Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[iceaura]

Setting up:

Then stop implying that there are exceptions to it.

I insist, always, that there are no such exceptions. All of my arguments assume that, all of my posts assume that.

The central matter is very simple, that in a determined universe, everything that can happen at any point in its evolution is determined by the initial state of the system.

Ok. A bit shaky on the physical laws and so forth, but essentially and generally reasonable in this driver/light situation.

It means that all outcomes are predecided,

Ok - we can set the dubious take on physical law aside for the moment, since we are here dealing with a limited situation in which such cavils don't matter. In our limited situation (driver/light) all outcomes are predecided.

and that there are no actual choices to be made by any entity contained therein.

WTF? Where did that come from? The only choices excluded are supernatural ones, and they were excluded from the beginning.
The driver's choices are both observed and necessarily existent - the color of the light has yet to exist, and there are two possibilities the driver has prepared for.

If you agree that every action in a determined universe is based on the accumulated action that preceded it, then there is no choice, only predetermined action that is perceived as choice.

That is false.
There are choices, prior to the event, and there have to be - since they determine the actions involved.
You claim all actions are determined, and then deny the existence of the mechanisms by which we observe them being determined. That makes no sense.

The driver approaches a traffic light. Note the driver's capabilities - in particular, that they can stop, they can go, and they can choose which based on the future color of the light. We observe this - these are physical features, these capabilities, and we can observe them as we observe the driver's height and shoe size. They will change in the future, of course - but we are observing them now.

 

[iceaura]

Whatever his is, it includes probabilistic outcomes as being deterministic (see post #806).
So be mindful that while he might profess that it is the same as yours, it clearly isn’t.

Nothing in his posted definition excludes determination by probability - it's just a detail of the mechanisms of physical determination that one would have to address if talking about the universe throughout all of time.

The driver approaches the light. Entirely macroscopic and slow speeds only. Nothing is quantum controlled, or probabilistic - Newton's universe of apples and billiard balls applies. I'm keeping it simple for y'all.

Back to the topic, eh? Something relevant from you?

 

[iceaura]

The latter has not been proven, especially not by you, rather it has merely been asserted.
We await your proof that perfect knowledge is impossible.

I have posted at least three links to mathematical proof, and two other simple demonstrations by argument (e.g. the knower/known division, and the abstraction problem). There remain three or four other arguments from physical law and the nature of physical reality (chaos, Heisenberg, etc) - but they are not necessary - from your repeated irrelevancies and bizarre tangents, it's clear you haven't bothered to read anything I post anyway.

You will wait a very long time for me to rerun bullshit errands you have sent me on more than once before.

Probability only determines probabilistically, not completely.

Not my problem. I agreed that the universe involved here is completely determined, just as you and Capracus and the rest specified and just as you can read in Capracus's post above, identical to yours from months ago (cannot do other than one must, remember? ) - the details of how you get around the nature of the physical laws involved are your problem. (That's just an indeterminacy issue anyway, which doesn't affect nonsupernatural freedom of will).

You, however, want to simply dismiss any answer that says “no”.
Why?

Not any answer. Just your particular and obviously inadequate one, that deals with supernatural freedom only. I want to dismiss that one, so a discussion of potentially valid and sound objections to freedom of will can begin.

 

[Baldeee]

Nothing in his posted definition excludes determination by probability - it's just a detail of the mechanisms of physical determination that one would have to address if talking about the universe throughout all of time.

Nothing excludes it... except the definition itself.
Note the part that says “completely determined”, which probabilistic outcomes simply don’t do: they only offer an outcome that is randomly selected from a probability function.
The simple test for a deterministic process: if you repeat the process with exactly the same input, will you always and with certainty get the same output?
If yes, then it is deterministic; If no, then it is not deterministic.
Since a probabilistic system is one that can give different outputs to the same input, the system is not deterministic; the output is not completely determined by the inputs.

So no, it is not a detail of the mechanism of physical determination that one would have to address, because it is not part of a deterministic system.

If you think otherwise, give me an example of a process that provides determination by probability in which the outcome is known with certainty from the input?
You seem to be equating determinism with mere causality, the notion that all effects are the result of a cause.
That isn’t determinism.
There is a difference between deterministic causation and probabilistic causation.

The driver approaches the light. Entirely macroscopic and slow speeds only. Nothing is quantum controlled, or probabilistic - Newton's universe of apples and billiard balls applies. I'm keeping it simple for y'all.

Back to the topic, eh? Something relevant from you?

We’ve been over everything you’ve offered: no actual ability to do otherwise, other than counterfactuals of course, and a notion of “freedom” found in orbiting Teslas.
It’s all well and good you trying to be relevant, but there’s only so many times you can kick a dead horse while on a racetrack and still expect it to jump the next hurdle.

 

[Baldeee]

I have posted at least three links to mathematical proof, and two other simple demonstrations by argument (e.g. the knower/known division, and the abstraction problem). There remain three or four other arguments from physical law and the nature of physical reality (chaos, Heisenberg, etc) - but they are not necessary - from your repeated irrelevancies and bizarre tangents, it's clear you haven't bothered to read anything I post anyway.

So you have nothing other than your misunderstanding of what you posted, which has been explained to you?
Fair enough.

Not my problem.

It very much is.
If you wish to discuss a deterministic universe, it behooves you to stick to a deterministic universe, not a probabilistic one.

I agreed that the universe involved here is completely determined, just as you and Capracus and the rest specified and just as you can read in Capracus's post above, identical to yours from months ago (cannot do other than one must, remember? )

Then stick to it, rather than drift off in to probabilistic universes.

- the details of how you get around the nature of the physical laws involved are your problem. (That's just an indeterminacy issue anyway, which doesn't affect nonsupernatural freedom of will).

I think this is where I’m supposed to get irate that you are once again raising the issue of indeterminacy, right?
Or is the irony lost on you?
Furthermore, are you now suggesting, and agreeing it seems, that probabilistic determination is a matter of indeterminacy?
Despite accepting that we had been discussing a deterministic universe but where you nonetheless raised the issue of probabilistic determination?

Not any answer. Just your particular and obviously inadequate one, that deals with supernatural freedom only.

It’s entirely adequate... unless you only want to discuss a compatibilist notion of freewill.
“Oh, but if it’s not possible, it must be supernatural, and I’m not allowing discussion of that!
“And rather than stopping you and others discussing it I’m going to keep trying to stop you discussing it by claiming it is a supernatural assumption!”

I want to dismiss that one, so a discussion of potentially valid and sound objections to freedom of will can begin.

Valid and sound objections, with respect a deterministic universe, have been given.
You are simply opting not to accept them.
If you want to create a thread to examine other objections to compatibilist notions of free will, go right ahead and start a thread, where claims of incompatibility are not allowed.
But that thread is not this one.
In this thread, every time you want to put forward a notion of freedom that you think is compatible, the initial valid objection is likely to be that it simply offers no ability to do otherwise, with explanations of how you’re looking at counterfactuals etc.
“Oh, but that’s the supernatural assumption of what freedom means!” you will no doubt bleat yet again, and you will once again be taken through how you are confusing assumption with conclusion.
“Oh, but if it’s not possible then it must be supernatural!”
And on and on and on you’ll go, getting no nearer where you want to be, yet still you hang around.

 

[iceaura]

Nothing excludes it... except the definition itself.

The definition does not mention probability.

If you wish to discuss a deterministic universe, it behooves you to stick to a deterministic universe, not a probabilistic one.

As I have, throughout.

Then stick to it, rather than drift off in to probabilistic universes.

Never did that.
Like I said, you aren't reading or responding to my posts.

“Oh, but if it’s not possible, it must be supernatural, and I’m not allowing discussion of that!

You also disallow the supernatural, as did everyone else here. The difference is you don't acknowledge your assumption of it.

Valid and sound objections, with respect a deterministic universe, have been given.
You are simply opting not to accept them.

Only one, by you, and I don't accept it because it only applies to supernatural freedom - the ability to do other than one must in a determined universe. And that is irrelevant here, by agreement, by the stipulation of a deterministic universe.

If you want to create a thread to examine other objections to compatibilist notions of free will, go right ahead and start a thread, where claims of incompatibility are not allowed.

No claims or arguments or observations of nonsupernatural incompatibility have been disallowed here, even in powerless and empty suggestion. They have instead been invited, encouraged, set up, practically begged for, by me. Many times.

You have not provided a single one, so far. No one is stopping you - you just can't get your head past your assumption that freedom requires violation of otherwise determined outcome, i.e. supernatural abilities.

you will once again be taken through how you are confusing assumption with conclusion.

Once again: The conclusion you claim followed from that assumption. You made a basic mistake in reasoning, called assuming the consequent, and got called on it - politely, and without mockery, and in detail, and explicitly addressing the exact logical step in which you employed the assumption (you can see that again, just above, in the response to Capracus's once more reposted definition). That took work, and courtesy, and effort, by other people. You were not grateful, or even polite.

You then responded by pointing to your conclusion, and refusing to acknowledge your assumption. You even repeated the entire argument, assumption and all, without addressing the problematic logical step or the invalidity of the "conclusion". You continue to do that, and include various personal attacks for reasons unspecified.

If one could believe you knew what you were doing, and deal with your inevitable insults of people who have taken the time and trouble to correct what is after all an elementary error, you might get the respect due the character in Catch 22 (Orr) who uses your tactic to deflect attention from the larger strategy behind his holding crabapples in his cheeks:

As he explains the latter, "Every time someone asked me why I was walking around with crab apples in my cheeks, I'd just open my hands and show them it was rubber balls I was walking around with, not crab apples, and that they were in my hands, not my cheeks. It was a good story. But I never knew if it got across or not, since it's pretty tough to make people understand you when you're talking to them with two crab apples in your cheeks."

But it is no longer possible to believe you have any idea what I am talking about here. Unlike Orr, you have no idea what you are doing.

So you will not be contributing to any discussion of nonsupernatural freedom of will. And since that is the thread topic - freedom of will in a deterministic universe can only be nonsupernatural freedom, with no doing other than one must - you won't be contributing here. Posting, maybe, but not with any relevance.

That leaves the matter to others. The floor is open.

 

[Baldeee]

The definition does not mention probability.

It doesn't need to in order to exclude it.
One merely needs to understand what is allowed, and from that the exclusions can also be understood.
For some, at least.

As I have, throughout.

Given that you think a probabilistic one is deterministic, you'll excuse me if I don't take what you have said here seriously.

Never did that.
Like I said, you aren't reading or responding to my posts.

You have been wandering into it since post #93 of this thread alone.

You also disallow the supernatural, as did everyone else here. The difference is you don't acknowledge your assumption of it.

Blah blah blah.
Once again: for the umpteenth+1 time: no assumption, just a conclusion.
Where in "able to do otherwise" is this supernatural assumption you are claiming?
Where?

Only one, by you, and I don't accept it because it only applies to supernatural freedom - the ability to do other than one must in a determined universe. And that is irrelevant here, by agreement, by the stipulation of a deterministic universe.

It applies to the notion of freedom as "able to do otherwise" (no supernatural assumption) within a deterministic universe.
There is no definition of freedom as "ability to do other than one must in a determined universe", if that is your thinking here?

No claims or arguments or observations of nonsupernatural incompatibility have been disallowed here, even in powerless and empty suggestion. They have instead been invited, encouraged, set up, practically begged for, by me. Many times.

But you don't get to cherry-pick.
If you disallow one incompatible notion of freedomon on grounds of assuming the supernatural, then ALL notions that are incompatible must also be due to being supernatural, because it is the incompatibility alone on which you are actually basing it being supernatural.
All you're doing is dismissing the most obvious candidate, but the approach that you have chosen to adopt must, if you're honest with it, treat all incompatible notions of freewill as being assuming the supernatural.

You have not provided a single one, so far.

I have provided the same one I have always provided: there is no actual freedom within the notion of freedom that the compatibilist puts forward.
No ability to do otherwise.
Or have you not understood the whole issue of counterfactuals etc?

If, however, you want me to dispute a notion of freewill that genuinely is compatible then you're asking me to against something that has begged the question.
I.e. you would be asking: if we assume freewill is compatible with determinism, is it compatible?
See how that begs the question?

No one is stopping you - you just can't get your head past your assumption that freedom requires violation of otherwise determined outcome, i.e. supernatural abilities.

No assumption - just a conclusion.
And again, if you're honest with it, your approach is simply to dismiss every incompatible notion of freedom as assuming the supernatural.

Once again: The conclusion you claim followed from that assumption.

No, the conclusion followed from a definition/notion of freedom being coupled with the premise of a deterministic universe.
The definition alone makes no assumption of the supernatural.
Where in "able to do otherwise" is the assumption of the supernatural?
Where?

You made a basic mistake in reasoning, called assuming the consequent, and got called on it - politely, and without mockery, and in detail, and explicitly addressing the exact logical step in which you employed the assumption (you can see that again, just above, in the response to Capracus's once more reposted definition). That took work, and courtesy, and effort, by other people. You were not grateful, or even polite.

Aw, does someone need a hug?
There was no mistake, no assuming the consequent, and the "analysis" of the logic was accordingly shown to be flawed.
What more do you expect?

You then responded by pointing to your conclusion, and refusing to acknowledge your assumption. You even repeated the entire argument, assumption and all, without addressing the problematic logical step or the invalidity of the "conclusion". You continue to do that, and include various personal attacks for reasons unspecified.

I acknowledge all my assumptions - none of which include anything supernatural.
You have only ever been able to show that the assumption is supernatural when coupled with the premise of the deterministic universe.
Divorce it from the deterministic universe and the supernatural issue just disappears, like a puff of smoke.
I.e. you are jumping to the conclusion, going "oh, it can't exist in a deterministic universe, therefore it must be assuming the supernatural!"
Your entire focus has been flawed from the getgo, yet you fail to acknowledge that when it has been pointed out and explained to you over and over and over and over and over...

If one could believe you knew what you were doing, and deal with your inevitable insults of people who have taken the time and trouble to correct what is after all an elementary error, you might get the respect due the character in Catch 22 (Orr) who uses your tactic to deflect attention from the larger strategy behind his holding crabapples in his cheeks: But it is no longer possible to believe you have any idea what I am talking about here. Unlike Orr, you have no idea what you are doing.

Your arrogance is pathetic, and entirely misplaced: the error is yours, as shown and explained in detail countless times.

So you will not be contributing to any discussion of nonsupernatural freedom of will.

Wow, now you're commanding me.
You're a mod with that power, are you?
You do make me laugh sometimes.

And since that is the thread topic - freedom of will in a deterministic universe can only be nonsupernatural freedom, with no doing other than one must - you won't be contributing here. Posting, maybe, but not with any relevance.

Not relevant to you, perhaps, who only accepts a notion of freedom that is possible, thus begs question in the thread title ("Is freewill possible in a deterministic universe").
After all, if something is not possible then, per you, it can only be considered supernatural.
Or can you name something that is not possible but wouldn't be considered by you to be supernatural?

Thus you are, at least if you're being honest with yourself and with what you've stated here, simply restricting your discussion to those who can say "yes".
One can not start a debate about whether something is possible or not by dismissing out of hand all notions of freedom, as your approach would honestly do, that concludes "no".

 

[Write4U]

Question; Is genetic mutation a deterministic or a purely random event. Genetic drift?

Abstract,
In this article we examine four objections to the genetic modification of human beings: the freedom argument, the giftedness argument, the authenticity argument, and the uniqueness argument. We then demonstrate that each of these arguments against genetic modification assumes a strong version of genetic determinism. Since these strong deterministic assumptions are false, the arguments against genetic modification, which assume and depend upon these assumptions, are therefore unsound.

Serious discussion of the morality of genetic modification, and the development of sound science policy, should be driven by arguments that address the actual consequences of genetic modification for individuals and society, not by ones propped up by false or misleading biological assumptions.

While questions about the metaphysics of human freedom are of the utmost importance in philosophy, they are not the focus of this article. However, there are some important parallels between psychological determinism and genetic determinism, since the interpretation of causation plays a pivotal role in both of these doctrines. Also, as we shall see below, worries about genetic determinism can reinforce concerns about psychological determinism

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1524970/

I'm not sure what to make of this article or if it even addresses the question.
But it is interesting!

 

[iceaura]

Aw, does someone need a hug?
There was no mistake, no assuming the consequent, and the "analysis" of the logic was accordingly shown to be flawed.

Nonsense. You assumed the consequent, and I labeled the exact spot - which is also visible in Capracus's "definition", as you can read above (page 41 now).

No, the conclusion followed from a definition/notion of freedom being coupled with the premise of a deterministic universe.

Yep. And you can read again - fifth or sixth time - about the spot in that "definition/notion" (assumptions, both) where you made the supernatural assumption, right here, in Capracus's posting and my reply just above. You don't even have to go searching.

You have only ever been able to show that the assumption is supernatural when coupled with the premise of the deterministic universe.

Which it is, automatically, whenever it appears, as stipulated by me and you and everyone else for this entire forum and every thread on this topic in it. As I have had to remind you, repeatedly, for some reason.
And which you explicitly included among your premises in the first place, in the argument from you I went through in careful detail, showing you exactly where, the exact logical step in which, you employed that assumption.

I acknowledge all my assumptions - none of which include anything supernatural.

You have denied making that assumption, each and every time you made it including right now and right here.
The weird thing is, I think you are sincere. I think you actually can't recognize that assumption as an assumption - we see that you have never been able to avoid making it, or paraphrase it, or even address my explication of it in your own posts. You simply can't get your head around the idea that defiance of deterministic natural causality is supernatural, and assuming or defining freedom of will as that ability excludes freedom of will so defined from a deterministic universe by assumption.

Not relevant to you, perhaps, who only accepts a notion of freedom that is possible, thus begs question in the thread title ("Is freewill possible in a deterministic universe").

I'm gratified that you consider nonsupernatural freedom of will - the topic as specified by the thread title - to be so obviously "possible". That supports my own assessment of the situation - of course, I can describe some of the possibilities, and you can't, but still your intuitive reaction is encouraging.

Wow, now you're commanding me.

? Uh, no. There's no command there, or anything resembling a command. Just an observation.
You apparently can't read my posts.
Which explains a lot - including why you have not been and will not be contributing to this thread, regardless of whether you post in it.

 

[iceaura]

Or can you name something that is not possible but wouldn't be considered by you to be supernatural?

In a deterministic universe, as assumed throughout:
Perfect prediction from complete knowledge.
Complete knowledge itself.
Anything else theoretically impossible, but not because it requires violation of determinative causality.

There is only one impossibility I have labeled supernatural here: ability to act contrary to determining causality. That is, unfortunately, your definition of freedom in a deterministic system. You assume that freedom - described by you as "genuine" or "actual" - requires that ability. You assume that by definition. That's the supernatural assumption.

Divorce it from the deterministic universe and the supernatural issue just disappears, like a puff of smoke.

You would of course need a completely different thread for that much different discussion about that otherwise irrelevant matter. The deterministic universe is stipulated to here, by everyone, months ago - you are one of those who need continual reminders of that.

The definition alone makes no assumption of the supernatural.
Where in "able to do otherwise" is the assumption of the supernatural?
Where?

? In the ability to break physical law and act contrary to determining causality, of course. As stated dozens of times before.

But you don't get to cherry-pick.
If you disallow one incompatible notion of freedomon on grounds of assuming the supernatural, then ALL notions that are incompatible must also be due to being supernatural, because it is the incompatibility alone on which you are actually basing it being supernatural.

I "disallowed" nothing. I'm not the one who assumed supernatural freedom and deduced incompatibility. I based the observation of supernatural assumption on your definition of freedom, not incompatibility of anything. I based nothing on incompatibility - that was a consequence of your definition of freedom, which I recommended you drop.
Do you even have a hint of how badly that definition/assumption has crippled you?

 

[Baldeee]

Nonsense. You assumed the consequent, and I labeled the exact spot - which is also visible in Capracus's "definition", as you can read above (page 41 now).

Er, no.
The definition provided by Capracus was a definition of determinism.
You seem utterly unable to separate the two issues: definition of freedom and definition of determinism.

Yep. And you can read again - fifth or sixth time - about the spot in that "definition/notion" (assumptions, both) where you made the supernatural assumption, right here, in Capracus's posting and my reply just above.

So I made the assumption in Capracus' post?
Wow, are you feeling okay?

You don't even have to go searching.

Well, apparently I do, 'cos firstly Capracus' post defines determinism, not freedom, and secondly I don't make posts under his name.
Thirdly, the notion of freedom as "ability to do otherwise" has no assumption of the supernatural.
You are utterly unable to argue that it does unless you first couple it with the nature of a universe in which you first conclude that it is incompatible.

Which it is, automatically, whenever it appears, as stipulated by me and you and everyone else for this entire forum and every thread on this topic in it. As I have had to remind you, repeatedly, for some reason.

There you go, combining the notion of freedom ("ability to do otherwise") with the premise of the deterministic universe, and suddenly the notion of freedom assumes the supernatural!
Your thinking is simply screwed up in this regard.
A definition of freedom can not assume the supernatural unless it, and it alone, requires the supernatural to operate.
How do we know what is supernatural, though?
Well, we can't know that until or unless we define what universe we are stipulating.
Oh, so does that mean the notion of freedom being used does NOT itself actually assume the supernatural?
You're damn right it doesn't; one can only conclude that it is not possible (or if you are so inclined "supernatural") once you combine the two (the notion of freedom, and the universe under consideration).

And which you explicitly included among your premises in the first place, in the argument from you I went through in careful detail, showing you exactly where, the exact logical step in which, you employed that assumption.

So, as thought, as explained from the outset when you first raised the fallacious claim, the notion of freedom itself is not an assumption of the supernatural, and it is only once you have coupled the notion with the universe under consideration that you can reach any such conclusion of non-existence.
But you are simply too stubborn to accept that, to accept your error, and instead you double-down on it every time you try to explain it.
See, even here you have had to couple the notion with the nature of the universe to conclude that it is non-existent.

You have denied making that assumption, each and every time you made it including right now and right here.

So tell me, straight up, no messing around, where in the assumption of freedom as "the ability to do otherwise" is the assumption of the supernatural?
Don't bring the nature of any universe into it, as that will only prove my point that you are jumping to the conclusion and simply saying that any non-existent freedom within the universe in question must be assuming the supernatural.
So where in that definition of freedom is the assumption of the supernatural?
Be honest, please, and answer that question.

The weird thing is, I think you are sincere.

I am both sincere and correct.
The former is helped by the latter.

I think you actually can't recognize that assumption as an assumption - we see that you have never been able to avoid making it, or paraphrase it, or even address my explication of it in your own posts.

Because it isn't.
It is a conclusion, reached only when (for the nth time) coupling the notion of freedom with the nature of the universe.
Let's see if you can explain how it is an assumption of the supernatural without appealing to the second premise, that of the deterministic universe....

You simply can't get your head around the idea that defiance of deterministic natural causality is supernatural, and assuming or defining freedom of will as that ability excludes freedom of will so defined from a deterministic universe by assumption.

... nope, there you go, you are utterly unable to.
You see, even here you have to dishonestly change the definition of freedom from "ability to do otherwise" to "defiance of deterministic natural causality".
Where have I ever defined freewill as such?
I have certainly concluded it, given the notion of freedom used, and the nature of the universe in question.
But a conclusion, lest you need reminding yet again, is not an assumption.

I'm gratified that you consider nonsupernatural freedom of will - the topic as specified by the thread title - to be so obviously "possible". That supports my own assessment of the situation - of course, I can describe some of the possibilities, and you can't, but still your intuitive reaction is encouraging.

Once again, the topic as specified by this thread is not "is non supernatural freedom of will possible..." but simply "is freewill possible...."
What of that do you not understand?
If you discount any freewill that is not possible as being supernatural, as your approach must honestly do, then you are left simply begging the question.

? Uh, no. There's no command there, or anything resembling a command. Just an observation.
You apparently can't read my posts.

If you can't see how your comments could be read as a command, then that speaks volumes for your inability to comprehend even what you write.

Which explains a lot - including why you have not been and will not be contributing to this thread, regardless of whether you post in it.

I'm still waiting for you to understand what this thread is even about.
Until you manage that, and until you stop thinking it's a question-begging exercise, what you think is relevant or not is rather moot.

But thanks for playing.

 

[Baldeee]

In a deterministic universe, as assumed throughout:
Perfect prediction from complete knowledge.
Complete knowledge itself.
Anything else theoretically impossible, but not because it requires violation of determinative causality.

I didn't ask about whether it violated determninative causality, but merely if you can think of things not possible that (if they existed) would not be considered by you to be supernatural.
If you think there is anything at all that fits these conditions then you are simply not being honest with yourself.
Or you are and you are simply not intelligent enough to comprehend how if something is impossible then to exist it must be considered supernatural.
Either way, I call bullshit on your answers, and I think you know they are bullshit.
Try again, please.

There is only one impossibility I have labeled supernatural here: ability to act contrary to determining causality.

But you don't get to cherry-pick.
Given the approach you have adopted, anything that is impossible you have to similarly identify as being supernatural, if you're honest with yourself.
Your inability to accept that is rather telling.

That is, unfortunately, your definition of freedom in a deterministic system. You assume that freedom - described by you as "genuine" or "actual" - requires that ability. You assume that by definition. That's the supernatural assumption.

And there you go again, unable to separate the definition of freedom from the nature of the universe in which it is operating.
That is the flaw in your analysis now, and it was the flaw when it was first pointed out to you: you can only identify it as being non-existent (or "supernatural" as you want to call it) when coupled with the nature of the universe in question.
As such, the definition/notion of freedom does NOT assume the supernatural.
It can't really be spelled out any clearer for you.

You would of course need a completely different thread for that much different discussion about that otherwise irrelevant matter. The deterministic universe is stipulated to here, by everyone, months ago - you are one of those who need continual reminders of that.

No, I'm not, I keep reminding others of it, and I keep having to remind you and others of what constitutes a deterministic universe (note: probabilistic universe is not a deterministic universe).
The deterministic universe is indeed stipulated here.
It is a premise, along with the notion of freedom being used: "ability to do otherwise".
Only when the two are coupled... well, you know the rest.
Or should do by now.

? In the ability to break physical law and act contrary to determining causality, of course. As stated dozens of times before.

Thank you!
Thank you once again for being unable to divorce the definition of freedom from the universe under consideration.
You have proven once again that it is not an assumption within the notion of freedom itself, but a conclusion (that it is non-existent/supernatural) that one reaches only when coupled with the premise of the deterministic universe.
So thank you for finally demonstrating your flaw to yourself, even if you haven't quite yet cottoned on to it being what you were doing.
Hopefully your own words will now persuade you!
So thank you!
Honestly.

If you somehow disagree, please feel free to try again, this time without mentioning the nature of the universe in question (i.e. the other premise).
Because each time you fail you are simply reconfirming what I have stated of your "assuming the supernatural" claim from the beginning: that it is fallacious.

I "disallowed" nothing.

But you are trying your utmost to, on the basis of fallacious reasoning on your part - as proven conclusively yet again above.
You are trying to dismiss any notion of freedom that is concluded to not exist.
If it is concluded to not be possible in a deterministic universe, for any reason, then to exist it must be supernatural.
And you don't want to discuss anything supernatural.
We have excluded the supernatural from discussion, haven't we.
This is your approach, if you are honest with yourself.

Only, when DaveC and I, and others, agreed that we were not discussing the supernatural, it was more along the lines of discounting anyone who wanted to come along and say: "yeah, freewill is possible, because X, Y, Z" where X, Y, and Z were supernatural.
It was not to discount any notion of freedom simply because it is not possible in a deterministic universe, as you are trying to do.
Because we were not claiming that what we consider to be impossible exists, it is not considered supernatural, merely concluded as non-existent.
And I think you knew/know that.
If you're honest with yourself.

I'm not the one who assumed supernatural freedom and deduced incompatibility.

Lucky for you, neither am I.
At least thus far you have not shown how "ability to do otherwise" itself assumes anything supernatural.

I based the observation of supernatural assumption on your definition of freedom, not incompatibility of anything.

Then, for Pete's sake, explain what in "ability to do otherwise" requires the supernatural, without invoking the nature of the universe in question?
Detail it, please, as it is sorely lacking from any explanation that has been given in the past 2,000 or so posts on this matter.
If you can't then for Pete's sake STFU about it, drop it as a case of an honest mistake on your part, and move on!

I based nothing on incompatibility - that was a consequence of your definition of freedom, which I recommended you drop.

I await your analysis of the notion of freedom itself that requires the supernatural.
Which will be interesting given you can't refer to the nature of the universe in question to be able to say what is beyond its nature or not.
As soon as you do refer to the nature of the universe in question you have proven my point for me.
Again.
But go for it.
It will be interesting to see you fail.
Repeatedly.

Do you even have a hint of how badly that definition/assumption has crippled you?

It hasn't.
At all.
The notion of freedom is reasonable and does not invoke anything supernatural, despite your best intentions.
Coupling it with the premise of a deterministic universe I conclude that freewill does not exist in such a universe.
Where exactly is the crippling effect of the definition of freewill that I have used?

Is it that you mean that it has crippled me from being able to say "yes"?
Well, in that regard, you would indeed be correct, just as any convincing reason for concluding "no" is indeed a crippling blow against saying "yes".

Anyway, it is ironic that, for all your talk of what has crippled me/others, it is actually your fallacious claim in this regard that has crippled you in this discussion, and pushed you into a corner of your own making, a corner you probably don't even recognise given your blinkered vision.
And even now I doubt you're grasping it, and will continue to bleat your fallacious claim, forever unable to divorce the notion of freedom from the nature of the universe in question, forever seeing a conclusion as an assumption.
Shame.
In my eyes you will forever be the one who thinks that premising Socrates as a man is to also assume that he is mortal, simply because we have also premised a universe in which all men are mortal.

 

[iceaura]

If you can't see how your comments could be read as a command, then that speaks volumes for your inability to comprehend even what you write.

By you, anything is possible. By someone with a record of comprehension, nope - can't see it.

You see, even here you have to dishonestly change the definition of freedom from "ability to do otherwise" to "defiance of deterministic natural causality".

That's not a change. The one entails the other - either direction.

The definition provided by Capracus was a definition of determinism.

With an example of your argument incorporating the supernatural assumption, for you to learn from.

You seem utterly unable to separate the two issues: definition of freedom and definition of determinism.

? Where do you think you see them confused?
I was locating an example of your employment of the supernatural assumption. I did that. Have you checked it out?

Thirdly, the notion of freedom as "ability to do otherwise" has no assumption of the supernatural.

Yes, it does. Blatantly. Obviously. No question, no doubt, no obscurity - right in your face.
Only the supernatural has the ability to defy deterministic causation in a deterministic universe (that is a fair definition of "supernatural").
By that you have defined freedom as supernatural, only, in the universe stipulated. And from that definition you "deduced" incompatibility of freedom and determinism.

But a conclusion, lest you need reminding yet again, is not an assumption.

You assumed supernatural freedom only. Your conclusions were based on that assumption.

You are utterly unable to argue that it does unless you first couple it with the nature of a universe in which you first conclude that it is incompatible.

All I needed was the deterministic universe you and the boys defined and insisted on assuming here, as the basis of all posting and discussion of this topic.

Once again, the topic as specified by this thread is not "is non supernatural freedom of will possible..." but simply "is freewill possible...."

Same as, in the deterministic universe you specified and insisted upon assuming. Only the nonsupernatural is relevant here, by your stipulation.

If you discount any freewill that is not possible as being supernatural, as your approach must honestly do,

Nonsense. I discount the supernatural as impossible, not the other way around. I do that at your insistence - your definition of determinism, your definition of freedom, etc.
Impossible free will would include anything requiring or granting complete knowledge or perfect prediction, anything requiring that the future be a cause of the past or present, and so forth. None of that would require supernatural ability - just unavailable natural ability. My supernatural is that which can act contrary to causality or deterministic physical law - that's a limited subset of the impossible, in a deterministic universe.

And that's the second time on this page of this thread you have been corrected on that very obvious matter.

I didn't ask about whether it violated determninative causality, but merely if you can think of things not possible that (if they existed) would not be considered by you to be supernatural.

And I handed you a short list of offhand examples of such things, stuff you have already seen. A direct response to an irrelevant and confused request, that in itself continued your spinout from relevance. (I make no difference to anything here whether or not I can think of nonsupernatural impossibilities in your assumed deterministic universe).

You're going spla here.

 

[iceaura]

In my eyes you will forever be the one who thinks that premising Socrates as a man is to also assume that he is mortal, simply because we have also premised a universe in which all men are mortal.

No problem. And the one who thinks that including as a premise that all men like Socrates are mortal makes claiming to have concluded that Socrates is mortal a bit silly. No problem there either.

 

[iceaura]

The notion of freedom is reasonable and does not invoke anything supernatural, despite your best intentions.
Coupling it with the premise of a deterministic universe I conclude that freewill does not exist in such a universe.

You assume only the supernatural is free. Then you "conclude" that a universe from which the supernatural has been excluded by definition also excludes freedom. All freedom.

Where exactly is the crippling effect of the definition of freewill that I have used?

In your inability to spot the glaring flaw in that argument, among many other examples, a dozen or so of which I noted as examples in the course of this discussion. I have been quoting and specifying and pointing them out all along, btw - too bad you don't read my posts. I'll keep pointing them out, since you're actually curious.

 

[Baldeee]

By you, anything is possible. By someone with a record of comprehension, nope - can't see it.

Any record you think you had is being offset by the growing record of your inability, such as with this example.
Ah, well.

That's not a change. The one entails the other - either direction.

Ironic that you think you have a record of comprhension, then, isn't it.
Until, and unless, you can divorce the definition of freedom from its existence or otherwise in a type of universe, you're really just crippling yourself.

With an example of your argument incorporating the supernatural assumption, for you to learn from.

Yet it is you who is inserting the assumption, not me.
You insert the assumption, which isn't there in the definition, yet accuse me of making it.
Dishonest much?

? Where do you think you see them confused?

In the definition of freedom that you think is being employed, the one that you think brings in the nature of the universe.
My notion of freedom does not.
So you are crippling yourself.

I was locating an example of your employment of the supernatural assumption. I did that. Have you checked it out?

No, you were looking at the employment of the definition of freewill, concluding that it doesn't exist in the premised universe, and then claiming that we must be assuming a supernatural version of freewill.
Because all you want to discuss is a version of freewill that is possible, and thus beg the question of this thread.
But please,

Yes, it does. Blatantly. Obviously. No question, no doubt, no obscurity - right in your face.

And I'm sure you'll be able to show me without bringing in the nature of any universe under discussion?
Let's see...

Only the supernatural has the ability to defy deterministic causation in a deterministic universe (that is a fair definition of "supernatural").

Sure.
And since we're not talking about anything defying deterministic causation, nothing can be considered supernatural.
In order to defy, something must be assumed to exist where it can not possibly do so.
I have not assumed freedom exists or not, rather just provided a definition as "ability to do otherwise".
And until the nature of the universe is premised, the existence or otherwise of that notion can not be concluded.

By that you have defined freedom as supernatural, only, in the universe stipulated. And from that definition you "deduced" incompatibility of freedom and determinism.

So you admit that "freedom" itself, without stipulating the universe, is neutral with regard supernatural?
Because for you to conclude that it is a definition of freedom in the universe stipulated you must be bringing in the second premise of the nature of the universe being discussed.
See, the issue is yours, not mine.
There is no assumption of the supernatural in the notion of freedom used.
It is only when coupled with the premise of the deterministic universe that one can conclude that the notion of freedom does not exist.
And you honestly think you have a record of comprehension?
Good one!

Seriously, take the notion of freedom and, without bringing in the nature of any universe, show me how it is assuming the supernatural?
Until you can do that your criticism and dismissal of the incompatibilist position for assuming the supernatural is demonstrably fallacious.

You assumed supernatural freedom only. Your conclusions were based on that assumption.

If you think that repeating it to yourself over and over again will make it any less false, you're mistaken.

All I needed was the deterministic universe you and the boys defined and insisted on assuming here, as the basis of all posting and discussion of this topic.

Yes, it's called a premise.
I.e. we have premised a deterministic universe.
We have premised a notion of freedom "ability to do otherwise".
We have concluded that the two are incompatible.
No assumption of the supernatural.

Same as, in the deterministic universe you specified and insisted upon assuming. Only the nonsupernatural is relevant here, by your stipulation.

So once again your're doubling down on only wanting to discuss notions of freedom that exist, thus begging the question of the thread.
Okay, at least you're consistent in that.
Unfortunately this thread is not for you, then, because we're here discussing whether freedom is possible, and that includes discussing notions that some conclude to not exist as well as notions that some conclude to exist.
Ta ta, then.

Nonsense. I discount the supernatural as impossible, not the other way around.

They're synonymous in this regard: if something is impossible then it must defy the nature of the universe - aka supernatural.
That is the approach you have taken.
So more irony regarding your comprehension, it seems.
And not doing wonders for whether you're seen as acting honestly or not, either.

I do that at your insistence - your definition of determinism, your definition of freedom, etc.

Determinism is what it is, where effect is completely determined by cause (thus excluding probabilistic causation).
The definition of freedom as "ability to do otherwise"... you are free not to accept that notion, and I've always been quite open that if you start with a different notion you will reach a different conclusion.
I could define my chair as "freedom", after all.
Oh, look, it exists!
But there is no assumption of the supernatural, only a conclusion that it is not compatible with determinism.

Impossible free will would include anything requiring or granting complete knowledge or perfect prediction, anything requiring that the future be a cause of the past or present, and so forth. None of that would require supernatural ability - just unavailable natural ability.

"Unavailable natural ability" - if it's unavailable it must be impossible to employ it, thus doing what you example must defy the available natural ability - aka supernatural.
See, you're not being honest with yourself, are you.
You're cherry-picking what you want to call supernatural.
And you're also making a few more notches in the irony bed-post regarding your history of comprehension.

My supernatural is that which can act contrary to causality or deterministic physical law - that's a limited subset of the impossible, in a deterministic universe.

See, again, if a natural ability is "unavailable" in a deterministic universe, then for your examples to exist they must defy those deterministic physical laws that are available, right?
So you're cherry-picking.
I get it, you're simply not being honest.
Fair enough.

And that's the second time on this page of this thread you have been corrected on that very obvious matter.

Clearly.

And I handed you a short list of offhand examples of such things, stuff you have already seen. A direct response to an irrelevant and confused request, that in itself continued your spinout from relevance. (I make no difference to anything here whether or not I can think of nonsupernatural impossibilities in your assumed deterministic universe).

You're going spla here.

I'll put that down to your lack of comprehension, then, as it does make a difference, because it all speaks to your approach to be to reject as supernatural anything that is concluded not to be possible / compatible etc.
Thus your approach is simply to beg the question of the thread.
Taking your undeniable approach, you have reworded the thread title: "Is a freedom that exists in a deterministic universe possible in a deterministic universe".
If you can't comprehend that this is your approach, then that's just further irony.

 

[Baldeee]

No problem. And the one who thinks that including as a premise that all men like Socrates are mortal makes claiming to have concluded that Socrates is mortal a bit silly. No problem there either.

Since noone is making that premise (all men like Socrates are mortal) here, you're just arguing a strawman.
Shame.

 

[Michael 345]

"Is a freedom that exists in a deterministic universe possible in a deterministic universe".

Is Mr Pretzel out of the comfort zone again?

 

[Baldeee]

You assume only the supernatural is free.

That has been your claim from the getgo, but it simply doesn't stack up with the assumption of freedom as "ability to do otherwise".
As explained, countless times now, it is only when coupled with the deterministic universe that one can conclude that it is not compatible.
There is simply nothing in that notion itself which assumes the supernatural.
And you, despite the constant bleating, the parrot-like repetition, have failed every time to show where it is.
Every time you try you bring in the nature of a universe with which to compare it to in order to make a conclusion that it is not compatible.
And then suddenly it becomes part of the assumption you think we are making.
It cripples you every time.

Then you "conclude" that a universe from which the supernatural has been excluded by definition also excludes freedom. All freedom.

I certainly conclude that a deterministic universe excludes an ability to do otherwise, yes.
That can be deduced from the notion of freedom and from the nature of the deterministic universe.
Change the nature of the universe and the notion of freedom might be deduced to exist.
e.g. a universe that allows humans to initiate causal chains.
See, nothing can be concluded, let alone assumed, to be supernatural until one introduces the second premise, the nature of the universe in question.
And you have utterly failed to show how the notion of freedom used is assuming the supernatural without you bringing in the nature of the universe.
Until you can do that, your unsupported criticism is simply the sound of a dog barking because it's not getting it's way, while the rest of the room is having a discussion.
Woof woof!
There's a good boy!

In your inability to spot the glaring flaw in that argument, among many other examples, a dozen or so of which I noted as examples in the course of this discussion. I have been quoting and specifying and pointing them out all along, btw - too bad you don't read my posts. I'll keep pointing them out, since you're actually curious.

Each time you think you have pointed them out you have simply been pointing out your own crippling flaw in your analysis, as explained to you each time.
You can point to any number of examples where you think the "supernatural assumption" is being made, but because of that flaw in your analysis they are each as incorrect and irrelevant as the next.
Each time you raise it I have the decency to point out the glaring flaw in your analysis, yet still you post it, still you are unable to comprehend it.
But I guess if you want to keep barking then you'll keep barking.

 

[Michael 345]

deterministic universe = one in which every future condition is already determined because of previous conditions

Restrictions - nothing which breaks the laws of physics allowed

As mentioned in previous post this thread it is NOT a condition that us Minions need be aware of any previous condition(s) or of any/all aspects of NOW (which is the current reality)

As the current reality dominoes fall and new reality dominoes present themselves to be knocked down, physics holds firm and only one reality emerges, in perpetuity

Freedom - ability to select from various options

Note well - Freedom - ability to select from various options

Not not not - ability to select from PERCEIVED various options

Perceived options are almost limitless (even though us Minions discount those eliminated by physics)

So at any particular NOW (reality) and contemplating the future (reality) explain, and if possible enumerate, how many options/freedoms are there?

Bonus (and a none to subtle hint), Does the number ever rise above 1?