Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[Capracus]

"If"?
After repeating myself a half dozen times, repeatedly posting links I had to look up to facts that should be common knowledge here (and if they aren't, I provided them), after repeatedly providing the evidence for the same damn point over and over, I came up with a rule:
You didn't bother to read my posts before replying, you do your own chasing. You can find my links in my posts as easily as I can - you do it.

Maybe you posted such links in your responses to other posters, but I don’t necessarily give those posts the same attention as those addressed to myself. I don’t see any such links in your responses to me, so if you’ve made them elsewhere please provide the links.

Same as yours, of course. I stipulated to it, remember?

That definition was stipulated to months ago. I can even recall having to remind you, and Baldee, and the rest, that this definition is what you guys agreed to - that "cannot do other than it must" is something you insisted on, and argued from, repeatedly. (You were denying it was a definition)

We've been through this many times now.

And since apparently I must once again repeat the same old observation, note that in your posted quote the supernatural assumption is laid out for you to deny making once again - this time it's called a "usual understanding", which I agree it most definitely is:

So now that you’ve reaffirmed that our definitional assumptions of determinism are in agreement, how do you explain any element of freedom where definitionally it cannot exist?

See the word "because"? That's it. That marks the "usual understanding" of freedom as supernatural that you deny.

The only way you can get a "because" there, make that logical step, is by assuming that freedom of will is excluded by the inability to do other than one must, that freedom involves doing other than causality determines or natural law allows - that only the supernatural (the defiance of natural law and causality and determined outcome, the abrogation of the "must") can be free.

That definition that we both presumably agree on, through logical extention leads to the the understanding that freedom of anything is incompatible with that definition.

That logical step requires that assumption, as a matter of logic, necessarily - notice there is no argument or evidence or justification of any kind mentioned: it's an assumption, pure and simple. So it was when Baldee and others posted their arguments and that definition, many times. So it was when you did. You are making that assumption, if you agree with that little argument shoehorned into the middle of the definition you posted and endorsed - and you do. You endorsed it, explicitly, and you are endorsing it now.

We endorsed the logical implications of the agreed upon definition of determinism because we’re trying to remain logically consistent in the interpretation of that definition. If we were tasked with assuming indeterminism, there’d be a reasonable expectation to consistently align with that definition.

That assumption is not granted. I think it's wrong. I note that the "usual understanding" involves a common error of reason - the assumption of the consequent - which should warn. I think there is room for meaningful freedom of will that does not involve anything or anyone doing other than they must, and I have made observations and suggestions for where to look and how to approach the topic. And I have posted reasons, arguments, and observations of physical reality in support of all that - so far, no relevant reply from any of you. No discussion of the matter at all.

Not even a post dealing with the simplest illustrative example - a driver approaching a traffic light - from you guys.

It doesn’t matter what example of human choice you care to present, because as implied by the agreed upon definition of determinism, the action that you define as choice, or decision made by the human entity, was actually decided by the predetermined nature of the entire system. So in our defined deterministic system, there is never actual decisions to be operationally made, because the system has already made them in advance.

I insist, always, that there are no such exceptions. All of my arguments assume that, all of my posts assume that.

Your posted inconsistencies say otherwise.

Ok. A bit shaky on the physical laws and so forth, but essentially and generally reasonable in this driver/light situation.

As is your take up until the point where you assume that the driver has actual options.

Ok - we can set the dubious take on physical law aside for the moment, since we are here dealing with a limited situation in which such cavils don't matter. In our limited situation (driver/light) all outcomes are predecided.

and that there are no actual choices to be made by any entity contained therein.

WTF? Where did that come from? The only choices excluded are supernatural ones, and they were excluded from the beginning.
The driver's choices are both observed and necessarily existent - the color of the light has yet to exist, and there are two possibilities the driver has prepared for.

If every aspect of your traffic light scenario is essentially predetermined(scripted) by the universe, then all of the action, including the changing traffic light, the perception of it by the driver, every aspect of their neurological processing, the resultant human manipulation of the car, and the car’s interaction with the road, are all fully determined actions that had no freedom to do otherwise in that determined system. In that whole description of the event, there were no options to choose from, there was only singular action to be followed.

That is false.
There are choices, prior to the event, and there have to be - since they determine the actions involved.
You claim all actions are determined, and then deny the existence of the mechanisms by which we observe them being determined. That makes no sense.

The problem with your interpretation is that you have isolated the action of choice from the predetermined causal chain that defines it. There is an appearance of choice to humans prior to an event because they have incomplete knowledge of that complete causal chain. The mechanisms that determines the action defined as choice are not determined by a set of immediate conditions, but by that of the complete action and determined nature of the universal whole. Every instant of human action in a determined system was predetermined from the outset, as was the action of the environments that they exist in.

The driver approaches a traffic light. Note the driver's capabilities - in particular, that they can stop, they can go, and they can choose which based on the future color of the light. We observe this - these are physical features, these capabilities, and we can observe them as we observe the driver's height and shoe size. They will change in the future, of course - but we are observing them now.

Look at the the narrow focus of your example. You say note the drivers capabilities without having sufficient knowledge of those capabilities in regards to how they can actually be expressed in relation to the actual determined elemental parameters of the event. We always only observe what has been determined to be observable, just as we always act in a manner that has been determined to be actionable. We don’t get to choose any of it in a determined system.

 

[Write4U]

iceaura said: ↑
The driver approaches a traffic light. Note the driver's capabilities - in particular, that they can stop, they can go, and they can choose which based on the future color of the light. We observe this - these are physical features, these capabilities, and we can observe them as we observe the driver's height and shoe size. They will change in the future, of course - but we are observing them now.

I am not sure if that is a convincing argument. The same can be said of a "smart" car. The car's capabilities is that they can stop, or go, and choose which based on the color of the light or proximity of an obstacle, all without a driver.
Does that give the car the freedom of choice? Or any freedom at all?

 

[Quantum Quack]

So now that you’ve reaffirmed that our definitional assumptions of determinism are in agreement, how do you explain any element of freedom where definitionally it cannot exist?

Why do you believe that the "quality" of freedom requires "material" indeterminism?

 

[Quantum Quack]

Capracus
Evolution by natural selection is an illusion if one accepts the abstracted universe being promoted here.
In other words you can not believe in Darwinism and this abstracted determinism simultaneously with out severe contradiction.

"Is Darwinism possible in a deterministic universe?"

 

[Write4U]

Is mutation a deterministic event?

 

[iceaura]

I don’t see any such links in your responses to me, so if you’ve made them elsewhere please provide the links.

You find them. I've run enough errands for people who don't bother to read my posts in the first place.

I am not sure if that is a convincing argument.

It's not an argument. It's an illustrative example that one can argue from - it prevents certain obscurities.

The problem with your interpretation is that you have isolated the action of choice from the predetermined causal chain that defines it.

What "interpretation" are you talking about? The example is quite simple - few "interpretations" are available.
What defines the choice is the causal past - and nothing in that example isolates the choice from its past.

There is an appearance of choice to humans prior to an event because they have incomplete knowledge of that complete causal chain.

The humans or machines observing the driver's capabilities, verifying their existence, and verifying by observation the driver's ability to choose between them, are not limited in their knowledge. You can go ahead and assume that they are omniscient if you want to - changes nothing about the driver.

In that whole description of the event, there were no options to choose from, there was only singular action to be followed.

There were of course options to choose from - that's how the driver's singular action are determined by the universe, remember?

If every aspect of your traffic light scenario is essentially predetermined(scripted) by the universe, then all of the action, including the changing traffic light, the perception of it by the driver, every aspect of their neurological processing, the resultant human manipulation of the car, and the car’s interaction with the road,

Why can't you guys deal with that example as posted?
Why are you posting irrelevancies about the future of the driver and the car? I can't believe you are consciously invoking backwards causality - claiming that the future color of the light determines the driver's choices and capabilities now, say - but there seems to be no other interpretation of this appeal to that future.

So in our defined deterministic system, there is never actual decisions to be operationally made, because the system has already made them in advance.

The system includes the driver, and the part of the system that makes the decision to stop or go (choosing from two capabilities) is the driver. The "system" making the choice is the same as the driver making the choice. The driver is the means by which the system makes the choice involved - we observe this.
I am trying to phrase this point in some way that registers in the naive materialist's awareness - the attempt to invoke the "system" or the "universe" as making the decision instead of the driver is common to them all.

You say note the drivers capabilities without having sufficient knowledge of those capabilities in regards to how they can actually be expressed in relation to the actual determined elemental parameters of the event.

The driver's capabilities are observed at a given time, and are describable (in theory) at that time. We know what they are by observation and description - in more or less the same way we know the driver's shoe size. Their future expression does not affect their present reality, which was determined by the past, any more than the fate of the driver's left foot affects its shoe size now. They do not change according to any "determined parameters of the event", whatever that even means - what "event" are you talking about?

Here's the example: A driver approaches a traffic light. The driver will stop the car if the light is red, keep going if it is green.

 

[Michael 345]

There were of course options to choose from -

Nooooo

Not not not - ability to select from PERCEIVED various

Note the highlighted PERCEIVED

You can have a billion perceived options from which only one will bare fruit because of the dominoes which have toppled in the past

 

[Michael 345]

Is mutation a deterministic event?

Yep

 

[Michael 345]

Here's the example: A driver approaches a traffic light. The driver will stop the car if the light is red, keep going if it is green.

The driver will stop the car if the light is red

Unless the brakes fail. Oops didn't know about leaking brake fluid cylinder

 

[Write4U]

The driver will stop the car if the light is red

Unless the brakes fail. Oops didn't know about leaking brake fluid cylinder

And the other guy is drunk and runs the red light, crashing into the sober driver who is obeying the traffic light.

 

[Vociferous]

Yes it would if we had free will. We don't, therefore matter rules over mind.

How could you possibly know that, considering you don't believe in free will? You're making a positive claim (free will entailing mind over matter) about something you don't think exists. That's as ridiculous as someone claiming a pink unicorn's favorite food is French toast. It's also a straw man to erect mind over matter as an easily assailable target that no one has argued.


___________________________________________________________________________________________

Can you explain how they are "begging the question"?

Since free will is usually couched as either being contrary to or limited by determinism, assuming determinism as a premise is assuming the conclusion that determinism is dominant. That any sort of free will must either not exist or accommodate determinism in a way that makes it not genuine free will at all. IOW, the premise precludes any genuinely alternative conclusion, which is literally begging the question. Redefining free will, as a pretense to allowing a alternative conclusion, is really just explaining it away.


___________________________________________________________________________________________

No reasonable professional physicists would claim that any interpretation of QM represents a full complete understanding of our fundamental reality. There is no empirical demonstration of the functional dynamics assumed in the behavior of the wave function for any interpretation. The only thing empirically demonstrable from QM is that probabilistic assessments yield practical descriptions of quantum states.

Well, there's no accounting for ignorance about the basics of the Copenhagen Interpretation or conflating theory completeness with a complete understanding of reality in general.

How can indeterminism be empirically demonstrated by QM when it doesn’t, or can’t address the underlying dynamics that appear to express it. If you can’t explain it’s expression, then how can you assume it to be an intrinsic quality? It would be just like assuming indeterminacy in a classical system that you have incomplete access to it’s functional dynamics. Determinism is an observable and established fact in the macro existence, and it has at least an equal chance of existing in the micro realms, so I think it’s reasonable to favor it over the alternative at this point.

In the lack of further knowledge, only empiricism is justified. No one knows whether QM addresses the underlying reality or not, so we can only accept what empirical evidence tells us. Anything more is pure assumption. Accepting empirical evidence is parsimony, where making added assumptions is not. What you "favor" is not an argument.

When you occupy a reality that’s known to be deterministic, and you claim that your actions are not, you are claiming an exemption from that condition.

It is not known to be philosophically deterministic, as no one can predict human choices based on initial conditions, nor trace a human choice to said conditions. It is causally deterministic, in that causality is demonstrable, but causality does not entail predeterminism. As such, free will is not an exception to causal determinism, but philosophical determinism is still begging the question.

 

[Vociferous]

That’s the point, though: you didn’t initially write what you meant.
I can’t initially go by what you mean unless you actually write what you mean.
You had to clarify, and your clarification has been responded to, along with your nonsense efforts to deflect.
But somehow it’s my problem that you didn’t express yourself accurately.

It's your problem that you've felt the need to beat that dead horse for how many posts now. I'm over it, and you should try to be as well.

So something that appears to be both red and green at the same time could really just be wholly red?

I’m not aware of that specific illusion, but our senses are not infallible, and many things can certainly appear to be one thing yet be something else entirely.
There are images that we can not help but see as moving yet are entirely static, for example.

Has nothing to do with illusion. My analogy to quantum superposition versus classical determinism just flew right over your head. To wit:

If one starts from first principles and sees no room for anything green other than as a result of subjective perception, then the green is simply a matter of subjective perception, not objective reality.

If one presumes that superimposed states are actually only one of said states then that is an unjustified assumption.

It’s not.
It’s a justified conclusion.

Exactly. It's a conclusion, not a premise. Hence begging the question.

Complexity usually involves things composed of many much simpler or fundamental elements, not simple things composed of more complex elements.

Who said the nature of appearance is simple?
I certainly haven’t.
By the time you get to “how things appear” you are already in the world of the complex, not the simple.

Neither have I, and how you got that from what you quoted is a mystery. I was never talking about appearance. You just latched onto the word "appears" as if it meant illusion, where it actually only separated the empirical evidence from any possible, underlying but unknown reality. Again, reference to QM was completely lost on you.

Note the slip in your language: you have gone from a matter of how things “appear” to now arguing about something that is in superposition.
If your argument here is that our reality is indeterministic, I would tend to agree.
But it is irrelevant as we are discussing a universe that is governed by determinism.

LOL! That's priceless! Nice of you to finally catch up, instead of running away with your own straw man. I've only mentioned appearance in respect to empirical evidence versus any possible, underlying but unknown reality. Go reread my posts, with your newfound clarity, for yourself.
A premise of determinism is begging the question. That's the same as asking if determinism is possible in free will universe. Yawn.

Again, if your argument is that if something actually is indeterministic then it is not deterministic, I would agree.
But we have stipulated here a deterministic universe, and any appearance of indeterminism within this universe would therefore necessarily be a “naive appearance of complexity”.

Begging the question. Boring.

BTW, where was this stipulated? Is this just a naive take on the thread's title? Why would a classical domain deterministic universe require determinism in all domains, or the preclusion of free will stemming from any other domain?
Again, that's just a boring as asking if determinism is possible in free will universe. It assumes the conclusion that one dominates.

If the universe is defined from the outset as being deterministic, that really is the nature of the universe being discussed.
If you believe that freewill requires indeterminism of some ilk then you would be an incompatibilist, because you would have to say that in a deterministic universe there is no scope for freewill.
It’s not rocket science.
At the moment you’re trying to argue about the nature of the universe, whether it is deterministic or not, but it has already been defined for purposes of this discussion as deterministic.

I'm not an incompatibilist, nor a compatibilist. Free will actually requires deterministic causality for choices to be meaningful. Otherwise, the sense of choice is just illusory and not free at all. I don't think compatibilists redefining free will is valid, any more than a compatibilist would think redefining determinism would be valid. But that seems to be a more nuanced discussion than your simple begging the question can manage.

Yes they can be isolated...
We have assumed for purposes of discussion that the universe is deterministic.
There.
Isolated.
See how easy that was?
We have isolated a universe for discussion that is entirely deterministic.
I.e. no indeterminism, no need for domains to interact.
I’m sorry if this assumption, upon which this thread (and the recent others like this on this forum) is based, is not to your liking, but either accept it or move on.
Trying to discuss the red herring of indeterminism simply has no place in this thread.

So this thread has zero to do with the real world? So you can argue your conclusion by artificially excising any alternative.
Cute. I guess some people think that's fun or worthwhile.

The question this thread is trying to answer is whether freewill can exist in a deterministic universe.
Let’s answer that one first, shall we?

Free will cannot exist without causality. If the consequences of a choice cannot be sufficiently predicted then the choice is just as arbitrary (not meaningful) as the consequence.
You seem to be presuming that determinism must have no exceptions in order to exist at all. I agree that our universe is largely deterministic. I just don't agree that we need to take the boring step of presuming it wholly deterministic to support a foregone conclusion.

It means can one exist with the other in the same domain.
What better test is there than to see if free will can exist in a deterministic universe.
After all, if freewill requires indeterminism at all then it is incompatible with determinism.

Why? Are determinism and indeterminism actually incompatible? Even if determinism relies, as it seems, on a more fundamental indeterminism?
The better test is the one that doesn't presume the conclusion.

First, it is not question begging at all, otherwise there wouldn’t be such thing as the compatibilist, who believes free will can exist in a deterministic universe.
Second, the question isn’t whether free will exists or not; the question is whether it can exist in a deterministic universe.
Notice the difference?

No, compatibilism does not presume that only determinism exists, to the exclusion of other domains or indeterminism.
Genuine free will can ONLY exist/be expressed in a causal universe. Choices without sufficiently predictable consequences are effectively random and meaningless, which is not free will. But where/how something is expressed is not how it comes to be.
Notice the difference?

If everyone agreed that freewill can’t exist in a deterministic universe then we could move on to whether free will does exist, whether the indeterminism in our reality (if one accepts that there is such) allows for freewill.

Do you even read what you write? So if everyone agreed with you "that freewill can’t exist in a deterministic universe", only then would you be happy to discuss "whether free will does exist"?
I couldn't ask for a better example of begging the question.

Given the question is whether free will is possible in a deterministic universe, not simply whether free will exists, how is that begging the question?
Unless you already hold the assumption that freewill requires some form of indeterminism, or already assume that freewill is not possible in a deterministic universe, perhaps?
If that is the case then, sure, question begging it is.
But since there are those who believe freewill to be possible in a deterministic universe, how can it be question begging?

But please, above all, stick to the question that has been asked: is freewill possible in a deterministic universe.
It’s not whether freewill exists or not.
And if you think our actual universe is not deterministic then we’re not talking about our actual universe but the abstracted deterministic universe.
If your answer to the question that has been asked is no, great, move on, or debate with those who think the answer is yes.
Or if your answer is no, feel free to debate with those who think the opposite.
If you want to ask a different question then raise a new thread for it.

Free will can ONLY exist in a sufficiently deterministic universe. Otherwise, choices are as arbitrary as their consequences and no more meaningful than random choice (what Libet mistook for free will). So no, I don't presume that free will is not possible in a deterministic universe. And that answers the question of whether free will is possible without precluding determinism. You're begging the question by precluding anything but determinism.

If you don't like what I post where, report me for posting off topic, if you really think that will fly. Otherwise, quit playing schoolmarm.

 

[Quantum Quack]

. That's the same as asking if determinism is possible in free will universe. Yawn.

Lol... love this...
"Is determinism possible in a freewill universe?"

Obviously the answer is yes...no?

 

[Michael 345]

No one knows whether QM addresses the underlying reality or not,

Ummmm QM? QM? Would I be correct in assuming QM is part of reality? Further if the answer is, YES QM is a integral part of reality, would I be correct in assuming that QM would be subject to physics and the laws of?

So what (by which) mechanism, does QM dodge reality and inserts free will?

 

[Vociferous]

Lol... love this...
"Is determinism possible in a freewill universe?"

Obviously the answer is yes...no?

Well, for those who assume the answer to "is free will possible in a deterministic universe" must be "no", it would only be consistent for them to also answer "no" to this as well. Which only proves it is begging the question. If swapping the premise changes the conclusion, the premise assumes the conclusion.

But yes, I think the answer to both (you know, the single question that simply doesn't beg the question) is yes.

Ummmm QM? QM? Would I be correct in assuming QM is part of reality? Further if the answer is, YES QM is a integral part of reality, would I be correct in assuming that QM would be subject to physics and the laws of?

So what (by which) mechanism, does QM dodge reality and inserts free will?

I've been assured by Baldeee that that is a wholly invalid question in this thread, unless and until everyone can fully agree that free will is not possible in a deterministic universe:

If everyone agreed that freewill can’t exist in a deterministic universe then we could move on to whether free will does exist, whether the indeterminism in our reality (if one accepts that there is such) allows for freewill.
...
But please, above all, stick to the question that has been asked: is freewill possible in a deterministic universe.
It’s not whether freewill exists or not.
...
If you want to ask a different question then raise a new thread for it.

So I guess I'll let you two sort it out between yourselves.

 

[Write4U]

Write4U said,↑
Yes it would if we had free will. We don't, therefore matter rules over mind.

Vociferous said,
How could you possibly know that, considering you don't believe in free will? You're making a positive claim (free will entailing mind over matter) about something you don't think exists. That's as ridiculous as someone claiming a pink unicorn's favorite food is French toast. It's also a straw man to erect mind over matter as an easily assailable target that no one has argued.

What are you on about? I said; "Yes it would if we had free will. We don't, therefore matter rules over mind." (Last I heard this was the mainstream viewpoint, for now).

will. noun,
1. the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action

Are you proposing that the concept of free will does not involve the ability to make uncaused conscious choices, such as humans claim to have and do?

I claim there is no uncaused result. Any state or action is always the result of a prior causality, even if that causality is a mathematical function.

 

[Vociferous]

What are you on about? I said; "Yes it would if we had free will. We don't, therefore matter rules over mind." (Last I heard this was the mainstream viewpoint, for now).
What that has to do with pink unicorn's favorite food is beyond me.

...free will does not entail mind over matter.

Yes it would if we had free will.

That's you making a positive claim about something you don't think exists. Ergo, the diet of pink unicorns. Right over your head, huh?

If we had free will we'd be able to adjust our brains to perceive and voluntarily correct optical illusions. We can't!!!

You claiming the straw man, that free will entails full control of our perceptions, which no one has argued, somehow makes some point, requires that you think you're making a positive claim about free will. If you don't understand that, no amount of simple English is likely to help. Oh well.

Are you proposing that free will does not involve conscious decision making, such as humans do? Are you proposing that there is a supernatural being that acts from free will?

No, that would be another straw man.

 

[iceaura]

As is your take up until the point where you assume that the driver has actual options.

They are observed, and demonstrated, and (btw) necessary for the existence of different responses to different criteria. Not assumed.
Or to bring it to bear: which of the two "options", stop vs go, are you claiming does not exist?
And what exactly happened to it, since the last time it was employed?

 

[iceaura]

Are you proposing that the concept of free will does not involve the ability to make non-caused conscious choices

I'm not.
That would be supernatural ability, in a deterministic universe (or situation within even a nondetermined universe, if that were to come up - in some other thread, one hopes. The basics are proving muddled enough).

 

[Write4U]

I'm not.
That would be supernatural ability, in a deterministic universe (or situation within even a nondetermined universe, if that were to come up - in some other thread, one hopes. The basics are proving muddled enough).

So, are you saying that Free Will is, or is not independent on a prior causal state? That is the question, no?

If it is, then FW is a deterministic function. If it is not, then it is supernatural, no?