To whom it may concern: if one lacks the belief that lacking belief is not believable, or believes the lack the lack of belief that others believe is lacking, is it true to say that lacking the lack of lack of belief, while not lacking the belief of lack of belief, is tantamount to lacking belief that belief can be lacked even though what you lack belief in doesn't actually exist? Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that, given the belief in the notion of believing that lack of belief is lacking, and that the notion of lacking belief is believed to be lacking, then lacking a lack of belief in being able to lack belief is just a notional position that one can believe to lack belief in? Or would that, too, not be lacking?
Needless to say, I find the above far more understandable, supportable and honest than the crud that spouts from Jan's computer.
At what point do others (and I'm looking mostly at you, Baldeee and JamesR) refrain from engaging in dialogue with someone whose mutual understanding of rather simple language you cannot honestly rely upon? You have both highlighted the inconsistencies and nonsense that Jan has spouted, so let's just move on, away from the semantic bovine excrement that he has crashed the thread with. Put him on ignore, at least.
Or is that just a notion you lack belief in without actually lacking belief in it?
Needless to say, I find the above far more understandable, supportable and honest than the crud that spouts from Jan's computer.
At what point do others (and I'm looking mostly at you, Baldeee and JamesR) refrain from engaging in dialogue with someone whose mutual understanding of rather simple language you cannot honestly rely upon? You have both highlighted the inconsistencies and nonsense that Jan has spouted, so let's just move on, away from the semantic bovine excrement that he has crashed the thread with. Put him on ignore, at least.
Or is that just a notion you lack belief in without actually lacking belief in it?