Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God

[James R]

more like...

1. E is All Ts
2. G is a not part of E.
3. Therefore E is part of G

From (1) we see that E is a collection of Ts, specifically the collection of ALL of the Ts.
"All Ts are part of (the collection) E" is an equivalent statement.

This is nothing like the argument I presented.

It is exactly the argument you presented, and indeed here you are putting the same flawed argument, still.

See above for further explanation.

 

[Syne]

Explanatory power isn't necessarily required. You haven't shown that the Big Bang or the laws of General Relativity necessitate an explanation that satisfies human animals, let alone any explanation at all.

The two criteria of parsimony are explanatory power and simplicity. If you neglect the former, any conclusion based solely on the latter is, at best, superficial. You can always claim a superficially simple explanation, like 'it just happened', but being devoid of explanatory power, it is meaningless. Lacking explanatory power, any assertion is effectively nothing more than navel-gazing.

No, the existing evidence suggests that nothing changed at the moment of the Big Bang, rather the universe was simply in its initial state and has evolved dynamically ever since.

Incorrect. Existing evidence tells us that earlier inflationary periods of our universe put any signal/observable from that period forever beyond our reach. So basic physics tells us that we cannot obtain any 'existing evidence' for an 'initial state'. IOW, your proclamation is, at best, wishful thinking.

General Relativity doesn't require a previous universe, nor any kind of empty pre-existence. According to the theory, everything that exists has only existed for a finite duration along with all of the associated causes, and it's no more illogical a proposition than any of the physical and metaphysical alternatives anyone else has postulated. An infinite regression of universes going infinitely far into the past is also entirely possible and not firmly ruled out by existing experiments, but it's not required nor is it the only alternative to a deity or creator.

As to why the Big Bang has to occur as far in the past as it did, the simplified model I studied directly once upon a time pretended that the universe had a uniform spatial distribution of dust, gas, dark energy and radiation, but all realistic cosmological models still require a Big Bang, and if I'm not mistaken, the time one traces back to the Big Bang depends on the historical matter and energy concentration in their local neighbourhood, since clocks at different positions and velocities do not tick at the same rates and with universally agreed simultaneity.

That's nothing but a lot of arm-waving. General Relativity cannot describe the Big Bang singularity. Neither can quantum mechanics. And whether or not we postulate an infinite regress, differences in observed local time do nothing to dismiss or alter the question of timing. How much time has elapsed doesn't matter. What matters is that it has been a finite duration...any finite duration.

If you have a proof that everything in nature requires an explanation comprehensible to human beings, please do share it. As it stands, science has no explanation for why the laws of physics exist nor the universe they exist in, only that they seem to pass virtually every test we throw at them. Since the scientific method only finds and tests patterns in nature, it can never explain why such patterns exist in the first place.

Any discussion about the origin of the universe is necessarily beyond what science can address. But so is complex human behavior. Should we avoid postulating parsimonious explanations of everything that does not avail itself to repeatable and controlled quantitative testing? Logical inference address more than the scientific method alone can.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_test_experiments

Bell test experiments now conclusively establish that cause-and-effect mechanics can't explain observed quantum phenomena without violating the known laws of Special Relativity, whereas probabilistic quantum mechanics has no such trouble and is fully compliant with Special Relativity.

That doesn't mean that macroscopic causality is ever violated. Again, there are two differing domains here. Yes, one domain is probabilistic while the other is deterministic. You seem to be laboring under the a priori assumption that the former is causative of the latter. Do you see the contradiction in assuming a probabilistic system is determines a deterministic system?

Wrong. QM not only allows us to avoid causality at the fundamental level, but it altogether demands that we avoid it.

Sure, but only within the quantum domain. You don't seem to understand the very simple fact that QM is only applicable at very small scales. Beyond those deterministic causality rules. You have not shown that the one can violate the other.

What you're describing is the macroscopic illusion of cause-and-effect that results from averaging out probabilities for zillions of atoms, generally on the order of Avogradro's number and larger. All experiments to date demonstrate that it's still an illusion, albeit an extremely reliable one.

Yeah, you've said that before, and it was just as meaningless then. What occurs in one domain does not magically change the nature of what occurs in the other.

Another problem is that many interpretations of quantum phenomena are experimentally equivalent. And these include purely deterministic ones.

 

[Jan Ardena]

Whatever. What matters for the purposes of the argument I have put to you is not whether you have 8 or 27 or 53 types of Energy, but whether all these "energies" are separate from God or the same as God.

I notice you tried to dodge that question. Will you answer it, or continue to try to dodge it?

What did the scriptural text say? Here it is again, the answer to your question lies within it.

Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence, and false ego - all together these eight constitute My separated material energies.

Take that as your answer and move on.

Premise 1 talks about all the "things" that exist, and labels that collection as "everything". Hence:
1. All Ts are part of a collection called E. ("All things are part of everything.")

That's not what it's saying. It says that all things is everything. It all things were just a part of everything, that would suggest there's more to everything than all things.

Premise 2 is straight forward:
2. G is a not part of E. ("God is not part of everything.")

Okay.

Your conclusion is:
3. Therefore E is part of G ("Everything is part of God").

Okay.

Do you agree that I have represented the logical structure of your argument correctly? If not, point out where I went wrong.
Otherwise, let's move on.

You made a vital error of agreeing with me, that all things is a part of everything (although I would term everything as the totality)

Don't bother to try and use your logic to explain this, because I don't see it as the same. Explain it, let us come to an agreement, then move on.

Put into it's basic form the premise of this is:
"E is the collection of all Ts that have property X."
("Everything" (E) is the collection of all "things" (T) that have the property of "existence" (X).)

No it's not the collection of, it is all things (the totality). Period. That is what Sarkus is presenting.

The assertion is: "No other thing can exist apart from everything". Is that reasonable?
In logical form, this assertion is "No A can exist that is not in the collection E."

Based on what ''things'' are, yes.

Let's assume the opposite: that there is an A that is not in E and A exists (has property X). But then, according to the premise, if A is a thing (T) then A must be part of E. This is a contradiction. Therefore, we have shown logically that any given A that is a "thing" (T) that "exists", A must be part of "everything" (E).

Everything has properties of existence. This does not imply that Existence is limited to things. So ''all things'' are not necessarily the totality. Therefore A exists as a non thing.

Everything has properties of existence
Existence is not limited to everything
God 's existence is not limited to everything

jan.

 

[Jan Ardena]

In English, when one says, "everything that began to exist", one is saying that there are two categories of things, one of which is things that did not begin to exist. It may very well be that one category of things is empty, but one is still making the categorization.

Not necessarily.

jan.

 

[Jan Ardena]

All the cultures who built temples, weren't looking for God?

They're not searching for God, they are serving God ( that is the intention).

What were they looking for? What's your explanation for the names of constellations? Why is there a hunter, Orion?

I don't know.

Which scripture though? It will need to have been translated into English for me whichever one it is. I have never had the idea that God is not physical, I am physical.
If I want to know what God is, it will have to be a physical experience, you know, like drinking beer is a physical experience.

Aren't all experiences physical?
Chill out and just try and make sense of it.

Is the question just: Can I experience God by drinking beer? Why can't I? Does it depend on how much I drink? Shouldn't I realise that I can't get enlightenment (knowledge of God) from something, unless that something is me, and stop searching in a bottle?

Why ask questions
like that?
What do you mean by God?

jan.

 

[PhysBang]

Not necessarily.

No, necessarily. That is what it means to speak that way in English, especially in a logical argument.

 

[Syne]

Personally I'm in favor of an uncaused first cause other than god in regard of the universe, since my, personal, finding that there very likely is no god, is based on many observations.

Thus I don't want to introduce a god into my model just to explain the beginning of the universe, when I have collected so many hints that there are no gods.

But this is a very personal view - and if someone can show me convincing evidence that a god, or many gods exist, I'll happily accept that fact. I'm agnostic, not atheist, meaning, that I have doubts, but I think we basically just can't know for sure.

E.g. if I assume there is an almighty god. They will be very good at hiding. How could I ever be sure that a god doesn't exist, if they use all their power to hide from me? This makes me think, I can't be sure that there is no god.

The other side is, a god which is so inactive, that one cannot find any trace of them, is likely as good as no god at all.

So for the time being I keep my doubts, but I like to talk with believers and listen to their views, since some day someone might actually come up with good evidence for the existence of a god. At the moment I don't want to convince anybody that there is no god. If they want to believe in one, it's fine for me. But if they want me to believe in their god, I want to see good evidence that their god actually exists.

At the moment I see a lot of competing religions, each telling me they are the correct one. This rather makes me think, none of them re right. But that's just a personal thing.

PS: Having said that, the the argument shown in this thread is not convincing me. Once I think it has logical flaws. Second, it doesn't explain that there is only one god, and not many. Third, it doesn't say which of the proposed gods of the religions is the right one. It leaves too many questions open to convince me.

It is a common fallacy to assume that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. While not sound reasoning, I don't think anyone can fault you for assuming it personally, since it is based on your personal confidence in what you would expect to be found in the affirmative case. I've already said that the KCA is not convincing. The KCA doesn't necessarily argue for a single god either. But god is active, just not in the miraculous means. God is active the way anything else is. Your most direct sense of yourself is self-reflection within your own mind. You are active via a body.

But I don't intend nor expect anything I could say to be convincing. If someone is ideologically bound to a strictly materialistic universe, there's no amount of logical reasoning likely to effect their beliefs.

 

[James R]

Jan Ardena:

What did the scriptural text say? Here it is again, the answer to your question lies within it.

Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence, and false ego - all together these eight constitute My separated material energies.

Take that as your answer and move on.

I didn't know you were quoting a "scriptural text" there.

I interpret that text as saying that the eight "energies" belong to God but are separated either from God or from each other. It's hard to tell which.

Would you agree, then, that it is possible that Ether, say, caused the universe, and not God? Or is Ether a part or feature of God? Could Water have caused the universe, and not God?

That's not what it's saying. It says that all things is everything. It all things were just a part of everything, that would suggest there's more to everything than all things.

Don't bother to try and use your logic to explain this, because I don't see it as the same. Explain it, let us come to an agreement, then move on.

"Everything" is just a label for the collection of all "things". I'm not asserting that "everything" consists of "things" plus something else. Are you?

Your second premise seems to be "God is not a part of everything". Is that the same as saying "God is a non-thing" or "God is not a thing"?

Your argument appears to be this, then:
1. "Everything" is defined as the collection of all "things".
2. God is not a "thing".
3. Therefore "everything" does not include God.
4. Therefore "everything" is part of God.

Is that a correct statement of your argument? Let's state it again, then:
1. E is the collection of all Ts.
2. G is not a T.
3. Therefore G is not part of the collection E.
4. Therefore E is part of G.

An equivalent argument of the same form is:
1. The toy menagerie is the collection of all stuffed toys.
2. The big red metal truck is not a stuffed toy.
3. Therefore the big red metal truck is not part of the toy menagerie.
4. Therefore the toy menagerie is part of the big red truck.

You see that conclusion (4) does not logically follow from the rest, do you not?

And therefore, your conclusion that "everything is part of God" does not follow from your premises, either.

Everything has properties of existence. This does not imply that Existence is limited to things. So ''all things'' are not necessarily the totality. Therefore A exists as a non thing.

Now you're saying this:

1. E is the collection of Ts. "Everything is the collection of things."
2. All Ts have the property X. "All things have the property of existence."
3. G is not a T. "God is not a thing."
4. Therefore G has property X. "Therefore God exists."

Equivalently:
1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stuffed toys (T).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The big red truck (G) is not a stuffed toy (T).
4. Therefore the big red truck (G) has the property of being fluffy (X).

Again, we see that your argument is logically invalid.

 

[Syne]

Jan Ardena:


I didn't know you were quoting a "scriptural text" there.

I interpret that text as saying that the eight "energies" belong to God but are separated either from God or from each other. It's hard to tell which.

Would you agree, then, that it is possible that Ether, say, caused the universe, and not God? Or is Ether a part or feature of God? Could Water have caused the universe, and not God?

That scripture is the Bhagavad Gita 7:4

Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and certainly false ego thus together are My eight separate energies.​

Bhagavad Gita 7:12 makes the point more clearly.

And try to understand that of all which is surely in the state of goodness, passion and slowness and thus all that is certainly so of Me, you should not know Me as being in them but that they are in Me.​

Sorry, I haven't kept up with your discussion with Jan, but I believe the argument would be something like:

1. "Everything" is defined as the collection of all "physical things".
2. "Physical things" require a cause.
3. God is not a "physical thing".
   
4. Therefore God does not require a cause.

Equivalently:

1. E is the collection of PTs. "Everything is the collection of physical things."
2. All PTs have the property X. "All physical things have a cause."
3. G is not a PT. "God is not a physical thing."
4. Therefore G has no property X. "Therefore God has no cause."​

And:

1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stuffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The big red truck (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the big red truck (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X).​

The KCA with the Bhagavad Gita passage in mind:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. God is not physical.
3. Therefore, God has no cause.
4. Therefore, God is the only available uncaused cause.

​

Not convincing, in itself, but assuming the givens, the logic holds.

 

[Sarkus]

Sorry, I haven't kept up with your discussion with Jan, but I believe the argument would be something like:

1. "Everything" is defined as the collection of all "physical things".
2. "Physical things" require a cause.
3. God is not a "physical thing".
   
4. Therefore God does not require a cause

The conclusion (4) is not valid given the wording of the premises: while you have stated in (2) that physical things require a cause, there is no mention of what non-physical things might require, if anything at all. One can not therefore simply assert that God, a non-physical thing, does not require a cause.

To get round that you would need reword (2) as "Only physical things require a cause".
And (1) is redundant - it serves no route to the conclusion.

Equivalently:

1. E is the collection of PTs. "Everything is the collection of physical things."
2. All PTs have the property X. "All physical things have a cause."
3. G is not a PT. "God is not a physical thing."
4. Therefore G has no property X. "Therefore God has no cause."​

And:

1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stuffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The big red truck (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the big red truck (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X).​

To illustrate the invalid logic, try this, using your logic:

1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stiffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The fluffy towel (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the fluffy towel (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X).
​

The KCA with the Bhagavad Gita passage in mind:

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. God is not physical.
3. Therefore, God has no cause.
4. Therefore, God is the only available uncaused cause.

​

Not convincing, in itself, but assuming the givens, the logic holds.

Unfortunately it doesn't, for the reason shown above (3 does not follow validly from 1 and 2).
Also, it assumes in (4) that God is the only non-physical thing capable of causal power, and thus you're back to the question-begging outlined in the OP.

 

[Sarkus]

It is a common fallacy to assume that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. While not sound reasoning, I don't think anyone can fault you for assuming it personally, since it is based on your personal confidence in what you would expect to be found in the affirmative case.

It becomes a matter of what one finds to be the most rational position, noting that rational doesn't necessarily equate to truth, although we would all of course hope that there is a perfect alignment between the two.

I've already said that the KCA is not convincing. The KCA doesn't necessarily argue for a single god either. But god is active, just not in the miraculous means. God is active the way anything else is. Your most direct sense of yourself is self-reflection within your own mind. You are active via a body.

So you believe.

But I don't intend nor expect anything I could say to be convincing. If someone is ideologically bound to a strictly materialistic universe, there's no amount of logical reasoning likely to effect their beliefs.

One could also quite easily say that if one is ideologically bound to belief in God then there is no amount of logical reasoning likely to effect their beliefs. There is no logical reasoning that proves God to exist , or to not exist, as truth - any argument that does is at best validly formed, but the soundness of the argument is beyond our ken.
Beyond that we simply go with what we find to be rational and pragmatic.

 

[Sarkus]

That's not what it's saying. It says that all things is everything. It all things were just a part of everything, that would suggest there's more to everything than all things.

Okay, all things is everything. Got it.
And yet you have also said that "everything is all that exists", you have excluded god from everything, and thus logically god can not exist under those premises.

No it's not the collection of, it is all things (the totality). Period. That is what Sarkus is presenting.

In this context the understanding of "the collection of all things" is synonymous with "the totality of all things".

Everything has properties of existence. This does not imply that Existence is limited to things. So ''all things'' are not necessarily the totality. Therefore A exists as a non thing.

Everything has properties of existence
Existence is not limited to everything
God 's existence is not limited to everything

I refer you back to your "variation" of definition of "everything" as being "all that exists".
In English this means that any thing or any non-thing that exists would be included under the label of "everything".

I'll leave JamesR to explain all the question-begging, though.

 

[Jan Ardena]

Okay, all things is everything. Got it.

That is what you're saying. Right?

And yet you have also said that "everything is all that exists", you have excluded god from everything, and thus logically god can not exist under those premises.

No I haven't excluded God, as God is not a thing.

In this context the understanding of "the collection of all things" is synonymous with "the totality of all things".

Right, but it could be synonymous with the totality of all non things , which explains nothing.
The totality merely includes everything, with the properties of cause and effect.
So how can we define 'the totality'?
If everything is all that exists, and everything that begins it's existence is brought into and out of being, then totality represent 'being'.
Funnily enough the definition of totality is quality or state of being.

the totality includes everything that begins to exist
the totality is being
God does not begin to exist
God is the totality

jan.

 

[Sarkus]

That is what you're saying. Right?

??? We're trying to understand what you are saying when you say "everything is all that exists". If everything is all that exists then anything that exists must fall under the umbrella of everything. If God, as you claim, is distinct from everything, then God does not exist.

No I haven't excluded God, as God is not a thing.

Apologies if I wasn't clear but you said English was your first language?
If something is excluded, it doesn't mean that it should be there but is deliberately kept out, it means that it is not entitled to be there (for whatever reason), or we simple do not consider it as part of whatever it is excluded from.
So yes, when you say that God is not a "thing", and you say that everything is all "things", then you are excluding God from being considered under the em really of everything.

Right, but it could be synonymous with the totality of all non things , which explains nothing.

Please can you explain how "the collection of all things" could in any way be synonymous with "totality of all non things"????

The totality merely includes everything, with the properties of cause and effect.

No, I've told you how "totality of" and "the collection of" should be interpreted in this context - I.e. as synonymous. There is no need to get into semantic nonsense about it.

the totality includes everything that begins to exist
the totality is being
God does not begin to exist
God is the totality

If you intended line 4 to be a valid conclusion from the first 3 (which I'm assuming are your premises) then I'm sorry to disappoint but it's not, it is a non sequitur. It is certainly a possible solution, just as much as sting that "God does not exist" would be a solution to the premises, but neither of them follow as the logical conclusion from just those premises.

Furthermore, in line 1 you are already making a distinction within everything between those things that begin to exist and those things that don't. What are you aware of within "everything" that does not begin to exist, when you have previously stated that everything is all that exists, everything is the collection of physical things, and physical things need a cause?


You seem to be jumping from one response to another with complete disregard for what you have previously stated. This generates a lack of consistency, and makes what you post extremely unclear as to your actual meaning.

 

[Syne]

The conclusion (4) is not valid given the wording of the premises: while you have stated in (2) that physical things require a cause, there is no mention of what non-physical things might require, if anything at all. One can not therefore simply assert that God, a non-physical thing, does not require a cause.

To get round that you would need reword (2) as "Only physical things require a cause".
And (1) is redundant - it serves no route to the conclusion.

The first premise serves only to define terms, just as James' example did. You can either ignore it, or take it up with James (whose benefit it was meant for). Aside from the non-physical requiring a cause being ontologically nonsensical, the conclusion is inferred from the premises:

(A) requires (B)
(C) is not equivalent to (A)​

Thus we can infer that:

(C) does not share the requirement of (A)​

Parsimony is aided by the economy of givens. Logical negation, e.g. 'is not', is boolean.

To illustrate the invalid logic, try this, using your logic:

1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stiffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The fluffy towel (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the fluffy towel (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X).
​

Unfortunately it doesn't, for the reason shown above (3 does not follow validly from 1 and 2).
Also, it assumes in (4) that God is the only non-physical thing capable of causal power, and thus you're back to the question-begging outlined in the OP.

Your premises do not correlate to mine and are trivially flawed as givens, since they define a non-universal characteristic instead of a necessary requirement. Requirements are such because the entity cannot ontologically exist without it. Stuffed toys can exist that are not fluffy, so the requirement not only doesn't hold for all stuffed toys, it also isn't ontologically isolated to that class of entity.

The direct contradiction in the conclusion should have clued you in on the fact that one or more of your premises were flawed. Your invalid comparison doesn't effect the fact that, assuming the givens, my premises offer no other alternative.

This post of yours is rather sad. I really have given you more credit than you here demonstrate you deserve.

 

[Syne]

One could also quite easily say that if one is ideologically bound to belief in God then there is no amount of logical reasoning likely to effect their beliefs. There is no logical reasoning that proves God to exist , or to not exist, as truth - any argument that does is at best validly formed, but the soundness of the argument is beyond our ken.
Beyond that we simply go with what we find to be rational and pragmatic.

Quite the contrary. While ideological belief in a strictly material existence allows no alternative to a material cause, a belief in some form of non-material existence allows for the alternatives of a material cause, god as cause, or some other non-material cause equally. Again, no version of the KCA is, itself, convincing or constitutes 'proof', but logical validity does not require either.

 

[Baldeee]

The first premise serves only to define terms, just as James' example did. You can either ignore it, or take it up with James (whose benefit it was meant for). Aside from the non-physical requiring a cause being ontologically nonsensical, the conclusion is inferred from the premises:

Why is it ontologically nonsensical for the non-physical requiring a cause?
If you think so, and it would be a premise open to questioning, then surely you should accept Sarkus' amendment to your argument of "only physical things require a cause"?
You have to bear in mind, and I'm sure JamesR and Sarkus would both tell you, that the form of logic doesn't care about the soundness of the premises, or what is ontologically nonsensical.
It merely cares about what can logically follow from what is stated - not from what isn't stated.
In this case, if your logical argument does not state "only physical things require a cause" then we can not rule out non-physical things also having a cause.
The non-applicability to non-physical things is not stated in a premise.

(A) requires (B)
(C) is not equivalent to (A)​

Thus we can infer that:

(C) does not share the requirement of (A)​

​

Sarkus is correct in his assessment: the logic is invalid.
- Ducks require oxygen (equivalent to "A requires B")
- You are not equivalent to a duck (equivalent to "C is not equivalent to A")
- So since you think you can infer that "C does not share the requirement of A" then I can infer that you do not require oxygen?
Had you, as Sarkus suggested, said "Only (A) requires (B)" in premise 1 then the conclusion would be valid.

Parsimony is aided by the economy of givens. Logical negation, e.g. 'is not', is boolean.

The form of the logical argument still has to be valid before you start being parsimonious about what you state and do not state.

Your premises do not correlate to mine and are trivially flawed as givens, since they define a non-universal characteristic instead of a necessary requirement.

I have to disagree here: the premises Sarkus has used, other than premise 3, are identical to the ones you provided as an example.
All he has done is swap "big red metal truck" for "fluffy towel" to highlight the invalidity of your conclusion.
Do you accept that neither the "big red metal truck" nor the "fluffy towel" are stuffed toys?
If so then the substitution does not alter the form of the argument.
If you have issue with the other premises then you need to examine why you used them in the first instance.

Requirements are such because the entity cannot ontologically exist without it. Stuffed toys can exist that are not fluffy, so the requirement not only doesn't hold for all stuffed toys, it also isn't ontologically isolated to that class of entity.

To quote your post #229:
"Equivalently:
...
And:
1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stuffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The big red truck (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the big red truck (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X)."

And Sarkus' highlighting of the invalid conclusion:
"1. The toy menagerie (E) is the collection of all stiffed toys (PT).
2. All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy (X).
3. The fluffy towel (G) is not a stuffed toy (PT).
4. Therefore the fluffy towel (G) does not have the property of being fluffy (X)."

You will note that lines 1 and 2 are identical.
It is you who has stated the univeral requirement for "all stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy" in your premises.
If you now disagree with this then you also need to separate the issue of validity - and I can confirm, as will JamesR and Sarkus, and possibly others, that your conclusion is invalid - with issues of soundness - i.e. whether the premises themselves are true.
It seems to be the issue of soundness that you now seem to be arguing about with "the requirement not only doesn't hold for all stuffed toys, it also isn't ontologically isolated to that class of entity."
But let's examine that sentence more closely:

"The requirement not only doesn't hold for all stuffed toys,": you'll note that in your example (even it was based on one JamesR provided previously) you stated in the premise that "All stuffed toys have the property of being fluffy", and as such it is you who have set up that the requirement does hold for all stuffed toys.
A valid conclusion must therefore follow that premise.

"it also isn't ontologically isolated to that class of entity.": this is a matter of soundness, not logical form.
As said previously, logical form doesn't give two hoots about the soundness of the premises.
If you don't set up the premises to specifically exclude things from possibility then logical form alone might suggest they can happen, even if in reality they can't.

E.g. All men are spiders
Spiders have eight legs
Therefore all men have eight legs.

You'll note: no bearing on reality (the premises are unsound) but the conclusion is valid.

Your example, however, is demonstrably invalid in its conclusion - as adequately shown by Sarkus.

The direct contradiction in the conclusion should have clued you in on the fact that one or more of your premises were flawed.

Again, this was your argument that you're now dismantling.
Sarkus merely highlighted the issue of validity by substituting a metal truck for a fluffy towel.
And you are also now criticising the soundness of your own argument.
Anyone would think you are just out to pick a fight with someone, even if that has to be yourself.

Your invalid comparison doesn't effect the fact that, assuming the givens, my premises offer no other alternative.

"Assuming the givens"?
Since when does logical form make assumptions not within the premises?
If you want there to be no other alternative then you have to set up the premises to rule our those alternatives.
Maybe by adding the "Only..." that Sarkus suggested?

This post of yours is rather sad. I really have given you more credit than you here demonstrate you deserve.

To be honest, I see nothing erroneous with what Sarkus has written, and he highlighted the invalidity quite clearly.
Had he not beaten me to the punch I would have pointed out the invalidity of your conclusion just as he has.
It is also rather surprising that you criticise an example he uses as being not comparable when it is the example you used to support your case (even if itself based on a JamesR example), so in essence you are merely criticising yourself, although it seemed to take Sarkus making the slight change ("red metal truck" to "fluffy towel") to highlight this to you.

If you're going to call a post "sad", or denigrate someone, then it behooves you not to do so while standing in quicksand, especially when they're throwing you a rope.

 

[Sarkus]

Quite the contrary.

??? Do you actually read the posts before you respond with contrariness? You say "quite the contrary" yet nothing you then say is actually contrary to what I have said - it is in fact not even on the topic of what I said, but rather a red-herring / strawman.

While ideological belief in a strictly material existence allows no alternative to a material cause, a belief in some form of non-material existence allows for the alternatives of a material cause, god as cause, or some other non-material cause equally.

My statement was a mirroring of yours, mine being specific to ideological belief in God, not to one where one remains open to all/any possibility of material/non-material cause (hence being a red-herring). If one has such a belief in God then they believe that God was the cause. Or are you aware of someone that believes in God but believes that God didn't ultimately cause the universe?
Furthermore, adhering to the notion of a strictly materialistic universe says nothing about the cause of that universe. One could quite happily mix belief in God and also in such a materialist universe, where God basically lets it do its own thing, governed by the rules he establishes within it etc.

So let me repeat what I said again, and let's see what it is you are actually contrary to: "if one is ideologically bound to belief in God then there is no amount of logical reasoning likely to effect their beliefs." So are you saying that if one is ideologically bound to belief in God then they can be reasoned away from it? Moreso than your claim that someone who is ideologically bound to a strictly materialistic universe can be?
I then said "There is no logical reasoning that proves God to exist , or to not exist, as truth - any argument that does is at best validly formed, but the soundness of the argument is beyond our ken." and is it this you disagree with? If so, care to present some logical reasoning that proves God to exist, or not, as truth (i.e. a valid and sound conclusion)?
"Beyond that we simply go with what we find to be rational and pragmatic." Perhaps it is this line you disagree with? You don't go with what you find to be rational and pragmatic??

So I'm really struggling to see what your disagreement is, because your comments had no bearing on what I actually said.
Please feel free to clarify.

Again, no version of the KCA is, itself, convincing or constitutes 'proof', but logical validity does not require either.

No version of the KCA has actually yet shown to be valid in concluding that God caused the universe. It's valid up to concluding that the universe had a cause, but beyond that... hasn't been shown yet.

 

[Sarkus]

This post of yours is rather sad. I really have given you more credit than you here demonstrate you deserve.

I won't go into the detail of your post as I think Baldeee has more than adequately dealt with it. Feel free not to give me any more credit if doing so relies on me having the same misunderstanding of the basics of logic as you. I mean, it would be nice to agree with you 'n' all that, but then we'd both be wrong.
And if you're going to spend time criticising an argument as wrong, best to make sure it's not actually one you exampled to support your case, and which is essentially being repeated back to you to highlight a specific flaw. That sort of thing will make you appear confused and not a little bit lacking.

 

[CptBork]

The two criteria of parsimony are explanatory power and simplicity. If you neglect the former, any conclusion based solely on the latter is, at best, superficial. You can always claim a superficially simple explanation, like 'it just happened', but being devoid of explanatory power, it is meaningless. Lacking explanatory power, any assertion is effectively nothing more than navel-gazing.

"The universe had an initial state." <--- There, that's the explanation, nothing more required. If you want to protest that this statement necessitates a deeper explanation, and propose that a creator exists which doesn't require an explanation for its own existence, then you still have to explain why this creator doesn't need an explanation, and you must construct explanations for each of your explanations in turn. You're stuck either way, so your arguments don't necessitate any logical propositions or conclusions.

Incorrect. Existing evidence tells us that earlier inflationary periods of our universe put any signal/observable from that period forever beyond our reach. So basic physics tells us that we cannot obtain any 'existing evidence' for an 'initial state'. IOW, your proclamation is, at best, wishful thinking.

Existing evidence strongly demonstrates that the universe evolves according to the laws of General Relativity, and has done so as early in time as we're able to discern with modern equipment. Extrapolating that theory as far back in time as possible, whether or not this extrapolations is correct in reality, indicates that the universe must necessarily have a Big Bang singularity in the finite past, and thus an initial state. No supernatural interpretation of our universe has ever led to accurate predictions and models of the cosmos, indeed quite the opposite, so the evidence to date does not support any philosophy which disagrees with General Relativity.

That's nothing but a lot of arm-waving. General Relativity cannot describe the Big Bang singularity. Neither can quantum mechanics.

General Relativity can accurately model the historical evolution of the universe starting from any time after the Big Bang, and folks such as Stephen Hawking have demonstrated that a Big Bang singularity must exist a finite time in the past according to its laws.

And whether or not we postulate an infinite regress, differences in observed local time do nothing to dismiss or alter the question of timing. How much time has elapsed doesn't matter. What matters is that it has been a finite duration...any finite duration.

If you're asking why the universe (according to our present understanding) should happen to be roughly 13.7 billion years old as viewed from our local reference frame, and why you happen to be alive here and now in this form at this precise time, then I can just as easily ask you why it shouldn't be that way.

Any discussion about the origin of the universe is necessarily beyond what science can address. But so is complex human behavior. Should we avoid postulating parsimonious explanations of everything that does not avail itself to repeatable and controlled quantitative testing? Logical inference address more than the scientific method alone can.

You're not making any valid logical inferences though, you're just postulating things without proper a priori justification.

That doesn't mean that macroscopic causality is ever violated. Again, there are two differing domains here. Yes, one domain is probabilistic while the other is deterministic. You seem to be laboring under the a priori assumption that the former is causative of the latter.

There's no magical energy scale where quantum probability simply shuts off and switches to determinism. Two metal boxes in identical macrostates but possessing differing microstates will, in theory (and sometimes even under measurable experimental conditions) exhibit two completely different behaviours under the right external influences. Here's a simplified macroscopic example of where Thor readily displays his gambling addiction: a macroscopic system produces a stream of photons, a small subset of those photons is chanelled off to a photodetector which detects 20% of the photons in that subset at random, and the photodetector is used to activate a macroscopic machine.

Do you see the contradiction in assuming a probabilistic system is determines a deterministic system?

No, I don't. Go look up Ehrenfest's equations if you don't believe me, and I can cite plenty of other examples. When you take the equations of quantum mechanics and calculate the average behaviour over large number of particles, you recover the classical deterministic laws of physics as a large-scale approximation.

Sure, but only within the quantum domain. You don't seem to understand the very simple fact that QM is only applicable at very small scales. Beyond those deterministic causality rules. You have not shown that the one can violate the other.

See above. Also yet another out of zillions of macroscopic examples: the random probabilistic rules of quantum mechanics are used to accurately model the large-scale thermal properties of macroscopic crystals, which haven't been explained by any other means.

Yeah, you've said that before, and it was just as meaningless then. What occurs in one domain does not magically change the nature of what occurs in the other.

You claim to be a fan of parsimony. The simplest explanation for the rules that govern macroscopic behaviour is that they're the exact same rules as those which govern each of the individual particles therein, except that the precise details are hidden upon superficial examination due to the averaging behaviour over large collections of particles. Furthermore, all evidence to date indicates that quantum randomness is fundamentally at work on any scale at which it's been tested.

Another problem is that many interpretations of quantum phenomena are experimentally equivalent. And these include purely deterministic ones.

Wrong. Bell test experiments have now conclusively ruled out the possibility of constructing any deterministic explanation for quantum mechanical behaviour without violating the causality requirements of Special Relativity.