The truly American version would be uploading the video to an overseas server.
On this occasion, it's one of those whiffs of a rumor of a third alternative, of sorts, but only kind of. An anchor point might be that for as much as Iceaura and I fight within our context, but we happen to emerge from very similar, and largely common literary-historical heritage; our American notion of social contract is woven into history and politics. We still have differences about it, but most of what keeps us fighting is other stuff, entirely; that's how fundamental social contract is to American political thought.
And while we might disagree about all that, some might disagree in another way. There are various arguments against the social contract, but few adherents who so identify; I actually owe someone else similar consideration in re
rule of law↗, and there is some overlap, there. That is, rule of law is like a syllogism; its consistency is unto itself. A tyrant, for instance, can respect rule of law, at least according to abstract theory, but even still it is a sketchy social contract should we even call it that; generally speaking, people think of such arrangements as rackets. Still, though, I think of a cutscene from a video game as emblematic, because the cynical retort was not entirely removed from our neighbor's disdain. That is, as our hero extolled the virtues of democracy, Isaac the bartender replied that wealth and ownership of property of ownership were the only real freedom; the point was punctuated by the fact of the setting in a Hong Kong nightclub where, despite tyranny and apocalypse, people still had it in them to party. It's an interactive cutscene; those not interested in extolling democracy can choose a different route. Nonetheless, that counterpoint functionally rings much like our neighbor's argument, to "care about the freedoms important to you".
Yet our neighbor has chosen what seems another course, which is the
general↑ delegitimization↑ of the
social contract↑, and the application is to (A) promote his argument by disqualifying the counterpoint, and (B) change the subject so as not to come back to the
faulty↑ equivocation↑ he would rather not defend.
Watch the birdie, so to speak. He can wreck his hope on the rocks all he wants, but there is no reason anyone else needs to follow him in.
The first two work. There is a symbiotic aspect. It's all a tangled mess.
Supremacism, dualism, neurosis.
Anthropologically, there
is an instinctive sensation or notion of tacit supremacism that seems to accompany familiarity. In the fiction of Steven Brust, an elven species insists on calling itself "human", and why not, since most days they can thrash humans. But this is not conjured from thin air; he refers, obliquely, to a feature of language in which the xenophobia of self and other, us and them, is simply a dimension of the experience, such as the word barbarian, which in turn derives from a word about creatures that sound funny; there is me, we, us, and then there are barbaros (βάρβαρος). By the time the Romans used the word, it was unmistakably pejorative.
Here we are, millennia later, and it seems almost unimaginable.
(¡cough!)
There is also a basic dualism in such formulation, and, this is as strange or not as supremacism concomitant to familiarity.
The American neurosis is actually a massive, deep, impossibly complicated mess, but the part we see really is as superficial and desperate as it so often seems. This superficiality important to symbiotic considerations; sometimes being seen is as vital an endeavor as anything else. Consider mgtow, which isn't entirely a digression; the more accurate but less catchy term would be
mbsgtow, because the object is to be
men being seen going their own way,
i.e., if they were really going their own way, then they wouldn't beg for women's attention in order to insult them on the way out the door.
And in such dimensions, neurotic tension can easily run rather quite shallow; it's hard to explain a particular press briefing that happened this week, but DHS Secretary Nielsen put on a show, Sunday and Monday, very nearly beyond belief. Quite clearly the most apparent stressor of being seen as the one in charge of an American atrocity against children is having some effect.
But there is a deeper aspect, and this goes back to questions of social contract, rule of law, and other such mysteries and philosophical aspects of civilized society. Consider, for a moment, that equality, between people and before the law, is an inevitable necessity of civilized society. Juxtapose that with a consideration of social contract:
The ultimate goal, then, of social contract theories is to show, in the most general sense, that social (moral, political, legal, etc.) rules can be rationally justified. This does not, however, distinguish the social contract from other approaches in moral and political philosophy, all of which attempt to show that moral and political rules are rationally justifiable in some sense. The true distinctiveness of the social contract approach is that justification does not rely on some exogenous reason or truth.
(D'Agostino, Gaus, and Thrasher↱)
The problem with exogenous reason or truth, as such, is that it is, in the context of what social contract seeks to resolve, arbitrary. We might consider, then, neurosis near to the heart of conscience; it is not simply that others in society superficially disapprove of one's behavior, but, rather, that the arbitrary justification of authority can be arbitrarily usurped. Superficial disapproval can be buried under ego defense, to be certain, but its real problem is that it reminds a conscience of vulnerability not understood. Nobody likes being reminded they are afraid.
And this fear, more than your or my disapproval, informing they are wrong. This is the dualism:
Us, them. Right, wrong. Good, evil. Thus, there is prejudice (us), recognition (not right), and assessment (therefore not good). While, yes, it is bad to be called a racist because it is bad to be a racist, most are arriving at that moment of protest through pathways that would seem rather quite strange to others under the circumstances.
Furthermore, part of what we need to bear in mind is that this all happens recursively on the fly; "modulated self preservation of quasi-creativity seeking self actualisation" is an overcomplicated statement that is not without merit. Each of the components is well enough, but imagine collective individual neurotic stress expressed in communal cult shaping code leading to catechismal creed with every factor simultaneously, independently and interdependently, dynamically, recursively, and perpetually transforming both phase and valence, and rarely or never resolved so accurately or stably to be identified according to itself such that it can only be identified according to the composite it lends to. Or maybe I should have gone with modulated might be too precise, but self-preservation, quasi-creativity, and self-actualization are all in play, and when pressed even the religious will admit God doesn't know what it all adds up to in any given moment.
And it seems worth noting, therein we also find elements of psychosocial symbiosis.
The bigots, as such, only know they are accused; should they perceive no exposure, they would react differently. The exposure they fear isn't bigotry itself, but being wrong, and therefore evil, and therefore weak. As noted, our neighbor presents an argument that is fundamentally about empowerment. Evil is to the beholder. Wrong, as a functional matter, means weakness, and that is dangerous.
It's also part of our Christian heritage. To wit, Max Weber. There is a reason the book is called,
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism↱.
Those who burned witches behaved as if they were somehow above accusation, which is important since part of the justification is in Matthew 25, to do or not unto the least of His brethren. It's easy to hope they would do the same for you if you convince yourself they never would. History also reminds that Torquemada was Jewish.
____________________
Notes:
D'Agostino, Fred, Gerald Gaus, and John Thrasher. "Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 31 May 2017. Plato.Stanford.edu. 19 June 2018. https://stanford.io/2lmd2ZI