Can a moral relativist be trusted?

[Sarkus]

"So when you have your period, do you use tampons or pads?"

Would you think this the kind of question that is to be answered with a simple answer, such as "Tampons," "Pads," "Both," or "Neither" -?
Or would you find it pertinent to explain that as a male, you don't menstruate and thus the question doesn't actually apply to you to begin with?

So you can't answer whether you think a moral relativist can be trusted?

Put it this way, is there any scenario in which someone such as myself could ever be deemed trustworthy in your eyes?

The idea that something can be considered relevant or irrelevant in and of itself, regardless of people considering it relevant or irrelevant, is nonsensical.

Things can be considered irrelevant if it can be shown that they do not in fact impact the outcome.
If process A-B-C always leads to the same result whatever you use for B (from among the valid options) then B can be considered irrelevant.
People may think that Their choice of B has an impact, and needs to be considered relevant. But this is not always the case.

Unless, of course, you in fact argue for some kind of absolutism/objectivism in which people are completely irrelevant and ideas have inherent value in and of themselves.

Hmmm. It's an interesting thought that I haven't considered before.
People would always be relevant in so much as they provide value-judgements, but one can always work with the absolute positions.
The question then would be applicability of any conclusion to the real world.
Anyhoo - don't want to be accused by myself of shifting goalposts!

 

[Trooper]

Steven Pinker Redefines Moral Relativism

Who was Norman Borlaug?

A scientist who did more than anyone else in the 20th century to teach the world to feed itself and whose work was credited with saving hundreds of millions of lives.

"The Man Who Saved A Billion Lives"

 

[Syne]

No, a moral objectivist does not tolerate things they view as immoral.

You'd be surprised what people are willing to tolerate. I'm not talking acceptance, or understanding, but mere tolerance.
Give this a try: "Frontiers of Diversity: Explorations in Contemporary Pluralism", a collection of papers, and most significantly " A Defense of Tolerance as a Moral Virtue" by Ronald Sandler and Cynthia Townley.

tol·er·ate
1. allow the existence, occurrence, or practice of (something that one does not necessarily like or agree with) without interference.​

Usually the objectivist's specific morality limits the actions that can be taken against an immoral action (unlawful vigilantism, committing immoral actions themselves, etc.). If an objectivist can interfere in accordance with their morality, they will (mediated by severity of the immoral action and often whether it is perpetrated against the in-group or not).

And no, after reading what I could access of that convoluted mess of self-justification, I definitely have no intention to pay for more. And a digression into the virtue of tolerance is way beyond the scope of the OP (which you seem to want to stick to).

So what makes one circumstance or society any more compelling than another? Just that they are born into one rather than another? How can luck of the draw make yours any better? Random luck is not compelling.

Define "better". And better for who? Judged by who?

If you claim that the moral relativist has a strong conviction, then these definitions should be readily apparent. Oh wait, under your meta-ethical view, there is no adjudicating between differing moralities. So you are forced to admit that your specific morality is no better or more compelling than any other.

Where is the conviction again?

There is no confusion: if cases where the inference is logically sound, the implication must be there.

Educate yourself already.

IMPLY = to put the suggestion into the message (sender implies)

INFER = to take the suggestion out of the message (receiver infers)
- http://grammartips.homestead.com/imply.html​

Your inference cannot cause an implication that was not intended. That you find your own inference sound is no surprise, as you are predisposed to do so. This is called confirmation bias.

"A moral relativist CAN defend their moral position", but only as the ultimately random chance of which culture/circumstances they find themselves in. Whatever subjective rationale they may utilize would differ under different circumstance/culture.

Yes, because each culture / society places different values on different things. One can defend ones position by stating the value that one places in such things. It would then be up to the person making any judgement (of one persons morals against another) to assess against the value that they place in such things.

Which would rule out? The relativist's conviction to their morals or their conviction to tolerance? And if tolerance is their moral conviction, why would anyone expect them to stand against any differing morality?

Why do you think atheists are so often criticized for being moral relativists? Could it be that the majority of moral absolutists in the world view that stance as untrustworthy?

You'd have to ask them. It could merely be jealousy. But heck, appeal to popularity if you want.

Ah, but if all moralities are equally valid, majority would be the only objective adjudicator.

That was only an example, but generally, absolutists are more likely to have morals that differ from their culture, while relativists claim theirs derive primarily from their culture.

That may be true in an increasingly secular society, but not across history, nor in religious societies.

Religious societies are actually more prone to include heretical objective moralities. Repression breeds resistance.

You asked how I would do so without asking any specific moral questions... And now you criticise me for avoiding questions that may expose their specific morality?
And I did not say I would trust them on those things alone.
But, as I have asked before, and perhaps you'll get the point of the question now, are you saying you would trust someone just because they said they were Christian? "Remember, most psychopaths seem completely normal in such respects."

You said: "What you exampled is nothing to do with one's meta-ethical philosophy but with ones actual morals!" Am I to take it that you did not mean that you would expressly exclude questions of "actual morals"?

I already answered your question about someone's claim to be a Christian. http://www.sciforums.com/showthread...t-be-trusted&p=3124788&viewfull=1#post3124788

Yep, ask me how I would do something without X and then say that you would do X. Nice way to discuss things.

You are the one who originally seemed to want to constrain yourself to "do something without X". I have no reason to constrain myself similarly.

Absolutism is not a meta-ethical stance at all. Moral absolutism is normative ethics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism). Moral universalism (objectivism) is the meta-ethical stance of an absolutist. Since you insist on a purely meta-ethical discussion, you should have no objection to sticking strictly to objectivism. Unless you are moving your own goalpost.

No, I'm happy with the distinction, although other sources than wiki suggest absolutism is indeed both a meta-ethical position and normative ethics. For example: www.philosophy-index.com/ethics/meta-ethics/absolutism.php. And www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/absolutism.

Your first link mostly talks about normative ethics, i.e. a "moral system". And in your second link, objectivism links to Ayn Rand instead of the meta-ethical position it is referencing.

Which sounds more reliable?

I don't think you can answer based on the issue of their meta-ethical position. ...So asking whether a moral relativist can be trusted is like asking if anyone can be trusted without judging their actual morals.

Given enough time in a new culture, would a relativist be any more likely to be swayed to the morality of that culture? After all, there seems to be nothing but societal pressure which formed their morality in the first place. A new, sustained peer pressure is highly likely to rule out over merely a past peer pressure.

 

[Syne]

Steven Pinker Redefines Moral Relativism

What a joke. The example he gives, of mating IV connectors, is just as liable to human error as an error in medication. Someone has to attach the right IV to the patient. So somewhere there still needs to be consequences for inattention, i.e. a "moral solution".

 

[wynn]

So you can't answer whether you think a moral relativist can be trusted?

Wait.

You've been arguing from and took offense due to what is basically a strawman all along!

It's trivially true that different people and different cultures have different views of morality. Descriptive moral relativism is trivial.

All along, while you were talking about moral relativism, you meant merely descriptive moral relativism - which nobody disagreed with or questioned anyway.

I was questioning meta-ethical moral relativism and normative moral relativism, describing what I took issue with, while you read my posts as if I would be talking about descriptive moral relativism.


This explains a lot!

 

[Sarkus]

Wait.

For what?
Are you unable to answer the question?
And no, I'm not talking about mere moral relativism.
Do you think you can trust someone who has a meta-ethical philosophy of relativism?

I was questioning meta-ethical moral relativism and normative moral relativism, describing what I took issue with, while you read my posts as if I would be talking about descriptive moral relativism.

I read your posts as being against the meta-ethical position.
But if you wish to dismiss things in such a manner, your choice.

 

[Sarkus]

And no, after reading what I could access of that convoluted mess of self-justification, I definitely have no intention to pay for more. And a digression into the virtue of tolerance is way beyond the scope of the OP (which you seem to want to stick to).

The point of it is that the moral relativist is not necessarily any more or less tolerant than an objectivist.

If you claim that the moral relativist has a strong conviction, then these definitions should be readily apparent.

And if you want to use such terms then you should be prepared to define them, lest confusion arises from misunderstanding.

Oh wait, under your meta-ethical view, there is no adjudicating between differing moralities. So you are forced to admit that your specific morality is no better or more compelling than any other.

There is adjudicating: by oneself, with regard what one knows, has experienced. There is merely no objective morality.

Where is the conviction again?

Each will have their own level of conviction for their own morals.

Your inference cannot cause an implication that was not intended. That you find your own inference sound is no surprise, as you are predisposed to do so. This is called confirmation bias.

My inference did not cause your implication.
It is simple logic that if an inference is validly taken from a statement without recourse to additional assumptions then the implication must also exist, intended or not.
I have previously shown the former, therefore the latter holds.
Deal with it and move on.

Which would rule out? The relativist's conviction to their morals or their conviction to tolerance? And if tolerance is their moral conviction, why would anyone expect them to stand against any differing morality?

"If". Not all relativists have tolerance as a moral virtue.

Ah, but if all moralities are equally valid, majority would be the only objective adjudicator.

That's the way appeals to authority generally work, yes.
Why need there be any objective adjudicator?

Religious societies are actually more prone to include heretical objective moralities. Repression breeds resistance.

Among relativists and objectivists alike. It is a matter of conviction and tolerance as to whether one acts upon it. And these are subjective.

You said: "What you exampled is nothing to do with one's meta-ethical philosophy but with ones actual morals!" Am I to take it that you did not mean that you would expressly exclude questions of "actual morals"?

Meta-ethical philosophy I consider to be irrelevant/neutral in such matters. It is the actual morals one holds that are important, irrespective of whether how you come by those morals or whether you hold them to be relative or objective. So why would I exclude such questions that probe specific morals? So yes, I did not mean what you somehow thought I meant.

I already answered your question about someone's claim to be a Christian. http://www.sciforums.com/showthread...t-be-trusted&p=3124788&viewfull=1#post3124788

So I take that as a no, you would not trust someone just on them telling you, but you would incorporate other information (actions, corroboration etc) into account.
So given that you think moral relativists can not be trusted (or that is at least the position you have taken here) why would you not do the same with them? Why would you judge them, as a category to be untrustworthy, such that you do so by dint just of them being so?

You are the one who originally seemed to want to constrain yourself to "do something without X". I have no reason to constrain myself similarly.

If you ask me how I would do something without doing X, and then I tell you and ask you how you would do it, do you not see the nonsense of saying that you would do X, when the question in hand is with regard doing it without X?
Is there any purpose here, or are you just not going to admit you made an error?

Your first link mostly talks about normative ethics, i.e. a "moral system". And in your second link, objectivism links to Ayn Rand instead of the meta-ethical position it is referencing.

I accept they're not necessarily the best references, and as said will happily go with the distinction you offered.

Given enough time in a new culture, would a relativist be any more likely to be swayed to the morality of that culture? After all, there seems to be nothing but societal pressure which formed their morality in the first place. A new, sustained peer pressure is highly likely to rule out over merely a past peer pressure.

It would seem intuitive to suggest "more likely", but only possibly in as much it is "more likely" to be able to move a mountain with a spoon than with a paper cup. (That said there are studies that show that direct brain stimulation in certain areas can alter our moral compass).
My view is that morals form at a very early age and are so embedded as to be rather difficult to actually change for anyone.
What is more likely is that peer pressure causes us to act what we consider immorally, but that guilt will follow, rather than causing us to change our actual morals.
And peer pressure may result in us becoming more tolerant, again rather than changing morals.
So while it may intuitively seem "more likely" I would have to go with "I don't know".

What I see no evidence for is the apparent pervading view that a relativist has supremely flexible morals, that a slight change in the wind direction could cause them to go against what they held to be moral only moments before,and thus can't be trusted.
Yes, exaggerated, I know, but I think it paints the appropriate picture.

 

[Yazata]

People need to remember that moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory. It isn't some algorithm for individuals to use in making their own moral judgements. Instead, it seeks to provide an explanation for what's happening when anyone, any human being, makes moral judgements. It's just as applicable to self-styled moral absolutists as to everyone else.

Part of the problem in this thread is that people are trying to imagine moral relativism as if it was somebody's first-order moral system. They are imagining the moral relativist as thinking, 'Murder is wrong for me, but it might be ok for you'. In other words, people might be imagining moral relativism as preventing the moral relativist from making general moral judgements.

That's not really what moral relativism is about and it isn't how it works. Every human being, whether they are meta-ethical moral relativists or not, makes general moral judgments. When somebody says 'murder is wrong', he/she means that 'everyone out there shouldn't commit murder'. Moral judgements are general and prescriptive by their nature. That's part of what makes moral judgements different from simple expressions of taste.

I think that initially, everyone pretty much goes with their gut on moral matters. They react to situations by thinking 'That's just wrong!' Or alternatively, 'That's great!' The first is something that they feel everyone shouldn't do, the second is something that they feel everyone should. People don't typically have lots of reasons when they make moral judgements and their judgements aren't the result of a great deal of preliminary cogitation.

The reasoning processes and the need for decision algorithms appear in puzzling problem cases, in cases of moral disagreement, and when people are challenged to justify their moral intuitions. That's where we see people appealing to moral theories, such as supposedly objective divinely revealed commands or utilitarian calculations of the benefits and harm that an act might cause. People will thrash around in search of some theory, revelation or algorithm that enables people to make moral judgements and to justify their moral judgements to others after the fact.

This is when meta-ethics makes its appearance on the scene. It isn't trying to determine what's right and wrong. These are more abstract kinds of theory that attempt to explain how people come by the principles and first-order theories that they appeal to in determining what's right and wrong.

The moral relativists will argue that unless people make up all of their moral principles for themselves, which the relativist thinks rarely if ever happens and might be psychopathic if it did, people are acquiring their gut instincts and their justificatory principles from whatever culture has most influenced them. That's typically going to be their surrounding culture, but in the case of immigrants it may be their natal culture, which leads to problems such as Muslims experience in Europe, when those two are significantly different.

Religious moral absolutists might stoutly insist that they are following God's Revealed Law. There's nothing remotely relativist about that. It's the antithesis of relativism. Good and evil, right and wrong, are objective and come straight from God himself. That's something solid and tangible to grasp onto in an increasingly diverse and heterogeneous world where the old certainties seem to be dissolving into mush.

The moral relativist will simply point out that the contents of God's revealed moral law, the nature of how it supposedly came to be known, and even the existence of the God that supposedly revealed it, are themselves relative to a particular religious tradition that perceives its own principles with the eyes of its own faith. That's why the moral relativism theorist argues that divine command ethics easily reduces to religious relativism. And since religion is an aspect of broader culture, to just another instance of cultural relativism.

 

[Magical Realist]

People need to remember that moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory. It isn't some algorithm for individuals to use in making their own moral judgements. Instead, it seeks to provide an explanation for what's happening when anyone, any human being, makes moral judgements. It's just as applicable to self-styled moral absolutists as to everyone else.

Part of the problem in this thread is that people are trying to imagine moral relativism as if it was somebody's first-order moral system. They are imagining the moral relativist as thinking, 'Murder is wrong for me, but it might be ok for you'. In other words, people might be imagining moral relativism as preventing the moral relativist from making general moral judgements.

That's not really what moral relativism is about and it isn't how it works. Every human being, whether they are meta-ethical moral relativists or not, makes general moral judgments. When somebody says 'murder is wrong', he/she means that 'everyone out there shouldn't commit murder'. Moral judgements are general and prescriptive by their nature. That's part of what makes moral judgements different from simple expressions of taste.

I think that initially, everyone pretty much goes with their gut on moral matters. They react to situations by thinking 'That's just wrong!' Or alternatively, 'That's great!' The first is something that they feel everyone shouldn't do, the second is something that they feel everyone should. People don't typically have lots of reasons when they make moral judgements and their judgements aren't the result of a great deal of preliminary cogitation.

The reasoning processes and the need for decision algorithms appear in puzzling problem cases, in cases of moral disagreement, and when people are challenged to justify their moral intuitions. That's where we see people appealing to moral theories, such as supposedly objective divinely revealed commands or utilitarian calculations of the benefits and harm that an act might cause. People will thrash around in search of some theory, revelation or algorithm that enables people to make moral judgements and to justify their moral judgements to others after the fact.

This is when meta-ethics makes its appearance on the scene. It isn't trying to determine what's right and wrong. These are more abstract kinds of theory that attempt to explain how people come by the principles and first-order theories that they appeal to in determining what's right and wrong.

The moral relativists will argue that unless people make up all of their moral principles for themselves, which the relativist thinks rarely if ever happens and might be psychopathic if it did, people are acquiring their gut instincts and their justificatory principles from whatever culture has most influenced them. That's typically going to be their surrounding culture, but in the case of immigrants it may be their natal culture, which leads to problems such as Muslims experience in Europe, when those two are significantly different.

Religious moral absolutists might stoutly insist that they are following God's Revealed Law. There's nothing remotely relativist about that. It's the antithesis of relativism. Good and evil, right and wrong, are objective and come straight from God himself. That's something solid and tangible to grasp onto in an increasingly diverse and heterogeneous world where the old certainties seem to be dissolving into mush.

The moral relativist will simply point out that the contents of God's revealed moral law, the nature of how it supposedly came to be known, and even the existence of the God that supposedly revealed it, are themselves relative to a particular religious tradition that perceives its own principles with the eyes of its own faith. That's why the moral relativism theorist argues that divine command ethics easily reduces to religious relativism. And since religion is an aspect of broader culture, to just another instance of cultural relativism.

Excellent distinctions Yazata! Everyone here needs to read this.

 

[Syne]

So what makes one circumstance or society any more compelling than another? Just that they are born into one rather than another? How can luck of the draw make yours any better? Random luck is not compelling.

Define "better". And better for who? Judged by who?

If you claim that the moral relativist has a strong conviction, then these definitions should be readily apparent.

And if you want to use such terms then you should be prepared to define them, lest confusion arises from misunderstanding.

Well since I was asking you, it is safe to assume "better" for you, as judged by you. Stand up for the basis of your own convictions and tell me why it is any more compelling than any other. Asking me to define simple words that any dictionary is suitable for seems like an evasion.

Oh wait, under your meta-ethical view, there is no adjudicating between differing moralities. So you are forced to admit that your specific morality is no better or more compelling than any other.

There is adjudicating: by oneself, with regard what one knows, has experienced. There is merely no objective morality.

Again, what is compelling about that argument?

My inference did not cause your implication.
It is simple logic that if an inference is validly taken from a statement without recourse to additional assumptions then the implication must also exist, intended or not.
I have previously shown the former, therefore the latter holds.

Damn, even when I give you the definitions you cannot manage to get them straight. Oh well.

Which would rule out? The relativist's conviction to their morals or their conviction to tolerance? And if tolerance is their moral conviction, why would anyone expect them to stand against any differing morality?

"If". Not all relativists have tolerance as a moral virtue.

Ah, but if all moralities are equally valid, majority would be the only objective adjudicator.

That's the way appeals to authority generally work, yes.
Why need there be any objective adjudicator?

Dispute resolution. Eventually disputes on moral issues come to a head, and some means of adjudication is necessary. Or is this where the tolerance, that "not all relativists have", comes into play? And if so, then you can answer my earlier question you avoided: Which would rule out?

Religious societies are actually more prone to include heretical objective moralities. Repression breeds resistance.

Among relativists and objectivists alike. It is a matter of conviction and tolerance as to whether one acts upon it. And these are subjective.

While there is plenty of reason to assume an objective morality that would differ from the culture (not being directly derived from the culture), why would you assume the same of a relativist morality (which is derived from the culture)?

So I take that as a no, you would not trust someone just on them telling you, but you would incorporate other information (actions, corroboration etc) into account.
So given that you think moral relativists can not be trusted (or that is at least the position you have taken here) why would you not do the same with them? Why would you judge them, as a category to be untrustworthy, such that you do so by dint just of them being so?

If I had no opportunity to gain further information, then yes, I would prefer someone who claims to be a Christian (or even just a moral objectivist) over a moral relativist. Just on the meta-ethical stances alone, the latter supposes that there is no objective right or wrong. That alone is inherently untrustworthy, especially without further information.

You only seem to be able to defend it by an appeal to specific morality, which you claim cannot be appealed to in a discussion of meta-ethics.

Given enough time in a new culture, would a relativist be any more likely to be swayed to the morality of that culture? After all, there seems to be nothing but societal pressure which formed their morality in the first place. A new, sustained peer pressure is highly likely to rule out over merely a past peer pressure.

It would seem intuitive to suggest "more likely", but only possibly in as much it is "more likely" to be able to move a mountain with a spoon than with a paper cup.

So while it may intuitively seem "more likely" I would have to go with "I don't know".

More likely is more likely, regardless the degree. And when judging trustworthiness, especially with a lack of further information, intuition is dominant. "I don't know" is not a compelling argument.

What I see no evidence for is the apparent pervading view that a relativist has supremely flexible morals, that a slight change in the wind direction could cause them to go against what they held to be moral only moments before,and thus can't be trusted.
Yes, exaggerated, I know, but I think it paints the appropriate picture.

Ah, but it is the pervading view, and does answer the OP by being so.

(That said there are studies that show that direct brain stimulation in certain areas can alter our moral compass).

Actually, these studies show that morality is made more objective when the brain is stimulated. The outcome is judge solely on its own, since the individual's ability to understand motive is disrupted.

 

[Syne]

People need to remember that moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory. It isn't some algorithm for individuals to use in making their own moral judgements. Instead, it seeks to provide an explanation for what's happening when anyone, any human being, makes moral judgements. It's just as applicable to self-styled moral absolutists as to everyone else.

No. What you are talking about here is descriptive moral relativism, which is nothing more than the observation that moral differences do exist (and an absolutist usually agrees with).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Descriptive

While meta-ethical moral relativists are de facto descriptive relativists, they go one step further, by asserting that there is no possible standard of right and wrong.

Part of the problem in this thread is that people are trying to imagine moral relativism as if it was somebody's first-order moral system. They are imagining the moral relativist as thinking, 'Murder is wrong for me, but it might be ok for you'. In other words, people might be imagining moral relativism as preventing the moral relativist from making general moral judgements.

That's not really what moral relativism is about and it isn't how it works. Every human being, whether they are meta-ethical moral relativists or not, makes general moral judgments. When somebody says 'murder is wrong', he/she means that 'everyone out there shouldn't commit murder'. Moral judgements are general and prescriptive by their nature. That's part of what makes moral judgements different from simple expressions of taste.

Here you are talking about normative ethics, i.e. prescriptive, not meta-ethics. You cannot deny that one's meta-ethical stance will effect one's normative stance. After all, meta-ethical relativism contradicts normative absolutism or universalism. IOW, meta-ethics establishes a class of possible normative ethics.

I think that initially, everyone pretty much goes with their gut on moral matters. They react to situations by thinking 'That's just wrong!' Or alternatively, 'That's great!' The first is something that they feel everyone shouldn't do, the second is something that they feel everyone should. People don't typically have lots of reasons when they make moral judgements and their judgements aren't the result of a great deal of preliminary cogitation.

Certainly not when they are primarily derived from their culture.

This is when meta-ethics makes its appearance on the scene. It isn't trying to determine what's right and wrong. These are more abstract kinds of theory that attempt to explain how people come by the principles and first-order theories that they appeal to in determining what's right and wrong.

Exactly. You cannot divorce the meta-ethical stance from the normative ethics.

The moral relativist will simply point out that the contents of God's revealed moral law, the nature of how it supposedly came to be known, and even the existence of the God that supposedly revealed it, are themselves relative to a particular religious tradition that perceives its own principles with the eyes of its own faith. That's why the moral relativism theorist argues that divine command ethics easily reduces to religious relativism. And since religion is an aspect of broader culture, to just another instance of cultural relativism.

I hope you do not think that all moral objectivists appeal to a god for their normative morals. Moral realism, for example. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

 

[wynn]

Ah, the fence-sitter

Oh please. If that is "fence-sitting" -- well, then getting a lobotomy is the best one can do in life!

 

[wynn]

People need to remember that moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory. It isn't some algorithm for individuals to use in making their own moral judgements.

How is it not??!

Instead, it seeks to provide an explanation for what's happening when anyone, any human being, makes moral judgements. It's just as applicable to self-styled moral absolutists as to everyone else.

Oh. So it is like the miriad of other hypotheses, just a hypothesis which we can go without happily?

Part of the problem in this thread is that people are trying to imagine moral relativism as if it was somebody's first-order moral system.

Because it is. You're simply conveniently backtracking to mere descriptive moral relativism - which nobody argued against anyway.

They are imagining the moral relativist as thinking, 'Murder is wrong for me, but it might be ok for you'.

Because when applied, this is what meta-ethical moral relativism comes down to.

That's not really what moral relativism is about and it isn't how it works. Every human being, whether they are meta-ethical moral relativists or not, makes general moral judgments. When somebody says 'murder is wrong', he/she means that 'everyone out there shouldn't commit murder'. Moral judgements are general and prescriptive by their nature. That's part of what makes moral judgements different from simple expressions of taste.

Of course.

People don't typically have lots of reasons when they make moral judgements and their judgements aren't the result of a great deal of preliminary cogitation.

Indeed, this is probably the case.
But to condone such an approach to morality, is to condone absolving people from responsibility for the moral judgments they make. Which may in fact be necessary in a multicultural society for a minimum (although temporary) level of social stability.

To go with the Emersonian "involuntary perceptions a perfect faith is due" - where does that get us? Romantic psychopathy in the name of respecting individualism and social variety?

 

[Sarkus]

Again, what is compelling about that argument?

The very idea of deciding for oneself is rather compelling to me.

Damn, even when I give you the definitions you cannot manage to get them straight. Oh well.

Damn, even when you give the definitions you cannot manage to see how they are logically linked. Oh well.

Dispute resolution. Eventually disputes on moral issues come to a head, and some means of adjudication is necessary.

Dispute resolution uses the morals of the adjudicator, not the morals of the disputing parties. And I would question the use of the term objective (given the discussion) but rather independent.
And the adjudicator could have any morals, any meta-ethical philosophy at all.
So dispute resolution is yet another neutral argument.

Or is this where the tolerance, that "not all relativists have", comes into play? And if so, then you can answer my earlier question you avoided: Which would rule out?

Tolerance is agin equally applicable to all camps.
Are you suggesting that moral objectivists can not be just as tolerant?

While there is plenty of reason to assume an objective morality that would differ from the culture (not being directly derived from the culture), why would you assume the same of a relativist morality (which is derived from the culture)?

A relativist morality can be derived from any thing, not just culture. It is not a case of "morality by popularity". And for that part of the mix that is one's culture, it clearly depends on how quickly the society is changing.

If I had no opportunity to gain further information, then yes, I would prefer someone who claims to be a Christian (or even just a moral objectivist) over a moral relativist. Just on the meta-ethical stances alone, the latter supposes that there is no objective right or wrong. That alone is inherently untrustworthy, especially without further information.

I didn't ask who you would prefer, just whether you would trust them, on that one thing alone. Would you?

You only seem to be able to defend it by an appeal to specific morality, which you claim cannot be appealed to in a discussion of meta-ethics.

Where on earth have I said that one can not appeal to specific morality???
My point has been, from the start, that it is one's specific morality that matters and NOT one's meta-ethical philosophy, which is would consider neutral in questions of trust.
I.e. It is possible to trust someone who is a moral relativist, just as it is possible to trust an objectivist.

More likely is more likely, regardless the degree. And when judging trustworthiness, especially with a lack of further information, intuition is dominant. "I don't know" is not a compelling argument.

The question is not one of "more likely", though, but of absolutes.
After all it is a question of "can a moral relativist be trusted", not a question of degrees.
Further, "I don't know" is very much a compelling argument in matters of trustworthiness or not: if I don't know then I don't trust. And I would not trust anyone on merely a claim of a meta-ethical philosophy, as it is their specific morals that matter and their actions that derive from them that matter, as judged against ones own morals.

Ah, but it is the pervading view, and does answer the OP by being so.

Pervading view is not an objective nor absolute view, and the OP is asking an absolute.
Otherwise it's just a case of asking "Is the pervading view that..." in which case it becomes a matter of statistics rather than philosophy.

Actually, these studies show that morality is made more objective when the brain is stimulated. The outcome is judge solely on its own, since the individual's ability to understand motive is disrupted.

It is questionable whether any sense of morality actually remains at the extreme, unless you wish to argue instinct somehow equates to morality.
But regardless, it shows that morality can be changed through that stimulation.

 

[Syne]

The very idea of deciding for oneself is rather compelling to me.

So it is only compelling because it is self-serving?

Damn, even when you give the definitions you cannot manage to see how they are logically linked. Oh well.

Either cite a credible reference to support this or quit acting as if you could. Your self-serving and subjective reasoning is not sufficient.

Why need there be any objective adjudicator?

Dispute resolution. Eventually disputes on moral issues come to a head, and some means of adjudication is necessary.

Dispute resolution uses the morals of the adjudicator, not the morals of the disputing parties.

That is a non sequitur. It does not matter one wit whose morals are used when we were only discussing the necessity for adjudication. But it seems you now agree that there are cases when it is necessary.

Or is this where the tolerance, that "not all relativists have", comes into play? And if so, then you can answer my earlier question you avoided: Which would rule out?

Tolerance is agin equally applicable to all camps.
Are you suggesting that moral objectivists can not be just as tolerant?

Quit avoiding the question. With the purpose of resolving a moral dispute, would standing up for your morals or tolerance take precedence? And I do not care about generalities about "all relativist". I am asking you, personally, a direct question.

It is not a matter of can or cannot. Tolerance is not as likely to be defined as a virtue in meta-ethical objectivism. There is a difference between tolerance, itself, being defined as a virtue and tolerance that is only coincidental following existing morals.

While there is plenty of reason to assume an objective morality that would differ from the culture (not being directly derived from the culture), why would you assume the same of a relativist morality (which is derived from the culture)?

A relativist morality can be derived from any thing, not just culture. It is not a case of "morality by popularity". And for that part of the mix that is one's culture, it clearly depends on how quickly the society is changing.

If relative morals differ primarily by culture, it is trivial to assume they are primarily derived from that culture. You have not suggested any specific alternative you would like to advance for discussion. The rate of cultural change is another non sequitur.

If I had no opportunity to gain further information, then yes, I would prefer someone who claims to be a Christian (or even just a moral objectivist) over a moral relativist. Just on the meta-ethical stances alone, the latter supposes that there is no objective right or wrong. That alone is inherently untrustworthy, especially without further information.

I didn't ask who you would prefer, just whether you would trust them, on that one thing alone. Would you?

Well, considering what we have been talking about this whole time, it should be safe to assume I prefer them with regards to trustworthiness. I even said: "That [meta-ethical relativism] alone is inherently untrustworthy." What part of that do you imagine does not answer the question of trust?!

Where on earth have I said that one can not appeal to specific morality???
My point has been, from the start, that it is one's specific morality that matters and NOT one's meta-ethical philosophy, which is would consider neutral in questions of trust.
I.e. It is possible to trust someone who is a moral relativist, just as it is possible to trust an objectivist.

Okay, let us examine the possible normative moralities of relativism.

Normative moral relativists believe not only the meta-ethical thesis, but that it has normative implications on what we ought to do. They argue that meta-ethical relativism implies that we ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when it runs counter to our personal or cultural moral standards. Most philosophers do not agree, partially because of the challenges of arriving at an "ought" from relativistic premises. Meta-ethical relativism seems to eliminate the normative relativist's ability to make prescriptive claims. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Normative​

So it would seem more likely that a relativist has no normative ethics (prescriptive, i.e. what others ought to do) at all, other than perhaps tolerance as a virtue. Since this sort of normative ethics only comes from relativism, the meta-ethical position alone is sufficient information.

More likely is more likely, regardless the degree. And when judging trustworthiness, especially with a lack of further information, intuition is dominant. "I don't know" is not a compelling argument.

The question is not one of "more likely", though, but of absolutes.
After all it is a question of "can a moral relativist be trusted", not a question of degrees.
Further, "I don't know" is very much a compelling argument in matters of trustworthiness or not: if I don't know then I don't trust. And I would not trust anyone on merely a claim of a meta-ethical philosophy, as it is their specific morals that matter and their actions that derive from them that matter, as judged against ones own morals.

Absolutes? There are no guarantees outside of legally actionable contract, so trust can only be a matter of degree.

So without any further information, you do not trust anyone? Sounds pessimistic or paranoid to me. Well, people do tend to judge others by the same standards they judge themselves.

Pervading view is not an objective nor absolute view, and the OP is asking an absolute.
Otherwise it's just a case of asking "Is the pervading view that..." in which case it becomes a matter of statistics rather than philosophy.

If you think the OP is asking an absolute then it is trivially pointless, as there will always be someone who is gullible enough to trust anyone.

But if there are no objective morals, the pervading view is as close to an objective criteria as we can ever get.

Actually, these studies show that morality is made more objective when the brain is stimulated. The outcome is judge solely on its own, since the individual's ability to understand motive is disrupted.

It is questionable whether any sense of morality actually remains at the extreme, unless you wish to argue instinct somehow equates to morality.
But regardless, it shows that morality can be changed through that stimulation.

It is not questionable at all. All of the participants made moral judgements, whether control or stimulated group. The stimulated group only constrained their moral judgement to objective harm done.

And I just said that they show that morality can be changed, by making it more objective. IOW, the only change was to make their moral judgements more contradictory to moral relativism.

 

[Sarkus]

So it is only compelling because it is self-serving?

Deciding for oneself does not necessarily imply self-serving.

Either cite a credible reference to support this or quit acting as if you could. Your self-serving and subjective reasoning is not sufficient.

Not could, did.
You chose, and continue to choose, to ignore what was presented.

That is a non sequitur. It does not matter one wit whose morals are used when we were only discussing the necessity for adjudication. But it seems you now agree that there are cases when it is necessary.

Did I ever disagree that there may be cases when it is necessary.
But when it is necessary it is not the morals or the meta-ethical position of the disputing parties but rather those of the adjudicator that are important, which means that the morals of the individual parties are irrelevant.
It is thus not a non-sequitur as it argues that your example of dispute resolution is moot.

Quit avoiding the question. With the purpose of resolving a moral dispute, would standing up for your morals or tolerance take precedence? And I do not care about generalities about "all relativist". I am asking you, personally, a direct question.

I hold tolerance as a virtue, but it would depend on the specific moral in question and the conviction I hold in that specific moral.

It is not a matter of can or cannot. Tolerance is not as likely to be defined as a virtue in meta-ethical objectivism. There is a difference between tolerance, itself, being defined as a virtue and tolerance that is only coincidental following existing morals.

Support this claim, please, that it is not as likely to be defined as a virtue, as it goes against everything I was taught regarding religion.

If relative morals differ primarily by culture, it is trivial to assume they are primarily derived from that culture. You have not suggested any specific alternative you would like to advance for discussion.

Primarily does not equate to necessarily, as you were arguing. Another significant influence is the family unit, the close friends, education etc. which at a wide enough level do form part of the overall culture, but at an individual level may be significantly removed.

The rate of cultural change is another non sequitur.

No it's not. In a society that changes slowly then the stress from any change upon ones morals is slight at best. But in a rapidly changing environment that stress is greater, for both the objectivist and the relativist alike. Unless you want to pre-assume that the relativist has flexible morals.
To ignore the speed of change of culture is to be naive.

Well, considering what we have been talking about this whole time, it should be safe to assume I prefer them with regards to trustworthiness. I even said: "That [meta-ethical relativism] alone is inherently untrustworthy." What part of that do you imagine does not answer the question of trust?!

Because the question I asked was not whether you would "prefer" the objectivist, or whether you thought meta-ethical relativists untrustworthy. Neither answer the question: would you trust a Christian purely on their say-so that they were a Christian.
It's not a difficult question, and I struggle to understand why you are reluctant to give a straight answer.

Okay, let us examine the possible normative moralities of relativism.
...
So it would seem more likely that a relativist has no normative ethics (prescriptive, i.e. what others ought to do) at all, other than perhaps tolerance as a virtue. Since this sort of normative ethics only comes from relativism, the meta-ethical position alone is sufficient information.

And this is supposed to argue against what, exactly?
How does it counter the notion that it is ones specific morals that matter?

Absolutes? There are no guarantees outside of legally actionable contract, so trust can only be a matter of degree.

Yet you consider moral-relativists "inherently untrustworthy".

So without any further information, you do not trust anyone? Sounds pessimistic or paranoid to me. Well, people do tend to judge others by the same standards they judge themselves.

No, I wouldn't trust people on their claim of meta-ethical philosophy alone. Utterly foolish to do so, in my view.
And remember, we're talking about leaving ones children with this person, lest you forget.
But heck, maybe I'll meet you in the street, tell you I'm a Christian, and then you can trust me with your PIN numbers and all your valuables as well?

If you think the OP is asking an absolute then it is trivially pointless, as there will always be someone who is gullible enough to trust anyone.

Right, so people who trust relativists are gullible.

But if there are no objective morals, the pervading view is as close to an objective criteria as we can ever get.

As said, appeals to authority do work that way. :shrug:

 

[Yazata]

No. What you are talking about here is descriptive moral relativism, which is nothing more than the observation that moral differences do exist (and an absolutist usually agrees with).

I prefer to tell you what I'm saying, rather than have you put words in my mouth.

While meta-ethical moral relativists are de facto descriptive relativists, they go one step further, by asserting that there is no possible standard of right and wrong.

That isn't correct. Moral relativists don't assert that there's no possible standard of right and wrong.

What they do assert is that different cultures out there have different standards of right and wrong. Your so-called 'descriptive moral relativist' stops with that observation.

The so-called 'meta-ethical moral relativist' makes the further observation that there doesn't seem to be any culture-independent means of determining which of those mutually-inconsistent moral standards might be objectively true.

You cannot deny that one's meta-ethical stance will effect one's normative stance. After all, meta-ethical relativism contradicts normative absolutism or universalism.

There are any number of moral standards out there. Proponents of each will typically use their standard to make moral judgements about everyone's actions, whether or not the individual that's being judged is a member of the same cultural group as the one doing the judging. Moral standards are typically universal in that sense. (Some philosophers argue that moral standards must necessarily be universalizable, though I'm not sure that I agree. A monastic might need to adhere to a higher moral standard than a layman.)

What's more, most people will further assume that their own moral standard is the best moral standard. In some cases that might mean the most advanced or the most humane. Others will insist that their moral standard comes direct from God's mouth. And they can prove it too, in the pages of their scriptures.

What the moral relativist does is express the opinion that there doesn't seem to be any pristine culture-independent way of objectively determining which of these diverse and inconsistent moral standards is in fact truest and best.

That doesn't mean that proponents of each one can't see their standard as universal, applicable to everyone. It doesn't mean that proponents of each one can't see their own standard as better and truer than all of the others.

If a normative moral absolutist wants for some reason to have his/her view be consistent with meta-ethical moral relativism, then all that they really need to concede is that there doesn't seem to be any objective way of demonstrating the superiority of their own moral standard to people who don't already accept that demonstration's cultural presuppositions.

God in fact revealed absolute morality to Mohammed. That's the only true morality and the best morality possible. But unless an individual accepts the truth of Islamic revelation, then he or she is unlikely to recognize that. So recognition and acceptance of the one divinely revealed absolute morality is relative to the Islamic religion, in which the record of God's true revelation resides.

Christ in fact revealed absolute morality in the Gospels. That's the only true morality and the best morality possible. But unless an individual accepts the truth of Gospel revelation, then he or she is unlikely to recognize that. So recognition and acceptance of the one divinely revealed absolute morality is relative to the Christian religion, in which the record of God's true revelation resides.

One could make similar observations about Western ideas of individual liberty, opportunity and human rights. I personally believe that my own culture has a vastly superior moral standard than that possessed by traditional legalistic Islam. But I really doubt that I'd have much chance of convincing a militant Islamist of that.

I hope you do not think that all moral objectivists appeal to a god for their normative morals. Moral realism, for example.

Of course.

The meta-ethical moral objectivists might be right. If they believe that there's some objective way of determining the correct moral standard, without having to accept a whole lot of cultural presuppositions in order to do it, then I invite them to explain what it is.

 

[Syne]

So it is only compelling because it is self-serving?

Deciding for oneself does not necessarily imply self-serving.

You are right. Deciding for oneself is not necessarily self-serving (but I did not say it was). It is the fact that deciding for oneself is the only compelling argument for relativism that is self-serving.

Now if you have a compelling argument any less self-serving than "because I can make up my own morals"...

Either cite a credible reference to support this or quit acting as if you could. Your self-serving and subjective reasoning is not sufficient.

Not could, did.
You chose, and continue to choose, to ignore what was presented.

Wow, way to lie. You have not cited a credible reference. Here, this is what it looks like:

IMPLY = to put the suggestion into the message (sender implies)

INFER = to take the suggestion out of the message (receiver infers)
- http://grammartips.homestead.com/imply.html

But thanks for demonstrating the self-serving and subjective nature of relativism.

Did I ever disagree that there may be cases when it is necessary.

Maybe this was just a completely superfluous question then:

Why need there be any objective adjudicator?

But when it is necessary it is not the morals or the meta-ethical position of the disputing parties but rather those of the adjudicator that are important, which means that the morals of the individual parties are irrelevant.
It is thus not a non-sequitur as it argues that your example of dispute resolution is moot.

That depends on the nature of the dispute. If it is a legal matter then, yes, the law (which, in a free society, tends to reflect the majority) would adjudicate. But any moral dispute that is not legally actionable would be a process of mediation, which definitely engages the moralities of all parties.

In mediation, an objective adjudicator is necessary, and no, his morality is not a primary factor.

I hold tolerance as a virtue, ...

Then why all the evasion, when that is typical of most moral relativists? Could it be that holding tolerance as a virtue demonstrates a degree of laxity of conviction?

Never once did Martin Luther King Jr. use the word tolerance in his speeches, says Žižek. "For him (and he was right) it would have been an obscenity to say white people should learn to tolerate us more." The goal of the Civil Rights Movement was not simply appealing to liberal magnanimity, but demanding equity, including economic equity. Tolerance is a request that represents a retreat from that ambitious vision. - http://bigthink.com/postcards-from-zizek/good-thinking-is-good-questioning​

It is not a matter of can or cannot. Tolerance is not as likely to be defined as a virtue in meta-ethical objectivism. There is a difference between tolerance, itself, being defined as a virtue and tolerance that is only coincidental following existing morals.

Support this claim, please, that it is not as likely to be defined as a virtue, as it goes against everything I was taught regarding religion.

Perhaps a matter of conviction? If you never learned/had genuine conviction, the gravity of what you may have been taught could have eluded you. (Of course I have no idea what the breadth of your religious education may have been.) And there is no single support for any claim of religion in general, as the subject is far too varied.

You can google the views of any given religion.

If relative morals differ primarily by culture, it is trivial to assume they are primarily derived from that culture. You have not suggested any specific alternative you would like to advance for discussion.

Primarily does not equate to necessarily, as you were arguing. Another significant influence is the family unit, the close friends, education etc. which at a wide enough level do form part of the overall culture, but at an individual level may be significantly removed.

However you wish to word it, difference largely by culture means derived largely from culture. Whatever the vectors of cultural influence (family unit, the close friends, education etc.), they are largely inconsequential as long as the difference is largely a matter of culture in general.

No it's not. In a society that changes slowly then the stress from any change upon ones morals is slight at best. But in a rapidly changing environment that stress is greater, for both the objectivist and the relativist alike. Unless you want to pre-assume that the relativist has flexible morals.
To ignore the speed of change of culture is to be naive.

The objectivist has an independent standard that is less prone to influence. Note the persistence of religion, even a single religion within a wide array of cultures and over a long period of time. I am not, here, assuming the relativist has especially flexible morals, only that they do not tend to have a standard especially independent of their culture. That simply makes them more prone to cultural accommodation.

Well, considering what we have been talking about this whole time, it should be safe to assume I prefer them with regards to trustworthiness. I even said: "That [meta-ethical relativism] alone is inherently untrustworthy." What part of that do you imagine does not answer the question of trust?!

Because the question I asked was not whether you would "prefer" the objectivist, or whether you thought meta-ethical relativists untrustworthy. Neither answer the question: would you trust a Christian purely on their say-so that they were a Christian.
It's not a difficult question, and I struggle to understand why you are reluctant to give a straight answer.

Wow, really? There is no reluctance, other than in assuming you may be mentally challenged. I have now answered you twice. Here, I will write it in fingerpaint:

I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists.

Okay, let us examine the possible normative moralities of relativism.
...
So it would seem more likely that a relativist has no normative ethics (prescriptive, i.e. what others ought to do) at all, other than perhaps tolerance as a virtue. Since this sort of normative ethics only comes from relativism, the meta-ethical position alone is sufficient information.

And this is supposed to argue against what, exactly?
How does it counter the notion that it is ones specific morals that matter?

"The meta-ethical position alone is sufficient information" to judge the possible normative morals.

Absolutes? There are no guarantees outside of legally actionable contract, so trust can only be a matter of degree.

Yet you consider moral-relativists "inherently untrustworthy".

No guarantee is required where no trust is given. Nothing is risked.

No, I wouldn't trust people on their claim of meta-ethical philosophy alone. Utterly foolish to do so, in my view.
And remember, we're talking about leaving ones children with this person, lest you forget.
But heck, maybe I'll meet you in the street, tell you I'm a Christian, and then you can trust me with your PIN numbers and all your valuables as well?

In a situation where I had no choice but to make a snap judgement (being forced to leave a child in a stranger's care), without any opportunity to glean anything more than meta-ethical position, yes, I would pick an objectivist over a relativist every time.

Such a dire situation seems to be the only one that limits the choice as you seem to demand (no normative morals, etc.). So if forced to leave your child with a stranger, what would you do? You have said that the meta-ethical stance is neutral, so with that info alone, you could only flip a coin, right?

If you think the OP is asking an absolute then it is trivially pointless, as there will always be someone who is gullible enough to trust anyone.

Right, so people who trust relativists are gullible.

One gullible person would satisfy the OP being a trivial question, as they would trust anyone, including a relativist. No need to get defensive and make unfounded inferences.

But if there are no objective morals, the pervading view is as close to an objective criteria as we can ever get.

As said, appeals to authority do work that way.

That is no refute, other than perhaps an argument from fallacy.

 

[wynn]

You are right. Deciding for oneself is not necessarily self-serving (but I did not say it was). It is the fact that deciding for oneself is the only compelling argument for relativism that is self-serving.

Now if you have a compelling argument any less self-serving than "because I can make up my own morals"...
/.../
But thanks for demonstrating the self-serving and subjective nature of relativism.

It's not clear how moral relativism is "self-serving."

One always decides for oneself anyway, this is a truism; it's how any decision is made, even if it is a decision to follow someone else unquestioningly.

If we want to talk about things that are self-serving, we first need to clarify what we mean by "self."

 

[Sarkus]

You are right. Deciding for oneself is not necessarily self-serving (but I did not say it was). It is the fact that deciding for oneself is the only compelling argument for relativism that is self-serving.

Now if you have a compelling argument any less self-serving than "because I can make up my own morals"...

All decisions we make are self-serving, for whatever reason we make them.
Altruism would be the only exception, if one even thinks that true altruism is possible.
So you'll need to do better than claim moral relativism is any more self-serving than objectivism.

Wow, way to lie. You have not cited a credible reference.

Apologies, I would have thought explaining the simple logic of the matter of your implication would have sufficed.

Maybe this was just a completely superfluous question then:

Are we to assume all questions are to be taken as statements to the contrary? Or perhaps you always assume that when somebody asks you "why X?" that they must hold the position of not-X?

That depends on the nature of the dispute. If it is a legal matter then, yes, the law (which, in a free society, tends to reflect the majority) would adjudicate. But any moral dispute that is not legally actionable would be a process of mediation, which definitely engages the moralities of all parties.

Ah, yes, shifting goalposts again: this time from adjudication to mere mediation.

In mediation, an objective adjudicator is necessary, and no, his morality is not a primary factor.

The mediator gets the parties talking and gets the parties to agree between themselves. It is not an objective adjudication.
As soon as the mediator takes on the role of adjudicator then he does so on his own morals, not those of the other parties.

Then why all the evasion, when that is typical of most moral relativists?

And what exactly am I supposed to be evading from? And what are you suggesting is "typical": evasion, or holding tolerance as a virtue?

Could it be that holding tolerance as a virtue demonstrates a degree of laxity of conviction?

In what? In morals? How do you judge what one holds to be a moral in the first instance if not that to which he has conviction?
Thus by default all morals would be held with equal conviction. What you would the see as a "laxity of conviction" is merely a matter of what one considers to be a moral judgement.

Perhaps a matter of conviction? If you never learned/had genuine conviction, the gravity of what you may have been taught could have eluded you. (Of course I have no idea what the breadth of your religious education may have been.)

What is perhaps a matter of conviction? That your unsupported claim goes against everything I have been taught about religion?
And your efforts to try to blame me for you not supporting your claims is laughable.

And there is no single support for any claim of religion in general, as the subject is far too varied.

It need not be religion in general: let's just start with Christianity, which would undoubtedly make up the vast majority of objectivists in the uk and USA.

You can google the views of any given religion.

As can you, to support your claim. Don't expect me to do your legwork for you.

However you wish to word it, difference largely by culture means derived largely from culture. Whatever the vectors of cultural influence (family unit, the close friends, education etc.), they are largely inconsequential as long as the difference is largely a matter of culture in general.

Sure, let's just define culture to be anything that influences the individual's morals.

The objectivist has an independent standard that is less prone to influence. Note the persistence of religion, even a single religion within a wide array of cultures and over a long period of time. I am not, here, assuming the relativist has especially flexible morals, only that they do not tend to have a standard especially independent of their culture. That simply makes them more prone to cultural accommodation.

"More prone" might be significant or it might just be another choice between a spoon or paper cup in trying to move a mountain. Care to actually quantifying the "more"?

Wow, really? There is no reluctance, other than in assuming you may be mentally challenged. I have now answered you twice. Here, I will write it in fingerpaint:

I do not trust meta-ethical moral relativists.

Even spelling it out you fail to understand the question... despite your rather ironic insult.
Let me give you an example of the relevance of your answer:
Me: "Do you like strawberries?"
You: "I don't like chocolate."

So let me ask again: "Would you trust someone purely on them claiming to be a Christian?"
Hopefully now you will understand that you replying "I do not trust a meta-ethical moral relativist" does not answer the question, no matter whether you underline it, write it in capitals, in bold, in colour or even blow it up your arse.

"The meta-ethical position alone is sufficient information" to judge the possible normative morals.

Not an issue, and never was, as there is nothing necessary about those morals, and, as I have been arguing all along, it is the specific morals alone that matter. I.e. It might help you understand "possible" normative morals, but does not answer the important question of what those morals actually are. So your comment just supports how irrelevant it actually is.

No guarantee is required where no trust is given. Nothing is risked.

But it's good to know you would risk leaving your child with someone just because they said they were a Christian.
[qupte]In a situation where I had no choice but to make a snap judgement (being forced to leave a child in a stranger's care), without any opportunity to glean anything more than meta-ethical position, yes, I would pick an objectivist over a relativist every time. [/quote]And hopefully for the last time: that is not the question. It is not a matter of preference. It is not the false dichotomy of having to pick one over the other, but of whether you would trust someone purely on the meta-ethical philosophy they claim. There is always the option, which I'm sure you will vehemently seek to avoid, of saying "I would not trust them on that information alone."

Such a dire situation seems to be the only one that limits the choice as you seem to demand (no normative morals, etc.). So if forced to leave your child with a stranger, what would you do? You have said that the meta-ethical stance is neutral, so with that info alone, you could only flip a coin, right?

False dichotomy: you could simply choose not to trust them.

Yet, given the choice between the objectivist and the person you have already argued would likely hold morals in line with society at large (and so, per your line of arguing, would have morals you would be familiar with) you would still choose an objectivist whose morals could be based on anything?

That is no refute, other than perhaps an argument from fallacy.

It is a refute: a popular shared subjectivity does not equate to an objectivity. To think otherwise, even to think it is "close to objective" is merely an appeal to authority.