Can a moral relativist be trusted?

[wynn]

The implications that cultural globalization might have for the foundations of ethics is a very interesting question.

Indeed!

I don't think that it would be correct to say that globalization is leading to the destruction of all human culture. I don't think that's possible.

No, but it is misleading to apply a concept of culture that may have applied 50 or 100 years ago to societies then, to modern society. Modern culture isn't culture in the old sense of the term.

It's probably more accurate to say that rapid worldwide air travel and instantaneous electronic communications are driving more and more cross-fertilization of cultures.

Not just cross-fertilizations - it's not just additions, but also that certain aspects become eliminated from a culture.

Eventually it's likely to generate some kind of hybridized and syncretistic overarching world culture, with strong regional subcultures continuing to survive for centuries to come, and with a great deal of internal diversity at the individual level. We are already seeing that. If I fly from San Francisco to Singapore, I'm not visiting an alien planet. There's probably as many commonalities as differences. I don't feel particularly out of place.

What you call "a modern, fragmented, individualist, nominally egalitarian culture" is still a culture. There would still be all kinds of commonalities tying it together, such as the assumptions of modernity (science, rationalism), ideals of individual freedom, liberty, human rights, fairness and opportunity.

One emerging trend appears to be that culture isn't a geographical notion anymore, but much more abstract. On principle, the people living in one apartment building, part of town or in a workplace could all belong to different cultures, esp. due to socio-economic mobility and the internet. Geographically and economically, these people may be living in proximity and have to interact with one another, but their cultural mentalities are somewhere else. This brings along a number of interpersonal problems, but also personal identity crises.

Fewer people every day live in the pre-modern situation where all the small details of their lives were determined their families or by their religious traditions. People have gradually gained a lot more opportunity in the modern world to make decisions for themselves. But they aren't doing that in a vacuum.

The question is whether having all those options and having to make so many decisions oneself actually improves the perceived quality of one's life.

The more versatile the people one has to interact with on a daily basis (given that culture is less and less geographically localized), the more decisions one has to make oneself, the more strain and confusion one experiences.
The romantic ideal of the take-charge individual is just that - an ideal. In such a modern versatile culture, the people who seem to do best are the more superficial ones, the materialistically oriented. But it's a lot more trouble for the more philosophical types who try to make sense of everything - they are more likely to be overwhelmed.

 

[Sarkus]

So, again, all other things remaining the same, whether a person is perceived as trustworthy or not, depends on the meta-ethical position of the potential truster.

And the issue is whether a moral relativist can be trusted.
The implication in the very question is that being a moral relativist alone is sufficient to deem someone untrustworthy, with no chance of being deemed trustworthy.
It is not merely a matter of time/effort to achieve a position of being trustworthy, but that moral relativists can or can not be trusted.

And I find it shocking, almost abhorrent, that some could consider being a moral relativist grounds alone for being considered untrustworthy, irrespective of the meta-ethical philosophy of the truster.

No, that's not the implication.

Then why did he raise it as part of the consideration behind a response that he felt a moral relativist would give, if not to distinguish it from such given by an absolutist?

That assumes that it is to be taken for granted that an individual's morality is a mixture of nature and esp. nurture. And not perhaps the result of the person's deliberate effort or divine intervention.

Not so, It could be through nature, nurture, deliberate effort or anything else - merely that moral judgements can differ across people, across societies.

My default is to assume that a person's morality is mainly the result of their own deliberate effort. So things look different from my perspective. One of the implications of this perspective is that moral relativists are refusing to take responsibility for their morality when they conveniently ascribe it to nature and nurture.

But if you think that morals can be different for people, even if from their own deliberate effort, then you are a relativist.
It is only if you think that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, independent of circumstance, situation, upbringing, individual effort etc that you are an absolutist.
So which are you??

Do you find that trustworthiness is the kind of qualifier like color of skin, age, city of origin, gender, ..?

No. It is not something that is fixed, and is in the eye of the beholder, not oneself.

No, but I think they may have invested more conscience, more deliberate effort into their morality, and on that count, may be more predictable, more reliable.

Surely what one invests is entirely individual, whether one is an absolutist or relativist. To assume otherwise seems to me to be an unsupported a priori assumption.

No, this is a very skewed presentation of absolutism. I suppose some absolutists might be like that, but not all. What you are talking about is complete decontextualization, not absolutism.

Absolutism is the view that certain acts are either always good or always bad, irrespective of circumstance. Therefore if they think it always bad or always good then they hold that it must be so for all people. Otherwise they are relativists.
Is it possible to be relativist AND an absolutist?

It is a yardstick, depending on the stated meta-ethical position and the meta-ethical position of the one making the assessment of a meta-ethical position.

Only in so far as they bring a priori assumptions into play - at which point the question at hand becomes contaminated beyond salvaging.

There are the academic definitions of "moral relativism" and then there are the actual RL definitions. And the two can differ.

And the same can be said for moral absolutists.

 

[Sarkus]

And I don't think there can be a convincing argument one way or another.

Yes there is: do you know anyone you trust who is a moral-relativist?
I do.

No, that's the fire-and-brimstone Christian talking.

No, it's simple logic that is talking, if one wishes to pit absolutism as the alternative. Relativism holds that different people can have different morals. If an absolutist accepts that other people can have different morals, how are they not a relativist? Therefore surely an absolutist must hold that their morals are the only ones.
I accept I may be relating univeralism with absolutism, so if you think so, explain to me how an absolutist can hold that others may have different morals without being a relativist?

It's a matter of principle. In actual empirical practice, the relativist and the absolutist may be the same, but in principle, they aren't. The absolutist feels bound to a much higher, much more powerful source or authority than the relativist, so, on principle, will feel more compelled toward consistency and persistence.

Perhaps, but "more compelled" is a far cry from deeming that relativists "can not be trusted".

Again, as noted earlier, this is an simplistic take on absolutism.
Here, when talking about absolutism, we concern ourselves mainly with the declared source of a person's morality.

Why only concern yourself with one aspect of the philosophy, and not others that might be of equal importance in the matter?

And, as yourself said in your first contribution here, that a judgment of another's trustworthiness depends also on our own moral stance.

Indeed - but at no point did I infer that one's moral stance immediately makes someone untrustworthy based on that person's meta-ethical philosophy, but through relating/judging the person's actions against one's own morality, irrespective of source of said morality.

We're relating them, not conflating them.

When you relate them through a "slippery slope" and then argue from the lowest position, I see that as conflation.

In what way?

The same way a theist can become an atheist.
But perhaps you'll say that such people were never moral absolutists to begin with.

 

[wynn]

The implication in the very question is that being a moral relativist alone is sufficient to deem someone untrustworthy, with no chance of being deemed trustworthy.
It is not merely a matter of time/effort to achieve a position of being trustworthy, but that moral relativists can or can not be trusted.

No, those are your inferences.

There is no law prohibitng us from clarifying, contextualizing or otherwise restating a question, if we find that the original question is not precise enough or that it is biased or otherwise problematic.

And this is what I am doing - restating the original question, to avoid assuming it implies the sort of things you suggest it does.


Moreover, I asked, precisely with this kind of trouble in mind:

Do you find that trustworthiness is the kind of qualifier like color of skin, age, city of origin, gender, ..?

to which you replied:

No. It is not something that is fixed, and is in the eye of the beholder, not oneself.

In which case, your above upset over the thought that a moral relativist cannot be trusted, is misplaced.



I have to go now, but will come back later.

 

[Sarkus]

You say it should - but I don't know of any convincing way that this is even possible.

People cannot just forget about their own meta-ethics, nor about the meta-ethics of others, nor can they ignore the ethical concerns that arise in their minds when talking to others.

Maybe one can become color-blind and not discriminate between white and black people. But one cannot become ethics-blind.

It's quite simple, really: you judge their actions according to your own morals; not your meta-ethical philosophy, not theirs, but their actions against your morals.
Simples.

And it's so "loosely based on Christian morality" that it is the same pretty much all over the world. So why declare any reference to Christianity at all?

Simplicity.
Further, your recognition that it is pretty much the same all over the world shows that even you seem to feel that there can not be much difference in actual morality between moral relativists and absolutists: So why should a moral relativists be deemed untrustworthy for having the same morals as someone who is an absolutist?

What about your Catholic brother?

He went to the same school - he would have the same understanding as me.
But hey, feel free to consider him a non-believer as well.

Oh, and you see, this is why I have doubts about ex-believers: When I discover factual evidence of their not knowing some basic teachings of their past religion, it's hard to believe that they ever really believed, ever really were members. Surely they had the feeling that they believe, and it may have been a very strong feeling (and they still may have it decades later), but that feeling can easily enough be induced by social emotional contagion, and isn't necessarily based in anything beyond that.

You confuse religious with being a believer.
One does not need any instruction to be a believer, although one might to be religious.

Why?

Because you are looking for superiority in a difference when such might not exist.

 

[Sarkus]

No, those are your inferences.

There is no law prohibitng us from clarifying, contextualizing or otherwise restating a question, if we find that the original question is not precise enough or that it is biased or otherwise problematic.

There may be no law, but it is disingenuous to do so when it has not been concluded that the original question is such.
As I said to another, if you want to move the goalposts, feel free, but don't complain when others stick to where they originally were.
Further, there has been no statement that the original question was not precise enough, or biased, or otherwise problematic. And no agreement that the question should be rephrased etc.

And this is what I am doing - restating the original question, to avoid assuming it implies the sort of things you suggest it does.

"Oh no, you may be correct, I'll have to shift the goalposts!"

Moreover, I asked, precisely with this kind of trouble in mind:
to which you replied:

In which case, your above upset over the thought that a moral relativist cannot be trusted, is misplaced.

How so, when noone here, arguing from a moral absolutist position, has admitted that it is possible to trust a moral relativist.
And since noone held up a sign, that everyone acknowledged, that the goalposts were being shifted, you can not fault that I am still discussing the original question, and have been consistent in doing so from the outset.

 

[Syne]

Do not let Sarkus fool you, Wynn. He is more than happy to argue moved goalposts, as long as he thinks it serves his purpose. When he starts complaining about it, it means he is losing confidence.

 

[Sarkus]

Again, ad nauseam, I never said you could take anyone at their word alone. What do you not understand about needing information before you can corroborate it? Without specific info about a person's morality, what can you possibly corroborate?

And, ad nauseam, one's meta-ethical philosophy is NOT specific info about one's morality. It is neutral in such matters.

But yes, even between simply relativist or objectivist meta-ethical positions (the OP actually defines both absolutist and universalist moral objectivism), the objectivist is preferred. We know that the objectivist does not have a tolerance for differing moralities that the relativist does. The relativist excuses wildly differing moralities as only cultural. It is this laxity that contributes to the distrust. If you can excuse something, you must have some sympathy for it.

Tolerance is independent of differing meta-ethical philosophy. It is just as possible to be tolerant regardless of such. But nice red herring.

As you can see, I do not need to rely on "lack of information is grounds for distrusting". Examining meta-ethical positions alone is sufficient. But it was you who seemed more than happy to argue moral relativism against a specific, absolute morality...at least til that seemed to be failing you. Either way, a relativist does not have a readily identifiable specific morality that does anything to alleviate the above liability of moral relativism.

If you do not need to rely on it, I just wonder why you argued such so vehemently, or even raised it in the first instance.
The question in hand is whether a moral relativist can be trusted, not whether you think it harder to trust, or requires more effort, or is more tolerant.
And a relativist CAN have a specific morality, they merely think that others can have different moralities.
So again, nice red-herring.

So a relativist may very well find no meta-ethical stance compelling either way, but for the large majority of moral objectivists (~80% belief in god), it is only the relativist's stance that offers no compelling argument (and no contribution to trust). Even differing objective moralities may at least offer some compelling argument, other than "cultural difference" (which operationally means "luck of the draw").

One does need to understand a relativists argument before making such a statement, rather than arguing from one's absolutist morality.
Further, the relativist position is not that each person's opinion is as good as anyone else's - merely that someone else's morals may differ due to their circumstance, society etc. That does not mean the relativist accepts the position as being, in their view, moral or even tolerable.

I never said it was "easy". Seems you are using that to avoid answering both of my questions.

If one says that it is "no more easy or difficult" one is not saying that you have said that it was easy - only that it is not easier nor difficult. You do understand the difference, I assume?

"If the relativist himself cannot defend his own morality as objectively better than any other, why should anyone expect their morality to be any more virtuous?" And I asked you (the one arguing moral relativism) what would keep a relativist from changing their moral stance, so it is a pointless evasion to turn that around on me.

It's not pointless. You are inferring firstly that there IS an objective "better", and secondly that it is easier for a relativist to change their moral position (see above). I disagree on both counts. A moral relativist CAN defend their moral position - but considers that every person's circumstance is different, and that there is no objective position.

Or should I simply take your silence on both questions as "nothing"? If you can defend your position, do so, otherwise you have no grounds to argue. Right now you are doing the typical pseudo-science "prove me wrong" nonsense, so the weakness of your argument is readily apparent.

Just so you're aware, you do know that this is a matter of philosophy, right? These are meta-ethical philosophies we're discussing.
And what position are you expecting me to defend, exactly: is there a moral dilemma you've posed that I've somehow missed?
With regard the question of whether moral relativists can be trusted - I have read nothing to suggest that they can not be.
So what more are you expecting? For me to counter a claim that has yet to be supported?

It is trivially true that if one's morals are derived from society one will answer moral questions as socially expected. Considering our current society condones things like abortion, the absolutist is more likely not to answer completely as socially expected. So there is a valid difference.

Not true at all, unless the absolutist garners their morals from a religion. But that is just playing with statistics. An absolutist per se is no more or less against abortion than a relativist.

How do you expect to question someone as to their moral stance, without showing your hand (to avoid lies) and without asking any specific moral questions?

I would ask about their upbringing, their activities etc. How would you do it? Or would you just flat out ask "Are you a moral relativist, 'cos we don't trust 'em!"

Seems you are retreating on every front you have advanced in this discussion.

Not at all: I'm just knocking back every red-herring that is raised.
And you wonder why I react so defensively when not only do you argue in favour of a view that considers moral relativists like me to be untrustworthy, but then use metaphors that aptly describe your combative view of the discussion.

No, you simply do not know the difference between inference and implication. These are all things you have inferred, not things I have implied. Like I said, needlessly defensive.

If the logic of my inference is sound, it must have been logically implied by you, consciously or not.

Meaningless distinction, as each still espouses a societal norm.

You asked. So complain to the author.

As I said above, many moral objectivists would not answer as socially expected.

It depends on who the person is and what their actual morals are. Being absolutist or relativist says nothing about one's actual morals.

Really? So you would trust a stranger with your children solely because you view yourself as trustworthy? That is either nonsense, naive, or dangerously foolish. I have already address the meat-ethical positions alone above.

I never said that nor even implied it. But hey, yet another red-herring.
As I have said all along, the meta-ethical position is neutral in this matter. Not too difficult to understand is it?

That is typical of a moral relativist.

Wow - stunning argument. Thanks.

As in my above quote, you know there is nothing compelling in your argument, especially in regard to trustworthiness. That you cannot see beyond your own meta-ethical position has no bearing.

There need be nothing compelling as the case has simply not been made that relativists are, by dint of being a relativist, to be considered untrustworthy.

Ah, but the OP is talking about both moral absolutism and moral universalism, so your focus on absolutist is a red herring (or a conflation of moral objectivism in general with moral absolutism). Moral universalism allows for differences in circumstance, but not a difference of moral judgement under identical circumstance.

Irrelevant, as the use of absolutism is merely as an example of difference to relativism. The question is a matter of whether relativists can be considered trustworthy. It doesn't matter whether it's in comparison to absolutism or universalism, the OP is a matter of claim of whether moral relativists can be trusted.
Do you have any compelling reason why relativists are to be deemed untrustworthy?
Do you yourself deem all moral relativists untrustworthy?
Or do you actually think that moral relativists can be trusted?
Maybe you don't want to answer that last question, as in doing so you might actually be responding directly to the heart of the issue, rather than merely shift goalposts with countless red herrings?

It is very naive of you to think that, since a person judges others by their own morality, they assume others share their morality.

With regard moral absolutists and objectivists, it is logically inconsistent to assume anything else, as explained to wynn. If they allow and accept others to have different morals then they are relativists. But hey, if absolutists or objectivists can also be relativists, do let me know.

And how do you make the ridiculous stretch that a moral objectivist would view a different morality as "acceptable"?!

I don't. If you read the sentence carefully I said that as soon as they do they are a relativist; the same way that as soon as an atheist believes in god they are a theist.

The difference of what people are involved does not change the moral judgement of an otherwise identical situation by a moral objectivist. But I can see where you are interjecting relativism, not only in the moral judgement, but in how each individual interprets the same situation (self-serving motives, etc.).

How can a morality based on such vagary be trusted?

The same way anyone can be trusted: through judgement of action against one's own morals.

So the relativist is more likely to lie?

No, this was a demonstration of the flaw of wynn's argument. Please do not take it out of context.

All of those attributes have only been inferred by you, not implied by me.

Sorry, I did embellish a tad, although you did use "self-serving". But you get the idea. And I notice that while you accuse me of trying to avoid, you don't do such a bad job yourself at it.

 

[Sarkus]

Do not let Sarkus fool you, Wynn. He is more than happy to argue moved goalposts, as long as he thinks it serves his purpose. When he starts complaining about it, it means he is losing confidence.

On the contrary, I merely get tired of people dragging things away from the topic in hand, often merely to further their own position. So don't confuse humouring the moving of goalposts with acceptance of them having been moved, or that the original purpose has been forgotten.
But heck, if it makes you feel better to think that I'm losing confidence, knock yourself out with it.

 

[Syne]

Tolerance is independent of differing meta-ethical philosophy. It is just as possible to be tolerant regardless of such. But nice red herring.

No, a moral objectivist does not tolerate things they view as immoral.

Moral universalism (also called moral objectivism or universal morality) is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals", regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexuality, or any other distinguishing feature. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_universalism​

As you can see, I do not need to rely on "lack of information is grounds for distrusting". Examining meta-ethical positions alone is sufficient. But it was you who seemed more than happy to argue moral relativism against a specific, absolute morality...at least til that seemed to be failing you.

If you do not need to rely on it, I just wonder why you argued such so vehemently, or even raised it in the first instance.
The question in hand is whether a moral relativist can be trusted, not whether you think it harder to trust, or requires more effort, or is more tolerant.

Then why have you argued it so long before complaining about "goalposts"? You introduced a specific morality with: "Would you leave your child with a random stranger solely on the basis they claimed to be a Christian?" And this question directly asked for a response pertaining to "known information." Do not blame me for your own shortsightedness.

Either way, a relativist does not have a readily identifiable specific morality that does anything to alleviate the above liability of moral relativism.

And a relativist CAN have a specific morality, they merely think that others can have different moralities.
So again, nice red-herring.

Read more carefully. I said "readily identifiable specific morality." I did not imply that they had no morality whatsoever.

Further, the relativist position is not that each person's opinion is as good as anyone else's - merely that someone else's morals may differ due to their circumstance, society etc. That does not mean the relativist accepts the position as being, in their view, moral or even tolerable.

Meta-ethical moral relativists believe not only that people disagree about moral issues, but that terms such as "good", "bad", "right" and "wrong" do not stand subject to universal truth conditions at all; rather, they are relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of an individual or a group of people. - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Meta-ethical​

So what makes one circumstance or society any more compelling than another? Just that they are born into one rather than another? How can luck of the draw make yours any better? Random luck is not compelling.

"If the relativist himself cannot defend his own morality as objectively better than any other, why should anyone expect their morality to be any more virtuous?" And I asked you (the one arguing moral relativism) what would keep a relativist from changing their moral stance, so it is a pointless evasion to turn that around on me.

It's not pointless. You are inferring firstly that there IS an objective "better", and secondly that it is easier for a relativist to change their moral position (see above). I disagree on both counts. A moral relativist CAN defend their moral position - but considers that every person's circumstance is different, and that there is no objective position.

Again, you confuse infer with imply. We infer things from others' statements and we imply things with our own.

"A moral relativist CAN defend their moral position", but only as the ultimately random chance of which culture/circumstances they find themselves in. Whatever subjective rationale they may utilize would differ under different circumstance/culture.

If you can defend your position, do so, otherwise you have no grounds to argue. Right now you are doing the typical pseudo-science "prove me wrong" nonsense, so the weakness of your argument is readily apparent.

Just so you're aware, you do know that this is a matter of philosophy, right? These are meta-ethical philosophies we're discussing.
And what position are you expecting me to defend, exactly: is there a moral dilemma you've posed that I've somehow missed?
With regard the question of whether moral relativists can be trusted - I have read nothing to suggest that they can not be.
So what more are you expecting? For me to counter a claim that has yet to be supported?

I have already given you ample argument and support, and in return all you have offered is your proclamation that meta-ethical stance has no bearing on trustworthiness.

Why do you think atheists are so often criticized for being moral relativists? Could it be that the majority of moral absolutists in the world view that stance as untrustworthy?

Everything I have said and done in these last years is relativism, by intuition. From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology, and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable. If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective immortal truth, then there is nothing more relativistic than fascism - Benito Mussolini​

Not true at all, unless the absolutist garners their morals from a religion. But that is just playing with statistics. An absolutist per se is no more or less against abortion than a relativist.

That was only an example, but generally, absolutists are more likely to have morals that differ from their culture, while relativists claim theirs derive primarily from their culture.

How do you expect to question someone as to their moral stance, without showing your hand (to avoid lies) and without asking any specific moral questions?

I would ask about their upbringing, their activities etc. How would you do it? Or would you just flat out ask "Are you a moral relativist, 'cos we don't trust 'em!"

So you would intentionally avoid any questions that may expose their specific morality? If their upbringing and activities sound okay, you would trust them with your kids? Remember, most psychopaths seem completely normal in such respects.

I would ask their opinion of highly divisive moral topics. If they try to ascertain my opinions before answering or uniformly answer as socially expected or politically correct, I would be suspect.

Ah, but the OP is talking about both moral absolutism and moral universalism, so your focus on absolutist is a red herring (or a conflation of moral objectivism in general with moral absolutism). Moral universalism allows for differences in circumstance, but not a difference of moral judgement under identical circumstance.

Irrelevant, as the use of absolutism is merely as a difference to relativism. The question is a matter of whether relativists can be considered trustworthy. Do you have any compelling reason why relativists are to be deemed untrustworthy?

Absolutism is not a meta-ethical stance at all. Moral absolutism is normative ethics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism). Moral universalism (objectivism) is the meta-ethical stance of an absolutist. Since you insist on a purely meta-ethical discussion, you should have no objection to sticking strictly to objectivism. Unless you are moving your own goalpost.

I have already given you reasons to think a relativist suspect, but you no doubt will continue to ignore them. Objectivism can allow for circumstances, as long as identical circumstances are judged as morally equal, while relativism allows for differing moral judgements of identical events, and even from each perspective within the same event.

Which sounds more reliable?

It is very naive of you to think that, since a person judges others by their own morality, they assume others share their morality.

With regard moral absolutists and objectivists, it is logically inconsistent to assume anything else, as explained to wynn. If they allow and accept others to have different morals then they are relativists. But hey, if absolutists or objectivists can also be relativists, let me know.

No, there is a huge difference between the simple fact that people have differing moralities and assuming those differing moralities to be equally valid (cannot be adjudicated). The former is an objective observation, while the latter is what defines relativism.

And how do you make the ridiculous stretch that a moral objectivist would view a different morality as "acceptable"?!

I don't. If you read the sentence carefully I said that as soon as they do they are a relativist; the same way that as soon as an atheist believes in god they are a theist.

Then they were already a relativist.

So the relativist is more likely to lie?

No, this was a demonstration of the flaw of wynn's argument. Please do not take it out of context.

I am not participating in any argument Wynn is making, so why are you refuting him to me?

 

[wynn]

There may be no law, but it is disingenuous to do so when it has not been concluded that the original question is such.

I concluded such. This is enough. This is my input.

We've been over this many times.

And since noone held up a sign, that everyone acknowledged, that the goalposts were being shifted, you can not fault that I am still discussing the original question, and have been consistent in doing so from the outset.

Oh, don't play the victim, as if you are just a poor little student participating in a discussion in which others set all the rules.




And how dare you accuse others of moving the goalsposts, when it was you yourself in your first post here who said:

First, we don't judge people by their moral philosophy but by our own: if I hold that morals are objective, etc, then this must surely hold for all people, whether they think them subjective or not.

You introduced the whole issue of judging others by one's own standards, right in your first post here.

 

[Sarkus]

I concluded such. This is enough. This is my input.

Great. Thanks for playing.

We've been over this many times.

We have? And you say that as if having "been over this many times" is sufficient to conclude you are correct in some matter? Raising the same point over and over again does not make it any more or less right.

Oh, don't play the victim, as if you are just a poor little student participating in a discussion in which others set all the rules.

Then don't be surprised that some of us are still trying to defend the position that you seem now to want to gloss over. Maybe you should be a bit more sympathetic toward those you are trying to claim are untrustworthy, by mere dint of holding morals to be subjective, irrespective of the person's actual moral compass, or their actions. Then perhaps you'll understand why they may see it as being disrespectful to merely shift discussions midway.
Heck, maybe you'd be happy to gloss over implied attacks on your character by people who don't know you from Adam and are pre-judging you on irrelevancies.
But heck, I'm not to be trusted, and I've probably been lying this whole time just out of a self-serving attitude.

And how dare you accuse others of moving the goalsposts, when it was you yourself in your first post here who said:
...
You introduced the whole issue of judging others by one's own standards, right in your first post here.

And how on earth is that moving the goalposts in any way?
The question is whether a moral relativist can be trusted: this implies a judgement of trustworthiness, which implies that we judge against something.
So what I raised is at the very heart of the matter and is in no way any shift in the goalpost.

 

[Sarkus]

No, a moral objectivist does not tolerate things they view as immoral.

You'd be surprised what people are willing to tolerate. I'm not talking acceptance, or understanding, but mere tolerance.
Give this a try: "Frontiers of Diversity: Explorations in Contemporary Pluralism", a collection of papers, and most significantly " A Defense of Tolerance as a Moral Virtue" by Ronald Sandler and Cynthia Townley.

Then why have you argued it so long before complaining about "goalposts"? You introduced a specific morality with: "Would you leave your child with a random stranger solely on the basis they claimed to be a Christian?" And this question directly asked for a response pertaining to "known information." Do not blame me for your own shortsightedness.

And don't blame me for you misunderstanding the purpose of a reply: the point in the above question being that naming a specific morality is irrelevant in and of itself, as there is still nothing on which to judge.

Read more carefully. I said "readily identifiable specific morality." I did not imply that they had no morality whatsoever.

But you still consider them untrustworthy, regardless of what their morality may be. If you don't then a simple "Yes, a moral relativist can be trusted," would suffice.

So what makes one circumstance or society any more compelling than another? Just that they are born into one rather than another? How can luck of the draw make yours any better? Random luck is not compelling.

Define "better". And better for who? Judged by who?

Again, you confuse infer with imply. We infer things from others' statements and we imply things with our own.

There is no confusion: if cases where the inference is logically sound, the implication must be there.

"A moral relativist CAN defend their moral position", but only as the ultimately random chance of which culture/circumstances they find themselves in. Whatever subjective rationale they may utilize would differ under different circumstance/culture.

Yes, because each culture / society places different values on different things. One can defend ones position by stating the value that one places in such things. It would then be up to the person making any judgement (of one persons morals against another) to assess against the value that they place in such things.

I have already given you ample argument and support, and in return all you have offered is your proclamation that meta-ethical stance has no bearing on trustworthiness.

You've given nothing that logically leads to one being considered untrustworthy by dint of their meta-ethical stance alone. I've given ample explanation as well.

Why do you think atheists are so often criticized for being moral relativists? Could it be that the majority of moral absolutists in the world view that stance as untrustworthy?

You'd have to ask them. It could merely be jealousy. But heck, appeal to popularity if you want.
As for Mussolini, no one is saying that all individuals on either side are squeaky clean... But if you want to be irrational and base views of trust on certain individuals who clearly had different morals, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy, feel free.

That was only an example, but generally, absolutists are more likely to have morals that differ from their culture, while relativists claim theirs derive primarily from their culture.

That may be true in an increasingly secular society, but not across history, nor in religious societies.

So you would intentionally avoid any questions that may expose their specific morality? If their upbringing and activities sound okay, you would trust them with your kids? Remember, most psychopaths seem completely normal in such respects.

You asked how I would do so without asking any specific moral questions... And now you criticise me for avoiding questions that may expose their specific morality?
And I did not say I would trust them on those things alone.
But, as I have asked before, and perhaps you'll get the point of the question now, are you saying you would trust someone just because they said they were Christian? "Remember, most psychopaths seem completely normal in such respects."

I would ask their opinion of highly divisive moral topics. If they try to ascertain my opinions before answering or uniformly answer as socially expected or politically correct, I would be suspect.

Yep, ask me how I would do something without X and then say that you would do X. Nice way to discuss things.

Absolutism is not a meta-ethical stance at all. Moral absolutism is normative ethics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism). Moral universalism (objectivism) is the meta-ethical stance of an absolutist. Since you insist on a purely meta-ethical discussion, you should have no objection to sticking strictly to objectivism. Unless you are moving your own goalpost.

No, I'm happy with the distinction, although other sources than wiki suggest absolutism is indeed both a meta-ethical position and normative ethics. For example: www.philosophy-index.com/ethics/meta-ethics/absolutism.php. And www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/absolutism.
But if it will help with clarity I will try to distinguish.

I have already given you reasons to think a relativist suspect, but you no doubt will continue to ignore them. Objectivism can allow for circumstances, as long as identical circumstances are judged as morally equal, while relativism allows for differing moral judgements of identical events, and even from each perspective within the same event.

Sure, you have raised reasons, and it have not ignored them, I have assessed them and found them not to answer the question in hand.
The question is simply whether a moral relativist can be trusted.
Not whether it takes more or less effort to achieve the trust, since they may all have different morals etc.

Which sounds more reliable?

I don't think you can answer based on the issue of their meta-ethical position. You have to judge the person's actions against against your own sense of morality, and each person is uniquely reliable or not, irrespective of their meta-ethical position.
Can a moral absolutist/universalist be trusted? Does saying that that is their meta-ethical position in any way describe what their actual morals are? No.
So asking whether a moral relativist can be trusted is like asking if anyone can be trusted without judging their actual morals.
Does a moral relativist make that task slightly harder? Possibly, but only if you already trust the moral code that the universalist claims to adhere to.

No, there is a huge difference between the simple fact that people have differing moralities and assuming those differing moralities to be equally valid (cannot be adjudicated). The former is an objective observation, while the latter is what defines relativism.

Whether or not they are equally valid is a moot point, since they will always be judged by a subjective view, not an independent measure. And the judgement will be against the morals that the person / society already holds.

Then they were already a relativist.

Which you won't know until they conclude such, in which case they will claim to be a universalist, in which case you can not trust them either. So we conclude that no one can be trusted.

I am not participating in any argument Wynn is making, so why are you refuting him to me?

Apologies, I thought that the comment you were replying to I had made to wynn rather than you. I was mistaken. So let me answer your original question: "So the relativist is more likely to lie?"
No, my example is to highlight how using your apparent assumption that the relativist is self-serving (I.e. The assumption that they will lie to do so) leads to a conclusion where you can no longer rely on the answer "I am a meta-ethical universalist", which makes the issue wholly neutral, as you ask a question where both sides give the same answer.

 

[wynn]

We have? And you say that as if having "been over this many times" is sufficient to conclude you are correct in some matter? Raising the same point over and over again does not make it any more or less right.

We've been over the issue of moving the goalposts several times, in other discussions too. I point out that the OP or some other point needs to be clarified, restated etc., and you accuse me of moving the goalposts.

Then don't be surprised that some of us are still trying to defend the position that you seem now to want to gloss over. Maybe you should be a bit more sympathetic toward those you are trying to claim are untrustworthy, by mere dint of holding morals to be subjective, irrespective of the person's actual moral compass, or their actions. Then perhaps you'll understand why they may see it as being disrespectful to merely shift discussions midway.

Heck, maybe you'd be happy to gloss over implied attacks on your character by people who don't know you from Adam and are pre-judging you on irrelevancies.
But heck, I'm not to be trusted, and I've probably been lying this whole time just out of a self-serving attitude.

Are you a moral relativist, or are you not? If you hold that different people from different cultures have different moralities, then what is there to complain about when you interact with different people from different cultures who have a different morality than you?
And if you hold there is no objective right and wrong, then how can you rightfully feel offended by something someone has done?

For a moral relativist, you doth complain too much!

The question is whether a moral relativist can be trusted: this implies a judgement of trustworthiness, which implies that we judge against something.
So what I raised is at the very heart of the matter and is in no way any shift in the goalpost.

In which case, you again have no fallacy to accuse me of, as I went along with that all along.

 

[wynn]

And the issue is whether a moral relativist can be trusted.

The implication in the very question is that being a moral relativist alone is sufficient to deem someone untrustworthy, with no chance of being deemed trustworthy.
It is not merely a matter of time/effort to achieve a position of being trustworthy, but that moral relativists can or can not be trusted.

The simple fact of the matter is that some people don't trust moral relativists.

It's not clear why a moral relativist (!) would have a problem with that.

And I find it shocking, almost abhorrent, that some could consider being a moral relativist grounds alone for being considered untrustworthy, irrespective of the meta-ethical philosophy of the truster.

Nobody said anything about "irrespective of the meta-ethical philosophy of the truster." That's your addition.

Then why did he raise it as part of the consideration behind a response that he felt a moral relativist would give, if not to distinguish it from such given by an absolutist?

He'll tell you that.

Not so, It could be through nature, nurture, deliberate effort or anything else - merely that moral judgements can differ across people, across societies.

"Moral judgements can differ across people, across societies" -- and? What would you like to suggest by pointing out that "moral judgements can differ across people, across societies" -?

But if you think that morals can be different for people, even if from their own deliberate effort, then you are a relativist.

That's naive. Acknowledging something that is trivially true doesn't make one anything in particular. There's more necessary in order to be a relativist.

It is only if you think that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, independent of circumstance, situation, upbringing, individual effort etc that you are an absolutist.
So which are you??

In short:

Actions are either good or bad, depending on whether they lead to a particular goal or not.
Externally the same action that leads to one goal (and is thus good in regard to that goal), can be such that it detracts from another goal (and is thus bad in regard to that goal).
Not all goals are equally worthy.
In different circumstances, different actions may be necessary to achieve the same goal.
A person's morality may change over time, due to a variety of factors.
A deliberate effort to clarify one's morality is superior to the moral sense that may develop via nature, nurture, or coincidence.

So I am neither a simplistic objectivist, nor a simplistic relativist, nor a simplistic universalist nor absolutist, although my stance is, technically, a little bit of each.

No. It is not something that is fixed, and is in the eye of the beholder, not oneself.

Okay. So how can moral relativists rightfully complain when they don't feel respected by other people?

Surely what one invests is entirely individual, whether one is an absolutist or relativist. To assume otherwise seems to me to be an unsupported a priori assumption.

A person who deliberately invests in something is more predictable, more reliable. Those are positive traits.

Absolutism is the view that certain acts are either always good or always bad, irrespective of circumstance. Therefore if they think it always bad or always good then they hold that it must be so for all people. Otherwise they are relativists.

That's too simplistic. See above.

Only in so far as they bring a priori assumptions into play - at which point the question at hand becomes contaminated beyond salvaging.

How on earth could one operate without apriori assumptions at all?! It's also called "having a standard to judge by." We all do that.

And the same can be said for moral absolutists.

Sure.

 

[wynn]

Yes there is: do you know anyone you trust who is a moral-relativist?

No.

No, it's simple logic that is talking, if one wishes to pit absolutism as the alternative. Relativism holds that different people can have different morals. If an absolutist accepts that other people can have different morals, how are they not a relativist? Therefore surely an absolutist must hold that their morals are the only ones.
I accept I may be relating univeralism with absolutism, so if you think so, explain to me how an absolutist can hold that others may have different morals without being a relativist?

As I am not the sort of absolutist you describehere, I'm not going to defend a position I don't hold.

Perhaps, but "more compelled" is a far cry from deeming that relativists "can not be trusted".

Well, you could always try with a lawsuit ...

Why only concern yourself with one aspect of the philosophy, and not others that might be of equal importance in the matter?

Because I don't entirely subscribe to it.

Indeed - but at no point did I infer that one's moral stance immediately makes someone untrustworthy based on that person's meta-ethical philosophy, but through relating/judging the person's actions against one's own morality, irrespective of source of said morality.

You agreed that trustworthiness exists in the eye of the beholder, and not as a kind of trait like color of skin or biological sex.

So to still talk about trustworthiness as something that can exist irrespective of the eye of the beholder, is misleading.

When you relate them through a "slippery slope" and then argue from the lowest position, I see that as conflation.

You're entitled to see it that way.

The same way a theist can become an atheist.
But perhaps you'll say that such people were never moral absolutists to begin with.

Ah, that doesn't clarify.

 

[Sarkus]

Are you a moral relativist, or are you not? If you hold that different people from different cultures have different moralities, then what is there to complain about when you interact with different people from different cultures who have a different morality than you?
And if you hold there is no objective right and wrong, then how can you rightfully feel offended by something someone has done?

For a moral relativist, you doth complain too much!

Yes, I consider myself a moral relativist. And moral relativism does not necessitate tolerance. Otherwise they would consider it a universal morality to be tolerant, which would negate the concept of relativism.
I can be offended by another's actions, irrespective of what I think of their morality.
Again, we judge actions according to our own morality.
For a moral relativist I complain as much as anyone would when insulted (in this case that I am to be considered untrustworthy by dint of being a relativist, rather than through any actual assessment of my morality).

In which case, you again have no fallacy to accuse me of, as I went along with that all along.

Yet you tried, by your own admission, to restate the issue so as to avoid implications I had inferred... which to me sounds like moving the goalposts because you didn't like where it was heading. But let's not dwell. If you feel I have offended unduly with the accusation, apologies.

 

[wynn]

It's quite simple, really: you judge their actions according to your own morals; not your meta-ethical philosophy, not theirs, but their actions against your morals.

No.
I judge others and their actions according to my meta-ethical philosophy and my particular morality, and I also consider their meta-ethical philosophy and their particular morality.

Further, your recognition that it is pretty much the same all over the world shows that even you seem to feel that there can not be much difference in actual morality between moral relativists and absolutists: So why should a moral relativists be deemed untrustworthy for having the same morals as someone who is an absolutist?

For the same reasons even you as a non- Jew feel uncomfortable around a self-declared Nazi supremacist.

IOW, it seems to me that we have arrived at a basic conflict of values that cannot be further explored.

He went to the same school - he would have the same understanding as me.

Not at all. Ever noticed that students from the same class come away with different grades and different knowledge, remembering different things with a different degree of precision?

You confuse religious with being a believer.
One does not need any instruction to be a believer, although one might to be religious.

Ah. You know damn well what I mean.

Because you are looking for superiority in a difference when such might not exist.

I allow for it in my system, but I understand it may not be allowed for in all systems.

 

[wynn]

The question in hand is whether a moral relativist can be trusted, not whether you think it harder to trust, or requires more effort, or is more tolerant.

"So when you have your period, do you use tampons or pads?"

Would you think this the kind of question that is to be answered with a simple answer, such as "Tampons," "Pads," "Both," or "Neither" -?
Or would you find it pertinent to explain that as a male, you don't menstruate and thus the question doesn't actually apply to you to begin with?

There need be nothing compelling as the case has simply not been made that relativists are, by dint of being a relativist, to be considered untrustworthy.

Irrelevant, as the use of absolutism is merely as an example of difference to relativism. The question is a matter of whether relativists can be considered trustworthy.

And don't blame me for you misunderstanding the purpose of a reply: the point in the above question being that naming a specific morality is irrelevant in and of itself, as there is still nothing on which to judge.

Things are considered, and considered relevant or considered irrelevant, or considered trustowrthy or not considered trustworthy by people.

A consideration cannot take place outside of the mind of an actual person.

The idea that something can be relevant or irrelevant in and of itself, regardless of people considering it relevant or irrelevant, is nonsensical.

Unless, of course, you in fact argue for some kind of absolutism/objectivism in which people are completely irrelevant and ideas have inherent value in and of themselves.

 

[Sarkus]

The simple fact of the matter is that some people don't trust moral relativists.

It's not clear why a moral relativist (!) would have a problem with that.

See previous post about relativism not necessarily equating to tolerance.

Nobody said anything about "irrespective of the meta-ethical philosophy of the truster." That's your addition.

Of course it's my addition as I'm qualifying my statement to be irrespective of such... I.e. that it holds whether the truster is a relativist, an objectivist, universalist etc.

He'll tell you that.

You claimed to know that it wasn't the implication he made, but now you can't tell my why he wrote what he wrote if not to imply it? Makes me wonder why you bothered commenting on it in the first place.

"Moral judgements can differ across people, across societies" -- and? What would you like to suggest by pointing out that "moral judgements can differ across people, across societies" -?

To point out that it makes no difference what gives rise to the variation in morals: you were suggesting that it was only nature or nurture that a relativist considered, rather than perhaps deliberate effort or divine intervention, or indeed any other cause for the difference.

That's naive. Acknowledging something that is trivially true doesn't make one anything in particular. There's more necessary in order to be a relativist.

Such as?

In short:

Actions are either good or bad, depending on whether they lead to a particular goal or not.
Externally the same action that leads to one goal (and is thus good in regard to that goal), can be such that it detracts from another goal (and is thus bad in regard to that goal).
Not all goals are equally worthy.
In different circumstances, different actions may be necessary to achieve the same goal.
A person's morality may change over time, due to a variety of factors.
A deliberate effort to clarify one's morality is superior to the moral sense that may develop via nature, nurture, or coincidence.

So I am neither a simplistic objectivist, nor a simplistic relativist, nor a simplistic universalist nor absolutist, although my stance is, technically, a little bit of each.

Ah, the fence-sitter
Thanks for clarifying, though.

Okay. So how can moral relativists rightfully complain when they don't feel respected by other people?

The same way anyone else can, by judging their actions against my own code. Just because I accept that they may have different views does not mean I can not be offended by them. As previously stated, relativism does not necessarily equate to tolerance.

A person who deliberately invests in something is more predictable, more reliable. Those are positive traits.

Not universally they're not.

How on earth could one operate without apriori assumptions at all?! It's also called "having a standard to judge by." We all do that.

So we might as well ask: "If we assume that relativists are not to be trusted, can a moral relativist be trusted?"
Does that help?