Can a moral relativist be trusted?

[wellwisher]

Morals are designed to optimize the entire group in terms of physical and emotional resources. Relative morals are designed to optimize a subset of the entire group. Trust has to do with whether the relative morals are helping your subset or not. The parent may not trust the stranger with their child but the child molester would think this is good of his/her group.

Stealing is immoral since it hurts the group by requiring it waste emotional and physical resources for self defense and compliance. If I belonged to the thief union, I may come up with a line of arguments that shows the morality of stealing since it benefits my group; ends justifies the means or Robin Hood. I am not concerned about the biggest picture. A thief would trust those relative morals, since he stands to gain.

 

[Syne]

People need to remember that moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory. It isn't some algorithm for individuals to use in making their own moral judgements. Instead, it seeks to provide an explanation for what's happening when anyone, any human being, makes moral judgements. It's just as applicable to self-styled moral absolutists as to everyone else.

No. What you are talking about here is descriptive moral relativism, which is nothing more than the observation that moral differences do exist (and an absolutist usually agrees with).

I prefer to tell you what I'm saying, rather than have you put words in my mouth.

Then why not elaborate? You know, fill in the words/meaning I may have gotten wrong.

For one, moral relativism is not necessarily a meta-ethical theory. There are also descriptive and normative varieties. And the only variety compatible with ("just as applicable to") normative absolutism is descriptive relativism.

While meta-ethical moral relativists are de facto descriptive relativists, they go one step further, by asserting that there is no possible standard of right and wrong.

That isn't correct. Moral relativists don't assert that there's no possible standard of right and wrong.

What they do assert is that different cultures out there have different standards of right and wrong. Your so-called 'descriptive moral relativist' stops with that observation.

The so-called 'meta-ethical moral relativist' makes the further observation that there doesn't seem to be any culture-independent means of determining which of those mutually-inconsistent moral standards might be objectively true.

You seem just as literal-minded as Sarkus. I meant relativism asserts that there is no possible single standard. And in what sense are you using "so-called"? "Commonly called" or "falsely termed"?

You cannot deny that one's meta-ethical stance will effect one's normative stance. After all, meta-ethical relativism contradicts normative absolutism or universalism.

There are any number of moral standards out there. Proponents of each will typically use their standard to make moral judgements about everyone's actions, whether or not the individual that's being judged is a member of the same cultural group as the one doing the judging. Moral standards are typically universal in that sense. (Some philosophers argue that moral standards must necessarily be universalizable, though I'm not sure that I agree. A monastic might need to adhere to a higher moral standard than a layman.)

It is trivial that people use their own morals to judge others, and I have already said this myself, several times in this thread. That does not make them "universal" (in the ethics sense), especially to a relativist (who does not believe a universal standard of right and wrong exist).

But how does any of this change or challenge anything I said? Or is this just exposition?

If a normative moral absolutist wants for some reason to have his/her view be consistent with meta-ethical moral relativism, then all that they really need to concede is that there doesn't seem to be any objective way of demonstrating the superiority of their own moral standard to people who don't already accept that demonstration's cultural presuppositions.

No, again you are confusing descriptive and meta-ethical relativism. Descriptive relativism is the only variety that is compatible with objectivism (the meta-ethical position of a normative absolutists) and the only variety that makes any assertion about what may or may not be objectively demonstrable. Meta-ethical relativism necessarily asserts the descriptive position as well as the opinion that there is no universal standard of right and wrong. It is the latter that is completely incompatible with any form of normative objectivism, as the two are starkly contrasted.

This view [Meta-ethical moral relativism] is contrasted by moral universalism, which argues that, even though people disagree, and some may even be unpersuadable (e.g. someone who is closed-minded), there is still a meaningful sense in which an action may be more "moral" than another; that is, they believe there are objective standards of evaluation that seem worth calling "moral facts"—regardless of whether they are universally accepted. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Meta-ethical​

I hope you do not think that all moral objectivists appeal to a god for their normative morals. Moral realism, for example.

Of course.

The meta-ethical moral objectivists might be right. If they believe that there's some objective way of determining the correct moral standard, without having to accept a whole lot of cultural presuppositions in order to do it, then I invite them to explain what it is.

Meta-ethical moral objectivism does not assert that there is any "objective way of determining the correct moral standard". At most, an objectivist may only agree with descriptive relativism. I say "may" because not all objectivists do. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descriptive_ethics#Descriptive_ethics_and_relativism

 

[Syne]

Deciding for oneself does not necessarily imply self-serving.

You are right. Deciding for oneself is not necessarily self-serving (but I did not say it was). It is the fact that deciding for oneself is the only compelling argument for relativism that is self-serving.

Now if you have a compelling argument any less self-serving than "because I can make up my own morals"...

All decisions we make are self-serving, for whatever reason we make them.
Altruism would be the only exception, if one even thinks that true altruism is possible.
So you'll need to do better than claim moral relativism is any more self-serving than objectivism.

So which is it? Does "deciding for oneself not necessarily imply self-serving", or are "all decisions we make self-serving"? Is that moving the goalpost?

You said that your compelling argument for relativism is "deciding for oneself" and now you are saying that "all decisions we make are self-serving". Hence your only compelling argument for relativism is self-serving.

If Deciding is Compelling (if A = B)
And If Deciding is Self-serving (and if A = C)
It Follows that Compelling is Self-serving (then necessarily B = C)

Objectivism does not make any appeal to people deciding for themselves, so if your own argument holds, it is trivially less self-serving.

Wow, way to lie. You have not cited a credible reference.

Apologies, I would have thought explaining the simple logic of the matter of your implication would have sufficed.

Really? Even after I explicitly told you your explanation alone would not suffice?

Your self-serving and subjective reasoning is not sufficient.

I take it, by your evasion and continued lack of any reference citation, that you cannot support your claim and are now retracting it.

Are we to assume all questions are to be taken as statements to the contrary? Or perhaps you always assume that when somebody asks you "why X?" that they must hold the position of not-X?

When someone asks "why X?" in necessarily follows that they hold, at least, an unsure position as regards X, unless it was rhetorical. And if it was rhetorical, you should have simply answered "yes" to my comment, "it seems you agree that there are cases when it is necessary."

I hold tolerance as a virtue, ...

Then why all the evasion, when that is typical of most moral relativists?

And what exactly am I supposed to be evading from? And what are you suggesting is "typical": evasion, or holding tolerance as a virtue?

You seemed reluctant to admit that tolerance is typically considered a virtue by relativists.

Could it be that holding tolerance as a virtue demonstrates a degree of laxity of conviction?

In what? In morals? How do you judge what one holds to be a moral in the first instance if not that to which he has conviction?
Thus by default all morals would be held with equal conviction. What you would the see as a "laxity of conviction" is merely a matter of what one considers to be a moral judgement.

It is trivially demonstrable that not "all morals would be held with equal conviction". For example, the morals against lying and killing. Or are you saying that any given person would necessarily have just as strong a conviction on both?

If conviction varies by specific moral, it follows that conviction may generally vary. Conviction is not an all or nothing proposition.

Or do you not see how MLK Jr. advocating "tolerance" instead of "justice" would have illustrated a lessor conviction?

Perhaps a matter of conviction? If you never learned/had genuine conviction, the gravity of what you may have been taught could have eluded you. (Of course I have no idea what the breadth of your religious education may have been.)

What is perhaps a matter of conviction? That your unsupported claim goes against everything I have been taught about religion?
And your efforts to try to blame me for you not supporting your claims is laughable.

Blame you? :shrug: I thought I was offering you the opportunity to detail some of what you were "taught about religion". You see, you made the claim "it goes against everything I was taught regarding religion". Since I have no idea what you were taught (or even what religion/denomination), I have no way to judge the veracity of that claim.

So without further information, it is an empty argument.

It is trivial that tolerance is less likely to be defined as a virtue in objectivism, since it figures prominently into relativism.

It need not be religion in general: let's just start with Christianity, which would undoubtedly make up the vast majority of objectivists in the uk and USA.

While I have already made my point, I will indulge you...just for fun.

One of the pet words of this age is "tolerance." It is a good word, but we have tried to stretch it over too great an area of life. We have applied it too often where it does not belong. The word "tolerant" means "liberal," "broad-minded," "willing to put up with beliefs opposed to one's convictions," and "the allowance of something not wholly approved."

Tolerance, in one sense, implies the compromise of one's convictions, a yielding of ground upon important issues. Hence, over-tolerance in moral issues has made us soft, flabby and devoid of conviction. - http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/octoberweb-only/144-212.0.html



Expressions of Christian values--indeed of historical American and world values--are slammed today by a secular minority (and an even smaller religious minority) that openly rejects the notion that any person can adopt, express, or live by a set of values that might offend the sensibilities (or lack thereof) of that minority. This minority hides behind the rhetoric of "diversity, inclusion, and tolerance," but in fact is actively engaged in prohibiting and persecuting any activities that might not conform to the minority's own system of uniform, exclusive, and intolerant philosophies. - http://www.hymnsite.com/diversity.html​

Note that there is a "smaller religious minority" that are, for lack of a better term, increasingly secularized.

Not long ago, the word 'tolerance' meant 'bearing or putting up with someone or something not especially liked'. However, now the word has been redefined to 'all values, all beliefs, all lifestyles, all truth claims are equal'.1 Denying this makes a person 'intolerant', and thus worthy of contempt. - http://christiananswers.net/q-eden/tolerance.html​

And here it is clearly recognized as it is expressed in relativism.

As can you, to support your claim. Don't expect me to do your legwork for you.

Oh, you mean like your lack of legwork in you infer/imply debacle?

However you wish to word it, difference largely by culture means derived largely from culture. Whatever the vectors of cultural influence (family unit, the close friends, education etc.), they are largely inconsequential as long as the difference is largely a matter of culture in general.

Sure, let's just define culture to be anything that influences the individual's morals.

Again, if morals largely differ by culture then it follows that they largely derive from the culture, regardless of how they reach the individual.

The objectivist has an independent standard that is less prone to influence. Note the persistence of religion, even a single religion within a wide array of cultures and over a long period of time. I am not, here, assuming the relativist has especially flexible morals, only that they do not tend to have a standard especially independent of their culture. That simply makes them more prone to cultural accommodation.

"More prone" might be significant or it might just be another choice between a spoon or paper cup in trying to move a mountain. Care to actually quantifying the "more"?

Again, the persistence of religion across widely varying cultures and over a significant time period is sufficient to establish "less prone" in contrast.

Even spelling it out you fail to understand the question... despite your rather ironic insult.
Let me give you an example of the relevance of your answer:
Me: "Do you like strawberries?"
You: "I don't like chocolate."

So let me ask again: "Would you trust someone purely on them claiming to be a Christian?"
Hopefully now you will understand that you replying "I do not trust a meta-ethical moral relativist" does not answer the question, no matter whether you underline it, write it in capitals, in bold, in colour or even blow it up your arse.

Okay, not mentally challenged, per se, just so unbelievably obtuse and literal-minded. Sure sounds challenging. If forced to choose, yes, I would trust a Christian, purely on that claim alone.

But if you were not so pedantically literal-minded, you would have understood this glaring implication at least one of the times I answered you. We have been discussing whether a person could trust an objectivist or relativist, in a thread that specifically asked about the relativist. What else do you think "I prefer them [objectivist/Christian] with regards to trustworthiness" means?

I am really starting to suspect that your only goal here is a strategy of attrition.

"The meta-ethical position alone is sufficient information" to judge the possible normative morals.

Not an issue, and never was, as there is nothing necessary about those morals, and, as I have been arguing all along, it is the specific morals alone that matter. I.e. It might help you understand "possible" normative morals, but does not answer the important question of what those morals actually are. So your comment just supports how irrelevant it actually is.

Yes, the meta-ethical position alone defines the possible morals, and in comparison to the relativists' possible lack of prescriptive ethics or, at best, tolerance to differing morals, the conviction of the objectivist is more trustworthy.

No guarantee is required where no trust is given. Nothing is risked.

But it's good to know you would risk leaving your child with someone just because they said they were a Christian.

Non sequitur.

In a situation where I had no choice but to make a snap judgement (being forced to leave a child in a stranger's care), without any opportunity to glean anything more than meta-ethical position, yes, I would pick an objectivist over a relativist every time.

And hopefully for the last time: that is not the question. It is not a matter of preference. It is not the false dichotomy of having to pick one over the other, but of whether you would trust someone purely on the meta-ethical philosophy they claim. There is always the option, which I'm sure you will vehemently seek to avoid, of saying "I would not trust them on that information alone."

So since you claim meta-ethical stance is neutral, you simply refuse any scenario that would sufficiently isolate the discussion to that aspect alone? You insist on leaving the possibilities of gaining more information or not leave your child with a stranger, because you know that either is stronger info than meta-ethical stance alone (which I agreed on long ago) and you are not confident enough in your null hypothesis to actually allow an honest test of it.

The OP asked:

"Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?"​

So after you argued that we should be discussing the OP (you know, strictly meta-ethics, which I obliged you on) you now insist on discussing the opposite of the OP? Make up your mind. A little intellectual honesty and consistency would be appreciated.

Nice rhetoric though.

Such a dire situation seems to be the only one that limits the choice as you seem to demand (no normative morals, etc.). So if forced to leave your child with a stranger, what would you do? You have said that the meta-ethical stance is neutral, so with that info alone, you could only flip a coin, right?

False dichotomy: you could simply choose not to trust them.

Yet, given the choice between the objectivist and the person you have already argued would likely hold morals in line with society at large (and so, per your line of arguing, would have morals you would be familiar with) you would still choose an objectivist whose morals could be based on anything?

You did not answer my question: "You have said that the meta-ethical stance is neutral, so with that info alone, you could only flip a coin, right?"

Your question assumes that the scenario plays out in my own culture (which happens to be ~75% Christian).

That is no refute, other than perhaps an argument from fallacy.

It is a refute: a popular shared subjectivity does not equate to an objectivity. To think otherwise, even to think it is "close to objective" is merely an appeal to authority.

This is not an appeal to authority, as no "expertise" has been appealed to. I think you mean authority of the many, commonly known as argumentum ad populum.

Appeal to belief is valid only when the question is whether the belief exists. Appeal to popularity is therefore valid only when the questions are whether the belief is widespread and to what degree. I.e., ad populum only proves that a belief is popular, not that it is true. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentum_ad_populum#Exceptions​

If there is no objective right or wrong then all morals are inherently equal. As such, widespread agreement is an objective measure of believed value in certain shared morals.

 

[Sarkus]

So which is it? Does "deciding for oneself not necessarily imply self-serving", or are "all decisions we make self-serving"? Is that moving the goalpost?

Apologies - I missed the word "possibly".

Really? Even after I explicitly told you your explanation alone would not suffice?

Yes, because the logic is neither subjective nor self-serving. It is what it is.

When someone asks "why X?" in necessarily follows that they hold, at least, an unsure position as regards X, unless it was rhetorical.

No, it doesn't necessarily follow at all: they may hold a very secure position regarding X, but are unsure as to your reasoning of reaching your conclusion.

You seemed reluctant to admit that tolerance is typically considered a virtue by relativists.

Why would I be reluctant?

It is trivially demonstrable that not "all morals would be held with equal conviction". For example, the morals against lying and killing.

This only holds if you view "bad" to be an "all or nothing".

Or are you saying that any given person would necessarily have just as strong a conviction on both?

In relation to the strength of "bad" they assign to the action.
The view of how "bad" one considers an action defines the conviction. One can therefore only compare whether morals are possibly lax by looking at actions people consider equally as "bad". Otherwise you are simply not comparing like with like.

Blame you? :shrug: I thought I was offering you the opportunity to detail some of what you were "taught about religion". You see, you made the claim "it goes against everything I was taught regarding religion". Since I have no idea what you were taught (or even what religion/denomination), I have no way to judge the veracity of that claim.

You made the initial claim - and I disputed it, by saying it goes against what I was taught. You then try to ask me to support my dispute? As if you are right until proven otherwise??

It is trivial that tolerance is less likely to be defined as a virtue in objectivism, since it figures prominently into relativism.

If you want to hold such an a priori assumption then go ahead.
However if tolerance is prominent in both your argument above falls flat.
Otherwise one might as well argue that blonde hair is less likely to be found in Scandanavian men because it features so prominently in women.
So care to support your claim?

While I have already made my point...

Of course you have
As for your examples, the first speaks of "over-tolerance", not tolerance per-se; the second speaks of mere lip-service to tolerance, not tolerance per-se; the second uses a rather specific definition of tolerance to make a point.

Again, if morals largely differ by culture then it follows that they largely derive from the culture, regardless of how they reach the individual.

Yet when speaking in absolutes, as this thread is, it is important not to equate a generalisation into such an absolute.

Okay, not mentally challenged, per se, just so unbelievably obtuse and literal-minded. Sure sounds challenging. If forced to choose, yes, I would trust a Christian, purely on that claim alone.

And again - no one is forcing you to choose!!!
Why are you so reluctant to actually address the question I asked?

But if you were not so pedantically literal-minded, you would have understood this glaring implication at least one of the times I answered you.

So accuracy is now to be deemed "pedantic literal-mindedness? I'm the one to blame for you not answering a simple question as intended rather than how you want to answer it??

I am really starting to suspect that your only goal here is a strategy of attrition.

Sure, disagreeing with you is purely a strategy of attrition.
Please try to stop being so obnoxious.

Yes, the meta-ethical position alone defines the possible morals, and in comparison to the relativists' possible lack of prescriptive ethics or, at best, tolerance to differing morals, the conviction of the objectivist is more trustworthy.

Once again your answer is irrelevant given the question asked. You are persisting on looking at preference rather than the absolute.

So since you claim meta-ethical stance is neutral, you simply refuse any scenario that would sufficiently isolate the discussion to that aspect alone?

Because your scenario of preference is NOT addressing that aspect alone. It is introducing a false-dichotomy that introduces preference rather than the issue in hand of absoluteness.
It's surely not that difficult a concept to grasp, is it?

You insist on leaving the possibilities of gaining more information or not leave your child with a stranger, because you know that either is stronger info than meta-ethical stance alone (which I agreed on long ago) and you are not confident enough in your null hypothesis to actually allow an honest test of it.

I insist on leaving the possibility of such because it is absolutely key to the argument. Your argument is nothing but equating a preference based on that information alone to the absolute distrust that the OP suggested.

The OP asked:

"Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?"​

Indeed - so why are you not actually addressing the question.
Note how it is not a matter of preference, but of absolute: "Is there any way...?"
You continue to argue "But I would prefer X over Y..." which is irrelevant.
My point is that the meta-ethical position is neutral, and that it is the actual morals of the person that matter: and the way to show that it is neutral is to say whether you could trust on meta-ethical grounds alone... i.e. leaving open the possibility of NOT TRUSTING. If you can not trust a Christian (as an example of an objectivist) merely on their say so then the meta-ethical position is demonstrably neutral.
Get it yet?
The issue then, as I have been arguing, is on what you would actually make such a decision (of trustworthiness) and whether the same would not be applicable to both objectivist and relativist alike.

So after you argued that we should be discussing the OP (you know, strictly meta-ethics, which I obliged you on) you now insist on discussing the opposite of the OP? Make up your mind.

The above should have clarified what you have patently not been able to understand thus far.

A little intellectual honesty and consistency would be appreciated.

Oh, the irony simply drips from this.

You did not answer my question: "You have said that the meta-ethical stance is neutral, so with that info alone, you could only flip a coin, right?"

Apologies, I thought raising the issue of your false-dichotomy would have sufficed.
Let me be more explicit: I would not trust either on their meta-ethical philosophy alone.
So no, it would not be left to a flip of a coin.

Your question assumes that the scenario plays out in my own culture (which happens to be ~75% Christian).

Yep - the same Christian culture on which you would agree that the moral-relativist will generally draw their morals.

This is not an appeal to authority, as no "expertise" has been appealed to. I think you mean authority of the many, commonly known as argumentum ad populum.

Yes - it was a slip - I did mean appeal to popularity.

If there is no objective right or wrong then all morals are inherently equal. As such, widespread agreement is an objective measure of believed value in certain shared morals.

Sure - it is a measure of the agreement with the moral value - which does not make it objective. Was this supposed to show how your wanting to use popularity as a measure of objectivity is not an appeal to popularity?

 

[Syne]

Apologies - I missed the word "possibly".

Wow, way to avoid all of this:

You said that your compelling argument for relativism is "deciding for oneself" and now you are saying that "all decisions we make are self-serving". Hence your only compelling argument for relativism is self-serving.

If Deciding is Compelling (if A = B)
And If Deciding is Self-serving (and if A = C)
It Follows that Compelling is Self-serving (then necessarily B = C)

Objectivism does not make any appeal to people deciding for themselves, so if your own argument holds, it is trivially less self-serving.

I will take that as having no refute.

When someone asks "why X?" in necessarily follows that they hold, at least, an unsure position as regards X, unless it was rhetorical. And if it was rhetorical, you should have simply answered "yes" to my comment, "it seems you agree that there are cases when it is necessary."

No, it doesn't necessarily follow at all: they may hold a very secure position regarding X, but are unsure as to your reasoning of reaching your conclusion.

So why not just agree, if you did?

Yes, because the logic is neither subjective nor self-serving. It is what it is.

Yep, no support whatsoever. One wonders why you keep making arguments you are unable to support.

Why would I be reluctant?

I do not know. Why make this argument?

"If". Not all relativists have tolerance as a moral virtue.

Merely argumentative and superfluous?

It is trivially demonstrable that not "all morals would be held with equal conviction". For example, the morals against lying and killing.

This only holds if you view "bad" to be an "all or nothing".

No, conviction is the firmness with which a belief or opinion is held, so if it is more excusable to lie than to kill, it is a matter of conviction, i.e. less firmness of belief. That one thing may be less bad than another is only the reason for less conviction.

Or are you saying that any given person would necessarily have just as strong a conviction on both?

In relation to the strength of "bad" they assign to the action.
The view of how "bad" one considers an action defines the conviction. One can therefore only compare whether morals are possibly lax by looking at actions people consider equally as "bad". Otherwise you are simply not comparing like with like.

You seem to be contradicting yourself. If "bad" varies and 'the strength of "bad" defines the conviction", then it follows that conviction varies.

If Bad Varies (A = B)
And If Bad defines Conviction (A = C)
It Follows that Conviction Varies (B = C)

You made the initial claim - and I disputed it, by saying it goes against what I was taught. You then try to ask me to support my dispute? As if you are right until proven otherwise??

I have already supported my argument, where you have not. Tolerance is prominent in normative relativism, where it is not in objectivism.

It is trivial that tolerance is less likely to be defined as a virtue in objectivism, since it figures prominently into relativism.

If you want to hold such an a priori assumption then go ahead.
However if tolerance is prominent in both your argument above falls flat.
Otherwise one might as well argue that blonde hair is less likely to be found in Scandanavian men because it features so prominently in women.
So care to support your claim?

There is nothing a priori about the fact that normative relativism holds tolerance to be prominent. Only you have made the claim that tolerance is equally prominent in objectivism, so that is your claim to support. I have already, repeatedly, supported my own.

Do your own legwork, as I am only asserting the null hypothesis that tolerance is not particularly prominent in objectivism. The refute is your burden to prove.

Again, if morals largely differ by culture then it follows that they largely derive from the culture, regardless of how they reach the individual.

Yet when speaking in absolutes, as this thread is, it is important not to equate a generalisation into such an absolute.

How is qualifying it as "largely" an absolute?

Yes, the meta-ethical position alone defines the possible morals, and in comparison to the relativists' possible lack of prescriptive ethics or, at best, tolerance to differing morals, the conviction of the objectivist is more trustworthy.

You are persisting on looking at preference rather than the absolute.

I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

Because your scenario of preference is NOT addressing that aspect alone. It is introducing a false-dichotomy that introduces preference rather than the issue in hand of absoluteness.
It's surely not that difficult a concept to grasp, is it?

Again, I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

I insist on leaving the possibility of such because it is absolutely key to the argument. Your argument is nothing but equating a preference based on that information alone to the absolute distrust that the OP suggested.

Again, I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

Indeed - so why are you not actually addressing the question.
Note how it is not a matter of preference, but of absolute: "Is there any way...?"
You continue to argue "But I would prefer X over Y..." which is irrelevant.
My point is that the meta-ethical position is neutral, and that it is the actual morals of the person that matter: and the way to show that it is neutral is to say whether you could trust on meta-ethical grounds alone... i.e. leaving open the possibility of NOT TRUSTING. If you can not trust a Christian (as an example of an objectivist) merely on their say so then the meta-ethical position is demonstrably neutral.
Get it yet?
The issue then, as I have been arguing, is on what you would actually make such a decision (of trustworthiness) and whether the same would not be applicable to both objectivist and relativist alike.

Again, I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists." And I have answered your question directly as well. And why is it you are here demanding a comparison when you have been so vehemently denying it? Me saying, "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists" is sufficient for the OP, and your question about Christianity is only a comparison.

You did not answer my question: "You have said that the meta-ethical stance is neutral, so with that info alone, you could only flip a coin, right?"

Apologies, I thought raising the issue of your false-dichotomy would have sufficed.
Let me be more explicit: I would not trust either on their meta-ethical philosophy alone.
So no, it would not be left to a flip of a coin.

So leaving the option to abstain from a choice allows you skirt the issue entirely.

If there is no objective right or wrong then all morals are inherently equal. As such, widespread agreement is an objective measure of believed value in certain shared morals.

Sure - it is a measure of the agreement with the moral value - which does not make it objective. Was this supposed to show how your wanting to use popularity as a measure of objectivity is not an appeal to popularity?

It is an objective measure of relative value, and as such one of the few deciding criteria available, especially to a moral relativist. Now if you insist on denying that then the moral relativist is left with nothing compelling other than self-interest.

This shows that fallacies do not, themselves, make an argument wrong. Hence argument from fallacy.

 

[Sarkus]

Wow, way to avoid all of this:
...
I will take that as having no refute.

If "all of this" becomes irrelevant by the omission referred to... consider it avoidance if you wish. I'll consider it not bothering with something that is made irrelevant.

So why not just agree, if you did?

Because I was interested in why you thought it.
Do you take objection to that?

Yep, no support whatsoever. One wonders why you keep making arguments you are unable to support.

If one needed to support every bit of logic beyond detailing the logic (i.e. with a reputable reference), we'd be here forever with you. Lucky you don't troll the maths forums, otherwise you'd be asking for proofs every time someone wrote "1+1=2".
If you can't accept the explanation as given, have the decency to explain what you think is wrong with it.

I do not know. Why make this argument?
...
Merely argumentative and superfluous?

Not at all - you merely have a habit of using a general but not necessary trait as being an objective attribute of the philosophy - i.e. you are arguing against the general when the question at hand is that absolute. Until you stop doing that then discussion with you becomes futile.

No, conviction is the firmness with which a belief or opinion is held, so if it is more excusable to lie than to kill, it is a matter of conviction, i.e. less firmness of belief. That one thing may be less bad than another is only the reason for less conviction.

Then we differ by what we refer to as conviction: if one does not hold a particular view then it is not a matter of conviction but a matter of not holding the opinion.
If someone believes X, then do they lack conviction in not-X? Or do they simply not believe it?
If someone believes X is a matter of subjectivity, do they lack conviction in the absoluteness of X, or do they have conviction in the subjectivity of X.

You seem to be contradicting yourself. If "bad" varies and 'the strength of "bad" defines the conviction", then it follows that conviction varies.

I never said conviction didn't vary.
My argument is that to consider someone as being lax in their conviction one needs to understand what their morals are and the strength of the "bad" that they attribute to the act.
To be "lax" one would need to have the same level of "bad" and show that conviction is not as strong as someone else might have.
Otherwise you are just using "laxity of conviction" as another term for holding a different moral view. I.e. where we hold an act to be of similar "bad"ness, we hold the same conviction, as conviction is a measure of how "bad" we think a view is.

I have already supported my argument, where you have not. Tolerance is prominent in normative relativism, where it is not in objectivism.

So using references that don't actually support your argument is now to be considered supporting your argument?

There is nothing a priori about the fact that normative relativism holds tolerance to be prominent.

I never said it was. I said (if you actually follow the logic of the argument) that you holding that it is only normative to relativism is an a priori assumption. You made the claim. Please support it. I am not necessarily arguing that it is normative to objectivisim, but you wish to dismiss it as not being so, so please support that claim. You have not yet done so.

Only you have made the claim that tolerance is equally prominent in objectivism, so that is your claim to support. I have already, repeatedly, supported my own.

You argued that because it was prominent in relativism it therefore isn't in objectivism: "It is trivial that tolerance is less likely to be defined as a virtue in objectivism, since it figures prominently into relativism. "
I have not said that it is equally prominent, only that it might be... but you have seemingly discounted that possibility, so please support that claim.

Do your own legwork, as I am only asserting the null hypothesis that tolerance is not particularly prominent in objectivism. The refute is your burden to prove.

I'm not claiming that it is prominent, only that it may be - you are the one making the positive claim, even if that claim is "the absence of...".
If you wish to rely on that absence then it is your burden to prove.

How is qualifying it as "largely" an absolute?

It doesn't, which is my point: that this discussion is about absolutes - and you are discussing matters of "largely" - a point you are seemingly keen to stress, and by doing you stress how you clearly miss the point of the discussion.

I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

Well done. I know that. Fortunately your view does not define the absolute rather only your view. i.e. you saying that you do not trust a meta-ethical moral relativist does NOT answer whether such can be trusted, only whether you consider that you would - and your grounds on which you make that assessment are flawed, as I have previously argued (e.g. you make such a decision on grounds that are logically neutral in the matter).

Again, I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

I'll take that as having no refute, shall I?

Again, I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

I'll take that as having no refute, shall I?

Again, I already answered in the absolute, as it pertains to the OP. "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists."

I'll take that as having no refute, shall I?

And I have answered your question directly as well.

You have? I recall you answering a false dichotomy which I didn't ask about, though. Perhaps that was what you are referring to?

And why is it you are here demanding a comparison when you have been so vehemently denying it?

I raise the comparison to highlight how one's meta-ethical philosophy is neutral to matters of trust. It might provide a preference, as you are so keen to point out, yet we are not talking preference but matters of absolutes... i.e. (again) not matters of "which do you prefer..." but matters of "is it possible to..." (ignoring the triviality of the gullible).

Me saying, "I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists" is sufficient for the OP, and your question about Christianity is only a comparison.

Your saying that does NOT answer the OP. Why do you have such difficulty in seeing that? Perhaps you feel that you have inadvertently taken an absolute stance when you didn't mean to, and are so driven by ego that you can't stomach withdrawing from the position?

So leaving the option to abstain from a choice allows you skirt the issue entirely.

Not at all - it ensures that the issue is addressed: that meta-ethical philosophy alone is neutral to matters of trust, although can provide preference.
If you want to introduce and argue the false-dichotomy, at least be clear that you are no longer arguing the OP but your own strawman.

It is an objective measure of relative value, and as such one of the few deciding criteria available, especially to a moral relativist. Now if you insist on denying that then the moral relativist is left with nothing compelling other than self-interest.

But we're not interested in the objective measure of relative value, but in the supposed objective value - either it has objective value or it has relative value. "Objective measure of relative value" does not equate to objective value... unless you appeal to popularity as defining an objective value (i.e. the fallacy you seem so eager to commit)

This shows that fallacies do not, themselves, make an argument wrong. Hence argument from fallacy.

Yet in your case it does. Go figure.


Now, if you're going to continue to not address the OP, but rather stick to issues of your preference etc, then perhaps we should just leave this here.
Your choice, but I'll probably only bother to respond if you bother to address the actual issues.

 

[Syne]

If "all of this" becomes irrelevant by the omission referred to... consider it avoidance if you wish. I'll consider it not bothering with something that is made irrelevant.

Not irrelevant, just qualified by the same "possibly" you omitted. That merely makes the only compelling argument for relativism "possibly" self-serving. And that is still significant, since you have yet to offer any other compelling argument.

Yep, no support whatsoever. One wonders why you keep making arguments you are unable to support.

If one needed to support every bit of logic beyond detailing the logic (i.e. with a reputable reference), we'd be here forever with you. Lucky you don't troll the maths forums, otherwise you'd be asking for proofs every time someone wrote "1+1=2".
If you can't accept the explanation as given, have the decency to explain what you think is wrong with it.

So when pressed, you resort to ad hominem and appeal to ridicule instead of whatever support you seem to imagine should be readily available. Nothing more than evasion.

I have already provided credible reference that supports what I have said. You have not. Do your own legwork, and support your own assertion.

Not at all - you merely have a habit of using a general but not necessary trait as being an objective attribute of the philosophy - i.e. you are arguing against the general when the question at hand is that absolute. Until you stop doing that then discussion with you becomes futile.

No, tolerance just so happens to be the only prominent thing that distinguishes normative relativism from other normative ethics. The only thing futile about this discussion is the complete lack of any alternative distinction. Yes, not all meta-ethical relativist are normative relativists, but no M-E objectivists are normative relativists. So it is a useful generality by comparison.

No, conviction is the firmness with which a belief or opinion is held, so if it is more excusable to lie than to kill, it is a matter of conviction, i.e. less firmness of belief. That one thing may be less bad than another is only the reason for less conviction.

Then we differ by what we refer to as conviction: if one does not hold a particular view then it is not a matter of conviction but a matter of not holding the opinion.
If someone believes X, then do they lack conviction in not-X? Or do they simply not believe it?
If someone believes X is a matter of subjectivity, do they lack conviction in the absoluteness of X, or do they have conviction in the subjectivity of X.

Less firmness is not equivalent not holding a particular view. But yes, viewing something as subjective does display less conviction than viewing it as objective, which is the same reason science holds solely subjective views suspect.

You seem to be contradicting yourself. If "bad" varies and 'the strength of "bad" defines the conviction", then it follows that conviction varies.

I never said conviction didn't vary.

Then why did you say:

Thus by default all morals would be held with equal conviction.​

My argument is that to consider someone as being lax in their conviction one needs to understand what their morals are and the strength of the "bad" that they attribute to the act.
To be "lax" one would need to have the same level of "bad" and show that conviction is not as strong as someone else might have.
Otherwise you are just using "laxity of conviction" as another term for holding a different moral view. I.e. where we hold an act to be of similar "bad"ness, we hold the same conviction, as conviction is a measure of how "bad" we think a view is.

The fact that the person admits their view purely subjective, itself, indicates a lessor conviction, especially compared to a reportedly objective view. The subjective view always requires some qualification, which is always a weaker statement.

If you qualify your statement, you add some information, evidence, or phrase in order to make it less strong or less generalized - http://vlc.polyu.edu.hk/academicwriter/argument/qualifying.htm​

This indicates the person's own perception of the strength of their own moral statements. They can have all the conviction in the world that their morality is subjective, but that only weakens their whole morality.

There is nothing a priori about the fact that normative relativism holds tolerance to be prominent.

I never said it was. I said (if you actually follow the logic of the argument) that you holding that it is only normative to relativism is an a priori assumption. You made the claim. Please support it. I am not necessarily arguing that it is normative to objectivisim, but you wish to dismiss it as not being so, so please support that claim. You have not yet done so.

I never said "it is only normative to relativism". I said: "It is trivial that tolerance is less likely to be defined as a virtue in objectivism, since it figures prominently into relativism." Do I need to bold any qualifying phrases for you?

I have not denied that tolerance could be considered a virtue under objectivism.

Only you have made the claim that tolerance is equally prominent in objectivism, so that is your claim to support. I have already, repeatedly, supported my own.

You argued that because it was prominent in relativism it therefore isn't in objectivism: "It is trivial that tolerance is less likely to be defined as a virtue in objectivism, since it figures prominently into relativism. "
I have not said that it is equally prominent, only that it might be... but you have seemingly discounted that possibility, so please support that claim.

"Seemingly discounted" is not a positive claim. It is trivial that tolerance figures more prominently into relativism than objectivism, just by their definitions alone. I have shown the former and only presented a null hypothesis of the latter. If you wish to refute the null hypothesis, it is your burden (just as your null hypothesis about meta-ethical stance and trustworthiness is mine).

So again, do your own legwork.

Do your own legwork, as I am only asserting the null hypothesis that tolerance is not particularly prominent in objectivism. The refute is your burden to prove.

I'm not claiming that it is prominent, only that it may be - you are the one making the positive claim, even if that claim is "the absence of...".
If you wish to rely on that absence then it is your burden to prove.

"The absence of..." is the definition of a null hypothesis, which is the opposite of a positive claim. I also never said it was not prominent, only that it was less prominent than normative relativism, which is defined by tolerance.

IOW, I assert that tolerance has no special relation to objectivism, while relativism is definitely defined as having such a relation to tolerance.

How can you hypocritically place the burden on me where you assert a null hypothesis but then also place it on me when I do? Some intellectual honesty please.

It doesn't, which is my point: that this discussion is about absolutes - and you are discussing matters of "largely" - a point you are seemingly keen to stress, and by doing you stress how you clearly miss the point of the discussion.

Nonsense. If asked to judge someone on their meta-ethical stance alone, you only have the general position. Meta-ethics does not define specific absolutes. We are discussing meat-ethics, not how any one individual may or may not specifically acquire their particular morals. This sort of minutia is basically special pleading.

Well done. I know that. Fortunately your view does not define the absolute rather only your view. i.e. you saying that you do not trust a meta-ethical moral relativist does NOT answer whether such can be trusted, only whether you consider that you would - and your grounds on which you make that assessment are flawed, as I have previously argued (e.g. you make such a decision on grounds that are logically neutral in the matter).

The OP asked:

Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?​

You have answered no, that meta-ethical position alone is not enough to judge. I have answered no as well, because of the lack of conviction inherently expressed in such a view. We already agree. It is only in your assertion that an objectivist would be no different that we differ.

And to that I have said, if forced, I would trust an objectivist over a relativist. You keep trying to pretend that this somehow goes beyond the scope of the OP, but objectivism is never questioned by the OP, and I am just as free to broaden the discussion as you are. If you insist on questioning the trustworthiness of an objectivist, I am free to define the circumstances in which that meta-ethical stance alone would be a factor in forcing a choice.

And since these circumstances have a different outcome for a relativist, they do answer the OP. Far better than your leading question of whether someone would leave their child with any stranger for no reason at all.

And why is it you are here demanding a comparison when you have been so vehemently denying it?

I raise the comparison to highlight how one's meta-ethical philosophy is neutral to matters of trust. It might provide a preference, as you are so keen to point out, yet we are not talking preference but matters of absolutes... i.e. (again) not matters of "which do you prefer..." but matters of "is it possible to..." (ignoring the triviality of the gullible).

Again, the OP asked:

Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?​

"Is there any way" leaves open the question of circumstances. So no, there is no way, even given the extreme circumstance of being forced to leave your child and choose between the two, that the relativist can be trusted.

But to answer your question, with the same criteria used in the OP, yes, it is possible to trust an objectivist solely on their meta-ethical stance, if in the extreme circumstance of being forced to choose.

So leaving the option to abstain from a choice allows you skirt the issue entirely.

Not at all - it ensures that the issue is addressed: that meta-ethical philosophy alone is neutral to matters of trust, although can provide preference.
If you want to introduce and argue the false-dichotomy, at least be clear that you are no longer arguing the OP but your own strawman.

Again, the OP leaves open the circumstances ("any way"), allowing for the choice between the two. It is your leading question of leaving your child with a stranger for no reason that is no longer arguing the OP.

It is an objective measure of relative value, and as such one of the few deciding criteria available, especially to a moral relativist. Now if you insist on denying that then the moral relativist is left with nothing compelling other than self-interest.

But we're not interested in the objective measure of relative value, but in the supposed objective value - either it has objective value or it has relative value. "Objective measure of relative value" does not equate to objective value... unless you appeal to popularity as defining an objective value (i.e. the fallacy you seem so eager to commit)

Fine, I am more than happy to leave you with only self-interest as a compelling argument for relativism.

Now, if you're going to continue to not address the OP, but rather stick to issues of your preference etc, then perhaps we should just leave this here.
Your choice, but I'll probably only bother to respond if you bother to address the actual issues.

As fully explained above, I have been addressing the OP. Now if you are afraid of what a side-by-side comparison of the two may mean for relativism, you are free to beg off.

 

[Sarkus]

Syne, apologies for trying to cut-to-the-chase with this post, but if you feel it worth throwing these long posts back and forth then I'll happily revisit your last one in full and reply on a line-by-line basis, not that it would necessarily get us anywhere different.
But otherwise I hope we can distill to the core of this matter (and if you think I've missed something important - apologies):

The OP asked:

Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?​

You have answered no, that meta-ethical position alone is not enough to judge. I have answered no as well, because of the lack of conviction inherently expressed in such a view. We already agree. It is only in your assertion that an objectivist would be no different that we differ.

I have not answered no, I answered yes, it is possible to trust, but that one needs to go beyond the meta-ethical position - as we would whether the person is a relativist or an objectivist.
So we don't agree: you don't think moral relativists can be trusted under any circumstance - even under the "extreme" you created - that their meta-ethical position alone is sufficient to deem them untrustworthy; I do think they can be trusted - and that it is their actual morals that matter.

Again, the OP asked:

Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?​

"Is there any way" leaves open the question of circumstances. So no, there is no way, even given the extreme circumstance of being forced to leave your child and choose between the two, that the relativist can be trusted.

This "extreme" circumstance that you created is inherently biased to your view, and is certainly not indicative of all "extremes", but do you think it somehow supports the absolute position, that meta-ethical relativists can not be trusted?

Let me give you another "extreme" circumstance: you have known someone your entire life. You want to leave your child with them, to babysit for you. But in conversation beforehand you discover (for the first time) that they are a meta-ethical relativist.
Do you now find your friend untrustworthy? I'm not asking about degrees, about whether they become "less trustworthy", but do you now deem them untrustworthy?

But to answer your question, with the same criteria used in the OP, yes, it is possible to trust an objectivist solely on their meta-ethical stance, if in the extreme circumstance of being forced to choose.

I didn't ask "with the same criteria". I asked the specific question with a specific purpose in mind: to demonstrate that meta-ethical philosophy is not generally what we use (yes, there are some "extreme" cases when that may be all we have) to judge matters of trustworthiness. You insisting on answering a different question than asked is thus unhelpful.

Again, the OP leaves open the circumstances ("any way"), allowing for the choice between the two. It is your leading question of leaving your child with a stranger for no reason that is no longer arguing the OP.

If taken out of context, yes, but as part of the chain of reasoning to show that meta-ethical position is not what we use to deem matters of trust, and (once accepted) that this then leads to the logical conclusion that moral relativists can be trusted, it is highly pertinent to answering the OP.

 

[wellwisher]

Again, the OP leaves open the circumstances ("any way"), allowing for the choice between the two. It is your leading question of leaving your child with a stranger for no reason that is no longer arguing the OP.

Let us do the experiment, of leaving a child with a stranger, in two different moral settings. In the first setting, the people are moral using the code of Christian ethics. The other setting is based on moral relativists, making their own laws. Which setting would make you more comfortable if you had to leave your child with a stranger? In the first, there is a big closet with the perverts locked away. In the other, that closet door is open since behavior is now relative to how you manipulate public opinion.

Do get me wrong, a moral relativists can be a super person, but as a group the closet is open into the room making the stranger sort of a wild card. If you found a small bible belt town down south one could trust the people. If you went into a lawless inner city, I would be worried. Maybe a liberal would like to use their child in this experiment and see if you were trust strangers with relative morality.

 

[Magical Realist]

Let us do the experiment, of leaving a child with a stranger, in two different moral settings. In the first setting, the people are moral using the code of Christian ethics. The other setting is based on moral relativists, making their own laws.

Bible verses supporting the physical abuse of children:


Proverbs 13:24 - "He that spareth his rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes."

Proverbs 22:15 - "Foolishness [is] bound in the heart of a child; [but] the rod of correction shall drive it far from him."

Proverbs 19:18 - "Chasten thy son while there is hope, and let not thy soul spare for his crying."

Proverbs 29:15 - "The rod and reproof give wisdom: but a child left [to himself] bringeth his mother to shame."

Proverbs 23:13-14 - "Withhold not correction from the child: for [if] thou beatest him with the rod, he shall not die."

Based on this, I doubt I'd leave my child with a Bible believer.

 

[Syne]

Bible verses supporting the physical abuse of children:

Based on this, I doubt I'd leave my child with a Bible believer.

Are you saying you would expect your child to be ill-behaved? If not, what would you have to worry about?

If there is no bad behavior, there is not need for correction (whatever the means). And no, I am not unreservedly condoning corporal punishment.

 

[Syne]

Syne, apologies for trying to cut-to-the-chase with this post, but if you feel it worth throwing these long posts back and forth then I'll happily revisit your last one in full and reply on a line-by-line basis, not that it would necessarily get us anywhere different.
But otherwise I hope we can distill to the core of this matter (and if you think I've missed something important - apologies):

No problem, I will repeat any point I feel needs addressed.

I have not answered no, I answered yes, it is possible to trust, but that one needs to go beyond the meta-ethical position - as we would whether the person is a relativist or an objectivist.
So we don't agree: you don't think moral relativists can be trusted under any circumstance - even under the "extreme" you created - that their meta-ethical position alone is sufficient to deem them untrustworthy; I do think they can be trusted - and that it is their actual morals that matter.

No, the OP specifically limits the question to the meta-ethical position. So you cannot add qualifiers only to allow you to answer yes. This is what you argued when you complained about moving the goalposts:

If you want to move the goalposts to one of "lack of information is grounds for distrusting" then be my guest - but the issue in hand, per the OP, is whether a moral relativist can be trusted - not merely whether the lack of information that "I am a moral-relativist" supplies promotes or hinders trust - but whether the moral relativist - by dint of being such - is to be trusted or not.

It is intellectually dishonest to insist that no one else move the goalposts in their arguments while you freely do so. You have consistently been hypocritical. You say you can trust them with more information, but the second I try to allow for more information in my argument of not trusting them you immediately cry foul.

Make up your mind already. If you can use more information to answer the OP's question, then so can I. If you think that is moving the goalposts of the OP, then you cannot use more information to answer either.

Does any of this register?

This "extreme" circumstance that you created is inherently biased to your view, and is certainly not indicative of all "extremes", but do you think it somehow supports the absolute position, that meta-ethical relativists can not be trusted?

Let me give you another "extreme" circumstance: you have known someone your entire life. You want to leave your child with them, to babysit for you. But in conversation beforehand you discover (for the first time) that they are a meta-ethical relativist.
Do you now find your friend untrustworthy? I'm not asking about degrees, about whether they become "less trustworthy", but do you now deem them untrustworthy?

The scenario I introduced is only biased if you honestly think that relativism cannot be considered more, or even equally, trustworthy when directly compared with objectivism (on an even playing field). Why are you so worried about an honest, direct comparison...if you really think it is completely neutral? You seem to have answered you own question about whether this scenario supports a meta-ethical relativist not being trusted.

Your new circumstance once again moves the goalpost of the OP by introducing more information. So since it does not reflect the OP, I do not have to answer with an absolute. But having all of the experiential information about the person, I would already know their meta-ethical stance long before they admitted it. You would have to be incredibly thick to know someone your "entire life" and not put two and two together.

But yes, if I were incredibly thick, that new revelation would make them less trustworthy. It is somewhat comparable to finding out that an otherwise good person is addicted to drugs.

But to answer your question, with the same criteria used in the OP, yes, it is possible to trust an objectivist solely on their meta-ethical stance, if in the extreme circumstance of being forced to choose.

I didn't ask "with the same criteria". I asked the specific question with a specific purpose in mind: to demonstrate that meta-ethical philosophy is not generally what we use (yes, there are some "extreme" cases when that may be all we have) to judge matters of trustworthiness. You insisting on answering a different question than asked is thus unhelpful.

No, you did not ask with the same criteria, but you have complained about moving the goalposts. Do not blame me for trying to accommodate your own complaint. That is what an intellectually honest discussion is all about.

"Not generally what we use"? I thought you were just recently complaining about generalities.

...you are arguing against the general when the question at hand is that absolute.

Again, make up you mind. I am only trying to accommodate your complaint that we should stick to the OP. And doing so, you agree that, "yes, there are some "extreme" cases when that may be all we have", and this answers the absolute question.

Again, the OP leaves open the circumstances ("any way"), allowing for the choice between the two. It is your leading question of leaving your child with a stranger for no reason that is no longer arguing the OP.

If taken out of context, yes, but as part of the chain of reasoning to show that meta-ethical position is not what we use to deem matters of trust, and (once accepted) that this then leads to the logical conclusion that moral relativists can be trusted, it is highly pertinent to answering the OP.

No, it is you being hypocritical and intellectually dishonest in every regard you have stipulated in this discussion. Your "chain of reasoning" only seems to be an attempt to limit the discussion in your favor (as evident in your uneven application of the constrictions you try to enforce on others but not abide by yourself).

And even here, you are using a generality ("meta-ethical position is not what we use to deem matters of trust") as if it answers the question you have repeatedly insisted was an absolute. It is whether meta-ethical position can determine trust, not whether it must always determine trust. Remember, the OP asked "is there any way", and that logic must be applicable.


But there is a way a moral relativist can be trusted, but only if forced to choose and absolutely no means of determining meta-ethical position is allowed. But then it is luck of the draw as to whether you end up choosing the relativist over any available objectivist.

And I have already answered if more information is available, you just refused to accept it at the time.

 

[Sarkus]

No, the OP specifically limits the question to the meta-ethical position. So you cannot add qualifiers only to allow you to answer yes.

WTF? No it doesn't - as you highlighted yourself: "Is there any way...". So how is it adding qualifiers outside the scope of that question to say "Yes, there is a way in which I can trust a meta-ethical relativist..." etc?

This is what you argued when you complained about moving the goalposts:

It's simply not moving the goalposts, as it is not in any way moving the question away from what was originally asked, and it bears no resemblance to your instances of goalpost shifting.

It is intellectually dishonest to insist that no one else move the goalposts in their arguments while you freely do so.

I have not done so. Your claims in this regard are utterly without foundation.

You have consistently been hypocritical. You say you can trust them with more information, but the second I try to allow for more information in my argument of not trusting them you immediately cry foul.

At no point have you said it is possible to trust a meta-ethical relativist even with more information. You have gone on and on and on about how you would prefer to trust an objectivist if the information is just limited to that - but that was not a question I ever asked (I asked if you would trust someone just on that information alone, not whether you would prefer to trust, not that you seem to understand the difference), nor was it asked in the OP - it was merely you shifting the goalposts from questions that were asked.

Make up your mind already. If you can use more information to answer the OP's question, then so can I. If you think that is moving the goalposts of the OP, then you cannot use more information to answer either.

You answer to the OP doesn't need any additional info: you categorically find meta-ethical realists untrustworthy, and can not see any way (other than through gullibility) of how someone could trust such a person. At that point there is no need for further information, even if the OP does allow for it, which it does (as part of the "any way").
So what more information were you intending to use with which to answer the OP?
Or are you perhaps referring to the separate question that I asked you that specifically did limit the information - and did so as part of a chain of logic (with which to answer the OP and show why I consider meta-ethical positions to actually be neutral with regard trustworthiness) - to which you insisting on additional information IS shifting goalposts.
Understand?

The scenario I introduced is only biased if you honestly think that relativism cannot be considered more, or even equally, trustworthy when directly compared with objectivism (on an even playing field).

Not at all - it was a case of sample bias: selecting an "extreme" scenario that you knew would, from your perspective, help support your case.

Why are you so worried about an honest, direct comparison...if you really think it is completely neutral? You seem to have answered you own question about whether this scenario supports a meta-ethical relativist not being trusted.

I haven't answered it because it is irrelevant: it is simply not a matter of preference.
To humour you, and I have already commented in this vain: I find your reasoning irrational in that, on meta-ethical philosophy alone, you would trust an objectivist (which could be any objectivist moral code) rather than a relativist that you yourself have argued mostly gets their morals from the culture in which they live / brought up in.
But it is irrelevant with regard the OP - as neither the OP nor I asked questions of preference.

Your new circumstance once again moves the goalpost of the OP by introducing more information.

How is it "more information" when it is supplying an example of "any way"? You seem now to be grasping at straws.

So since it does not reflect the OP, I do not have to answer with an absolute.

It does reflect the OP: "Is there any way...?" Well, what if you discover that someone you have always trusted is actually a relativist, and you hadn't known up to that point?
It is perfectly in line with the OP.

But having all of the experiential information about the person, I would already know their meta-ethical stance long before they admitted it. You would have to be incredibly thick to know someone your "entire life" and not put two and two together.

Pathetic.

But yes, if I were incredibly thick, that new revelation would make them less trustworthy.

There you go again with matters of degrees, when such was not asked.
Answer the question: in such a scenario, however remote a chance you think it would be to arise: would you trust them or not? It's a yes or no answer: Yes if they remain trustworthy; No if by dint of that revelation they become untrustworthy.

No, you did not ask with the same criteria, but you have complained about moving the goalposts. Do not blame me for trying to accommodate your own complaint. That is what an intellectually honest discussion is all about.

I have not moved the goalposts: I have merely asked specific questions to take you through the rationale of how I deem the meta-ethical philosophy to be neutral.

"Not generally what we use"? I thought you were just recently complaining about generalities.

I was merely humouring you by accepting your contrivance of the "extreme" scenario when we had to choose between people on purely their meta-ethical philosophy.

Again, make up you mind. I am only trying to accommodate your complaint that we should stick to the OP. And doing so, you agree that, "yes, there are some "extreme" cases when that may be all we have", and this answers the absolute question.

Again, WTF??
How does acknowledging that there may be some "extreme" cases where the info is all we have in any way answer the absolute question "Can a moral relativist be trusted?" or "Is there any way a person can logically leave their child with another person and logically trust that person if he states that there are no objectively and intrinsically good or evil actions?"
It doesn't.
It merely acknowledges that there are some instances, contrived or otherwise, when that is all you have to go on.
Q: "Is there any way a relativist can be trusted?"
Your "answer": "Well, when the only info we have is their meta-ethical philosophy, I would trust an objectivist over a relativist."
If you can not see how this does not answer the question then just give up this discussion now.

No, it is you being hypocritical and intellectually dishonest in every regard you have stipulated in this discussion.

Yet more unwarranted accusations.

Your "chain of reasoning" only seems to be an attempt to limit the discussion in your favor (as evident in your uneven application of the constrictions you try to enforce on others but not abide by yourself).

So now when someone lays out their thinking this is to be deemed an attempt to limit the discussion in their favour??
I have not been uneven in application, I have merely enforced them (or at least tried to) where they are stipulated by the questions being asked. It is you who continually answers different questions than were asked. And you have the audacity to accuse me of intellectual dishonesty.

And even here, you are using a generality ("meta-ethical position is not what we use to deem matters of trust") as if it answers the question you have repeatedly insisted was an absolute. It is whether meta-ethical position can determine trust, not whether is must always determine trust.

Addressed above.

Remember, the OP asked "is there any way", and that logic must be applicable.

Yep - and you are arguing that there is no way a relativist can be trusted.

But there is a way a moral relativist can be trusted, but only if forced to choose and absolutely no means of determining meta-ethical position is allowed. But then it is luck of the draw as to whether you end up choosing the relativist over any available objectivist.

Oh, for Pete's sake!!
Stop answering questions that have not been asked, as if they somehow answer the questions that have been!!

And I have already answer if more information is available, you just refused to accept it at the time.

You answered that you wouldn't trust a relativist, that you do not think that they can be trusted, and your example above gives the only way as being outside the scope of the OP - yet you only a short moment ago answered that your friend, if you found out at a later time that they were a relativist, "that new revelation would make them less trustworthy". Note: not untrustworthy but "less trustworthy".
So you would not trust a relativist... except when you trust them?

However, after trying to distil the discussion to the key points (or at least what I think are), your contradictory thinking is clearly apparent, and with your apparent inability to follow an argument, your unwarranted accusations, and your continuing habit of answering questions that weren't asked in lieu of those that were, this will be my last post on the matter with you until you have something different to offer in these regards.

But heck, you don't trust me any way.

 

[iceaura]

I don't trust anyone whose morality consists of reasoning from abstract principles - relativist or absolutist.

If somebody knocks on my door, and I know the only reason he didn't kill me yesterday is that his sacred book told him not to, I'm not opening that door.

 

[Syne]

Sarkus, as much as you seem to believe otherwise, there are no attainable absolutes in reality. That belief is a false dilemma. So any argument claiming that trust is a solely all or nothing proposition is moot. The only sort of "trust" that may feign at absolute is that of the gullible, which is not an informed, critical trust (mentioned in the OP as "a logical and rational way to trust"). So you can dispense with this argument against more or less trustworthy altogether.

I am not obliged to play along with any chain of reasoning you feel necessary to revealing your rationale. If you cannot make your argument without playing games, then your argument is not strong enough to stand on its own merit. You have insisted on sticking to the OP, and you have even admitted your question does not (adding limitations). I thought you were arguing moving the goalposts of the OP, which was a reasonable argument. But since you now say that the only goalpost moved was the one you had already moved (adding limitations not in the OP), your whole criticism of moving the goalpost is moot. You were the first to move the goalpost, and a hypocrite for accusing anyone else of doing so.

You have asked if I would trust a stranger, claiming to be a Christian, with my child, and I have told you under what circumstances I would. I have also answered the OP, with or without further information and with a full rationale either way.

 

[Syne]

Deleted

 

[wynn]

I don't trust anyone whose morality consists of reasoning from abstract principles - relativist or absolutist.

Then what kind pf people do you trust?

 

[Sarkus]

Ah, just more of the same from you, then, Syne?
Nonetheless I have a few moments to spare.

Sarkus, as much as you seem to believe otherwise, there are no attainable absolutes in reality. That belief is a false dilemma. So any argument claiming that trust is a solely all or nothing proposition is moot. The only sort of "trust" that may feign at absolute is that of the gullible, which is not an informed, critical trust (mentioned in the OP as "a logical and rational way to trust"). So you can dispense with this argument against more or less trustworthy altogether.

Either you trust someone or you don't, whether it is absolute trust (I never mentioned it being all or nothing, that is merely your strawman) or not. Your appeal to a qualification of the level of trust is thus noted yet is ultimately irrelevant, yet you still can't bring yourself to admit that you could actually trust a relativist.

I am not obliged to play along with any chain of reasoning you feel necessary to revealing your rationale. If you cannot make your argument without playing games, then your argument is not strong enough to stand on its own merit.

So now a chain of reasoning is playing games? And I know you are not obliged to follow a line of reasoning, but it is rather telling that you seem to refuse to want to follow one that goes against your position.
And don't confuse the strength or otherwise of an argument with your inability to understand it: that is nothing but ego on your part, the same ego that prevents you from actually admitting that yes, you could trust a relativist - not as quickly or as easily as an objectivist, but that you would/could still trust one.

You have insisted on sticking to the OP, and you have even admitted your question does not (adding limitations).

I have not admitted that it does not stick to the OP. I have admitted that if you take it out of context, as you did, then it could be seen that way, but as part of the reasoning (which you think is merely playing games) it is wholly sticking to the OP. So please stop taking things out of context.

I thought you were arguing moving the goalposts of the OP, which was a reasonable argument. But since you now say that the only goalpost moved was the one you had already moved (adding limitations not in the OP), your whole criticism of moving the goalpost is moot. You were the first to move the goalpost, and a hypocrite for accusing anyone else of doing so.

And since I have not moved the goalposts, but merely asked additional questions to help you understand the rationale behind my answer to the OP, your objection is noted but found once again to be baseless other than through taking things deliberately out of context, as you seem to want to do.

You have asked if I would trust a stranger, claiming to be a Christian, with my child, and I have told you under what circumstances I would.

But you didn't answer the question in that manner: you merely gave an example of circumstances where you would, but did not explicitly give an answer to the question I asked with the circumstances I gave. You skirted and evaded the question.
Had you said: "The only time I would is under these conditions:..." then we could have moved on.
But you didn't, instead answering along the lines of "I would prefer to trust them over a relativist..." or some such, which did not answer the question.

I have also answered the OP, with or without further information and with a full rationale either way.

Yes, you have been quite clear in your answer to the OP: "...there is no way... that the relativist can be trusted." Or was it "...that new revelation would make them less trustworthy"?
Yes, very clear.

Let's hope none of your relativist friends read this thread, lest they realise you'll discard their friendship and no longer deem them trustworthy. Ah, no, that's right, you only surround yourself with objectivists.

 

[Magical Realist]

Are you saying you would expect your child to be ill-behaved? If not, what would you have to worry about?

If there is no bad behavior, there is not need for correction (whatever the means). And no, I am not unreservedly condoning corporal punishment.

Since noone can guarantee whether their child is going to behave or misbehave, which is why we hire babysitters to begin with, it behooves the parents to avoid bible believers altogether if they don't want to risk their child being physically abused. Just common sense...

And note, the standard for what is a misbehaving child is alot different for christians than it is for the average loving parent:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTiBv99MYDk

 

[Syne]

Are you saying you would expect your child to be ill-behaved? If not, what would you have to worry about?

If there is no bad behavior, there is not need for correction (whatever the means). And no, I am not unreservedly condoning corporal punishment.

Since noone can guarantee whether their child is going to behave or misbehave, which is why we hire babysitters to begin with,

That is a very pessimistic view of one's own child, as a babysitter is primarily there as a safeguard against things that can occur in the parent's presence, like choking, fire, or other unforeseeable accidents. But with that view, I can completely understand why you would not expect your child to behave. After all, people do not tend to teach what they do not expect can be learned.

And note, the standard for what is a misbehaving child is alot different for christians than it is for the average loving parent:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTiBv99MYDk

Hasty generalization. Would you also say that Mao or Pol Pot are equally representative of all atheists? I seriously doubt you would, else you would be ceding any argument about morality. So maybe it would be wise to avoid that fallacy altogether.