Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God

[PhysBang]

The KCA with the Bhagavad Gita passage in mind:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. God is not physical.
3. Therefore, God has no cause.
4. Therefore, God is the only available uncaused cause.

​

Not convincing, in itself, but assuming the givens, the logic holds.

No, the logic does not hold. The movement from 1 & 2 to 3 is a fallacy. The movement from 3 to 4 is a serious non sequitor.

 

[Syne]

Why is it ontologically nonsensical for the non-physical requiring a cause?

If you assume that the non-physical has an existence that requires a cause then you are making unfounded, a priori assumptions. We can agree on the premise that physical things require a cause, because we've never observed otherwise. Since we have not observed the non-physical, it is ridiculous to just make unfounded assumptions about it. Now if you want to argue that some particular conception of a non-physical existence must require a cause, make your case.

If you think so, and it would be a premise open to questioning, then surely you should accept Sarkus' amendment to your argument of "only physical things require a cause"?
You have to bear in mind, and I'm sure JamesR and Sarkus would both tell you, that the form of logic doesn't care about the soundness of the premises, or what is ontologically nonsensical.
It merely cares about what can logically follow from what is stated - not from what isn't stated.
In this case, if your logical argument does not state "only physical things require a cause" then we can not rule out non-physical things also having a cause.
The non-applicability to non-physical things is not stated in a premise.

Certainly. Logic doesn't care about soundness of premise, but we're not discussing pure logic here. We're discussing both whether the premises are sound and whether they logically lead to the conclusion. For one, soundness assures a premise does not beg the question.

But I have no problem with you adding 'only' if that helps you understand the premise. If you cannot manage to infer that from the parsimonious premises, so be it.

​

Sarkus is correct in his assessment: the logic is invalid.
- Ducks require oxygen (equivalent to "A requires B")
- You are not equivalent to a duck (equivalent to "C is not equivalent to A")
- So since you think you can infer that "C does not share the requirement of A" then I can infer that you do not require oxygen?
Had you, as Sarkus suggested, said "Only (A) requires (B)" in premise 1 then the conclusion would be valid.

LOL! Oxygen is not necessary and sufficient for a duck to exist, since a dead duck is still a duck.

By 'require' is meant necessary and sufficient. An necessary relationship is one where (A) cannot exist unless (B) is true. A sufficient relationship is one in which (B) is adequate grounds to conclude (A) exists. Hence:

Physical things cannot exist without a cause (necessity).
Any physical cause assumes a physical effect (sufficiency).

If you wish to define such a relationship and premise for the non-physical, that is your own assertion.

I have to disagree here: the premises Sarkus has used, other than premise 3, are identical to the ones you provided as an example.
All he has done is swap "big red metal truck" for "fluffy towel" to highlight the invalidity of your conclusion.
Do you accept that neither the "big red metal truck" nor the "fluffy towel" are stuffed toys?
If so then the substitution does not alter the form of the argument.
If you have issue with the other premises then you need to examine why you used them in the first instance.

'Fluffy towel' begs the question in the conclusion, i.e. whether it is fluffy. That is logically invalid, and it should be obvious to even the most simple-minded. You see, simply swapping entities in a logical premise still has to avoid circular reasoning, like that introduced by defining a towel as 'fluffy' and then concluding it is 'fluffy'. Valid logic does not allow you to define the conclusion before inferring it.

To quote your post #229:
"Equivalently:
...
And:
1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stuffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The big red truck (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the big red truck (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X)."

And Sarkus' highlighting of the invalid conclusion:
"1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stiffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The fluffy towel (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the fluffy towel (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X)."

You will note that lines 1 and 2 are identical.
It is you who has stated the univeral requirement for "all stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy" in your premises.
If you now disagree with this then you also need to separate the issue of validity - and I can confirm, as will JamesR and Sarkus, and possibly others, that your conclusion is invalid - with issues of soundness - i.e. whether the premises themselves are true.
It seems to be the issue of soundness that you now seem to be arguing about with "the requirement not only doesn't hold for all stuffed toys, it also isn't ontologically isolated to that class of entity."
But let's examine that sentence more closely:

"The requirement not only doesn't hold for all stuffed toys,": you'll note that in your example (even it was based on one JamesR provided previously) you stated in the premise that "All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy", and as such it is you who have set up that the requirement does hold for all stuffed toys.
A valid conclusion must therefore follow that premise.

"it also isn't ontologically isolated to that class of entity.": this is a matter of soundness, not logical form.
As said previously, logical form doesn't give two hoots about the soundness of the premises.
If you don't set up the premises to specifically exclude things from possibility then logical form alone might suggest they can happen, even if in reality they can't.

E.g. All men are spiders
Spiders have eight legs
Therefore all men have eight legs.

You'll note: no bearing on reality (the premises are unsound) but the conclusion is valid.

Your example, however, is demonstrably invalid in its conclusion - as adequately shown by Sarkus.

Again (and this really shouldn't bear repeating to a rational adult who know thing one about logic), but a logical premise cannot assume the conclusion. That is the fallacy of begging the question (circular reasoning). But let's start by just looking at premise 2:

2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).​

This does not say that ONLY stuffed toys are fluffy. The simple illustration of this is that all thumbs are fingers but not all fingers are thumbs. The property of being fluffy is only defined as being necessary to stuffed toys (So you are right...the requirement is 'defined' as holding for all stuffed toys, whether that premise is sound or not). It is not sufficient to conclude that any fluffy thing is a stuffed toy. Very simple logic here guys.
Now I will admit it was unwise to use James' example, since its conclusion was equally faulty. It did not define 'fluffy' as sufficient for the existence of a stuffed toy, so it could not be used to conclude a truck was not fluffy. My actual form of the KCA corrected for that by making the relationship required, i.e. both necessary and sufficient.

Sufficiency means that the property or thing is ontologically isolated to a class of thing. This is because the existence of that property or thing is sufficient to conclude that a particular class of thing exists. Necessity and sufficiency are logical relationships between statements. They have no bearing on soundness. "If you don't set up the premises to specifically exclude things from possibility then logical form alone might suggest they can happen"?! Logical statements are not required to be exhaustive. Logical statements can be mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, collectively exhaustive, etc..

Again, this was your argument that you're now dismantling.
Sarkus merely highlighted the issue of validity by substituting a metal truck for a fluffy towel.
And you are also now criticising the soundness of your own argument.
Anyone would think you are just out to pick a fight with someone, even if that has to be yourself.

Actually, it was James' argument. I'm criticizing the form of his example, and yes, mistakenly equated to my own. Yes, it was not immediately obvious that it was logically invalid, since I tend to give James much more benefit of the doubt. I've already explained the differences and where each is logically valid/invalid. My actual argument is logically valid.

"Assuming the givens"?
Since when does logical form make assumptions not within the premises?
If you want there to be no other alternative then you have to set up the premises to rule our those alternatives.
Maybe by adding the "Only..." that Sarkus suggested?

The assumptions are all within the premises, as already explained. The premise stating that physical things 'require' a cause already ruled out a non-physical thing requiring a cause because a physical thing necessitates a cause and a cause is sufficient to conclude a physical thing.

 

[Syne]

My statement was a mirroring of yours, mine being specific to ideological belief in God, not to one where one remains open to all/any possibility of material/non-material cause (hence being a red-herring). If one has such a belief in God then they believe that God was the cause. Or are you aware of someone that believes in God but believes that God didn't ultimately cause the universe?
Furthermore, adhering to the notion of a strictly materialistic universe says nothing about the cause of that universe. One could quite happily mix belief in God and also in such a materialist universe, where God basically lets it do its own thing, governed by the rules he establishes within it etc.

So let me repeat what I said again, and let's see what it is you are actually contrary to: "if one is ideologically bound to belief in God then there is no amount of logical reasoning likely to effect their beliefs." So are you saying that if one is ideologically bound to belief in God then they can be reasoned away from it? Moreso than your claim that someone who is ideologically bound to a strictly materialistic universe can be?
I then said "There is no logical reasoning that proves God to exist , or to not exist, as truth - any argument that does is at best validly formed, but the soundness of the argument is beyond our ken." and is it this you disagree with? If so, care to present some logical reasoning that proves God to exist, or not, as truth (i.e. a valid and sound conclusion)?
"Beyond that we simply go with what we find to be rational and pragmatic." Perhaps it is this line you disagree with? You don't go with what you find to be rational and pragmatic??

So I'm really struggling to see what your disagreement is, because your comments had no bearing on what I actually said.
Please feel free to clarify.

And? I'm not arguing from an ideological belief in a god. OTOH, you do seem to be arguing from a materialist view. And yes, materialism generally does preclude a non-material cause.

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all phenomena, including mental phenomena and consciousness, are identical with material interactions.

Materialism is closely related to physicalism, the view that all that exists is ultimately physical.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism​

Anyway, I have yet to find the atheist or materialist who allows for the possibility of a creator god. Are you claiming to?

If one is ideologically bound to belief in a god then one is more open to non-material causes, since they already believe in one. It's not rocket science.

 

[brucep]

The two criteria of parsimony are explanatory power and simplicity. If you neglect the former, any conclusion based solely on the latter is, at best, superficial. You can always claim a superficially simple explanation, like 'it just happened', but being devoid of explanatory power, it is meaningless. Lacking explanatory power, any assertion is effectively nothing more than navel-gazing.



Incorrect. Existing evidence tells us that earlier inflationary periods of our universe put any signal/observable from that period forever beyond our reach. So basic physics tells us that we cannot obtain any 'existing evidence' for an 'initial state'. IOW, your proclamation is, at best, wishful thinking.



That's nothing but a lot of arm-waving. General Relativity cannot describe the Big Bang singularity. Neither can quantum mechanics. And whether or not we postulate an infinite regress, differences in observed local time do nothing to dismiss or alter the question of timing. How much time has elapsed doesn't matter. What matters is that it has been a finite duration...any finite duration.



Any discussion about the origin of the universe is necessarily beyond what science can address. But so is complex human behavior. Should we avoid postulating parsimonious explanations of everything that does not avail itself to repeatable and controlled quantitative testing? Logical inference address more than the scientific method alone can.


That doesn't mean that macroscopic causality is ever violated. Again, there are two differing domains here. Yes, one domain is probabilistic while the other is deterministic. You seem to be laboring under the a priori assumption that the former is causative of the latter. Do you see the contradiction in assuming a probabilistic system is determines a deterministic system?



Sure, but only within the quantum domain. You don't seem to understand the very simple fact that QM is only applicable at very small scales. Beyond those deterministic causality rules. You have not shown that the one can violate the other.



Yeah, you've said that before, and it was just as meaningless then. What occurs in one domain does not magically change the nature of what occurs in the other.

Another problem is that many interpretations of quantum phenomena are experimentally equivalent. And these include purely deterministic ones.

Really he doesn't understand? I'll predict you're the one who doesn't understand. All the interpretations of quantum mechanics are experimentally equivalent. They have to be theoretically equivalent, make identicle predictions with identicle experimental results, to interpret quantum mechanics. If they don't then it isn't an interpretation. Most all the interpretations use determinism as a pedagogical tool to help the new student understand the so called weird predictions of quantum mechanics. The fact that the quantum domain is a microscopic domain is easy to understand. What's your problem.? Oh yeah your problems is your philosophical conclusions are nonsense. You're not getting to lecture folks about stuff you don't understand.

 

[Syne]

Really he doesn't understand? I'll predict you're the one who doesn't understand. All the interpretations of quantum mechanics are experimentally equivalent. They have to be theoretically equivalent, make identicle predictions with identicle experimental results, to interpret quantum mechanics. If they don't then it isn't an interpretation. Most all the interpretations use determinism as a pedagogical tool to help the new student understand the so called weird predictions of quantum mechanics. The fact that the quantum domain is a microscopic domain is easy to understand. What's your problem.? Oh yeah your problems is your philosophical conclusions are nonsense. You're not getting to lecture folks about stuff you don't understand.

What are you babbling about? You seem to only be agreeing with what I've said. Let's see...I said:

many interpretations of quantum phenomena are experimentally equivalent...check
QM is only applicable at very small scales...check​

So the only thing you seem to have an actual problem with is that some interpretations of QM are deterministic? Uh, look up Many-worlds or De Broglie-Bohm.

Wait...maybe you're just being pedantic about the word 'many'? Really?

 

[Baldeee]

If you assume that the non-physical has an existence that requires a cause then you are making unfounded, a priori assumptions.

Noone is making that assumption.
It merely remains a possibility that hasn't been ruled out by the premises.
If you assume otherwise then it is you who is making the a priori assumption.

We can agree on the premise that physical things require a cause, because we've never observed otherwise. Since we have not observed the non-physical, it is ridiculous to just make unfounded assumptions about it. Now if you want to argue that some particular conception of a non-physical existence must require a cause, make your case.

Until I move on to the soundness of the premises, I'm concentrating on the validity of the argument, otherwise no matter how true the premises, the argument would remain unsound.

Certainly. Logic doesn't care about soundness of premise, but we're not discussing pure logic here. We're discussing both whether the premises are sound and whether they logically lead to the conclusion.

No, I'm discussing validity - I haven't even begun to discuss the veracity of the premises.
Nor has Sarkus for that matter, reading through his responses.
The soundness of the argument should only be considered once the validity is established, otherwise you're relieving your bladder into the wind.

For one, soundness assures a premise does not beg the question.

Actually it is mere validity that assures that: if valid then there is no question begging.
To demonstrate - an argument with true premises that begs the question:
Everyone but me on this forum is called Baldeee.
I am on this forum.
Therefore I am called Baldeee.
The premises are true but the argument, however, suffers from begging the question.
A sound argument must indeed be valid, but it is the validity that assures no question begging.

But I have no problem with you adding 'only' if that helps you understand the premise. If you cannot manage to infer that from the parsimonious premises, so be it.

It's not a matter of understanding, it's a matter of the logical argument being valid or not.
It's up to you: if you don't include it then that particular argument is demonstrably invalid.

LOL! Oxygen is not necessary and sufficient for a duck to exist, since a dead duck is still a duck.

Okay - try it with a slight tweak:
- A living duck requires oxygen (equivalent to "A requires B")
- You are not equivalent to a living duck (equivalent to "C is not equivalent to A")
- So since you think you can infer that "C does not share the requirement of A" then I can infer that you do not require oxygen?

Similarly:
- A car requires energy in order to do work.
- You are not a car.
- Therefore you do not require energy to do work.
Both are invalid, and both demonstrate the invalidity of your argument on which their logical form is based.

If you wish to define such a relationship and premise for the non-physical, that is your own assertion.

Why do I need to define one?
You are presenting the argument, and unless you rule something out in the premise then it is should not be assumed as ruled out.
You have again, with your two lines above, merely stated things about physical things.
You simply haven't excluded anything for the non-physical.
As stated many times now, inserting the word "only" would resolve that particular issue in your original argument.

'Fluffy towel' begs the question in the conclusion, i.e. whether it is fluffy. That is logically invalid, and it should be obvious to even the most simple-minded.

I'm sure the word "fluffy" was inserted to ensure that even you understood that other things can indeed be "fluffy".
The example is, however, valid if you remove that particular word, and demonstrates the point even more so now that you are aware that towels can indeed be fluffy.
The conclusion your logic would result in would be that the towel can not be fluffy simply because it doesn't fit into the category of stuffed toys.
The example (without the word "fluffy") thus demonstrates the invalid logic you're employing.

You see, simply swapping entities in a logical premise still has to avoid circular reasoning, like that introduced by defining a towel as 'fluffy' and then concluding it is 'fluffy'. Valid logic does not allow you to define the conclusion before inferring it.

Resolved as per above.
Remove the word "fluffy" and then by your invalid logic you conclude that the towel can not be fluffy because it isn't a stuffed toy.

Again (and this really shouldn't bear repeating to a rational adult who know thing one about logic), but a logical premise cannot assume the conclusion. That is the fallacy of begging the question (circular reasoning). But let's start by just looking at premise 2:

2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).

This does not say that ONLY stuffed toys are fluffy.

And where in your original argument does it use the ONLY?
It doesn't.
The example therefore remains comparable.

The simple illustration of this is that all thumbs are fingers but not all fingers are thumbs. The property of being fluffy is only defined as being necessary to stuffed toys (So you are right...the requirement is 'defined' as holding for all stuffed toys, whether that premise is sound or not). It is not sufficient to conclude that any fluffy thing is a stuffed toy. Very simple logic here guys.

We know - hence JamesR posted that example as a demonstration of this very issue.
Your equivalent premise: "Physical existence requires a cause"... the property of requiring a cause is only defined as being necessary to physical existence.
And yet you seem to show you understand the flaw in the stuffed-toy example, but you're struggling to see the same issue in your own argument.

Now I will admit it was unwise to use James' example, since its conclusion was equally faulty.

Of course it was equally faulty - it was highlighting the faultiness of the logical form you employed.
It was designed to be faulty.

It did not define 'fluffy' as sufficient for the existence of a stuffed toy, so it could not be used to conclude a truck was not fluffy.

Nowhere did your original argument define any relationship for non-physical items.
Defining one specifically for the physical does not also define one for the non-physical.
However, had you, as Sarkus originally said, and as I have pointed out, included the word "only" at the start, then your initial example would not have suffered from this specific flaw.

My actual form of the KCA corrected for that by making the relationship required, i.e. both necessary and sufficient.

No, your form of the KCA is just as flawed.

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. God is not physical.
3. Therefore, God has no cause.
4. Therefore, God is the only available uncaused cause.

In 1 you have merely stated what is necessary and sufficient for physical items.
You have said nothing about the non-physical, which may or may not require a cause.
In this case, even if you had put "Only physical existence requires a cause" it would not save the argument from being invalid: it would merely imply that a cause is not necessary for non-physical existence, but does not exclude the possibility of the non-physical from having a cause.
So no, your form of the KCA is still flawed: 3 does not follow from 1 and 2, and 4 is a non-sequitur.

Sufficiency means that the property or thing is ontologically isolated to a class of thing. This is because the existence of that property or thing is sufficient to conclude that a particular class of thing exists. Necessity and sufficiency are logical relationships between statements. They have no bearing on soundness.

Actually they have quite a bit of bearing on soundness: the claim of necessity in the premise must be true else the argument is unsound.
However we are still on issues of validity, but we can discuss the veracity of premises later.

"If you don't set up the premises to specifically exclude things from possibility then logical form alone might suggest they can happen"?! Logical statements are not required to be exhaustive. Logical statements can be mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive, collectively exhaustive, etc..

I am aware of that - and my comment stands.
I didn't say "explicitly exclude", I said "specifically exclude" - which can be achieved through a number of means.
You have utilised none of them.

Actually, it was James' argument. I'm criticizing the form of his example, and yes, mistakenly equated to my own. Yes, it was not immediately obvious that it was logically invalid, since I tend to give James much more benefit of the doubt.

It was designed to be invalid.
And it mirrors yours - it is comparable - it highlights why your initial argument is invalid.
I'm pleased that you can see the flaw in his example, but still stumped as to why you seem incapable of applying that to yours.

I've already explained the differences and where each is logically valid/invalid. My actual argument is logically valid.

No, it's not valid.
Your explanations have been found wanting, as detailed above.

To be continued...

 

[Baldeee]

Continuation...

The assumptions are all within the premises, as already explained. The premise stating that physical things 'require' a cause already ruled out a non-physical thing requiring a cause because a physical thing necessitates a cause and a cause is sufficient to conclude a physical thing.

And herein lies your error: your premises, as worded, simply do not show that a cause is sufficient to conclude a physical thing.

To take you through my thinking here...

Before we set up any premises, there are the following possibilities:
(A) physical existence caused by a physical cause.
(B) physical existence caused by a non-physical cause.
(C) physical existence uncaused.
(D) non-physical existence caused by a physical cause.
(E) non-physical existence caused by a non-physical cause.
(F) non-physical existence uncaused.

Remember - these are not premises, they are merely logical possibilities, okay.
Think of them as options that remain open until logically closed off.
If you can think of any others, let me know.

Now let's examine what you have set as premises:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. God is not physical.
3. Therefore, God has no cause.
4. Therefore, God is the only available uncaused cause.

1. Okay - physical existence requires a cause - so we're confirming options (A) and (B) and we're removing (C) from consideration as being not possible.

2. Okay - God is non-physical - so that means with regard to God (D), (E) and (F) are all possibilities.

3. This conclusion is that only (F) can apply to God, but hopefully by now you can see why this does not follow from 1 and 2 - as from 2 we are still left with (D) and (E) as well as with (F).
1 merely closes off option (C), and 2 merely states that God is non-physical.
We certainly haven't yet closed off (D) and (E), no matter what we say about the necessity and sufficiency relating to physical existence.
Do any of the premises suggest/state/imply that the non-physical can not be caused?
No.

4. Does not follow from the above, and until we resolve 3 there is no point in examining the other possible flaws in the validity of this conclusion.


So maybe you are reading too much into the premises you have set up - or perhaps they are not worded as you thought/intended?
But as worded they do not validly lead to the conclusion you state - as shown above.


Now, you can try to be snarky, try to claim that I/we are dumb, that I/we don't have a grasp of basic logic and try to assert some sort of intellectual superiority if you wish, but let's try to just look at just the arguments presented, okay?

 

[CptBork]

QM is only applicable at very small scales...check

That's not what he said. You apply QM to the fundamental constituent particles in an object and then add up all their combined behaviours to determine the object's macroscopic properties, as I just recently discussed in post #240. QM applies at all scales, as long as all significant gravitational fields in the area can be approximated by uniform accelerations.

So the only thing you seem to have an actual problem with is that some interpretations of QM are deterministic? Uh, look up Many-worlds or De Broglie-Bohm.

The De Broglie-Bohm interpretation doesn't offer any actual means of determining the exact outcome of an experiment in terms of the initial conditions, it merely passes the quantum randomness off to a separate "pilot wave" and leaves it to future generations to try and find a deterministic description of how that wave guides things. All local hidden variable theories have now been experimentally ruled out by loophole-free Bell test experiments, and all non-local hidden variable theories are in violation of the basic causality structure in Special Relativity, i.e. they necessarily require unresolvable time paradoxes.

As for the many-worlds interpretation of QM, it still randomness when determining which state our personal universe will assume out of the infinitude of possibilities.

 

[Jan Ardena]

??? We're trying to understand what you are saying when you say "everything is all that exists". If everything is all that exists then anything that exists must fall under the umbrella of everything. If God, as you claim, is distinct from everything, then God does not exist.

Only if 'things' are the only source of existence.

Apologies if I wasn't clear but you said English was your first language?
If something is excluded, it doesn't mean that it should be there but is deliberately kept out, it means that it is not entitled to be there (for whatever reason), or we simple do not consider it as part of whatever it is excluded from.
So yes, when you say that God is not a "thing", and you say that everything is all "things", then you are excluding God from being considered under the em really of everything.

There's no need to exclude God, anymore than the need to exclude daffodils from a list of terrorist suspects.

Please can you explain how "the collection of all things" could in any way be synonymous with "totality of all non things"????

I said the totality of all things, is synonymous as the totality of all non things.

No, I've told you how "totality of" and "the collection of" should be interpreted in this context - I.e. as synonymous.

I'm not going to adhere to that, because they mean different things. So I'm going to be using the proper/ultimate definition of totality, in which everything that begins to exist, is but a part of.

If you intended line 4 to be a valid conclusion from the first 3 (which I'm assuming are your premises) then I'm sorry to disappoint but it's not, it is a non sequitur. It is certainly a possible solution, just as much as sting that "God does not exist" would be a solution to the premises, but neither of them follow as the logical conclusion from just those premises.

You mean the title God, does not exist? If the totality exists (which it must because here we are), and within it, everything that begins to exist, comes into being, and goes out of being, then the totality must have something to do with it. That totality fits the description of God.

Furthermore, in line 1 you are already making a distinction within everything between those things that begin to exist and those things that don't. What are you aware of within "everything" that does not begin to exist, when you have previously stated that everything is all that exists, everything is the collection of physical things, and physical things need a cause?

I'm making a distinction between the totality, and everything that begins to exist.

You seem to be jumping from one response to another with complete disregard for what you have previously stated. This generates a lack of consistency, and makes what you post extremely unclear as to your actual meaning.

And you keep assuming that everything is all that exists.

jan.

 

[PhysBang]

That totality fits the description of God.

Yes, it fits a specific description of god.

Yet we know that this is not a correct description, since the divine is not expressible, or even conceivable, in our current state.

Or rather, if we are to accept the Vedic tradition, we should know this.

 

[Sarkus]

Only if 'things' are the only source of existence.

So everything is not all that exists, contrary to your previous variationof definition?

There's no need to exclude God, anymore than the need to exclude daffodils from a list of terrorist suspects.

Let me repeat, as you do seem to be struggling with your English comprehension: if you say that X is distinct from class of items Y, you are excluding X from Y.
You have said that God is distinct from everything, and thus you are excluding God from everything. And it's not me you should be telling that there's no need to exclude God - you are the one that has done it, not me.
Why is a discussion with you so difficult, Jan, with an inordinate amount of time spent trying to explain to you the implications of what you have typed, and your stubborn refusal to comprehend it?

I said the totality of all things, is synonymous as the totality of all non things.

Eh? The totality of all things is synonymous with the totality of all non-things??? Does it take effort to type such drivel, or does it come naturally to you?

I'm not going to adhere to that, because they mean different things. So I'm going to be using the proper/ultimate definition of totality, in which everything that begins to exist, is but a part of.

Jan, I really couldn't care what you want to adhere to or not: I used the term and I have explained to you how it should have been understood in the context it was originally stated.

You mean the title God, does not exist?

That is not something I have stated.

I'm making a distinction between the totality, and everything that begins to exist.

No, in that premise you're distinguishing between two subgroups of "everything": those hints that begin to exist, and those things that do not.
Otherwise you should just write as your premise: "everything has a cause".

And you keep assuming that everything is all that exists.

I don't make that assumption, I am merely using the "variation" of definition that you have already used and showing how it is inconsistent with other things you are coming up with.

Now, are you going to actually address any of the criticisms of your logic? All you have thus far done is sidetracked the discussion into petty semantics, irrelevancies and responded to issues with trite non-answers.

 

[Jan Ardena]

Let me repeat, as you do seem to be struggling with your English comprehension: if you say that X is distinct from class of items Y, you are excluding X from Y.
You have said that God is distinct from everything, and thus you are excluding God from everything. And it's not me you should be telling that there's no need to exclude God - you are the one that has done it, not me.
Why is a discussion with you so difficult, Jan, with an inordinate amount of time spent trying to explain to you the implications of what you have typed, and your stubborn refusal to comprehend it?

Then I exclude God in the same way one excludes daffodils from terrorist suspects. Moving on....

Eh? The totality of all things is synonymous with the totality of all non-things??? Does it take effort to type such drivel, or does it come naturally to you?

All things and non things, are the same with respect to the totality. That is what I meant.

That is not something I have stated.

Makes no difference.

No, in that premise you're distinguishing between two subgroups of "everything": those hints that begin to exist, and those things that do not.
Otherwise you should just write as your premise: "everything has a cause".

No, I'm making a distinction between the totality, and and everything. The only thing in question is things that begin to exist, otherwise it is the totality.

I don't make that assumption, I am merely using the "variation" of definition that you have already used and showing how it is inconsistent with other things you are coming up with.

And now you're trying to equate everything to the totality.

jan.

 

[Jan Ardena]

Yes, it fits a specific description of god.

Yet we know that this is not a correct description, since the divine is not expressible, or even conceivable, in our current state.

Or rather, if we are to accept the Vedic tradition, we should know this.

We only need to understand there is aan uncaused cause. Do you have any objections?
Jan.

 

[Sarkus]

Then I exclude God in the same way one excludes daffodils from terrorist suspects. Moving on....

So you exclude God from all that exists (your claim) thus God does not exist (the logical conclusion of what you have said).

All things and non things, are the same with respect to the totality. That is what I meant.

Say what you mean.
And I have made no reference to "the totality" in an absolute sense as you wish to use it but as merely the whole of a subset. So please quit with the strawman.

Makes no difference.

Then why ask the question.

No, I'm making a distinction between the totality, and and everything. The only thing in question is things that begin to exist, otherwise it is the totality.

Then reword your premise to do that, as at the moment it doesn't.

And now you're trying to equate everything to the totality.

No, I am merely using the "variation" of definition that you have already used and showing how it is inconsistent with other things you are coming up with.

Now, are you going to actually address any of the criticisms of your logic? All you have thus far done is further sidetracked the discussion into petty semantics, irrelevancies, and responded to issues with trite non-answers.

 

[PhysBang]

We only need to understand there is aan uncaused cause. Do you have any objections?
Jan.

Well, yes. I object to the way that you simply deny the rules of logic and the English language.

I also do not think that the case has been made that there is a beginning to everything in the universe and I do not believe that the case has been made that the universe as a whole began with a single event.

 

[James R]

Jan Ardena:

You seem to be struggling with Sarkus to make a simple point. Let's see if I can help you.

You claim that "the totality" can be divided into two classes: "things" and "non-things".
In addition, you claim that God falls into the class of "non-things". That is, God is "not a thing", but God is part of "the totality".

The Kalam Cosmological Argument, as you will recall, states:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe had a cause.
(4. Therefore the cause of the universe is God.)

Now, here's your chance to clarify what you mean. One possibility is that you are trying to replace (1) with:

1. The totality that begins to exist has a cause.

If so, then this premise now divides "the totality" into two classes of its own, namely "members of the totality that begin to exist" and "members of the totality that do not begin to exist". So, again, we need to ask whether God is in the part of the totality that began to exist or not. What has happened here is that you have simply substituted a new term "the totality" for the words "Everything" or "Every thing" in the Kalam Cosmological Argument, without adding anything important to the logic. In this case the original objection from my opening post still applies and I must ask you "Is there anything in 'the totality' other than God that did not begin to exist?"

A second possibility is that you want to leave the KCA as it is (i.e. with "everything" or "every thing" in the first premise). In that case, I must ask you whether there is any "thing" that did not begin to exist. If there is, then that thing might logically be a cause of the universe. If, on the other hand, there is no "thing that did not begin to exist", then premise (1) can legitimately be re-written as "Everything has a cause", and we're back to the original Cosmological argument regarding "things".

This is all probably too convoluted for you to follow easily, especially considering your poor grasp of logical argument, so let me try to try to construct what I think is most likely your argument. You can correct me if I'm wrong.

Jan's Cosmological Argument (first steps)
First, some definitions:
1. The "totality" consists of "things" and "non-things".
2. God is not a "thing" (God is a "non-thing").
3. The universe is a "thing".

Second, the universe is caused:
4. Every "thing" has a cause.
6. Therefore (from 3 and 4), the universe has a cause.

Third, there must be a First Cause of "things":
7. An infinite chain of causes is impossible.
8. Therefore there must be a First Cause that is itself uncaused.

Fourth, God is uncaused:
9. Non-things are uncaused.
10. Therefore (from 2 and 9) God is uncaused.

It's about here that I get stuck, so I hope you, Jan, can add the rest. My questions:
A. Given (1), does the class of "non-things" contain anything other than God?
B. (7) needs justification. Can you provide any?
C. (9) needs justification. Can you provide any?
D. Given (9), then depending on the answer to (A) there may be non-things other than God that are uncaused. Do you agree?
E. How do you get from the premises I have listed to the conclusion "The First Cause is God"?
F. How do we get from the conclusion "The First Cause is God" to establishing that this God is like any God from "scriptures" (e.g. that he is a personal God)?

I hope you can help, Jan.

 

[spidergoat]

It's simple. Jan assumes the thing Jan is trying to prove, and is resolute in making excuses for it.

Wash, rinse, repeat.

 

[James R]

It's simple. Jan assumes the thing Jan is trying to prove, and is resolute in making excuses for it.

That's all well and good, but what I am interested in here is discussing the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

It seems to me that Jan believes that the KCA logically proves that God exists. If he doesn't think it proves God's existence, he can just say so. But if he does think that it's a watertight argument, then he needs to justify his position and respond to the objections that have been raised against the KCA.

I and others (notably Sarkus and Baldeee) have argued that the KCA is not logically valid. That is, the argument doesn't even work as a logical argument.

If Jan, or somebody else, can jump that first hurdle, then we can go on to consider whether the premises of the KCA are sound or not (i.e. whether the premises can themselves be justified).

If Jan would prefer to put his own argument for the existence of God, I suggest that he does that in a separate thread, after we have finished the current discussion about the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

 

[Syne]

Okay - try it with a slight tweak:
- A living duck requires oxygen (equivalent to "A requires B")
- You are not equivalent to a living duck (equivalent to "C is not equivalent to A")
- So since you think you can infer that "C does not share the requirement of A" then I can infer that you do not require oxygen?

I've already told you that 'requires' means both necessary and sufficient. While the existence of a living duck does necessitate oxygen, the existence of oxygen is not sufficient to assume a living duck. Hence the existence of oxygen allows for you to exist as well.

Remember - these are not premises, they are merely logical possibilities, okay.
Think of them as options that remain open until logically closed off.

No, what you seem to be wanting are axioms. Logical statements are not required to axiomatic.

Premise - an assumption that something is true
Axiom - a statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without controversy or question
​

An axiom can be a premise, but not all premises are required to be axiomatic. Hence me saying, 'assuming the givens'. You really should be able to infer a logical conclusion from ANY set of givens (even intentionally ridiculous ones), so long as the form of logic is valid.

 

[Baldeee]

I've already told you that 'requires' means both necessary and sufficient. While the existence of a living duck does necessitate oxygen, the existence of oxygen is not sufficient to assume a living duck. Hence the existence of oxygen allows for you to exist as well.

Understood, although it is a rather abnormal usage of the term "requires" hence the continued confusion.
But no matter, your argument remains a simple case of begging the question: you have stated in premise 2 that God exists, which is the supposed intention of the proof, is it not?
That is what the KCA is aiming to do, prove the existence of God?
Your formulation, though, appears valid to line 3 - if God exists and is not physical then God does not need a cause, given premise 1's "requires" meaning that it is both necessary and sufficient.
But up to that point it is certainly not a proof of God's existence - you have simply established that existence in premise 2.

Your conclusion in line 4 is also invalid as it seems to rely on God being the only non-physical thing.
Can you name anything other than God that is not physical?
If not then this conclusion seems to beg the question in the same manner as in the OP.
If you can then 4 does not follow unless you can somehow logically remove those other non-physical things from consideration.

No, what you seem to be wanting are axioms. Logical statements are not required to axiomatic.

Why do you once again feel you have to assert an intellectual superiority?
I know full well what axioms and premises are, and I am not wanting axioms.
I merely laid out the possibilities that exist, given the discussion to that point, before any of your already stated premises are applied.
It was an effort to take you through my thinking, as I mentioned.
Nothing to do with axioms.

So again, please just address the issues.

I would have expected you rather to have explained that your usage of "requires" as meaning necessity and sufficiency rules out options (D) and (E) - i.e. if something is caused then it must be physical, and the non-physical can only ever be uncaused.
That is what your premise 1 asserts through your usage of "requires" is it not?
You could have then demonstrated that this makes your conclusion 3 valid, using the elements of my thought process as laid out before you.
And from there you could have tried to explain your logic for concluding line 4.
Rather than the pointless posturing that you ended up doing.

So, we can continue discussing what is actually presented in each other's arguments, or you can go and stand in front of a mirror and posture to your heart's content.
Your choice.