MarcAC said:
I really like that § (too obvious I'm sure); I should've chosen the name Marc-A-§ea [A Sea of Christian Thought]
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(please don't spoil my dreams of doing stand-up comedy by stating how funny that was).
Woohoo! You're so great, Marc.
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MarcAC said:
NIV
Romans 7
14. We know that the law is spiritual; but I am unspiritual, sold as a slave to sin. 15. I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do. 16. And if I do what I do not want to do, I agree that the law is good. 17. As it is, it is no longer I myself who do it, but it is sin living in me. 18. I know that nothing good lives in me, that is, in my sinful nature. For I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out. 19. For what I do is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do–this I keep on doing. 20. Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin living in me that does it.
21. So I find this law at work: When I want to do good, evil is right there with me. 22. For in my inner being I delight in God's law; 23. but I see another law at work in the members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within my members. 24. What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death? 25. Thanks be to God–through Jesus Christ our Lord!
So then, I myself in my mind am a slave to God's law, but in the sinful nature a slave to the law of sin.
I'm not sure if this was referenced before but it might be pertinent to the discussion regarding Peter.
Maybe our souls/spirits experience the present (with regards to colegrey and God making us experience actions in present)? Maybe our souls/spirits are the "ones" who really exercise free will through time while our bodies are "fixed" in it? Maybe God fixes it so that we may always end up doing the right? Maybe through our free will we sometimes end up doing wrong? It would make sense in a sense. Sometimes we forget the concept of The Serpent and the role it plays. God's Will, Satan's will, our will? Spiritual warfare.
I don't this modification is necessary, it only complicates everything.
Like I say later to Laser Eyes, In each theory, we have to keep to the axioms given. Each derivation and each inference have to be in accordance with the axioms. (See below.)
21. So I find this law at work: When I want to do good, evil is right there with me. 22. For in my inner being I delight in God's law; 23. but I see another law at work in the members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within my members.
This is the burden of free will in practice. If we wouldn't be aware of this doubleness, the two laws that are at work, we wouldn't know we have options to choose from. In other words, we wouldn't have free will.
For now I've had enough of sciforums; likewise I'm sure.
I shall miss you.
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ellion said:
I think this just skirts the issue.
remind me what issue you were addressing.
You suggested that emotions modify our free will. This is what I oppose. To say emotions modify our free will skirts the issue of us actually having full free will, without modifications. That we have full free will seems to be too hard to accept, so modifications of free will are sometimes proposed.
yes, i definitely think emotions are as much a part of me as my mind. you seem to be suggesting that your emotions arent or that you are not willing to accept them. correct me if necessary.
This is not what I am saying at all.
We don't exist apart from our emotions, neither do they "have an impact on our free will". What they have "impact" on is rational thinking -- but this "impact" is possible only when a person's rational thinking is inconsistent and incoherent. In an argument (where rational discussion is supposed), "emotions take over" when the person's arguments show to be inconsistent and incoherent. You'll see people get angry or frustrated when they find themselves holding contradictory beliefs, and glad when they find their beliefs to be consistent and coherent.
I think that the "impact of emotions" as described above is actually about "secondary emotions" (for the lack of a better term), emotions that come as a reaction to specific cognitive states. These emotions have nothing to do with our free will, they do not limit it. They are reactions to cognitive inconsistency and incoherence -- and these are indicative of our limited knowledge and abilities, not of a limited free will.
"Primary emotions", like being happy when playing with your cat or being sad when someone close to you has been hurt, they don't affect your free will either. They may affect your agenda of yourself, your how-I-am-supposed-to-be. If a person pereceives a tension between his emotions and his agenda of himself, this is once more indicative of there being a cognitive inconsistency and incoherence between the beliefs he holds. Again, something that is indicative of our limited knowledge and abilities, not of a limited free will.
But if we are to establish any kind of laws and justice, we have no choice but to separate strictly and with exactness.
seperating things to the extent that they are not part of a whole (or parts of the whole are overlooked) is not the best basis for understanding or establishing a thing.
with respect to the rest of your post i need to restate what i have said before free will is only free will when it is without resritction and it is my will. as i have said before we do not have free will in all situations but we do have free will in some situations and we have the potential to develop our will and become less restricted.
I disagree. As soon as we accept the theory that we have only limited free will, we're on a slippery slope.
A prisoner who planned to escape, but failed -- according to the theory of limited free will, he should have probably never even be able to come up with the idea of escaping (if his will is to be determined by his circumstances) -- "If he couldn't escape, he has limited free will." But this is an ex post understanding, and it supposes the identity "If you can't do it, you don't have the will to do it" -- which is false.
What is limited is the prisone's field of action, what is limited is what he can do. What is not limited when he wants to escape, is his will to escape.
with regard to peter i dont think his actions were his unrestricted will.
That's just the thing! Peter may not have acted the way he may have wanted. Maybe you aren't able to throw a stone to the Moon. But this doesn't mean you can't have the will to!
We should not judge a person's free will (that preceded the action!) by the outcome of the action!
It is a false notion of causality.
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everneo said:
1. Can you tell the difference between freewill and fantasy?
In what sense do you mean this dichotomy?
Someone wanting to throw a rock 10 meters far vs. someone wanting to throw a rock to the Moon?
Or someone imagining he can lift 50 kilos vs. someone imagining he can lift 500 kilos?
2. Do yo consider your laziness (or anyother shortcomings/weakness) as part of your free will?
No.
If my laziness or any other shortcoming or weakness would be part of my free will, then I could have never overcome this laziness, neither could I think that there can be something else beyond my shortcomings or weaknesses. But I can overcome my laziness, and I can see beyond my shortcomings and my weaknesses.
3. Do you think not tying/keeping your cat within your house is your freewill or your irresponsibility?
This is an odd question, you present an odd dichotomy.
If I would believe that the harm my cat can do is more important than the well-being of my cat (her well-being refers to her getting fresh air, exercise etc.), then my keeping my cat in the house would be an act of my free will. If she escaped anyway, then she would have acted against my free will.
The key is in what I *believe* -- 1. whether I care more about the well-being of my cat, or for the harm she can do, and 2. whether I consistently keep to my beliefs. This is usually where the confusion with free will sets in.
If I merely don't like the cat going out, for she may cause harm in the neighbour's garden, but at the same time believe that the well-being of my cat is important, then I have potentially contraditctory beliefs. And it is due to this contraditction that I have troubles directing my actions and taking responsibility.
If I consistently believe
1. The well-being of my cat is more important than any harm she can do.
2. I will take responsibility for whatever harm she may do.
then there is no trouble.
If I consistently believe
1. The well-being of my cat is less important than the harm she can do.
2. I will put the cat in a place where she can do no harm. If she should escape, I will take no responsibility.
then there is no trouble.
But people often don't hold such consistent beliefs. Usually, the set looks thus:
1. The well-being of my cat is very important. But it is not more important than a certain harm she can do, there are limits to everything.
2. I will take responsibility for whatever harm she may do, but if she does too much, I will punish her or get rid of her.
then there is trouble. The "too much" is defined quite arbitrarily and vaguely, and it is when our beliefs are only vaguely defined that we find ourselves thinking we have limited free will.
Similarly, Peter wanted to serve Jesus. But Peter apparently held inconsistent and incoherent beliefs, and this is what directed his actions as it did. We can say his ability to act on his free will was limited -- and it was limited due holding inconsistent and incoherent beliefs.
Peter maybe held this set of beliefs:
1. Serve God.
2. Always do the right thing.
3. I have free will.
Such a set can lead to an action of betrayal. This is why it is crucial that a person's set of beliefs is consistently and coherently defined, without there being contradictions or possible contradictions -- if one wants to feel like one acts one one's free will.
(The problem with the above beliefs is this:
1. Serve God. >> if it is not clear how to do that, one can't consistently do it
2. Always do the right thing. >> implies always speak the truth, no matter what (thus, one would tell anyone any truth they asked for)
3. I have free will. >> if I can choose A, I can also choose something else, if there is choice possible )
4. Do you agree that freewill is restricted by various factors, viz.,
- personal shortcomings (that you are/were able to correct & responsible primarily)
- physical shortcomings (that you have no control over generally)
Free will is not restricted by these factors. What is restricted is the ability to always act out the free will as one has planned it.
If we put a modifying clause on free will itself, ie. if we say we have limited free will, we find ourselves poorly defined, and in possible contradiction with observation. How far does this limitation of free will go? Does this limitation always apply? When does it apply, when not? If I used to be lazy, and this laziness has restricted my free will, but a couple of years later I have overcome that laziness -- how could this happen, if my laziness was restricting my free will?!
I think it is more efficient, it offers a more consistent explanation if we say that we have full free will, but
our acting it out as we planned is limited by the environment, other people's free will, our own physical shortcomings and by the possible inconsistencies and incoherence of the beliefs that we hold.
Such an explanation is in accordance with the observation that people can and do change, and with the ways people employ to change.
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Laser Eyes said:
The basic point on which we disagree is you will not accept that God can choose not to know something in advance of it happening. I say that he can do this if he wishes. You say that he can not.
I did not say He cannot.
My point is that you are talking about SOME OTHER GOD, NOT THE GOD OF THE BIBLE.
Yet you use Biblical scripture to support your points. Why?
Let's try and break it down to as simple a comparison as possible. Suppose there are 2 Gods. We'll call them God X and God Y. Both of these Gods have the ability to know all things including future events.
God X knows all things and he can not avoid having this knowledge. God X is unable to choose not to know something. God X would sometimes prefer not to know something that is going to happen but he can not do this. He has the knowledge of all future events at all times and there is nothing he can do about it.
God Y also knows all things but he has the ability to choose not to know something if he wishes, unlike God X. If God Y would prefer not to know something that is going to happen he can avoid having this knowledge. God Y can have the knowledge of all future events to the extent he wishes. God Y can know every single thing that is going to happen or selected future events at his discretion.
Now, which of these 2 Gods is more powerful? Which of these 2 Gods has greater ability? Just answer this question.
How you skirt the issue! You are NOT talking about the God of the Bible, and that's all there is to your argument.
Sure, one can make up some generic god, some philosophical construct with the properties one gives to that construct.
But such a god is not supported by the Bible. Why refer to it then?
In each theory, we have to keep to the axioms given. Each derivation and each inference have to be in accordance with the axioms.
Your solution -- if it is to be applied to the God of the Bible -- does not hold, as the axiom "God is loving" is completely disregarded. You have made your solution such that you have modified the axioms "God is omniscient" and "God is omnipresent", and with this modification, you avoided applying the axiom "God is loving".
I don't know which god you are talking about, but it certainly isn't the God of the Bible. I find it useless to discuss the concept of a God-given free will (which is a concept coming from Christianity), but without regard to Christianity.
I find it useless to talk about generic gods. Anyone can make one up to fit his or her purposes.