cause is sufficient to assume physical existence.
While I have no doubt Syne knows what he is trying to say, I don't think he knows how to state it such that others can understand it clearly, nor do I think he fully understands necessity and sufficiency.Syne said:We are not assuming cause necessitates physical existence, but that physical existence is sufficient to assume a cause:
C is necessary for PE
PE is sufficient to assume C
I'm not sure that you understand the term "validity". Many people have an aesthetic aversion to infinite causal chains and to causal loops but aesthetic aversion doesn't bear on logical validity.Logical validity rules out both infinite regress and causal loop.
One does not have to introduce either as a premise. One can merely demonstrate that either is an alternative to the supposed schema of causes offered in the KCA.Introducing either as a premise begs the question in an argument about causal origin.
Here, again, we have the aesthetic rather than the logical. If one assumes that every physical change has a cause, then one assumes that. There is nothing logically wrong with having an infinite chain of cause, nor is there anything wrong with having a closed causal loop. In both cases, these causal chains retain the proposition that all physical events or beings have causes.If you assume physical existence necessitates and is sufficient to assume a cause,[
then you cannot conclude that the ultimate cause is physical. Concluding that the ultimate cause is physical just feeds back into the first premise, meaning it never reaches a valid conclusion.
You are missing the point: it is the KCA that goes beyond the boundaries of logic. It could be that there is not enough evidence to reach a valid conclusion on the issue.Now if you want to construct a valid logical argument to support either of these as a conclusion, I would invite you to do so.
And this definition is, in itself, so very wrong: it goes very much beyond the required scope of the argument. If we are speaking of the causes of physical being, then why do we need to make the wild claim that no effect can produce a non-physical being? Given that we have no experience with such beings, why should we say, on the basis of out experience with physical beings, that cause-and-effect does not effect non-physical beings?If you read the post you quoted, then you would find I already explicitly specified (1) as both necessary and sufficient. At the very lease, 'requires' is a synonym of 'necessitates'. This does, indeed, conclude that 'not A implies not B' because the premise is 'A only if B'. So I assume you'd now agree that the argument is valid to this point.
It is a question of validity because it Seems to have absolutely no bearing on the claim that you are making about nothingness. You may thing that it does, but you have not explained this leap in reasoning. I suspect that you are grossly mistaken about the theory Guth argued, in which an existing physical state transforms, without cause, into a new state before returning to the initial state. The "nothingness" of Guth's hypothesis is not nothingness.Maybe you're unfamiliar with Guth's 'ultimate free lunch'? This is actually the best logically valid way to try to exclude god as a possibility. Either way, this is a question of soundness, not validity.
It could be that James R is, unlike you, neither confusing the two different hypotheses of Guth nor incorrectly identifying the initial state of the universe of the "free lunch" hypothesis as nothingness in anything other than a metaphorical sense.Already established that I can conclude (3). If you'll familiarize yourself with Guth's model of inflationary cosmology and his supposition of the universe as possessing a net zero total energy and being the 'ultimate free lunch' from nothing, i.e. requiring neither a creator god nor previous physical existence, then you may understand the conclusion of (5). Quite frankly, I'm surprised you're not already familiar with it. Are you making some rhetorical point?
Even if the universe began a finite time in the past, it may still have an infinite history of causes. I believe that Stephen Hawking has a nice demonstration of this somewhere in A Brief History of Time, but I could be wrong about that source. I'm sure that there should be something out there that explains this nicely.(6) is not a conclusion at all, derived or otherwise. If it were, it would be preceded by 'therefore', 'so', 'thus', etc.. (6) is a premise, and can only be evaluated for soundness. But how is an infinite time period not an infinite regress, in this context? Assuming causation, an infinite time period necessitates an infinite chain of causes. Doesn't matter if those causes regress through a 'universal origin' event or not.
I quote myself...
To sound like Carl Sagan: The cosmos is all there ever was, is, and ever will be.
I think I already did.That's cool. Describe the cosmos as God, then pretend that God doesn't exist.
jan.
Suppose we accept that "every physical effect requires a cause". Then there are two possibilities for the cause of any suggested physical effect. The first is that there is a finite chain of causes that ends with some kind of ultimate cause which started the whole thing off. The second is that their is an infinite chain of causes - one physical effect causing another, causing another, causing another, ad infinitum. In the second case there is no ultimate or first cause because the chain never terminates. You can keep tracing back the causes forever.
I still think it is an idiosyncratic usage of the word "requires". When we say "A requires B", we do not ordinarily mean, in addition, that B requires A. And yet this is the usage you are insisting on.
An example is probably unnecessary, but let me provide one just in case. If I say "My watch requires a battery in order to operate", most people would not assume that "a battery requires my watch in order to operate". If you want to use the word "necessitates" instead of "requires", the same applies.
I'm familiar with Guth's model of inflation. The "ultimate free lunch" part is an add-on assumption to that. The fact is that nobody knows what is required for a big bang to occur. Personally, I suspect that "nothing" won't be sufficient to do the job. But I could, of course, be wrong.
Lawrence Krauss in his book A universe from nothing considers the meaning of "nothing" in physics in some detail. I would say that his version of "nothing" is somewhat different from yours.
I think I already did.
Are you a troll?
No one should pay any attention to you now.Hats off for admitting you already did.
I'm not a troll. Are you?
jan.