Question: If it's really "judicial tyranny", what's to stop Congress from
banning handguns?
making Sunday the official holy day of the United States?
invalidating marriages between differing races or ethnicities?
coercing you into a false confession of criminal activity?
In my time, I've heard people argue all sorts of odd things. The government is coming for your shotguns, the government will torture and murder Sabbatarians under a National Sunday Law, that races ought not intermarry, that the Miranda Act itself is criminal.
• • •
An extract from "Judicial Review", by Gerald Gunther:
The classic justification for Judicial review was set forth by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803). Marshall relied on general principles and constitutional text. His arguments from principle are not compelling. For example, his unchallengeable assertion that the Constitution was designed to establish a limited government does not demonstrate that courts should enforce those limitations. Constitutions prescribing limits on government had been adopted before 1903, as many have been since; but relatively few look to the judiciary for enforcement. Similarly, the fact that judges take an oath to support the Constitution does not imply judicial review, for the Constitution requires the oath of all federal and state officers. Far more persuasive are Marshall's references to two passages of the Constitutional text. First, Article III lists cases "arising under the Constitution" as one of the subjects included within the judicial power of the United States, suggesting that constitutional questions can give rise to judicial rulings. Second, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI lists the Constitution first as among the legal sources that "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Although the inferences derivable from the constitutional text are not unchallengeable, they provide the strongest available support for Marshall's justification for judicial review. True, Article VI is specifically addressed only to state judges, for the "supreme Law of the Land" clause is followed by the statement that "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Still, the Constitutional Convention debates and federal legislation, ever since Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, have contemplated Supreme Court review of state court rulings on constitutional questions, and it is surely plausible to argue that the Supreme Court's authority on review would be no less than that of the state judges obeying the command of the supremacy clause.
Federal court review of state court judgments is an especially plausible aspect of judicial review, for it is a typical policing technique to maintain the delineations of governing authority in federal systems .... Yet even federal systems are conceivable without judicial review. Thus, nationalists at the Constitutional Convention initially urged reliance on the congressional veto and on military force to curb excesses by the states. The supremacy clause, and its reliance on routine judicial power to enforce federalistic restraints, stemmed from suggestions by states' rights forces at the convention.
Judicial review in the interest of Federalism has played an important role in the United States; some observers, indeed, view it as the most essential function of judicial review. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once put it: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." The supremacy clause goes along way toward assuring this protection of the Union; but it provides less compelling justification for judicial review of congressional acts.
The constitutional text cited by John Marshall supports judicial review in all its aspects in a more basic sense. Article III and Article VI both reflect the central premise central to judicial review--the premise that the Constitution is to be considered a species of law and accordingly cognizable in the courts of law. Judicial review is essentially the judicial enforceability of constitutional norms, and viewing the Constitution as law rather than mere policy or precatory adjuration is the keystone of the more persuasive argument that the American constitutional scheme was designed to rely on judges, not merely troops or political restraints, to enforce constitutional limits.
(Gunther, Judicial Power, 3-4)
Admittedly a bit lengthy, but the text covers assertions pertaining to judicial review of the States as well as Congress.
"Judicial tyranny" is a very loose term. While some use it in such a manner as to wield some assertion of political significance, I look at judicial tyranny as a human dimension that tends to correct itself. (
Plessy, meet
Brown.)
Generally speaking, the most vociferous criticism of judicial review and the issues that raise complaints of activist judges and judicial tyranny are often disgruntled folks who feel that the object of their displeasure ought not be regarded under the Constitution. This is why anti-abortion foes have in the past--I don't know about the present--considered important the assertion that "there is no single constitutional item explicitly establishing the right to (privacy/abortion/fill-in-the-blank)". To ask some of the folks who like their guns, half of the Second Amendment doesn't actually exist, or, rather, means absolutely nothing. For these people, anything short of outlawing abortion, any degree of prohibition or regulation regarding weapons is unacceptable.
Loving v. Virginia, which struck down anti-miscegenation laws, has been accused of judicial activism in applying the U.S. Constitution over states' rights.
History indicates quite clearly that left to its own, Congress will trample all over the Constitution, as will the states. Thus, if the U.S. Constitution is to be the Supreme Law of the Land, how does that occur? Judicial review is a natural consequence, a necessity of our Republic.
As to the topic post, for instance, one of the article links contains a common sentiment:
One way to stop the continuing erosion of the American people's right to govern themselves would be to appoint judges who follow the great Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' doctrine that his job was to see that the game is played by the rules, "whether I like them or not."
Sowell, "Noon"
It seems a likable idea, but what does Sowell mean when he says it, compared to how I or another might read it?
An aging Supreme Court means that there is now a perhaps once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to stop the erosion of democratic self-government by putting advocates of judicial restraint, rather than judicial activism, on the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.
Sowell, "Noon"
Judicial restraint as opposed to judicial activism? William Van Alstyne wrote, in "Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint",
Descriptions of judicial activism and judicial restraint in constitutional adjudication are, of course, but partial truths. In two centuries of judicial review, superintended by more than one hundred Justices who have served on the Supreme Court, and who have interpreted a Constitution highly ambiguous in much of its text, consistency has not been institutional but personal. Individual judges have maintained strongly diverse notions of the "proper" judicial role, and the political process of appointment of Supreme Court justices has itself had a great deal to do with the dominant perspectives of that role from time to time ....
.... (P)rocedurally, the Supreme Court has usually exercised great restraint. Subject to some notable exceptions, it has eschewed addressing the constitutional consistency of acts of of government to a dramatically greater degree of self-denial than it has exercised in confronting other kinds of legal issues seeking judicial resolution. Substantively, the Court has been predisposed to the national government in respect to the powers of that government: except for the early twentieth century, Thayer's law, requiring a showing of "clear error," has been the dominant motif. In respect to the states, on the other hand, the Court has been actively more interventionist, construing the Constitution to enforce its own notions of national interest in the absence of decisions by Congress. And, most controversial in recent decades, it has been unstably active in deciding whether it will interpret the Constitution as a more egalitarian set of imperatives than as a document principally concerned with commerce, federalism, the separation of powers, and protection of explicitly protected liberties.
Van Alstyne, Judicial Power, 70
Thomas Sowell agrees on a general point:
The vastly more important issue is whether people who go into court should expect their cases to be decided on the basis of the law or on the basis of the particular judge's own philosophy.
Sowell, "Part II"
In his zeal to tag liberals, Sowell undertakes a curious revision of history:
Liberals seem to be taking the same myopic view of judicial activism that they once took toward the institution of special prosecutors -- which seemed like a great idea to them when special prosecutors were going after Republicans but suddenly not so great when Bill Clinton became the target.
Sowell, "Part II"
Now, let's just pause for a moment to get this straight:
• Trafficking illegal drugs in order to aid and abet terrorists (Irangate): Republicans felt investigation inappropriate.
• Wife of president's investment profit, pre-election: Republicans demanded investigation.
• President got a blowjob? Republicans demanded investigation, impeachment.
• Relationship between executive branch and accused criminals who contributed heavily to administration policy: Republicans felt investigation inappropriate.
• Relationship between executive position regarding handling of prisoners and documented abuse of prisoners: apparently this is a Democrat-sponsored, anti-American festival of lies.
It was Republicans who reasoned, when the time came to renew the special prosecutor law, that Americans were tired of investigations wielded as political weapons. How convenient that the wielders should also call for that outcome.
And such seemingly-small distortions of history are only important in order to understand the perspective defining such vague terms as "judicial activism".
The issue of judicial activism is not just an issue of the moment. It is an enduring issue of great moment because it means the erosion of the American people's Constitutional right to govern themselves. If activist judges are allowed to continue to become increasingly our real rulers, what are elections for? Just to provide jobs for politicians?
Public acceptance of judicial coups has only led to increasing audacity in words and deeds by activist judges. Justice Anthony Kennedy's recent decision banning the execution of murderers under the age of 18 was a classic case in point. It was based, he said, on "evolving standards" and a "national consensus," as well as on what people were saying in other countries. Even if all of this were true, none of these things is statutory law, much less the Constitution of the United States.
Sowell, "Part II"
Interestingly, if people point to "judicial activism" in the 2000 election decisions in Florida, they're disrespectful. Calling the first term of the W. administration "the Bush junta" was somehow disrespectful. Yet here is a conservative complaining about "judicial coups". And what is his example? "Evolving standards" and juvenile execution.
Here's a simple one:
• We understand more about how human brains work than we did in the past. An assertion central to the court's decision reads:
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime ... The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions ....
Roper v. Simmons
Thus we now have a factor in consideration that had not been previously properly recognized. By considering that factor, the standard by which the decision is made has changed, or, in relevant jargon, "evolved".
At this time we cannot know what Mr. Sowell would say about looking to fifteenth-century English common law for legal precedents pertaining to American issues, but certainly the court did look abroad in
Bowers v. Hardwick, which protected the right of the states to make anti-sodomy laws. Perhaps we should e-mail him.
Lawrence v. Texas, which overturned
Bowers, is also accused of judicial activism in the sense that makes activism synonymous with tyranny.
But it does seem odd that Sowell would criticize judicial acknowledgment of evolving standards, national consensus, and a comparison of standards elsewhere in the world. Evolving standards will be invoked in an effort to overturn
Roe v. Wade, the poster child of judicial activism/tyranny accusations. National consensus is held in opposition to the U.S. Constitution in issues pertaining to homosexuals, civil rights, and equal protection under the law. International issues have worked on behalf of "judicial restraint" in the sense that holds "restraint" virtuous against a tyrannical "activism".
It is incidental that these things are not all true. What do pretty words like "evolving standards" mean except that some people agree with you, even if the law says nothing of the sort? As for a "national consensus," we have elections to determine that and judges have no special expertise as pollsters.
What all this vaguely romantic verbiage boils down to is that judges can treat the Constitution as simply a grant of power to act as philosopher kings and respond to whatever constituency they prefer to the voting public. That is lawless law.
Sowell, "Part II"
Sowell's perspective seems to suffer the fatal flaw of presuming that everybody does or should read words the same. We know this is not the case: there are those who come up, from time to time, in order to assert that their rights are violated unless someone else's are abridged. Drop by any protest against library books in order to see that one in action.
Part of the problem, though, is that Sowell only leaves the issue to be defined by what isn't there.
Such judicial behavior is not going to stop until it gets stopped. This might be done with Congressional restrictions on court jurisdiction, with Constitutional Amendments, or by the other branches of government simply refusing to obey some judicial decisions, as President Andrew Jackson did long ago.
Short of Constitutional confrontations, however, a less dangerous option would be putting on the judicial bench people with a track record of supporting judicial restraint rather than activism. But this approach is being blocked by liberal Senators -- mostly Democrats but with a big assist from Republican Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Sowell, "Part II"
First off, it just doesn't work that way. Congressional restrictions? Those can only go so far, and they're not enough to force judicial regression to such a degree as Sowell and other conservatives would hope and pray for. Additionally, I admit it would be entertaining to see Congress try to constitutionally quash the Supreme Court without addressing the question I noted at beginning of this post. But when it comes to a litmus test of demanding advocacy of "judicial restraint rather than activism", what does
that really mean?
Would Sowell set aside objective evidence that juvenile brains think differently than adult brains? Is refusing to consider new and developing knowledge a defining characteristic of judicial restraint?
Would Sowell reject or honor the "national consensus" against gay marriage? Or are the courts being elitist if they find the national consensus discredited by its calling for an unconstitutional discrimination?
Would Sowell decry the "activism" that led the court to reject Virginia's right to make an anti-miscegenation law? After all, the law was shown to run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: it required a condition contradictory to the Supreme Law of the Land. Perhaps Sowell's "judicial restraint" would read according to a decision overturned by "judicial activism"? In
Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice Warren, in the majority opinion, related the words of a judge who sentenced the Lovings to a year in prison or twenty-five year banishment from Virginia:
In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."
After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment....
Loving v. Virginia
Does Sowell's "judicial restraint" include setting aside the Supreme Law of the Land in order to please God? (The Christians already have their answer: Matthew 22.21, Mark 12.17, and Luke 20.25, make it fairly explicit).
Perhaps Sowell and his fellows should tell us more about what "judicial restraint" is instead of constantly coming up short by protesting dubious characterizations of "judicial activism" or tyranny.
Or maybe Sowell's sense of judicial restraint is satisfied by Justice O'Connor, who was heard to storm that a Gore presidency was unacceptable, shortly before the Supreme Court undertook arguments. Perhaps he was dissatisfied with Scalia's (wise, I think) recusal from Newdow's most recent round with the Pledge? Anyone happen to catch those articles? I confess I haven't scoured his archive.
It's just that we don't actually have much to go on, other than the notion that "judicial tyranny is bad". Sometimes I wonder if people understand the notion of consequences. The reason it is so hard to make the case that, "
for judges to rule on consttutionality or unconstitutionality of a law is unconstitutional", is that it's a weak case from the outset. The strongest point in its favor is that there is no single constitutional point directly empowering judicial review. History, however, suggests quite clearly that judicial review is, in fact, a consequence of necessity, the produce of the Constitution itself.
• • •
Muhlenberg said:
Plessy vs. Ferguson (1892); Wickard v. Filburn (1942); Everson v. Board of Education (1947) Roe v. Wade(1972) to mention just a few.
Interesting selection.
Plessy seems more an exercise in what is considered "judicial restraint", in which the law and Constitution are considered as narrowly as possible in order to retain as much of the status quo as possible.
Roe, on the other hand, is the poster child of judicial tyranny for many advocates of conservative politics on the bench. Issues surrounding
Wickard and
Everson, however, fascinate me since they're not front-line cases in the argument against judicial review.
Wickard may be nitpicking, although I haven't read the detail and thus have no firm opinion, but it doesn't strike me as unduly coercive or inventive in general.
Everson seems inclined toward "restraint" inasmuch as it speaks against a complete divorce of religious and public entities, and perhaps toward the liberalism accused of activism inasmuch as it seeks a reason to be inclusive. That, too, is without the detail, but the capsule summaries of the case seem to be in line with the decision. Thus, I'd be interested in hearing how these two cases especially constitute judicial tyranny or even mere activism. You may be onto something completely new, since the controversy surrounding these two decisions is not as immediately apparent to me as it is in something like a
Plessy,
Roe, or
Roper (each of which presents a different controversial aspect and thus should not be grouped together beyond the generalization applied).
____________________
Notes:
Gunther, Gerald. "Judicial Review".
Judicial Power and the Constitution. Leonard W. Levy et al., eds. New York: MacMillan, 1990.
Van Alstyne, William. "Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint".
Judicial Power and the Constitution. Leonard W. Levy et al., eds. New York: MacMillan, 1990.
Sowell, Thomas. "High noon for judges". Townhall.com. March 8, 2005. See
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20050308.shtml
Sowell, Thomas. "High noon for judges: Part II". Townhall.com. March 9, 2005. See
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20050309.shtml
U.S. Supreme Court.
Roper v. Simmons. March 1, 2005. See
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-633.ZS.html
U.S. Supreme Court.
Loving v. Virginia. June 12, 1967. See
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0388_0001_ZO.html