Can a moral relativist be trusted?

[Syne]

Of course it will influence, but then of course the person could also be lying about whatever moral philosophy they adhere to.
Personally I wouldn't trust anyone (especially in such matters) on what they claimed, and would go on what else I knew of them (actions, reputations from people I trust etc).
I.e. How do we even trust what a person says about their moral philosophy if we don't have anything else with which to trust their honesty?

That is why I said "in part", as a person's own skill in judging others will weigh heavily on the accuracy of any appraisal. There is no substitute for such skill, and people lacking such are justifiably less trusting or others.

I also said "what they may know of the others' morality", which is not limited to what they are simply told. For example, if you know someone attends a Christian church regularly then you have some idea of both their morals and commitment.

It could, but that is to discount the strength of tendencies toward certain moral views based on the culture and society one is in.

Even within a give culture, there is a wide variance of adherence to the generally accepted moral norms. Psychopathy exists in any culture.

No, I say it isn't, as you are trusting someone's word without justification. Once you assume they are telling the truth then, yes, it is better than nothing, but how do you know it is correct / trustworthy without any experience.
Would you leave your child with a random stranger solely on the basis they claimed to be a Christian?

That completely depends on how my interaction with them went, no matter how brief. Did they offer that they were a Christian, completely unbidden or non sequitur? Did they otherwise tout their trustworthiness without any dispersion? Is everything I witness them say and do not completely congruent?

If the answer to any of these is yes, then they are not to be trusted, regardless of their claims. On the other hand, if the answers are no and they do follow a known and agreeable morality, they can generally be trusted.

A moral relativist would have to pass the same sort of social test, but with the added disadvantage of their specific morals being a significant unknown. And in such a case, asking direct questions about these unknowns is more likely to illicit a socially expected, rote response or an intentional lie.

So yes, the moral absolutist is still logically preferable.

And by the same measure there is no knowing if the person claiming to be a non-relativist is telling the truth - unless we have some way of trusting them, perhaps?
Which would put us back at square one.

It is called social skills.

 

[wynn]

The latter is not moral relativism at all, and I'm honestly not sure why you would think it is.

It's taking moral relativism to its logical conclusions, especially as they apply in a modern, fragmented, individualist, nominally egalitarian culture, which can hardly be called culture at all anymore.

The notion of moral relativism as "Moral relativism is based the observation that moral judgements seem dependent on the standards, norms and principles accepted by particular social groups at particular times" works fine enough in an idealistic model of culture that exists for traditional cultures, like 60 or more years ago. But not in the modern Western "culture," at least not for all the people in it, because more and more people just aren't typical parts of social groups anymore.

Yes, 'cos this is what moral relativists all say, all believe, all hold to be true.

When pressed, don't they?

Sure - psycopaths might often claim to hold to an objective morality. As such the mere statement of such is no guide to who they actually are.

Fortunately, we are often able to contextualize people's statements.
Like in another recent thread on enlightenment, where we were discussing what it says about a person who makes a point of claiming to be enlightened.

I might consider myself to have a Christian moraltiy - but merely because I was brought up in said society.

By that token, I have Christian morality too. But I don't consider myself having Christian morality, and I don't consider you to have Christian morality either. There's a lot more necessary to rightfully be considered as having a particularly morality than just being born and raised into a society that has a particular morality. There has to be at least an admission of such belonging, an acceptance by other members, and consistent practice. You and I lack on all three.

As someone who has diverged from your family and background of origin in terms of religion, you do not simply belong to Christian culture, which makes you a good example of the problem with the notion of culture as such I've talked about earlier.

Christians might feel comfortable in saying that Western society has basically Christian morality. Like one Christian once insisted that I have Christian morality, that I am looking up to Jesus, even though myself I am not a member of any Christian church. But this is just Christian imperialism, and some secular Westerners uncritically adopt it. Myself, I feel deeply offended by this notion, and resent the idea that I have a Christian morality. Neither Christians nor Christianity have monopoly on the kind of moderate morality I have.

A person's meta-ethical position determines what particular moral norms and with what priorities one will hold on to.

"Generally" does not make it necessarily so in all cases, so I think you have answered my point for me with your choice of words.

No it doesn't.
It might do, and it might generally be the case that there is an apparent correlation, but that does not make it necessarily true.

I suppose that looks so from your perspective of moral relativism, as your meta-ethical position determines what particular moral norms and with what priorities you hold on to.

I am a moral relativist. My morals are very much based on my upbringing, my Christian upbringing, my parents, the society in which I live etc.
My brother holds to an objective morality. He is Christian, and adheres fairly much to the very same Christian morality as I do - but has a rather different meta-ethical view.

I know personally that being born and raised into a particular society doesn't mean all that much, at least not anymore. At least in more recent times, it is perfectly possible to be born and raised into a particular society, and yet not belong to it, not be a member of it.

Why do you have an apparent desire to discredit moral relativists, because this does seem to be visibly biasing your arguments?

Actually, I would like to see that the moral relativists are right - with all the implications of their position.
If I am so vehemently against them, it's in the hope to see how they can refute my objections. Because if they can, then this would point toward their superiority.

 

[wynn]

Moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory that hypothesizes that people acquire their moral values from their cultures.

But this is possible only in traditional cultures to begin with, and such an understanding of moral relativism applies only in relation to traditional cultures. I already talked this above in reply to Sarkus.

Nothing says that the relativists can't believe that their own culture's view of things is preferable to a different culture's. Moral relativism predicts that they will most likely believe exactly that.

But this applies only for people who actually believe they belong to a particular culture. Again, that's something that may have applied typically 60 or more years ago.
In modern times, the tendency is toward fragmentation of society, toward individualism, and in this context, moral relativism comes to mean morality is individual, not cultural. (And from there, it is just a step to "anything goes.")

The relativist is just expressing the view that it's impossible for human beings to leave all moral culture behind so as to be able to make their moral judgements from some pristine and absolutely objective point of view.

I've never considered this dichotomy.

It seems to me that the modern moral relativist is expressing the view that it's impossible for human beings to actually belong to a moral culture, and that the only way we are able to make moral judgements is from some pristine and absolutely subjective/individual point of view.


The official meta-ethical discourse nowadays may still be the one from 50 or more years ago, but the actual situation has changed dramatically since then.

 

[Sarkus]

It's taking moral relativism to its logical conclusions, especially as they apply in a modern, fragmented, individualist, nominally egalitarian culture, which can hardly be called culture at all anymore.

I don't see it as being a logical conclusion. Maybe if you include any number of a priori assumptions along with it, then perhaps.
But moral relativism itself? No.

The notion of moral relativism as "Moral relativism is based the observation that moral judgements seem dependent on the standards, norms and principles accepted by particular social groups at particular times" works fine enough in an idealistic model of culture that exists for traditional cultures, like 60 or more years ago. But not in the modern Western "culture," at least not for all the people in it, because more and more people just aren't typical parts of social groups anymore.

One doesn't have to be "typical parts of social groups" at all... nor does one necessarily have morals that alter with every situation, or are in any way flexible once they have been entrenched through upbringing. You seem to be reading far more into the position than is actually there.

When pressed, don't they?

No.

Fortunately, we are often able to contextualize people's statements.
Like in another recent thread on enlightenment, where we were discussing what it says about a person who makes a point of claiming to be enlightened.

And I would argue that that contextualisation is most often through assessment of action - i.e. the practical.

By that token, I have Christian morality too. But I don't consider myself having Christian morality, and I don't consider you to have Christian morality either. There's a lot more necessary to rightfully be considered as having a particularly morality than just being born and raised into a society that has a particular morality. There has to be at least an admission of such belonging, an acceptance by other members, and consistent practice. You and I lack on all three.

Rubbish - not that we lack those three but that one needs those to be considered to have a Christian morality, or any specific form of morality.
Morality isn't about practice outside of the applicability of the morals, nor is it about acceptance within a community, nor is there a need for consistent practice outside the applicability of the morals.

As someone who has diverged from your family and background of origin in terms of religion, you do not simply belong to Christian culture, which makes you a good example of the problem with the notion of culture as such I've talked about earlier.

I'm not talking about belonging to their culture - but to have a shared morality.

Christians might feel comfortable in saying that Western society has basically Christian morality. Like one Christian once insisted that I have Christian morality, that I am looking up to Jesus, even though myself I am not a member of any Christian church. But this is just Christian imperialism, and some secular Westerners uncritically adopt it. Myself, I feel deeply offended by this notion, and resent the idea that I have a Christian morality. Neither Christians nor Christianity have monopoly on the kind of moderate morality I have.

I just consider it a shared morality - at least in most senses - but that says nothing about that which is outside the remit of the morality itself.

I suppose that looks so from your perspective of moral relativism, as your meta-ethical position determines what particular moral norms and with what priorities you hold on to.

My meta-ethical position determines nothing. You think a person has a choice over their morality? Sure, they can rationalise their way in or out of decisions, but their underlying morality will mostly be fixed at a rather early age - based on upbringing, society etc.

I know personally that being born and raised into a particular society doesn't mean all that much, at least not anymore. At least in more recent times, it is perfectly possible to be born and raised into a particular society, and yet not belong to it, not be a member of it.

And I would again argue that belonging to a society is not a requisite of having the morals of that society.

Actually, I would like to see that the moral relativists are right - with all the implications of their position.
If I am so vehemently against them, it's in the hope to see how they can refute my objections. Because if they can, then this would point toward their superiority.

Superiority in what??
And as for refuting your objections, they seem so entwined with any number of assumptions that you have introduced that I can not help thinking that you can not see the wood for the trees.

 

[Sarkus]

That is why I said "in part", as a person's own skill in judging others will weigh heavily on the accuracy of any appraisal. There is no substitute for such skill, and people lacking such are justifiably less trusting or others.

I also said "what they may know of the others' morality", which is not limited to what they are simply told. For example, if you know someone attends a Christian church regularly then you have some idea of both their morals and commitment.

Not at all - I know people who attend a Christian church that I would never leave any child with! Christians are not all equal just because they may attend the same church.

Even within a give culture, there is a wide variance of adherence to the generally accepted moral norms. Psychopathy exists in any culture.

Exactly - and in matters of trust, how much can you go purely on the word of a person?
That completely depends on how my interaction with them went, no matter how brief. Did they offer that they were a Christian, completely unbidden or non sequitur? Did they otherwise tout their trustworthiness without any dispersion? Is everything I witness them say and do not completely congruent?

If the answer to any of these is yes, then they are not to be trusted, regardless of their claims. On the other hand, if the answers are no and they do follow a known and agreeable morality, they can generally be trusted. [/quote]You seem to be arguing my point for me in that we go by practical matters - rather than just the words themselves. And yes, I consider it a practical matter for someone to offer info unbidden etc... as the important matter is in when/how they gave the info, rather than just the info itself.

A moral relativist would have to pass the same sort of social test, but with the added disadvantage of their specific morals being a significant unknown. And in such a case, asking direct questions about these unknowns is more likely to illicit a socially expected, rote response or an intentional lie.

Why would it? Is that not introducing an a priori assumption of the nature of the person?
Why would the person not just as likely tell the truth?

So yes, the moral absolutist is still logically preferable.

As long as you can trust what they say... and as long as you don't introduce a priori assumptions about the nature of the relativist.
Personally I judge neither on their stated meta-ethical position: it might inform how I judge their actions and other responses in a discussion, but I don't think it significant in and of itself.
So no, the moral absolutist is not still logically preferable, in my view.

It is called social skills.

Sure - but now you're moving away from someone merely indicating their meta-ethical position, and judging them on the rest of the info you get from them (including their practical aspects while giving the info).
Sure, the meta-ethical position can help us guide the questioning / interrogation, but in and of itself I do not consider it of any real value, and certainly not something that in and of itself gives any logical advantage one way or the other... in and of itself it is neutral, and merely a reference point for other information.

 

[Syne]

Not at all - I know people who attend a Christian church that I would never leave any child with! Christians are not all equal just because they may attend the same church.

I do not know what "the same church" has to do with anything, but I said it would give you "some idea". Nothing is foolproof.

Exactly - and in matters of trust, how much can you go purely on the word of a person?

You seem to be arguing my point for me in that we go by practical matters - rather than just the words themselves. And yes, I consider it a practical matter for someone to offer info unbidden etc... as the important matter is in when/how they gave the info, rather than just the info itself.

I never even implied that we could go solely on the word of a person, only that what we may know of their morality is a significant factor. What we may know includes things like their congruity with what we know of their morality, but being able to judge that congruity relies heavily on knowing something about their morality in the first place.

You seemed to imply earlier that you would consider it a significant factor if you knew someone was "amoral, or who adheres to moral nihilism". Moral relativism just suffers from a lessor degree of uncertainty and/or mistrust, but all moralities fit somewhere on the same spectrum.

A moral relativist would have to pass the same sort of social test, but with the added disadvantage of their specific morals being a significant unknown. And in such a case, asking direct questions about these unknowns is more likely to illicit a socially expected, rote response or an intentional lie.

Why would it? Is that not introducing an a priori assumption of the nature of the person?
Why would the person not just as likely tell the truth?

It is simple logic. The more unknowns about a person, the less trust they inspire. It is also simple logic that a person who espouses a morality they believe is highly dependent upon their culture, will answer any related question in a way that is socially expected, whether honest or not.

So yes, the moral absolutist is still logically preferable.

As long as you can trust what they say... and as long as you don't introduce a priori assumptions about the nature of the relativist.
Personally I judge neither on their stated meta-ethical position: it might inform how I judge their actions and other responses in a discussion, but I don't think it significant in and of itself.
So no, the moral absolutist is not still logically preferable, in my view.

Then you must have some knowledge of any given moral relativist's specific morals that is not available to anyone else. A moral relativist can espouse anything from amorality or nihilism to Buddhism. So between moral relativism and a specified morality (which just tends to be absolute or at least well-defined), a specific morality is the only logical preference.

As I said before, the espoused morality is significant in having some basis on which to judge general congruity. Moral relativism itself tells us nothing useful, so it is no surprise that a moral relativist would not find that info helpful. You just judge all other moralities by your own standard, and you find that standard wanting in judging others.

No surprise there.

Sure - but now you're moving away from someone merely indicating their meta-ethical position, and judging them on the rest of the info you get from them (including their practical aspects while giving the info).
Sure, the meta-ethical position can help us guide the questioning / interrogation, but in and of itself I do not consider it of any real value, and certainly not something that in and of itself gives any logical advantage one way or the other... in and of itself it is neutral, and merely a reference point for other information.

Where have I even implied that stated morality alone is sufficient? I said it was significant, not sufficient. But you seem to be agreeing that knowing a person's specific morality can "help us guide the questioning/interrogation" in judging congruity. How does something that helps make a judgement have no real value?

Again, moral relativism does not provide any specific moral info where a specified morality does. You cannot judge a person's congruity without any specific info.

 

[Sarkus]

I never even implied that we could go solely on the word of a person, only that what we may know of their morality is a significant factor. What we may know includes things like their congruity with what we know of their morality, but being able to judge that congruity relies heavily on knowing something about their morality in the first place.

Which we can only know, or corroborate through other information - which we would need to do regardless of what meta-ethical philosophy they claim to adhere to.
To me this logically leads to the conclusion that one espousing moral relativism is no grounds alone for the assessment of trustworthiness.
If we're also going on all the other information that an interview would entail, then the question is trivial, unless their meta-ethical philosophy alone indicates untrustworthiness - which is what this thread is about: "Can a moral relativist be trusted?".

You seemed to imply earlier that you would consider it a significant factor if you knew someone was "amoral, or who adheres to moral nihilism". Moral relativism just suffers from a lessor degree of uncertainty and/or mistrust, but all moralities fit somewhere on the same spectrum.

There is a significant and non-trivial difference between having no morality at all and a morality that one considers to be based on upbringing and subjective matters (i.e. not objective).

It is simple logic. The more unknowns about a person, the less trust they inspire. It is also simple logic that a person who espouses a morality they believe is highly dependent upon their culture, will answer any related question in a way that is socially expected, whether honest or not.

There is ZERO logic at all in what you state. What you describe simply is not moral relativism, and is no part of moral relativism.
This is merely your idea of what it entails.
A moral relativist HAS morals... so where on earth do you get this bizarre notion that they would therefore be any more or less dishonest?
Being a moral relativist does NOT mean that they necessarily adhere to social norms, nor that they would simply state a socially expected answer, or anything else along this line of thinking. It merely means that they think their morals are subjective - not that they have no morals.
It is possible that they might adhere to the moral norms of their society - but that is completely different to what you state above.

Then you must have some knowledge of any given moral relativist's specific morals that is not available to anyone else. A moral relativist can espouse anything from amorality or nihilism to Buddhism. So between moral relativism and a specified morality (which just tends to be absolute or at least well-defined), a specific morality is the only logical preference.

Not at all - as one can only assess their adherence to any specified morality through the same process as assessing their actual morality. So whether they espouse one morality or another is of no difference in and of itself.

As I said before, the espoused morality is significant in having some basis on which to judge general congruity. Moral relativism itself tells us nothing useful, so it is no surprise that a moral relativist would not find that info helpful. You just judge all other moralities by your own standard, and you find that standard wanting in judging others.

Being a helpful answer or not is no indication of trustworthiness.
Would you prefer the person lies about their meta-ethical position if asked?
The question is whether it is grounds alone to deem someone untrustworthy: "Can a moral relativist be trusted?" - not whether it would take additional effort to establish such.

Furthermore, if the person asking the question is a moral absolutist then they must hold that morals are objective - and thus why would they not merely assume that everyone has the same morals, that everyone has the same sense of what is right and wrong? To such a person, how can the question even be relevant, when the important matter is actually whether they consider the person to act in accordance with those morals.

Where have I even implied that stated morality alone is sufficient? I said it was significant, not sufficient. But you seem to be agreeing that knowing a person's specific morality can "help us guide the questioning/interrogation" in judging congruity. How does something that helps make a judgement have no real value?

It has value in enabling a fine-tuning of any questioning, of perhaps reducing the time taken to establish the trustworthiness or not - but in and of itself is of no value to the specific question of trustworthiness.

Again, moral relativism does not provide any specific moral info where a specified morality does. You cannot judge a person's congruity without any specific info.

No - you may have to dig deeper. And since when is a case of "It requires additional effort: therefore he must be untrustworthy!"??
And, as stated, why would a moral absolutist even question the meta-ethical philosophy of someone else, when they judge according to their own, and they consider their own to be the same as everyone else's?

But you also seem to be thinking that moral relativists will choose to lie, be dishonest, more than other people?
As said, I most likely have the same morals as my brother - yet we have very different meta-ethical philosophies.
Why would I be any more or less trustworthy as him just because I consider morals to be subjective, and he considers them objective? Whether we think one way or the other, we both have the same morals.
But according to you I could change mine at a whim, to suit the situation, would lie or be dishonest to give a socially accepted answer.
I honestly don't think you have a particularly good grasp of what moral relativism is, and are confusing it with either amoralism or moral nihilism.

 

[Syne]

What we may know includes things like their congruity with what we know of their morality, but being able to judge that congruity relies heavily on knowing something about their morality in the first place.

Which we can only know, or corroborate through other information - which we would need to do regardless of what meta-ethical philosophy they claim to adhere to.
To me this logically leads to the conclusion that one espousing moral relativism is no grounds alone for the assessment of trustworthiness.
If we're also going on all the other information that an interview would entail, then the question is trivial, unless their meta-ethical philosophy alone indicates untrustworthiness - which is what this thread is about: "Can a moral relativist be trusted?".

You cannot "corroborate" information you do not possess, and moral relativism, alone, offers scant info. Lack of information logically promotes distrust.

As I have already said, meta-ethical moral relativism is defined as a view which holds that there is no objective right or wrong. That alone is enough to question the conviction in whatever unknown morality the moral relativist may espouse. If the relativist himself cannot defend his own morality as objectively better than any other, why should anyone expect their morality to be any more virtuous? If all moralities are objectively equal, then what is to keep a relativist from changing their moral stance due to situational or self-serving factors?

Nothing, and by their own admission.

There is a significant and non-trivial difference between having no morality at all and a morality that one considers to be based on upbringing and subjective matters (i.e. not objective).

Only a matter of degree.

It is simple logic. The more unknowns about a person, the less trust they inspire. It is also simple logic that a person who espouses a morality they believe is highly dependent upon their culture, will answer any related question in a way that is socially expected, whether honest or not.

There is ZERO logic at all in what you state. What you describe simply is not moral relativism, and is no part of moral relativism.
This is merely your idea of what it entails.
A moral relativist HAS morals... so where on earth do you get this bizarre notion that they would therefore be any more or less dishonest?
Being a moral relativist does NOT mean that they necessarily adhere to social norms, nor that they would simply state a socially expected answer, or anything else along this line of thinking. It merely means that they think their morals are subjective - not that they have no morals.
It is possible that they might adhere to the moral norms of their society - but that is completely different to what you state above.

Who said anything about a relativist being any more or less dishonest? I said "honest or not". If they are moral, they will reply as socially expected (since their morality derives from their culture). And it is trivial that those who have a socially questionable morality will lie about it.

You are getting needlessly defensive and imagining strawman arguments I have not even implied. I never said anything about relativists lacking morals of some kind.

Meta-ethical relativists are, firstly, descriptive relativists: they believe that, given the same set of facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one ought to do (based on societal or individual norms). - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism#Meta-ethical​

If you can find any definition of what the contradictory "individual norms" may be, I am all ears. Norms are necessarily aggregated.

Not at all - as one can only assess their adherence to any specified morality through the same process as assessing their actual morality. So whether they espouse one morality or another is of no difference in and of itself.

No, you must first take more time to learn what their morality entails, which is not a problem for readily known moralities.

So which is it? Is the moral relativist likely to follow social norms or is it a liability that we cannot make that assumption, and must first discover their morality?

Being a helpful answer or not is no indication of trustworthiness.
Would you prefer the person lies about their meta-ethical position if asked?
The question is whether it is grounds alone to deem someone untrustworthy: "Can a moral relativist be trusted?" - not whether it would take additional effort to establish such.

Already addressed above.

Furthermore, if the person asking the question is a moral absolutist then they must hold that morals are objective - and thus why would they not merely assume that everyone has the same morals, that everyone has the same sense of what is right and wrong? To such a person, how can the question even be relevant, when the important matter is actually whether they consider the person to act in accordance with those morals.

Again, we cycle back to my original point. A moral absolutist uses their morality to judge the actions of others (after the fact), but uses knowledge of the others' morality to estimate their future action (i.e. trust). Yes, people do tend to make very general assumptions about others based on their own perception of themselves, but the OP asks very pointed and crucial questions where this tendency cannot be relied on.

And again, what morals can we assume any given moral relativist to possess? You have asserted that we cannot rely on them to conform to social norms, and that you have no special insight into them either.

No - you may have to dig deeper. And since when is a case of "It requires additional effort: therefore he must be untrustworthy!"??
And, as stated, why would a moral absolutist even question the meta-ethical philosophy of someone else, when they judge according to their own, and they consider their own to be the same as everyone else's?

Wow, that is a wildly unsupported assumption. How can you justify assuming a moral absolutist considers their own morals to be the same as everyone else?

It is trivial that requiring "additional effort" means less readily available information, and that less information logically promotes distrust.

And again, actions are only judged after the fact in accordance with one's morality. The OP is asking about trust not judgement in general. Trust is estimated by known motivations (i.e. morality) of future possible actions.

But you also seem to be thinking that moral relativists will choose to lie, be dishonest, more than other people?

I never said moral relativists would lie any more or less than others.

As said, I most likely have the same morals as my brother - yet we have very different meta-ethical philosophies.
Why would I be any more or less trustworthy as him just because I consider morals to be subjective, and he considers them objective? Whether we think one way or the other, we both have the same morals.
But according to you I could change mine at a whim, to suit the situation, would lie or be dishonest to give a socially accepted answer.
I honestly don't think you have a particularly good grasp of what moral relativism is, and are confusing it with either amoralism or moral nihilism.

Think about this for a moment.

Why do we trust science, or the scientific method? We trust it because it is objective. We consider subjective experience to be anecdotal and only to be tentatively trusted when we lack any other evidence. Thus to people who believe that objective morality exists, a subjective morality is much less reliable.

But according to you, nothing is objectively right or wrong, and you cannot be counted on to adhere to social norms. Subjective experience is not an insignificant liability (which is why science tries to manage its influence), and if the person's morality is circumstance-dependent, there is no confidence that their subjective nature will illicit a self-serving motivation.

 

[wynn]

A moral relativist HAS morals... so where on earth do you get this bizarre notion that they would therefore be any more or less dishonest?

It's a matter of comparing the relativist stance with the absolutist one.

Being a moral relativist does NOT mean that they necessarily adhere to social norms, nor that they would simply state a socially expected answer, or anything else along this line of thinking. It merely means that they think their morals are subjective - not that they have no morals.

And generally, subjectivity is suspect in our culture, and possibly in most others as well.

Although subjectivity and individualism are sometimes praised, they aren't always. Morality is one such area where it is suspect.

Furthermore, if the person asking the question is a moral absolutist then they must hold that morals are objective - and thus why would they not merely assume that everyone has the same morals, that everyone has the same sense of what is right and wrong?

No. It should be:
If the person asking the question is a moral absolutist then they must hold that morals are objective - and thus they would assume that everyone should have the same morals, that everyone should have the same sense of what is right and wrong.

For an absolutist, any aberration from what they believe to be the norm, is a sign of inferiority or pathology.

(Most people appear to hold to this anyway, whether they consider themselves to be absolutists or not.)

And, as stated, why would a moral absolutist even question the meta-ethical philosophy of someone else, when they judge according to their own, and they consider their own to be the same as everyone else's?

Again, an absolutist doesn't consider everyone's morality to already be the same.
The questioning is necessary in order to establish whether the questioned person manifests aberrations.

But you also seem to be thinking that moral relativists will choose to lie, be dishonest, more than other people?

Moral relativists are more likely to be unpredictable. Unpredictable and untrustworthy go hand in hand.

Why would I be any more or less trustworthy as him just because I consider morals to be subjective, and he considers them objective? Whether we think one way or the other, we both have the same morals.

Because he finds that his morality is bound to a higher principle, he's more likely than you to be consistent and persistent in applying his morality. Which is a positive factor for trusting him more than you.

Here's an important point about trust though: there is the sort of trust of "I trust I can leave my children with this person and this person will look after them well" and then there is the trust of "This person will most likely always be a loser/criminal, so there is no point in counting on them to look after my children well."
In both cases, there is a trust, although here, the emphasis is on predictability. For example, an outspoken Nazi can be trusted to continue to be so for the foreseeable time. We tend to experience a kind of ease with people who are direct and defintive in their stances, regardless of what their stances are; it's the directness, the definitveness that gives us that ease, even trust.

I honestly don't think you have a particularly good grasp of what moral relativism is, and are confusing it with either amoralism or moral nihilism.

Because amoralism and nihilism is what relativism can fade into. IRL, it doesn't always, but it is a possible logical conclusion.

 

[wynn]

I don't see it as being a logical conclusion. Maybe if you include any number of a priori assumptions along with it, then perhaps.
But moral relativism itself? No.
One doesn't have to be "typical parts of social groups" at all... nor does one necessarily have morals that alter with every situation, or are in any way flexible once they have been entrenched through upbringing. You seem to be reading far more into the position than is actually there.

I'm applying the relativist position to real world situations.

And I would argue that that contextualisation is most often through assessment of action - i.e. the practical.

The problem with assessing people by their actions is that, except in rare cases of apparent aberrations, we have no way of knowing why exactly it happened or how it was motivated.

When all you know is that a drunk driver caused a collision in which another driver was killed - that tells you what exactly about the first driver's morality?
Maybe he was deliberately drunk driving. Maybe he urgently had to go somewhere, and had no other means of transportation. Maybe he was being blackmailed. Maybe ... The action itself doesn't reveal much.
This is why courts of law allow for consideration of extenuating circumstances.

Rubbish - not that we lack those three but that one needs those to be considered to have a Christian morality, or any specific form of morality.
Morality isn't about practice outside of the applicability of the morals, nor is it about acceptance within a community, nor is there a need for consistent practice outside the applicability of the morals.

So how then do you suggest that a person's morality be assessed and named? Simply by the power of their verbal claim?

I'm not talking about belonging to their culture - but to have a shared morality.

Then why call it "Christian" then?

My meta-ethical position determines nothing. You think a person has a choice over their morality? Sure, they can rationalise their way in or out of decisions, but their underlying morality will mostly be fixed at a rather early age - based on upbringing, society etc.

Well, it's telling that it is only recently that you have first heard about the concept of the proper formation of conscience. It's a central concept in Catholicism involving a deliberate effort to form one's morality.

Superiority in what??

In everything.

And as for refuting your objections, they seem so entwined with any number of assumptions that you have introduced that I can not help thinking that you can not see the wood for the trees.

Gee, thanks.

 

[wynn]

I never even implied that we could go solely on the word of a person, only that what we may know of their morality is a significant factor. What we may know includes things like their congruity with what we know of their morality, but being able to judge that congruity relies heavily on knowing something about their morality in the first place.

You seemed to imply earlier that you would consider it a significant factor if you knew someone was "amoral, or who adheres to moral nihilism". Moral relativism just suffers from a lessor degree of uncertainty and/or mistrust, but all moralities fit somewhere on the same spectrum.

Maybe I am too idealistic on this, but I think there may on principle exist a philosophical outlook adhering to which it may be possible to adequately assess another person simply via an interview.

A basic example of such an outlook are old practices of oaths where an oath was so significant that a person could not lie about it and would be automatically bound by it once making it.
Another is trial by ordeal.
It would be ideal to devise questions answering which would bring about the same truth-revealing effect as oaths and ordeals.

 

[Sarkus]

You cannot "corroborate" information you do not possess, and moral relativism, alone, offers scant info. Lack of information logically promotes distrust.

So you would trust someone who said that they held Christian morals, without further corroboration??
My point is that one's meta-ethical philosophy is no ground for distrusting - and is no more or less information than claiming to be a moral absolutist.
If you want to move the goalposts to one of "lack of information is grounds for distrusting" then be my guest - but the issue in hand, per the OP, is whether a moral relativist can be trusted - not merely whether the lack of information that "I am a moral-relativist" supplies promotes or hinders trust - but whether the moral relativist - by dint of being such - is to be trusted or not.

Anything outside of this is simply a red-herring.

As I have already said, meta-ethical moral relativism is defined as a view which holds that there is no objective right or wrong. That alone is enough to question the conviction in whatever unknown morality the moral relativist may espouse. If the relativist himself cannot defend his own morality as objectively better than any other, why should anyone expect their morality to be any more virtuous? If all moralities are objectively equal, then what is to keep a relativist from changing their moral stance due to situational or self-serving factors?

Nothing, and by their own admission.

It is no less difficult or easy for a moral relativist to change their moral position than it is for a moral absolutist.
Perhaps you can provide support that shows relativists are prone to changing them more easily, more frequently?
Otherwise this is just unsupported wishful thinking on your part, and a continuing confusion of relativism with amoralism.
A relativist does not, "by their own admission", say that they change their moral stance due to situational or self-serving factors. They merely say, for example, that one culture may have different morals than another.

Only a matter of degree.

Yes, like atheism is merely a matter of degree of belief in god.

Who said anything about a relativist being any more or less dishonest? I said "honest or not". If they are moral, they will reply as socially expected (since their morality derives from their culture). And it is trivial that those who have a socially questionable morality will lie about it.

The emphasis was that they would give a socially expected answer "honest or not"... and the implication is that only a moral relativist would do this, and moral absolutists wouldn't.
What you exampled is nothing to do with one's meta-ethical philosophy but with ones actual morals!

You are getting needlessly defensive and imagining strawman arguments I have not even implied. I never said anything about relativists lacking morals of some kind.

If you can't understand the implications of your own arguments... :shrug:

What you are doing is giving examples of actions from a lack of morals and attributing them to moral relativists.
You are, for whatever reason, conflating the two positions: moral relativism and moral nihilism (or amoralism).

If you can find any definition of what the contradictory "individual norms" may be, I am all ears. Norms are necessarily aggregated.

In this context, individual norms would be those of a far smaller group than society as a whole, and if a group of people are discussing, and are each from a different society, they would have individual norms compared to the others in that discussion group.

No, you must first take more time to learn what their morality entails, which is not a problem for readily known moralities.

Sure - so move the goalposts to one of lack of information.

So which is it? Is the moral relativist likely to follow social norms or is it a liability that we cannot make that assumption, and must first discover their morality?

My view is that the moral relativist almost certainly has the vast majority of their morals taken from their society. And if you were to know nothing of their meta-ethical position you would not be able to tell any difference between them and their neighbour in such regards.

Again, we cycle back to my original point. A moral absolutist uses their morality to judge the actions of others (after the fact), but uses knowledge of the others' morality to estimate their future action (i.e. trust). Yes, people do tend to make very general assumptions about others based on their own perception of themselves, but the OP asks very pointed and crucial questions where this tendency cannot be relied on.

Yet it can be, and is only through a priori assumptions that they hold that they would ever consider the moral relativist to be any more or less untrustworthy than a moral absolutist.
Espousing a meta-ethical philosophy does not mean one adheres to it, or even what it might entail.
The question is whether being a moral relativist itself is grounds for being untrustworthy... and nothing you have argued suggests that it should be... unless you conflate relativism with amoralism, or you consider moral relativism to be a lack of information and thus deem people untrustworthy as a result.

And again, what morals can we assume any given moral relativist to possess? You have asserted that we cannot rely on them to conform to social norms, and that you have no special insight into them either.

And what morals can we assume any given moral absolutist to possess? Can we rely on them to adhere to any morals they may claim to possess?
In my view the espousing of a moral code, and the meta-ethical philosophy itself are both netural with regards trustworthiness - nothing on which to base trustworthiness nor untrustworthiness.

Wow, that is a wildly unsupported assumption. How can you justify assuming a moral absolutist considers their own morals to be the same as everyone else?

So if they're not the same, they are all relative???
If a moral absolutist considers stealing to be immoral, then it would be irrespective of situation, of society, of consequence etc. So even if someone else who held that stealing in certain situations was moral (e.g. if they were starving), the moral absolutist would hold it to be immoral. In other words they would not care what the other person's claimed morality was, they would deem it to be immoral, and treat the person as having been immoral for stealing.
They therefore insist that everyone has the same morality, and judge accordingly.
As soon as they accept that someone has an acceptable different morality than them then they are relativists.

It is trivial that requiring "additional effort" means less readily available information, and that less information logically promotes distrust.

Can we please put the goalposts back?

And again, actions are only judged after the fact in accordance with one's morality. The OP is asking about trust not judgement in general. Trust is estimated by known motivations (i.e. morality) of future possible actions.

And if we have nothing on which to base the truth of their claims about their morals?

I never said moral relativists would lie any more or less than others.

You implied - by the wording of your example specific to moral relativists.

Think about this for a moment.

Why do we trust science, or the scientific method? We trust it because it is objective. We consider subjective experience to be anecdotal and only to be tentatively trusted when we lack any other evidence. Thus to people who believe that objective morality exists, a subjective morality is much less reliable.

Yet science is based on repeatable performance in exactly the same situation. This is where it differs to human activity: scenarios are very rarely exactly the same for everyone involved.
Your comparison would hold if you had the same people involved in the same situation... then their morals should not change. This would give you an objective view of those peoples' morals in that specific situation.

But according to you, nothing is objectively right or wrong, and you cannot be counted on to adhere to social norms. Subjective experience is not an insignificant liability (which is why science tries to manage its influence), and if the person's morality is circumstance-dependent, there is no confidence that their subjective nature will illicit a self-serving motivation.

So, taking this to the extreme, the moral relativist will therefore claim a moral absolutist meta-ethical philosophy. So everyone will claim an asbsolutist meta-ethical philosophy (true for the absolutists, self-serving for the relativist) and therefore the claim of a meta-ethical philosophy becomes no yardstick at all.

Further, there is no confidence that anyone will not seek a self-serving conclusion, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy.
Throughout you are assuming that moral absolutist are incapable of such, or much less so than the relativist.
You seem to have a picture in your head of relativists being devious, conniving, scheming, self-serving - when all they claim is that one society's morals might be different to another's. Everything else you attribute to the relativist is attributable to people equally, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy.

 

[Sarkus]

And generally, subjectivity is suspect in our culture, and possibly in most others as well.

Although subjectivity and individualism are sometimes praised, they aren't always. Morality is one such area where it is suspect.

And this discussion is whether it should be, not whether it generally is: it is clear that others think it is, but I have not seen a convincing argument for it yet.

No. It should be:
If the person asking the question is a moral absolutist then they must hold that morals are objective - and thus they would assume that everyone should have the same morals, that everyone should have the same sense of what is right and wrong.

For an absolutist, any aberration from what they believe to be the norm, is a sign of inferiority or pathology.

I think "should" and "has" are logically from the same place: they think the person "should" have the same sense, and actually "has" them, but chooses to go against them.
As soon as they allow themselves to accept that the other person's moral compass is different then they are a relativist, regardless of whether they agree with that person or not.

Again, an absolutist doesn't consider everyone's morality to already be the same.
The questioning is necessary in order to establish whether the questioned person manifests aberrations.

Then the moral absolutist would consider the person to be immoral in some regards, as they "should" have the same morals.

And this just adds further that if they accept that others may have a different compass that allows what they see as immorality, surely it makes no different whether the interviewee claims to be absolutists or relativists - as they would still need to explain their morals - so that the interviewer can establish the necessary detail.
I.e. the meta-ethical philosophy itself is neutral.

Moral relativists are more likely to be unpredictable. Unpredictable and untrustworthy go hand in hand.

Why would they be unpredictable - they are more likely to stick to the societal norms on the large issues, and are just as human as the next person when it comes to the more detailed.

Because he finds that his morality is bound to a higher principle, he's more likely than you to be consistent and persistent in applying his morality. Which is a positive factor for trusting him more than you.

Why would they be more consistent and persistent? Where is the support for this claim?
If a moral absolutist considers stealing to be wrong, would they be any more or less likely to do so if they were starving, for example?

Here's an important point about trust though: there is the sort of trust of "I trust I can leave my children with this person and this person will look after them well" and then there is the trust of "This person will most likely always be a loser/criminal, so there is no point in counting on them to look after my children well."
In both cases, there is a trust, although here, the emphasis is on predictability. For example, an outspoken Nazi can be trusted to continue to be so for the foreseeable time. We tend to experience a kind of ease with people who are direct and defintive in their stances, regardless of what their stances are; it's the directness, the definitveness that gives us that ease, even trust.

Sure. But the question is not whether one is more trustworthy or not, rather whether being a moral relativist should be considered untrustworthy.

Because amoralism and nihilism is what relativism can fade into. IRL, it doesn't always, but it is a possible logical conclusion.

If that is what you think then the point at which you "fade into" amoralism and nihilism you are no longer a moral relativist - so conflating the two remains fallacious.
Further, even a moral absolutist can become amoral.

 

[Sarkus]

I'm applying the relativist position to real world situations.

I don't think you are - but instead applying amoralism.

The problem with assessing people by their actions is that, except in rare cases of apparent aberrations, we have no way of knowing why exactly it happened or how it was motivated.

When all you know is that a drunk driver caused a collision in which another driver was killed - that tells you what exactly about the first driver's morality?
Maybe he was deliberately drunk driving. Maybe he urgently had to go somewhere, and had no other means of transportation. Maybe he was being blackmailed. Maybe ... The action itself doesn't reveal much.
This is why courts of law allow for consideration of extenuating circumstances.

Sure - nothing can be perfect - if it was then "trust" wouldn't be a factor.

So how then do you suggest that a person's morality be assessed and named? Simply by the power of their verbal claim?

A person's morality should be assessed the same regardless of meta-ethical philosophy - which is why I consider the meta-ethical to be neutral in matters of trustworthiness. I.e. I simply consider it not important to the assessment of trustworthiness.

Then why call it "Christian" then?

Because, in matters of what I might consider good or bad, it adheres predominantly to the Christian morality at least at the top level (i.e. I consider stealing on the whole to be wrong, but not in all situations), and in the Western society this gives a fairly quick understanding of what that might entail.
Is it 100% Christian? No.
If someone was looking for a more detailed analysis I would say that it is "(loosely) based on" Christian morality.
But you're right, I wouldn't refer to it as Christian in the strictest sense.
But I stress again that it has nothing to do with whether I belong to their churches, their community, whether I attend mass etc.

Well, it's telling that it is only recently that you have first heard about the concept of the proper formation of conscience. It's a central concept in Catholicism involving a deliberate effort to form one's morality.

Consider my Catholic schools to be remiss in this regard.
I might have reverted to atheism much earlier if I had known about this back then.

In everything.

I think you expect too much.

Gee, thanks.

Any time.

 

[wynn]

So you would trust someone who said that they held Christian morals, without further corroboration??
My point is that one's meta-ethical philosophy is no ground for distrusting - and is no more or less information than claiming to be a moral absolutist.
If you want to move the goalposts to one of "lack of information is grounds for distrusting" then be my guest - but the issue in hand, per the OP, is whether a moral relativist can be trusted - not merely whether the lack of information that "I am a moral-relativist" supplies promotes or hinders trust - but whether the moral relativist - by dint of being such - is to be trusted or not.

Trust is something interpersonally subjective, something that exists between two people and requires effort on both their parts.
Although we often use the qualifier "trustworty" is an objective-like sense, in much the way we use the qualifier "black," "from London" or "female" - qualifiers which are experienced/perceived the same way by all, trustworthiness is not that kind of qualifier.
The same person can, on the grounds of the same information, appear trustworthy to one person, and not trustworthy to another person.
"Is this person male?" is not the same kind of question as "Is this person trustworthy?" - even though we'd often like to treat them as being the same.

So, again, all other things remaining the same, whether a person is perceived as trustworthy or not, depends on the meta-ethical position of the potential truster.

Yes, like atheism is merely a matter of degree of belief in god.

From some theistic perspectives, it is precisely that.

The emphasis was that they would give a socially expected answer "honest or not"... and the implication is that only a moral relativist would do this, and moral absolutists wouldn't.

No, that's not the implication.

My view is that the moral relativist almost certainly has the vast majority of their morals taken from their society.

That assumes that it is to be taken for granted that an individual's morality is a mixture of nature and esp. nurture. And not perhaps the result of the person's deliberate effort or divine intervention.

My default is to assume that a person's morality is mainly the result of their own deliberate effort. So things look different from my perspective. One of the implications of this perspective is that moral relativists are refusing to take responsibility for their morality when they conveniently ascribe it to nature and nurture.

The question is whether being a moral relativist itself is grounds for being untrustworthy...

Do you find that trustworthiness is the kind of qualifier like color of skin, age, city of origin, gender, ..?

And what morals can we assume any given moral absolutist to possess? Can we rely on them to adhere to any morals they may claim to possess?

No, but I think they may have invested more conscience, more deliberate effort into their morality, and on that count, may be more predictable, more reliable.

If a moral absolutist considers stealing to be immoral, then it would be irrespective of situation, of society, of consequence etc. So even if someone else who held that stealing in certain situations was moral (e.g. if they were starving), the moral absolutist would hold it to be immoral. In other words they would not care what the other person's claimed morality was, they would deem it to be immoral, and treat the person as having been immoral for stealing.

No, this is a very skewed presentation of absolutism. I suppose some absolutists might be like that, but not all. What you are talking about is complete decontextualization, not absolutism.

So, taking this to the extreme, the moral relativist will therefore claim a moral absolutist meta-ethical philosophy. So everyone will claim an asbsolutist meta-ethical philosophy

Indeed.

and therefore the claim of a meta-ethical philosophy becomes no yardstick at all.

It is a yardstick, depending on the stated meta-ethical position and the meta-ethical position of the one making the assessment of a meta-ethical position.

Further, there is no confidence that anyone will not seek a self-serving conclusion, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy.

This is not necessarily a problem or a flaw. There is often the underlying assumption that in order to be moral, one sometimes has to act to one's disadvantage. And indeed, some particular moral systems (systems of beliefs and values) may be such. Esp. materialistic systems suffer from this problem. But I don't think it is an inherent problem of all morality as such. There are theistic moral systems, for example, acting in line with which it is impossible to act to one's disadvantage (although such a person's actions may be perceived as such by people who hold to other moral systems; such as abstaining from sex and alcohol is by some people considered to be an act of depriving oneself, but not for the person who holds to that theistic system).

It's important to initiate interactions with others in such a way that both parties benefit, and come to such an agreement that both parties are interested in keeping to the agreement, because by keeping to it they both benefit the most.

However, initiating such interactions and coming to such agreement can require quite a bit of skills, resources and opportunity, which not everyone has.

You seem to have a picture in your head of relativists being devious, conniving, scheming, self-serving - when all they claim is that one society's morals might be different to another's. Everything else you attribute to the relativist is attributable to people equally, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy.

There are the academic definitions of "moral relativism" and then there are the actual RL definitions. And the two can differ. Not all RL moral relativists humbly limit themselves to claiming "that one society's morals might be different to another's."
If you want to argue from RL examples of moral relativists, then you need to get the people in line who claim to be moral relativists. This variety among people who claim to be moral relativists is probably yet another factor for moral relativism's bad reputation.

 

[wynn]

And this discussion is whether it should be, not whether it generally is: it is clear that others think it is, but I have not seen a convincing argument for it yet.

And I don't think there can be a convincing argument one way or another. The fact of the matter is that humans are both relatively self-sufficient, but also relatively dependent on each other. If it would be just one or the other, it would be easy enough to come up with a definitive argument one way or another.

I think "should" and "has" are logically from the same place: they think the person "should" have the same sense, and actually "has" them, but chooses to go against them.

No, that's the fire-and-brimstone Christian talking.
Since there may be many reasons for why a person doesn't have the morality that one thinks they should have, it's not a matter of mere choice. It could be due to choice, it could be due to mental illness, it could be due to some kind of depravity, and more. This is why should and has are not the same.

As soon as they allow themselves to accept that the other person's moral compass is different then they are a relativist, regardless of whether they agree with that person or not.

No. As you say later:

Then the moral absolutist would consider the person to be immoral in some regards, as they "should" have the same morals.

And this just adds further that if they accept that others may have a different compass that allows what they see as immorality, surely it makes no different whether the interviewee claims to be absolutists or relativists - as they would still need to explain their morals - so that the interviewer can establish the necessary detail.

I.e. the meta-ethical philosophy itself is neutral.

Not from the absolutist perspective.

Why would they be unpredictable - they are more likely to stick to the societal norms on the large issues, and are just as human as the next person when it comes to the more detailed.
Why would they be more consistent and persistent? Where is the support for this claim?

It's a matter of principle. In actual empirical practice, the relativist and the absolutist may be the same, but in principle, they aren't. The absolutist feels bound to a much higher, much more powerful source or authority than the relativist, so, on principle, will feel more compelled toward consistency and persistence.

If a moral absolutist considers stealing to be wrong, would they be any more or less likely to do so if they were starving, for example?

Again, as noted earlier, this is an simplistic take on absolutism.
Here, when talking about absolutism, we concern ourselves mainly with the declared source of a person's morality.

Sure. But the question is not whether one is more trustworthy or not, rather whether being a moral relativist should be considered untrustworthy.

And, as yourself said in your first contribution here, that a judgment of another's trustworthiness depends also on our own moral stance.

If that is what you think then the point at which you "fade into" amoralism and nihilism you are no longer a moral relativist - so conflating the two remains fallacious.

We're relating them, not conflating them.

Further, even a moral absolutist can become amoral.

In what way?

 

[wynn]

A person's morality should be assessed the same regardless of meta-ethical philosophy -

You say it should - but I don't know of any convincing way that this is even possible.

People cannot just forget about their own meta-ethics, nor about the meta-ethics of others, nor can they ignore the ethical concerns that arise in their minds when talking to others.

Maybe one can become color-blind and not discriminate between white and black people. But one cannot become ethics-blind.

Because, in matters of what I might consider good or bad, it adheres predominantly to the Christian morality at least at the top level (i.e. I consider stealing on the whole to be wrong, but not in all situations), and in the Western society this gives a fairly quick understanding of what that might entail.
Is it 100% Christian? No.
If someone was looking for a more detailed analysis I would say that it is "(loosely) based on" Christian morality.

And it's so "loosely based on Christian morality" that it is the same pretty much all over the world. So why declare any reference to Christianity at all?
To the best of my knowledge, no society encourages or is neutral about stealing per se. Even pirates, who do steal from others from other groups, have rules and punishments for stealing within the same group.

Consider my Catholic schools to be remiss in this regard.

What about your Catholic brother?


Oh, and you see, this is why I have doubts about ex-believers: When I discover factual evidence of their not knowing some basic teachings of their past religion, it's hard to believe that they ever really believed, ever really were members. Surely they had the feeling that they believe, and it may have been a very strong feeling (and they still may have it decades later), but that feeling can easily enough be induced by social emotional contagion, and isn't necessarily based in anything beyond that.

I think you expect too much.

Why?

 

[wellwisher]

Morality is rational if you view morality in the sense of maximizing the group. Morality is not about "me" but is about "all of us". Relative morality is not about maximizing the group, but attempts to add the needs of special interests above the group.

The easiest way to see the logic of morality=group is to look at the ten commandments. Each one maximizes the ancient group. If I steal for example, this creates stress and anger within the group. It creates the need for defensive measures which waste resources. If we steal we now need police, jails and judges all of which add up to wasted resources. This group law will not maximize every special interest group, such as the criminal lobby, who will argue this is how they earn a living.

The first commandment is there is one God. The logic for this is arguing about religion can get people excited and divide a group. The first commandment has one god and therefore there is no need to argue about which god is better or tougher. The group is maximized by one less source of division. This law may not maximize all the special interests who want to push forward a different god, so they can be a leader and get all the babes and benefits, but that may split the group and/or add stress to the group.

Government waste and inefficiency is immoral, in a rational sense, since it wastes group resources for political gain. This is not a subjective value judgment but rather a rational judgement that can be done with math. Relative morality makes this appear justified so the use of math does not apply; about feelings, prestige and social darwinism.

Picture the ancient group guided by morality, so the group is maximized in terms of cooperation and efficiency of resources. This allows the group to rise above since the machine is very efficient. The result is a surplus for the group; all the resources that could have been wasted on immorality is collecting in a pile. This pile of surplus is then used for ethical decisions.

In an immoral culture, guided by relative morality for special interest, there is no pile, but rather a hole appears where the pile should be collecting; deficit spending. The group is not maximized only special interests. A moral government would actually turn a profit for its citizens in terms of value added; pile begins to appear in the hole.

 

[Yazata]

especially as they apply in a modern, fragmented, individualist, nominally egalitarian culture, which can hardly be called culture at all anymore.

The implications that cultural globalization might have for the foundations of ethics is a very interesting question.

I don't think that it would be correct to say that globalization is leading to the destruction of all human culture. I don't think that's possible.

It's probably more accurate to say that rapid worldwide air travel and instantaneous electronic communications are driving more and more cross-fertilization of cultures. Eventually it's likely to generate some kind of hybridized and syncretistic overarching world culture, with strong regional subcultures continuing to survive for centuries to come, and with a great deal of internal diversity at the individual level. We are already seeing that. If I fly from San Francisco to Singapore, I'm not visiting an alien planet. There's probably as many commonalities as differences. I don't feel particularly out of place.

What you call "a modern, fragmented, individualist, nominally egalitarian culture" is still a culture. There would still be all kinds of commonalities tying it together, such as the assumptions of modernity (science, rationalism), ideals of individual freedom, liberty, human rights, fairness and opportunity.

Fewer people every day live in the pre-modern situation where all the small details of their lives were determined their families or by their religious traditions. People have gradually gained a lot more opportunity in the modern world to make decisions for themselves. But they aren't doing that in a vacuum.

 

[Syne]

You cannot "corroborate" information you do not possess, and moral relativism, alone, offers scant info. Lack of information logically promotes distrust.

So you would trust someone who said that they held Christian morals, without further corroboration??
My point is that one's meta-ethical philosophy is no ground for distrusting - and is no more or less information than claiming to be a moral absolutist.
If you want to move the goalposts to one of "lack of information is grounds for distrusting" then be my guest - but the issue in hand, per the OP, is whether a moral relativist can be trusted - not merely whether the lack of information that "I am a moral-relativist" supplies promotes or hinders trust - but whether the moral relativist - by dint of being such - is to be trusted or not.

Anything outside of this is simply a red-herring.

Again, ad nauseam, I never said you could take anyone at their word alone. What do you not understand about needing information before you can corroborate it? Without specific info about a person's morality, what can you possibly corroborate?

But yes, even between simply relativist or objectivist meta-ethical positions (the OP actually defines both absolutist and universalist moral objectivism), the objectivist is preferred. We know that the objectivist does not have a tolerance for differing moralities that the relativist does. The relativist excuses wildly differing moralities as only cultural. It is this laxity that contributes to the distrust. If you can excuse something, you must have some sympathy for it.

As you can see, I do not need to rely on "lack of information is grounds for distrusting". Examining meta-ethical positions alone is sufficient. But it was you who seemed more than happy to argue moral relativism against a specific, absolute morality...at least til that seemed to be failing you. Either way, a relativist does not have a readily identifiable specific morality that does anything to alleviate the above liability of moral relativism.

Fortunately, relativism is philosophically very weak. If every opinion is as good as any other, there can be nothing especially compelling about the relativist’s opinion. - https://humanism.org.uk/about/humanist-philosophers/faq/relativism-explained/​

So a relativist may very well find no meta-ethical stance compelling either way, but for the large majority of moral objectivists (~80% belief in god), it is only the relativist's stance that offers no compelling argument (and no contribution to trust). Even differing objective moralities may at least offer some compelling argument, other than "cultural difference" (which operationally means "luck of the draw").

It is no less difficult or easy for a moral relativist to change their moral position than it is for a moral absolutist.
Perhaps you can provide support that shows relativists are prone to changing them more easily, more frequently?
Otherwise this is just unsupported wishful thinking on your part, and a continuing confusion of relativism with amoralism.
A relativist does not, "by their own admission", say that they change their moral stance due to situational or self-serving factors. They merely say, for example, that one culture may have different morals than another.

I never said it was "easy". Seems you are using that to avoid answering both of my questions. "If the relativist himself cannot defend his own morality as objectively better than any other, why should anyone expect their morality to be any more virtuous?" And I asked you (the one arguing moral relativism) what would keep a relativist from changing their moral stance, so it is a pointless evasion to turn that around on me.

Or should I simply take your silence on both questions as "nothing"? If you can defend your position, do so, otherwise you have no grounds to argue. Right now you are doing the typical pseudo-science "prove me wrong" nonsense, so the weakness of your argument is readily apparent.

The emphasis was that they would give a socially expected answer "honest or not"... and the implication is that only a moral relativist would do this, and moral absolutists wouldn't.
What you exampled is nothing to do with one's meta-ethical philosophy but with ones actual morals!

It is trivially true that if one's morals are derived from society one will answer moral questions as socially expected. Considering our current society condones things like abortion, the absolutist is more likely not to answer completely as socially expected. So there is a valid difference.

How do you expect to question someone as to their moral stance, without showing your hand (to avoid lies) and without asking any specific moral questions?

Seems you are retreating on every front you have advanced in this discussion.

If you can't understand the implications of your own arguments...

What you are doing is giving examples of actions from a lack of morals and attributing them to moral relativists.

No, you simply do not know the difference between inference and implication. These are all things you have inferred, not things I have implied. Like I said, needlessly defensive.

In this context, individual norms would be those of a far smaller group than society as a whole, and if a group of people are discussing, and are each from a different society, they would have individual norms compared to the others in that discussion group.

Meaningless distinction, as each still espouses a societal norm.

My view is that the moral relativist almost certainly has the vast majority of their morals taken from their society. And if you were to know nothing of their meta-ethical position you would not be able to tell any difference between them and their neighbour in such regards.

As I said above, many moral objectivists would not answer as socially expected.

Yes, people do tend to make very general assumptions about others based on their own perception of themselves, but the OP asks very pointed and crucial questions where this tendency cannot be relied on.

Yet it can be, and is only through a priori assumptions that they hold that they would ever consider the moral relativist to be any more or less untrustworthy than a moral absolutist.
Espousing a meta-ethical philosophy does not mean one adheres to it, or even what it might entail.
The question is whether being a moral relativist itself is grounds for being untrustworthy... and nothing you have argued suggests that it should be... unless you conflate relativism with amoralism, or you consider moral relativism to be a lack of information and thus deem people untrustworthy as a result.

Really? So you would trust a stranger with your children solely because you view yourself as trustworthy? That is either nonsense, naive, or dangerously foolish. I have already address the meat-ethical positions alone above.

In my view the espousing of a moral code, and the meta-ethical philosophy itself are both netural with regards trustworthiness - nothing on which to base trustworthiness nor untrustworthiness.

That is typical of a moral relativist. As in my above quote, you know there is nothing compelling in your argument, especially in regard to trustworthiness. That you cannot see beyond your own meta-ethical position has no bearing.

Wow, that is a wildly unsupported assumption. How can you justify assuming a moral absolutist considers their own morals to be the same as everyone else?

So if they're not the same, they are all relative???
If a moral absolutist considers stealing to be immoral, then it would be irrespective of situation, of society, of consequence etc. So even if someone else who held that stealing in certain situations was moral (e.g. if they were starving), the moral absolutist would hold it to be immoral. In other words they would not care what the other person's claimed morality was, they would deem it to be immoral, and treat the person as having been immoral for stealing.
They therefore insist that everyone has the same morality, and judge accordingly.
As soon as they accept that someone has an acceptable different morality than them then they are relativists.

Ah, but the OP is talking about both moral absolutism and moral universalism, so your focus on absolutist is a red herring (or a conflation of moral objectivism in general with moral absolutism). Moral universalism allows for differences in circumstance, but not a difference of moral judgement under identical circumstance.

It is very naive of you to think that, since a person judges others by their own morality, they assume others share their morality. And how do you make the ridiculous stretch that a moral objectivist would view a different morality as "acceptable"?!

Yet science is based on repeatable performance in exactly the same situation. This is where it differs to human activity: scenarios are very rarely exactly the same for everyone involved.
Your comparison would hold if you had the same people involved in the same situation... then their morals should not change. This would give you an objective view of those peoples' morals in that specific situation.

The difference of what people are involved does not change the moral judgement of an otherwise identical situation by a moral objectivist. But I can see where you are interjecting relativism, not only in the moral judgement, but in how each individual interprets the same situation (self-serving motives, etc.).

How can a morality based on such vagary be trusted?

So, taking this to the extreme, the moral relativist will therefore claim a moral absolutist meta-ethical philosophy. So everyone will claim an asbsolutist meta-ethical philosophy (true for the absolutists, self-serving for the relativist) and therefore the claim of a meta-ethical philosophy becomes no yardstick at all.

So the relativist is more likely to lie?

Further, there is no confidence that anyone will not seek a self-serving conclusion, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy.
Throughout you are assuming that moral absolutist are incapable of such, or much less so than the relativist.
You seem to have a picture in your head of relativists being devious, conniving, scheming, self-serving - when all they claim is that one society's morals might be different to another's. Everything else you attribute to the relativist is attributable to people equally, irrespective of meta-ethical philosophy.

All of those attributes have only been inferred by you, not implied by me.