Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[Write4U]

That's you making a positive claim about something you don't think exists. Ergo, the diet of pink unicorns. Right over your head, huh?

Really?
That is such a naive analysis, I shouldn't even bother. But let me teach you.

Write4U said:
"Yes it would if we had free will, which we don't". The only positive claim is contained in the previous statement that "matter rules the mind". (Brain in a vat).

All other scenarios are moot.
But IF WE DID ?................

 

[Quantum Quack]

"Yes it would if we had free will, which we don't"

But what exactly is it we supposedly don't have?

 

[Vociferous]

But IF WE DID ?................

You then erect the straw man of equating free will with mind over matter. If you can't understand how that's a fallacy, I really can't help you.

 

[Baldeee]

It's your problem that you've felt the need to beat that dead horse for how many posts now. I'm over it, and you should try to be as well.

Your apology is accepted.

Has nothing to do with illusion. My analogy to quantum superposition versus classical determinism just flew right over your head. To wit:

Apologies, when you used the word "appears" and the discussion is exclusively about a deterministic universe, I assumed you were not simply arguing an irrelevancy.
Seems I was wrong.

If one presumes that superimposed states are actually only one of said states then that is an unjustified assumption.

Not for a deterministic universe, no.

Exactly. It's a conclusion, not a premise. Hence begging the question.

Eh?
Do you even know what it means to beg the question in logic?
One must conclude the point presumed, and since there is no conclusion of what has been presumed, it is not begging the question.
One can only reach the conclusion through the combination of the premises.
Unless you're one of those that sees all syllogistic conclusions as begging the question, perhaps?

Neither have I, and how you got that from what you quoted is a mystery. I was never talking about appearance. You just latched onto the word "appears" as if it meant illusion, where it actually only separated the empirical evidence from any possible, underlying but unknown reality. Again, reference to QM was completely lost on you.

Not lost, I was just giving you the benefit of the doubt of being relevant to the discussion of the deterministic universe.
I apologise for being wrong: you were indeed simply being irrelevant.

LOL! That's priceless! Nice of you to finally catch up, instead of running away with your own straw man. I've only mentioned appearance in respect to empirical evidence versus any possible, underlying but unknown reality. Go reread my posts, with your newfound clarity, for yourself.

As said, it makes your comments irrelevant.

A premise of determinism is begging the question. That's the same as asking if determinism is possible in free will universe. Yawn.

Utter nonsense.
1. it is not begging the question unless one defines freewill with reference to being impossible in a deterministic universe.
Defining it as "ability to do otherwise" is not begging the question, because one must couple it with a premise of the nature of the universe to be able to assess whether it is possible.
2. determinism is possible in a "free will universe".
Just because a free will universe allows freewill doesn't preclude it from also allowing determinism.
E.g. if a freewill universe is one where, say, free will is allowed by dint of human thought initiating uncaused chains of events, then determinism might well govern all non-human interactions.
Thus determinism would be possible in such a universe.
If this was supposedly your test of begging the question then hopefully that shows you that it is not.

Begging the question. Boring.

Then feel free to close the door on your way out.

BTW, where was this stipulated? Is this just a naive take on the thread's title?

Not a naive take but the intended take.
There have been several similar threads on this matter, others of which may suit your purposes better, and this was hived out so as to restrict discussion to a deterministic universe.

Why would a classical domain deterministic universe require determinism in all domains, or the preclusion of free will stemming from any other domain?

Because all the domains in question in this thread - aka the universe - are deterministic.

Again, that's just a boring as asking if determinism is possible in free will universe. It assumes the conclusion that one dominates.

Not just dominates, but is the whole.
Again, if you don't want to join the discussion, you know where the exit is.

I'm not an incompatibilist, nor a compatibilist. Free will actually requires deterministic causality for choices to be meaningful. Otherwise, the sense of choice is just illusory and not free at all. I don't think compatibilists redefining free will is valid, any more than a compatibilist would think redefining determinism would be valid. But that seems to be a more nuanced discussion than your simple begging the question can manage.

We've had at least one here that wants to redefine determinism.
But who says that free will requires deterministic causality for choices to be meaningful?
What of probabilistic causality?
What of QM?
If you think that freewill is possible in a deterministic universe - i.e. where every closed domain you wish to consider is deterministic, then you are a compatibilist.
If you think that freewill is not possible in such, you are an incompatibilist.
It is a binary position, unless one simply doesn't know.

So this thread has zero to do with the real world? So you can argue your conclusion by artificially excising any alternative.
Cute. I guess some people think that's fun or worthwhile.

It is a rather old debate, and one that is being discussed here.
Again, don't let the door hit you on your way out.

Free will cannot exist without causality.

The question is whether it can exist without deterministic causality, the notion that the effect is completely defined by the cause.
This is separate from probabilistic causality, which is inherently indeterministic.

If the consequences of a choice cannot be sufficiently predicted then the choice is just as arbitrary (not meaningful) as the consequence.
You seem to be presuming that determinism must have no exceptions in order to exist at all. I agree that our universe is largely deterministic. I just don't agree that we need to take the boring step of presuming it wholly deterministic to support a foregone conclusion.

Then start a new thread.
And given what the compatibilists here say, it is far from a foregone conclusion in their eyes.
Maybe you want to share your views with them, given that, from your view that the actual question asked is begging the question, and you see the answer as a foregone conclusion, you are an incompatibilist.

Why? Are determinism and indeterminism actually incompatible? Even if determinism relies, as it seems, on a more fundamental indeterminism?
The better test is the one that doesn't presume the conclusion.

Noone has presumed the conclusion.

No, compatibilism does not presume that only determinism exists, to the exclusion of other domains or indeterminism.

In the matter of freewill that is exactly what it presumes.

Genuine free will can ONLY exist/be expressed in a causal universe. Choices without sufficiently predictable consequences are effectively random and meaningless, which is not free will. But where/how something is expressed is not how it comes to be.
Notice the difference?

If that is your notion of freewill then feel free to discuss it in the remit of this discussion: the deterministic universe.
Is your notion of freewill possible in a deterministic universe?
Not a universe that is mostly deterministic, or any other mix of determinism and indeterminism, but a wholly deterministic universe.

Do you even read what you write? So if everyone agreed with you "that freewill can’t exist in a deterministic universe", only then would you be happy to discuss "whether free will does exist"?

In this thread, yes.
If I started a thread asking "is 2 + 2 = 4 correct?" would that be begging the question in your view?
Not to me - it is simply a question.
If everyone gave the same answer of "yes" to that question, then the thread has served its purpose.
So if you want to discuss whether free will does exist (e.g. in our universe), start a new thread, although there's probably any number of threads that have asked a question to that effect.
E.g. [/url]http://www.sciforums.com/threads/does-physics-disprove-the-existence-of-free-will.161342/ as offered in the OP of this thread.[/URL]

I couldn't ask for a better example of begging the question.

Then we have a very different view of what that means.
Here, given that there are those on both side of the debate (those who would say "yes" and those who would say "no"), it seems to be rather far from begging the question.
If it was begging the question there should only be one answer.

Free will can ONLY exist in a sufficiently deterministic universe. Otherwise, choices are as arbitrary as their consequences and no more meaningful than random choice (what Libet mistook for free will). So no, I don't presume that free will is not possible in a deterministic universe.

Nor does the question asked in this thread.

And that answers the question of whether free will is possible without precluding determinism.

It is certainly your answer to a different question than was asked here.
Any time you want to be relevant, just join in, though.

You're begging the question by precluding anything but determinism.

For your notion of free will, perhaps, but not for others.
My notion of free will is simply "ability to do otherwise" and there is no question begging involved.

If you don't like what I post where, report me for posting off topic, if you really think that will fly. Otherwise, quit playing schoolmarm.

This thread is specific to the deterministic universe.
We have had other more general threads about freewill and our actual universe, so if you want to discuss that it would be the decent thing to go and play in those sandpits.
Or you can remain irrelevant in this one.

 

[Write4U]

You then erect the straw man of equating free will with mind over matter. If you can't understand how that's a fallacy, I really can't help you.

Nooo, that is the whole idea of the exercise. Every variable emerges from an assumed position.

One does not need to believe what one may contemplate. The same holds for your position.

 

[Write4U]

But what exactly is it we supposedly don't have?

Free Will, according to mainstream science/philosophy

free will, n.
1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will.
2. The power of making choices that are neither determined by natural causality nor predestined by fate or divine will

. https://www.thefreedictionary.com/free will

This is contrary to determinisms;

Philosophers have debated both the truth of determinism, and the truth of free will. This creates the four possible positions in the figure. Compatibilism refers to the view that free will is, in some sense, compatible with determinism. The three incompatibilist positions, on the other hand, deny this possibility. The hard incompatibilists hold that both determinism and free will do not exist, the libertarianists that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and the hard determinists that determinism does hold and free will does not exist.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism#With_free_will

 

[Vociferous]

Not for a deterministic universe, no.

Yes, even in a deterministic universe, classical domain waves exhibit superposition, and presuming that a superposed wave is really just one of its contributing waves is still unjustified. Please learn some physics.

Eh?
Do you even know what it means to beg the question in logic?
One must conclude the point presumed, and since there is no conclusion of what has been presumed, it is not begging the question.
One can only reach the conclusion through the combination of the premises.
Unless you're one of those that sees all syllogistic conclusions as begging the question, perhaps?

If the premise is philosophical determinism:

"The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will." https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/determinism​

Then that precludes free will, simply by definition, as a premise. That can only arrive at one conclusion. Just like "is determinism possible is a free will universe" can only arrive at one conclusion. If changing the premise changes the conclusion so decisively, it's begging the question. If that's beyond you, we're at an impasse.

Now if you're talking about causal determinism (causality), then your whole shtick about no indeterminism goes right out the window. Causality can include probabilistic causation, even in the classical domain:

"Interpreting causation as a deterministic relation means that if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does smoking cause cancer. As a result, many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_causation

Not lost, I was just giving you the benefit of the doubt of being relevant to the discussion of the deterministic universe.

I apologise for being wrong: you were indeed simply being irrelevant.

As said, it makes your comments irrelevant.

Then ignore it, if that's how you're determined to take it. No one is stopping you. Or...maybe they are. You have no free will, right?

Utter nonsense.
1. it is not begging the question unless one defines freewill with reference to being impossible in a deterministic universe.
Defining it as "ability to do otherwise" is not begging the question, because one must couple it with a premise of the nature of the universe to be able to assess whether it is possible.
2. determinism is possible in a "free will universe".
Just because a free will universe allows freewill doesn't preclude it from also allowing determinism.
E.g. if a freewill universe is one where, say, free will is allowed by dint of human thought initiating uncaused chains of events, then determinism might well govern all non-human interactions.
Thus determinism would be possible in such a universe.
If this was supposedly your test of begging the question then hopefully that shows you that it is not.

1. Again, philosophical determinism IS defined so as to preclude genuine free will. And causality does not preclude probabilistic causation. Take your pick.
2. It does simply by determinism being defined as mutually exclusive to free will.

So, I'm going to have to assume you mean causation, not philosophical determinism. In which case, probabilistic causation, and thereby indeterminism, is well within the bounds of the thread's title.
Again, take your pick. Begging the question or allowing for indeterminism.

Then feel free to close the door on your way out.

No thanks. Not your call.

Not a naive take but the intended take.
There have been several similar threads on this matter, others of which may suit your purposes better, and this was hived out so as to restrict discussion to a deterministic universe.

It is naive to think that either philosophical determinism is not begging the question or causality precludes probability.

Again, that's just a boring as asking if determinism is possible in free will universe. It assumes the conclusion that one dominates.

Not just dominates, but is the whole.

Exactly. It's a mutually exclusive premise that begs the question.

Free will actually requires deterministic causality for choices to be meaningful.

We've had at least one here that wants to redefine determinism.
But who says that free will requires deterministic causality for choices to be meaningful?

Um. I did. I just wrote it.

What of probabilistic causality?
What of QM?
If you think that freewill is possible in a deterministic universe - i.e. where every closed domain you wish to consider is deterministic, then you are a compatibilist.
If you think that freewill is not possible in such, you are an incompatibilist.
It is a binary position, unless one simply doesn't know.

Make up your mind. You're the one who wants to keep discussion about whether free will exists separate from whether free will and determinism can co-exist. That they can co-exist tells us nothing about how free will comes to be in the first place. So you're being irrelevant, by your own standard.

I think that causality is necessary for the expression of free will AND that it is not valid to redefine free will, as compatibilists do, to explain it away. If you insist on calling that compatibilism, that's your problem. It's only a binary position if you insist on begging the question.

Free will cannot exist without causality.

The question is whether it can exist without deterministic causality, the notion that the effect is completely defined by the cause.
This is separate from probabilistic causality, which is inherently indeterministic.

So you are talking about philosophical determinism, and thus are definitely begging the question. Well, I can't say I didn't try to let you off the hook.
Every effect can be completely defined by its cause without every cause being such an effect.

Then start a new thread.

Not your call. Ho hum.

And given what the compatibilists here say, it is far from a foregone conclusion in their eyes.
Maybe you want to share your views with them, given that, from your view that the actual question asked is begging the question, and you see the answer as a foregone conclusion, you are an incompatibilist.

I don't know what compatibilists have claimed here. I'm talking about standard compatibilist arguments, where the only thing they change is redefining free will to explain it away in light of determinism. If compatibilists here accept a free will that is illusory or "cannot will as it wills", that's their business. I'll tell them what I've been telling you. That's not genuine free will.

Noone has presumed the conclusion.

You keep saying that, without any compelling argument.

No, compatibilism does not presume that only determinism exists, to the exclusion of other domains or indeterminism.

In the matter of freewill that is exactly what it presumes.

No, like you, it just deems them irrelevant. And like you, it begs the question, only by redefining free will as not free will (because determinism is defined as mutually exclusive to genuine free will). See, you agree with compatibilists more than you knew. And that's why the binary choice is a false dilemma, when you presume philosophical determinism.

If that is your notion of freewill then feel free to discuss it in the remit of this discussion: the deterministic universe.
Is your notion of freewill possible in a deterministic universe?
Not a universe that is mostly deterministic, or any other mix of determinism and indeterminism, but a wholly deterministic universe.

Already answered.

Do you even read what you write? So if everyone agreed with you "that freewill can’t exist in a deterministic universe", only then would you be happy to discuss "whether free will does exist"?

In this thread, yes.

Wow, a clearer admission of begging the question could not be made.

If I started a thread asking "is 2 + 2 = 4 correct?" would that be begging the question in your view?
Not to me - it is simply a question.
If everyone gave the same answer of "yes" to that question, then the thread has served its purpose.

So you're "just asking a question", not making a logical argument?
And like math, your premises are axiomatic and your conclusion is thus tautological?

Then we have a very different view of what that means.
Here, given that there are those on both side of the debate (those who would say "yes" and those who would say "no"), it seems to be rather far from begging the question.
If it was begging the question there should only be one answer.

If one side has to redefine free will to accommodate determinism and the other merely assert determinism, both are begging the question by accepting the conclusion as a premise. Both agree that genuine free will cannot co-exist with determinism.

For your notion of free will, perhaps, but not for others.
My notion of free will is simply "ability to do otherwise" and there is no question begging involved.

Your notion is tailored to accommodate your presumption of philosophical determinism, e.g. begging the question.

 

[Vociferous]

Nooo, that is the whole idea of the exercise. Every variable emerges from an assumed position.

One does not need to believe what one may contemplate. The same holds for your position.

Then that straw man doesn't even have a pretense of making a point. Fine by me.

 

[Write4U]

To me the question rests with: Is Free Will necessary in our model of the Universe? If Free Will is not an evolutionary requirement of spacetime, why would it emerge spontaneously? IMO, Occam's Razor prevails here.

 

[iceaura]

So, are you saying that Free Will is, or is not independent on a prior causal state? That is the question, no?

For the twentieth time: I and everyone here over the past 40 pages of so (until just lately, and the resulting confusion will probably kill the thread) stipulated a causally deterministic universe - everything in such a universe is a product of cause and effect from the states of the immediate past. Nothing is "independent".

 

[iceaura]

If one side has to redefine free will to accommodate determinism and the other merely assert determinism, both are begging the question by accepting the conclusion as a premise. Both agree that genuine free will cannot co-exist with determinism.

The only "redefinition" of free will here has been the exclusion of supernatural abilities from acts of will. A large fraction of the posters here want to define freedom as the ability to defy physical law and act contrary to what has been determined by causation from the immediately prior circumstances. The supernatural assumption.

They have been calling that freedom of will "genuine", "actual", and the like. When you use that kind of language, it suggests that you harbor a supernatural definition of freedom in acts of choice and decision and will. True?

That definition seems both question begging and contrary to what we observe in acts of will and decision - nonsupernatural freedom of some kind, such as the analogies at the level of the human mind to the degrees of freedom necessary for describing the behaviors of even simple mechanical systems, offers to meet all our requirements for freedom except the ability to act contrary to what cause and effect have determined. We seem to be able - maybe - to get everything except the abrogation of physical law, and that we don't need surely?

 

[Capracus]

Why do you believe that the "quality" of freedom requires "material" indeterminism?

If an entity could act independently of environmental determination, then in relation to that environment its action would be indetermined, but such cases don't seem to be apparent in our human experience.

Evolution by natural selection is an illusion if one accepts the abstracted universe being promoted here.
In other words you can not believe in Darwinism and this abstracted determinism simultaneously with out severe contradiction.

"Is Darwinism possible in a deterministic universe?"

Selection of any kind is only a description of determined action. Are we going to ascribe the quality of choice to the behavior of the asteroid that impacted the Earth 65 million years ago and played its role in natural selection?

You find them. I've run enough errands for people who don't bother to read my posts in the first place.

If you want to use them in defense of your positions in conversations with me, you need to include them in those conversations, otherwise it’s pointless to bring them up.

What "interpretation" are you talking about? The example is quite simple - few "interpretations" are available.
What defines the choice is the causal past - and nothing in that example isolates the choice from its past.

When you interpret determined human or universal action to be optional, you’ve strayed from the agreed upon definition of a determined system. There is nothing optional in a determined system.

The humans or machines observing the driver's capabilities, verifying their existence, and verifying by observation the driver's ability to choose between them, are not limited in their knowledge. You can go ahead and assume that they are omniscient if you want to - changes nothing about the driver.

Definitionally choose means to select from a set of alternatives, but in a determined system there are no alternatives, so choice is never an option.

There were of course options to choose from - that's how the driver's singular action are determined by the universe, remember?

There were only options perceived by the driver because the driver is incapable of perceiving the complete set of determinate factors that define the outcome of the event. That complete set of determinate factors rules out any possibility for alternatives.

Why can't you guys deal with that example as posted?
Why are you posting irrelevancies about the future of the driver and the car? I can't believe you are consciously invoking backwards causality - claiming that the future color of the light determines the driver's choices and capabilities now, say - but there seems to be no other interpretation of this appeal to that future.

Everything I included in my example was contextually relevant to the event you described. The common thread in my example was the determined nature of all of the action listed, and the complete absence of choice associated with any of that action.

The system includes the driver, and the part of the system that makes the decision to stop or go (choosing from two capabilities) is the driver. The "system" making the choice is the same as the driver making the choice. The driver is the means by which the system makes the choice involved - we observe this.

You’re positing a system that permits alternate outcomes, essentially making things up as it goes along, that isn’t consistent with the agreed upon definition of a system that has determined all outcomes in advance. The system doesn’t operationally make choices, it just expresses determined action.

The driver's capabilities are observed at a given time, and are describable (in theory) at that time. We know what they are by observation and description - in more or less the same way we know the driver's shoe size. Their future expression does not affect their present reality, which was determined by the past, any more than the fate of the driver's left foot affects its shoe size now. They do not change according to any "determined parameters of the event", whatever that even means - what "event" are you talking about?

If you were able to describe all of the determined elemental parameters of the event, there wouldn’t be anything in that description that would resemble the imagined action of choice. There wouldn’t be alternate paths of action avaliable, only the single path inherently determined by the universal whole.

They are observed, and demonstrated, and (btw) necessary for the existence of different responses to different criteria. Not assumed.
Or to bring it to bear: which of the two "options", stop vs go, are you claiming does not exist?
And what exactly happened to it, since the last time it was employed?

In a determined system there is only one specific outcome for any moment in time. Since every moment in time in that system is unique, so are the associated outcomes. The descriptors stop and go aren’t options, they’re determined momentary outcomes, of which only one will be situationally appropriate for any given moment.

Well, there's no accounting for ignorance about the basics of the Copenhagen Interpretation or conflating theory completeness with a complete understanding of reality in general.

Except you're the one who initially made such a conflation.

Copenhagen-like interpretations accept the empirical indeterminism of QM as a full description of the underlying reality.

The empirical indetermination you speak of is an artifact of human measurement, not necessarily of any other aspect of reality. The wave function in QM is considered to be wholly deterministic, while our ability to functionally describe it is not. And in regards to those probabilistic descriptions in QM, the greater the frequency in probabilistic description of a given quantum state, the more determined that quantum state appears, which lends even more credence to the determined nature of reality at that level.

In the lack of further knowledge, only empiricism is justified. No one knows whether QM addresses the underlying reality or not, so we can only accept what empirical evidence tells us. Anything more is pure assumption. Accepting empirical evidence is parsimony, where making added assumptions is not. What you "favor" is not an argument.

There is no empirical evidence that quantum states are indeterministic, only that we are constrained to measure them that way.

It is not known to be philosophically deterministic, as no one can predict human choices based on initial conditions, nor trace a human choice to said conditions. It is causally deterministic, in that causality is demonstrable, but causality does not entail predeterminism. As such, free will is not an exception to causal determinism, but philosophical determinism is still begging the question.

In the context of this thread topic, reality is considered to be deterministic, in which case all universal action would be subject to initial conditions. And in the context of our everyday existence, determinism would appear to empirically rule the day.

 

[Baldeee]

Yes, even in a deterministic universe, classical domain waves exhibit superposition, and presuming that a superposed wave is really just one of its contributing waves is still unjustified. Please learn some physics.

In a deterministic universe there is no superposition.
There is a difference between deterministic causation and probabilistic causation, and superposition is the latter.
Yes, cause and effect, but not deterministic.
Deterministic is the notion that every event is completely determined by the cause: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic_system
A probabilistic cause doesn't do that, as it cannot completely determine the cause.

If the premise is philosophical determinism:

"The doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes regarded as external to the will." https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/determinism​

Determinism (the philosophical position one holds) is potentially a conclusion one reaches if one believes that the universe is deterministic (system).
Referring to a universe that is deterministic describes the mechanics of how the universe works: effect being completely determined by the cause.
So no, it does not include the question-begging within the definition of philsophical determinism that you have posted.
One can have a deterministic universe where people are not determinists, where determinism is not held, where compatibilists still have their position.
The philosophical position is different from the mechanics, and we are not assuming here that philosophical determinism is true, only that the universe is deterministic.

Now if you're talking about causal determinism (causality), then your whole shtick about no indeterminism goes right out the window. Causality can include probabilistic causation, even in the classical domain:

"Interpreting causation as a deterministic relation means that if A causes B, then A must always be followed by B. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does smoking cause cancer. As a result, many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_causation​

Then ignore it, if that's how you're determined to take it. No one is stopping you. Or...maybe they are. You have no free will, right?1. Again, philosophical determinism IS defined so as to preclude genuine free will. And causality does not preclude probabilistic causation. Take your pick.
2. It does simply by determinism being defined as mutually exclusive to free will.

If you have defined determinism as such then sure, that begs the question. [/quote]Again, philosophical determinism is a position/conclusion one reaches, based on a number of premises/beliefs.
We are not talking about philosophical determinism but simply about determinism.
Not probabilistic causation either, but deterministic causation.
And even if one wants to consider probabilistic causation, it offers nothing but randomness and no freedom.

So, I'm going to have to assume you mean causation, not philosophical determinism.

False dilemma as we're talking deterministic causation.
That is what is meant by a deterministic universe - i.e. where if A causes B it must always cause B.
Simple as that.

In which case, probabilistic causation, and thereby indeterminism, is well within the bounds of the thread's title.
Again, take your pick. Begging the question or allowing for indeterminism.

False dilemma, as explained.

No thanks. Not your call.

Never said it was.

It is naive to think that either philosophical determinism is not begging the question or causality precludes probability.

Straw man, as we're not talking about mere causality but deterministic causality.
Where every effect is completely determined by the cause.

Exactly. It's a mutually exclusive premise that begs the question.

So is defining Socrates as a man, and as a mortal, yet the conclusion there isn't begging the question.
Or maybe you think it is?

Um. I did. I just wrote it.

And that's your notion of freewill, your argument.
My point that it is not necessarily the notion that others hold.

Make up your mind. You're the one who wants to keep discussion about whether free will exists separate from whether free will and determinism can co-exist. That they can co-exist tells us nothing about how free will comes to be in the first place. So you're being irrelevant, by your own standard.

Merely showing how your claim of what freewill is is not necessarily universally held.
One is entirely able to define freewill how they want as long as it is toward answering the question raised with regard a deterministic universe.

I think that causality is necessary for the expression of free will AND that it is not valid to redefine free will, as compatibilists do, to explain it away.

You haven't even defined it at all, let alone shown your definition to be the only acceptable one, nor how compatabilists redefine it.

If you insist on calling that compatibilism, that's your problem. It's only a binary position if you insist on begging the question.

Not a problem.
And it's a binary position unless you misunderstand the question.

So you are talking about philosophical determinism, and thus are definitely begging the question. Well, I can't say I didn't try to let you off the hook.

No, I'm not talking about philosophical determinism.
I'm talking about whether free will can exist in a deterministic universe - where determinism is the notion that every effect is completely determined by the cause.

Every effect can be completely defined by its cause without every cause being such an effect.

No it can't:
If causes A and B sometimes lead to X and sometimes lead to Y, then A and B are not completely defining the effect.
They may define a probability function of effects, but not the effect itself.
And if B is probabilistic, say, but A and B always lead X, then B is either not a determining factor at all (in that the probability function is irrelevant), or the probability function is either 1 or 0 rather than anything in between - i.e. not probabilistic at all in any useful non-trivial sense of the word.

I don't know what compatibilists have claimed here. I'm talking about standard compatibilist arguments, where the only thing they change is redefining free will to explain it away in light of determinism.

If compatibilists here accept a free will that is illusory or "cannot will as it wills", that's their business. I'll tell them what I've been telling you. That's not genuine free will.

Ok, well maybe you want to start actually engaging with them, to see what they have to say?

You keep saying that, without any compelling argument.

Premise 1: freedom is the ability to do otherwise; premise 2: deterministic universe, where every effect is completely determined by the causes.
Where in that is the question-begging premise?
I shouldn't have to repeat this but for some reason I keep doing so: compatibilists are quite happy to take those premises and come to a different conclusion.
No question-begging.

No, like you, it just deems them irrelevant.

If it walks, quacks and sounds like a duck...

And like you, it begs the question, only by redefining free will as not free will (because determinism is defined as mutually exclusive to genuine free will).

Philosophical determinism is, but we are talking about the nature of the system, not the philosophical position.

Wow, a clearer admission of begging the question could not be made.

Then we have different views of what begging the question entails.

So you're "just asking a question", not making a logical argument?

If views differ as to the answer, or how the answer is reached, discussion ensues, support is given for each person's answers.
If everyone agrees, then yes, it is just a question.

And like math, your premises are axiomatic and your conclusion is thus tautological?

The premises are what they are for the purposes of this thread.
If you want to see them as axiomatic with regard this thread, sure.
Tautological, though, no, as that depends upon interpretation of what free will and "ability to do otherwise" is.
Again, maybe actually engage and you may find out.

If one side has to redefine free will to accommodate determinism and the other merely assert determinism, both are begging the question by accepting the conclusion as a premise. Both agree that genuine free will cannot co-exist with determinism.

Or one genuinely has no such a priori assumption as to what free will entails (i.e. a correct understanding of "ability to do otherwise") and one explores what is possible within the framework of a deterministic universe.
Then the conclusion one reaches pops out the end, no accepting of any premise as a conclusion.
Unless you think that any question to which the answer is "yes/no" begs the question??

Your notion is tailored to accommodate your presumption of philosophical determinism, e.g. begging the question.

I don't presume philosophical determinism at all.
I am merely discussing a deterministic universe, and the place of freewill within that.
There is no assumption of conclusion within any of the definitions/notions used.
I do reach the conclusion that they are incompatible, though.

 

[Write4U]

For the twentieth time: I and everyone here over the past 40 pages of so (until just lately, and the resulting confusion will probably kill the thread) stipulated a causally deterministic universe - everything in such a universe is a product of cause and effect from the states of the immediate past. Nothing is "independent".

Have I said different?

 

[iceaura]

Have I said different?

You asked, about my posting - apparently you have read different, somehow.

I'm talking about whether free will can exist in a deterministic universe - where determinism is the notion that every effect is completely determined by the cause.

A set of causes, at best. Hardly anything has "the cause".
Causation is not a fundamental or root level thing, after all. It's a fuzzy and ill-defined and context-dependent concept - as Zen adepts have made a wisdom of illustrating and making obvious. It's a term in what the pros sometimes call "folk science" - good enough for this thread and similar arenas, but not a technical term of art. https://twelvelinks.blogspot.com/2006/02/causation-as-folk-science.html

You’re positing a system that permits alternate outcomes

No, I'm not. I'm pointing to directly observed alternative capabilities, from which a likewise observed choice will be made in the future. There will be only one outcome of that choice - the driver will either stop or go, and if one has the means of knowing the future color of the traffic light when the driver arrives at it that outcome can be predicted with certainty.
Meanwhile, in the example the driver has not arrived at the light - we take this moment to describe the driver's capabilities as we observe them: stop, go, choose which depending on the color of the light at arrival. These are physical observations - a computer, which has no imagination, records them.

If you were able to describe all of the determined elemental parameters of the event, there wouldn’t be anything in that description that would resemble the imagined action of choice.

That would invalidate the description - whatever you are talking about with the latest gibberish about "elemental parameters", they cannot make observed physical entities/events vanish. If some description fails to include them, it will have to be changed.

Everything I included in my example was contextually relevant to the event you described

As I noted above, you guys have never - not once - dealt with that example as posted. Why you insist on changing that little scene, often making your posts irrelevant or wrong, often hiding from yourselves the issues the simple example was designed to make obvious and unavoidable - is genuinely mysterious.

What is it that prevents you guys from dealing with a simple and carefully chosen illustrative example posted right in front of your faces, with an explicit warning that this time you change nothing about it if you reply? A warning based on all the other times one of you guys bothered to address that illustrative example, because every single time you started by changing significant aspects of it.
Once again, as before: You screwed up the timeline. You screwed up the context of choice. You screwed up the context of observation. You screwed up that deliberately simple, deliberately focused little touchstone so completely that I have to check: what event do you think I described? Because from your posting I can't tell, and from your alterations and reply it appears you were not aware of the central issues involved in the situation I did describe.

And all you had to do to avoid that mess is respond to a post as written. Is that so hard?

 

[Baldeee]

A set of causes, at best. Hardly anything has "the cause".

I don't disagree, but I have to use a word, and "cause" is as good as any, especially if one takes the entire state of the system at one moment as the cause for the next.
So singular does just fine.

 

[Write4U]

You asked, about my posting - apparently you have read different, somehow.

I asked clarification, I did not offer critique. Seems we are in agreement on that point at least....

 

[Vociferous]

The only "redefinition" of free will here has been the exclusion of supernatural abilities from acts of will. A large fraction of the posters here want to define freedom as the ability to defy physical law and act contrary to what has been determined by causation from the immediately prior circumstances. The supernatural assumption.

They have been calling that freedom of will "genuine", "actual", and the like. When you use that kind of language, it suggests that you harbor a supernatural definition of freedom in acts of choice and decision and will. True?

That definition seems both question begging and contrary to what we observe in acts of will and decision - nonsupernatural freedom of some kind, such as the analogies at the level of the human mind to the degrees of freedom necessary for describing the behaviors of even simple mechanical systems, offers to meet all our requirements for freedom except the ability to act contrary to what cause and effect have determined. We seem to be able - maybe - to get everything except the abrogation of physical law, and that we don't need surely?

There is no need to invoke the supernatural for free will to still entail "willing what it wills" and not illusory. So yes, either of those are redefinitions justified by a straw man of the supernatural. Genuine free will need not defy physical law, as that should have observable consequences and we don't see any such contrary acts. I don't really care what you've associated with "genuine". You'll either take my arguments at face value or argue straw men. Your choice.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Except you're the one who initially made such a conflation.

No, that's just you projecting.

The empirical indetermination you speak of is an artifact of human measurement, not necessarily of any other aspect of reality. The wave function in QM is considered to be wholly deterministic, while our ability to functionally describe it is not. And in regards to those probabilistic descriptions in QM, the greater the frequency in probabilistic description of a given quantum state, the more determined that quantum state appears, which lends even more credence to the determined nature of reality at that level.

There is no definitive evidence that empirical indeterminism is an artifact of measurement, although I agree it's a possibility. But in that lack of knowledge, only empiricism is justified. All else is speculation. Again, you're spouting empirically unjustified aspects of particular interpretations when you claim QM is deterministic, as Copenhagen-like interpretations do not make that assumption. You might want to look it up, so you can tell the difference between empirical fact and interpretation. Copenhagen-like interpretations hew the closest to empirical fact and parsimony.

There is no empirical evidence that quantum states are indeterministic, only that we are constrained to measure them that way.

Since our measurements are ALL we have to go by, the ONLY empirical evidence is that QM is indeterministic. Please, learn the physics.

In the context of this thread topic, reality is considered to be deterministic, in which case all universal action would be subject to initial conditions. And in the context of our everyday existence, determinism would appear to empirically rule the day.

And if that determinism is philosophical, it is begging the question, as philosophical determinism is defined as precluding free will. Causal determinism of everyday physical causality does not make that presumption. It only requires that effects are preceded by causes, but not that all causes are themselves wholly deterministic effects.

 

[Write4U]

There is no need to invoke the supernatural for free will to still entail "willing what it wills" and not illusory.

But invoking "willing what it wills" invokes a causal motive to will anything at all.
OTOH, a mathematical function requires no will, merely mathematical accuracy.

In a deterministic universe, if we pose this ;
(2 + 2) "wills" (= 4), in mathematical terms, then sentient intelligence is not required, just the mathematical function.

 

[iceaura]

And if that determinism is philosophical, it is begging the question, as philosophical determinism is defined as precluding free will.

Nonsupernatural freedom of will is not precluded by any determinism except moment by moment totalitarian control (including mental) by an outside agent - such as a deity.

especially if one takes the entire state of the system at one moment as the cause for the next.

The mechanisms of local causation still have to be specified to establish determinism at the local level. Causation by everything and causation by nothing are locally indistinguishable.

Genuine free will need not defy physical law, as that should have observable consequences and we don't see any such contrary acts. I don't really care what you've associated with "genuine".

Just verifying separation between posters using the same words for different things.
Good luck, btw.