Sarkus,
Thanks for your post. My own additional comments, as applied to Jan's argument, are as follows:
1. That belief in metaphysical notions is natural.
I have no issue with this. This is the part of the article in the opening post that is supported by the science that it cites. Besides, many atheists have been aware of this for years. I suspect it's a novelty to Jan, which explains his enthusiasm.
2. That being natural means that there doesn't have to be a reason for it, rather that one needs a reason to go against it.
There may be a natural tendency to believe in gods/God. When we talk about the reason why a particular person holds the belief, we could certainly say that one reason is that they have a natural tendency to believe. Jan claims that he doesn't need a reason to believe in God, but he has actually spent the entire thread arguing, in effect, that the reason he believes in God is this natural tendency he has. In other words, he doesn't recognise that in making the argument that "it's natural" he is actually
giving a reason for his belief. He thinks the reason he believes is "it's natural for me".
In reality, I don't think "it's natural" is the
whole reason, because a mere predisposition to accept a belief doesn't automatically mean that one accepts it. This is obvious from the fact that all the atheists here are, like Jan, human beings who share the same evolutionary heritage as Jan (and, indeed, common ancestors (eek!)). By Jan's own argument, we are all predisposed to believe in Jan's God, yet none of the atheists actually believe. We can only conclude that the reason that "it's natural to believe in God" is not sufficient, in itself, to cause belief.
Accepting or rejecting a given belief is obviously not just a matter of having a natural predisposition. One must be exposed to the belief before the predisposition even becomes relevant. Then, a number of factors come into play. This is mostly because beliefs do not exist in a vacuum. What I believe or do not believe about God interacts with what I believe or do not believe about lots of other things. The same is true for Jan, of course.
The fact is: Jan is telling us a half-truth. If we concede that it is "natural" for him to believe in God, the question still remains as to what the reasons are for his belief. We have only the beginnings of an explanation. In light of his predisposition, it
makes sense that he believes. His predisposition is
consistent with his belief, but the same predisposition also consistent with my lack of belief, as it must be. The reasons that Jan believes and I do not lie elsewhere than "it's natural". Maybe his believe gives him comfort or warm fuzzy feelings inside. Maybe it makes him feel more included in his community. Maybe he enjoys the ritual. Who knows? He isn't telling. But the reasons are there.
Jan argues that he doesn't need a reason to believe, but rather that you and I need a reason to deny. You and I both know that 'deny' is the wrong word, because what we actually have is non-acceptance of a belief, not denial of an established truth. Do we have reasons not to accept Jan's God? Clearly we do, just as Jan has reasons to accept it. The possibility of belief was out there for each of us (you, me and Jan), and each of us made a considered decision. In Jan's case, that decision might have been to simply jump into the offered belief system without thinking about it very much, but it's still a decision, and there are reasons for every decision. Jan might not even know why he believes, when it comes down to that. The reasons might actually be subconscious, but they must be there. The only alternative is that there is no explanation for Jan's belief, and that's just silly, especially since Jan has spent the better part of this thread giving us a partial explanation.
3. That being natural means that it is the truth.
Jan has a problem separating the subjective from the objective. Objectively, he holds a belief in God. It is objectively true that he holds the belief. Since Jan's subjective truth is that God Is, then as far as Jan is concerned the case is closed. God Is because Jan believes, and Jan can't distinguish that situation from the one where Jan believes because God Is.
The veracity or otherwise of the
subject matter of Jan's God belief - as opposed to the veracity of his
holding that particular belief - is properly a separate question to the one that is under discussion in this thread, although inevitably we have also been discussing that, as far as is possible given Jan's limitations.
