Judicial Tyranny

extrasense

WHAT ON EARTH DO YOU THINK THE DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT ACTUALLY IS?

It's not a criminal usurpation of any power whatsoever. It's their ******* job. Get a grip. Get real. Accept the facts.
 
I put ES on ignore months ago. Every now and then my curiosity gets the best of me, and I read one of his posts. I always regret it.
 
Silas said:
It's not a criminal usurpation of any power whatsoever. It's their ******* job. .

What it is, is obvious.

It is ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL sham.

It is a back door to tyranny and slavery.

es
 
what are you suggesting? that any law passed by the legislature should be automatically be enforced? that would make the constitution pointless. instead of "judicial tyrrany", the legislative branch would get to judge if laws are constitutional in addition to being able to write the laws. basically they would be accountable to noone. their decisions would be final, and even if they blatantly contradicted the constitution their laws would be carried out.
 
isaacdelongchamp said:
what are you suggesting? that any law passed by the legislature should be automatically be enforced? .

You might have missed existence of the executive branch. If a law has been passed by the legislature, and signed by the executive, it MUST be enforced.

e :cool: s
 
so how do you stop the leglitive branch and the the executive branch from getting together and declaring themselves life terms?
 
While SCOTUS assumed the power to decide constitutional issues in Marbury (1803) it did not negate a legislative act of Congress until 1857.

In that case, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ruled the 1820 Missouri Compromise to be unconstitutional. The decision made slavery legal in all states, stated that slaves were not citizens of the United States, could not become citizens of the United States and had no right to sue for anything in Federal courts.

That is undoubted the worst example of judicial tyranny in American history as it ignited the Civil War but there are many other instances of Judges usurping power, violating inalienable rights and/or creating law from the Bench--Plessy vs. Ferguson (1892); Wickard v. Filburn (1942); Everson v. Board of Education (1947) Roe v. Wade(1972) to mention just a few.

Thomas Jefferson and his congress got so tired of judges usurping power, they abolished nearly half the Federal courts in the nation and suspended the U.S. Supreme Court for two sessions (for 14 months, the USA did not have a sitting Supreme Court).
 
Question: If it's really "judicial tyranny", what's to stop Congress from

banning handguns?
making Sunday the official holy day of the United States?
invalidating marriages between differing races or ethnicities?
coercing you into a false confession of criminal activity?​

In my time, I've heard people argue all sorts of odd things. The government is coming for your shotguns, the government will torture and murder Sabbatarians under a National Sunday Law, that races ought not intermarry, that the Miranda Act itself is criminal.

• • •​

An extract from "Judicial Review", by Gerald Gunther:

The classic justification for Judicial review was set forth by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803). Marshall relied on general principles and constitutional text. His arguments from principle are not compelling. For example, his unchallengeable assertion that the Constitution was designed to establish a limited government does not demonstrate that courts should enforce those limitations. Constitutions prescribing limits on government had been adopted before 1903, as many have been since; but relatively few look to the judiciary for enforcement. Similarly, the fact that judges take an oath to support the Constitution does not imply judicial review, for the Constitution requires the oath of all federal and state officers. Far more persuasive are Marshall's references to two passages of the Constitutional text. First, Article III lists cases "arising under the Constitution" as one of the subjects included within the judicial power of the United States, suggesting that constitutional questions can give rise to judicial rulings. Second, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI lists the Constitution first as among the legal sources that "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."

Although the inferences derivable from the constitutional text are not unchallengeable, they provide the strongest available support for Marshall's justification for judicial review. True, Article VI is specifically addressed only to state judges, for the "supreme Law of the Land" clause is followed by the statement that "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Still, the Constitutional Convention debates and federal legislation, ever since Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, have contemplated Supreme Court review of state court rulings on constitutional questions, and it is surely plausible to argue that the Supreme Court's authority on review would be no less than that of the state judges obeying the command of the supremacy clause.

Federal court review of state court judgments is an especially plausible aspect of judicial review, for it is a typical policing technique to maintain the delineations of governing authority in federal systems .... Yet even federal systems are conceivable without judicial review. Thus, nationalists at the Constitutional Convention initially urged reliance on the congressional veto and on military force to curb excesses by the states. The supremacy clause, and its reliance on routine judicial power to enforce federalistic restraints, stemmed from suggestions by states' rights forces at the convention.

Judicial review in the interest of Federalism has played an important role in the United States; some observers, indeed, view it as the most essential function of judicial review. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once put it: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." The supremacy clause goes along way toward assuring this protection of the Union; but it provides less compelling justification for judicial review of congressional acts.

The constitutional text cited by John Marshall supports judicial review in all its aspects in a more basic sense. Article III and Article VI both reflect the central premise central to judicial review--the premise that the Constitution is to be considered a species of law and accordingly cognizable in the courts of law. Judicial review is essentially the judicial enforceability of constitutional norms, and viewing the Constitution as law rather than mere policy or precatory adjuration is the keystone of the more persuasive argument that the American constitutional scheme was designed to rely on judges, not merely troops or political restraints, to enforce constitutional limits.


(Gunther, Judicial Power, 3-4)

Admittedly a bit lengthy, but the text covers assertions pertaining to judicial review of the States as well as Congress.

"Judicial tyranny" is a very loose term. While some use it in such a manner as to wield some assertion of political significance, I look at judicial tyranny as a human dimension that tends to correct itself. (Plessy, meet Brown.)

Generally speaking, the most vociferous criticism of judicial review and the issues that raise complaints of activist judges and judicial tyranny are often disgruntled folks who feel that the object of their displeasure ought not be regarded under the Constitution. This is why anti-abortion foes have in the past--I don't know about the present--considered important the assertion that "there is no single constitutional item explicitly establishing the right to (privacy/abortion/fill-in-the-blank)". To ask some of the folks who like their guns, half of the Second Amendment doesn't actually exist, or, rather, means absolutely nothing. For these people, anything short of outlawing abortion, any degree of prohibition or regulation regarding weapons is unacceptable. Loving v. Virginia, which struck down anti-miscegenation laws, has been accused of judicial activism in applying the U.S. Constitution over states' rights.

History indicates quite clearly that left to its own, Congress will trample all over the Constitution, as will the states. Thus, if the U.S. Constitution is to be the Supreme Law of the Land, how does that occur? Judicial review is a natural consequence, a necessity of our Republic.

As to the topic post, for instance, one of the article links contains a common sentiment:

One way to stop the continuing erosion of the American people's right to govern themselves would be to appoint judges who follow the great Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' doctrine that his job was to see that the game is played by the rules, "whether I like them or not."

Sowell, "Noon"

It seems a likable idea, but what does Sowell mean when he says it, compared to how I or another might read it?

An aging Supreme Court means that there is now a perhaps once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to stop the erosion of democratic self-government by putting advocates of judicial restraint, rather than judicial activism, on the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.

Sowell, "Noon"

Judicial restraint as opposed to judicial activism? William Van Alstyne wrote, in "Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint",

Descriptions of judicial activism and judicial restraint in constitutional adjudication are, of course, but partial truths. In two centuries of judicial review, superintended by more than one hundred Justices who have served on the Supreme Court, and who have interpreted a Constitution highly ambiguous in much of its text, consistency has not been institutional but personal. Individual judges have maintained strongly diverse notions of the "proper" judicial role, and the political process of appointment of Supreme Court justices has itself had a great deal to do with the dominant perspectives of that role from time to time ....

.... (P)rocedurally, the Supreme Court has usually exercised great restraint. Subject to some notable exceptions, it has eschewed addressing the constitutional consistency of acts of of government to a dramatically greater degree of self-denial than it has exercised in confronting other kinds of legal issues seeking judicial resolution. Substantively, the Court has been predisposed to the national government in respect to the powers of that government: except for the early twentieth century, Thayer's law, requiring a showing of "clear error," has been the dominant motif. In respect to the states, on the other hand, the Court has been actively more interventionist, construing the Constitution to enforce its own notions of national interest in the absence of decisions by Congress. And, most controversial in recent decades, it has been unstably active in deciding whether it will interpret the Constitution as a more egalitarian set of imperatives than as a document principally concerned with commerce, federalism, the separation of powers, and protection of explicitly protected liberties.


Van Alstyne, Judicial Power, 70

Thomas Sowell agrees on a general point:

The vastly more important issue is whether people who go into court should expect their cases to be decided on the basis of the law or on the basis of the particular judge's own philosophy.

Sowell, "Part II"

In his zeal to tag liberals, Sowell undertakes a curious revision of history:

Liberals seem to be taking the same myopic view of judicial activism that they once took toward the institution of special prosecutors -- which seemed like a great idea to them when special prosecutors were going after Republicans but suddenly not so great when Bill Clinton became the target.

Sowell, "Part II"

Now, let's just pause for a moment to get this straight:

• Trafficking illegal drugs in order to aid and abet terrorists (Irangate): Republicans felt investigation inappropriate.
• Wife of president's investment profit, pre-election: Republicans demanded investigation.
• President got a blowjob? Republicans demanded investigation, impeachment.
• Relationship between executive branch and accused criminals who contributed heavily to administration policy: Republicans felt investigation inappropriate.
• Relationship between executive position regarding handling of prisoners and documented abuse of prisoners: apparently this is a Democrat-sponsored, anti-American festival of lies.​

It was Republicans who reasoned, when the time came to renew the special prosecutor law, that Americans were tired of investigations wielded as political weapons. How convenient that the wielders should also call for that outcome.

And such seemingly-small distortions of history are only important in order to understand the perspective defining such vague terms as "judicial activism".

The issue of judicial activism is not just an issue of the moment. It is an enduring issue of great moment because it means the erosion of the American people's Constitutional right to govern themselves. If activist judges are allowed to continue to become increasingly our real rulers, what are elections for? Just to provide jobs for politicians?

Public acceptance of judicial coups has only led to increasing audacity in words and deeds by activist judges. Justice Anthony Kennedy's recent decision banning the execution of murderers under the age of 18 was a classic case in point. It was based, he said, on "evolving standards" and a "national consensus," as well as on what people were saying in other countries. Even if all of this were true, none of these things is statutory law, much less the Constitution of the United States.


Sowell, "Part II"

Interestingly, if people point to "judicial activism" in the 2000 election decisions in Florida, they're disrespectful. Calling the first term of the W. administration "the Bush junta" was somehow disrespectful. Yet here is a conservative complaining about "judicial coups". And what is his example? "Evolving standards" and juvenile execution.

Here's a simple one:

• We understand more about how human brains work than we did in the past. An assertion central to the court's decision reads:

It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime ... The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions ....

Roper v. Simmons

Thus we now have a factor in consideration that had not been previously properly recognized. By considering that factor, the standard by which the decision is made has changed, or, in relevant jargon, "evolved".​

At this time we cannot know what Mr. Sowell would say about looking to fifteenth-century English common law for legal precedents pertaining to American issues, but certainly the court did look abroad in Bowers v. Hardwick, which protected the right of the states to make anti-sodomy laws. Perhaps we should e-mail him. Lawrence v. Texas, which overturned Bowers, is also accused of judicial activism in the sense that makes activism synonymous with tyranny.

But it does seem odd that Sowell would criticize judicial acknowledgment of evolving standards, national consensus, and a comparison of standards elsewhere in the world. Evolving standards will be invoked in an effort to overturn Roe v. Wade, the poster child of judicial activism/tyranny accusations. National consensus is held in opposition to the U.S. Constitution in issues pertaining to homosexuals, civil rights, and equal protection under the law. International issues have worked on behalf of "judicial restraint" in the sense that holds "restraint" virtuous against a tyrannical "activism".

It is incidental that these things are not all true. What do pretty words like "evolving standards" mean except that some people agree with you, even if the law says nothing of the sort? As for a "national consensus," we have elections to determine that and judges have no special expertise as pollsters.

What all this vaguely romantic verbiage boils down to is that judges can treat the Constitution as simply a grant of power to act as philosopher kings and respond to whatever constituency they prefer to the voting public. That is lawless law.


Sowell, "Part II"

Sowell's perspective seems to suffer the fatal flaw of presuming that everybody does or should read words the same. We know this is not the case: there are those who come up, from time to time, in order to assert that their rights are violated unless someone else's are abridged. Drop by any protest against library books in order to see that one in action.

Part of the problem, though, is that Sowell only leaves the issue to be defined by what isn't there.

Such judicial behavior is not going to stop until it gets stopped. This might be done with Congressional restrictions on court jurisdiction, with Constitutional Amendments, or by the other branches of government simply refusing to obey some judicial decisions, as President Andrew Jackson did long ago.

Short of Constitutional confrontations, however, a less dangerous option would be putting on the judicial bench people with a track record of supporting judicial restraint rather than activism. But this approach is being blocked by liberal Senators -- mostly Democrats but with a big assist from Republican Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.


Sowell, "Part II"

First off, it just doesn't work that way. Congressional restrictions? Those can only go so far, and they're not enough to force judicial regression to such a degree as Sowell and other conservatives would hope and pray for. Additionally, I admit it would be entertaining to see Congress try to constitutionally quash the Supreme Court without addressing the question I noted at beginning of this post. But when it comes to a litmus test of demanding advocacy of "judicial restraint rather than activism", what does that really mean?

Would Sowell set aside objective evidence that juvenile brains think differently than adult brains? Is refusing to consider new and developing knowledge a defining characteristic of judicial restraint?

Would Sowell reject or honor the "national consensus" against gay marriage? Or are the courts being elitist if they find the national consensus discredited by its calling for an unconstitutional discrimination?

Would Sowell decry the "activism" that led the court to reject Virginia's right to make an anti-miscegenation law? After all, the law was shown to run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: it required a condition contradictory to the Supreme Law of the Land. Perhaps Sowell's "judicial restraint" would read according to a decision overturned by "judicial activism"? In Loving v. Virginia, Chief Justice Warren, in the majority opinion, related the words of a judge who sentenced the Lovings to a year in prison or twenty-five year banishment from Virginia:

In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."​
After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment....


Loving v. Virginia

Does Sowell's "judicial restraint" include setting aside the Supreme Law of the Land in order to please God? (The Christians already have their answer: Matthew 22.21, Mark 12.17, and Luke 20.25, make it fairly explicit).

Perhaps Sowell and his fellows should tell us more about what "judicial restraint" is instead of constantly coming up short by protesting dubious characterizations of "judicial activism" or tyranny.

Or maybe Sowell's sense of judicial restraint is satisfied by Justice O'Connor, who was heard to storm that a Gore presidency was unacceptable, shortly before the Supreme Court undertook arguments. Perhaps he was dissatisfied with Scalia's (wise, I think) recusal from Newdow's most recent round with the Pledge? Anyone happen to catch those articles? I confess I haven't scoured his archive.

It's just that we don't actually have much to go on, other than the notion that "judicial tyranny is bad". Sometimes I wonder if people understand the notion of consequences. The reason it is so hard to make the case that, "for judges to rule on consttutionality or unconstitutionality of a law is unconstitutional", is that it's a weak case from the outset. The strongest point in its favor is that there is no single constitutional point directly empowering judicial review. History, however, suggests quite clearly that judicial review is, in fact, a consequence of necessity, the produce of the Constitution itself.

• • •​

Muhlenberg said:

Plessy vs. Ferguson (1892); Wickard v. Filburn (1942); Everson v. Board of Education (1947) Roe v. Wade(1972) to mention just a few.

Interesting selection. Plessy seems more an exercise in what is considered "judicial restraint", in which the law and Constitution are considered as narrowly as possible in order to retain as much of the status quo as possible. Roe, on the other hand, is the poster child of judicial tyranny for many advocates of conservative politics on the bench. Issues surrounding Wickard and Everson, however, fascinate me since they're not front-line cases in the argument against judicial review. Wickard may be nitpicking, although I haven't read the detail and thus have no firm opinion, but it doesn't strike me as unduly coercive or inventive in general. Everson seems inclined toward "restraint" inasmuch as it speaks against a complete divorce of religious and public entities, and perhaps toward the liberalism accused of activism inasmuch as it seeks a reason to be inclusive. That, too, is without the detail, but the capsule summaries of the case seem to be in line with the decision. Thus, I'd be interested in hearing how these two cases especially constitute judicial tyranny or even mere activism. You may be onto something completely new, since the controversy surrounding these two decisions is not as immediately apparent to me as it is in something like a Plessy, Roe, or Roper (each of which presents a different controversial aspect and thus should not be grouped together beyond the generalization applied).
____________________

Notes:

Gunther, Gerald. "Judicial Review". Judicial Power and the Constitution. Leonard W. Levy et al., eds. New York: MacMillan, 1990.

Van Alstyne, William. "Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint". Judicial Power and the Constitution. Leonard W. Levy et al., eds. New York: MacMillan, 1990.

Sowell, Thomas. "High noon for judges". Townhall.com. March 8, 2005. See http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20050308.shtml

Sowell, Thomas. "High noon for judges: Part II". Townhall.com. March 9, 2005. See http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20050309.shtml

U.S. Supreme Court. Roper v. Simmons. March 1, 2005. See http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-633.ZS.html

U.S. Supreme Court. Loving v. Virginia. June 12, 1967. See http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0388_0001_ZO.html
 
"judicial activism" when it happens, has its roots in the ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL ability of courts to judge "constitutionality" of the laws.

This ability can and must be taken away from the courts.

It is that simple, and it will save our system of government from degenerating into tyranny and slavery.

ES
 
Yes, you present a persuasive case.

(1) How is judicial review "anti-Constitutional"?
(2) How will removing judicial review save the government from ... well ...
(3) How does judicial review lead to tyranny and slavery?​

Lacking consideration those points, there's not much to your argument. However, since you're not into in-depth posts, let me save you the effort: even with consideration of those points, you won't have much of a case.

I mean, hey, surprise me. Do what attorneys, legal scholars, and historians have been unable to, and make that case.
 
tiassa said:
I mean, hey, surprise me. Do what attorneys, legal scholars, and historians have been unable to, and make that case.

Honestly Tiassa, if you can't see by now how putting more power in the hands of ever fewer people with less oversight and more accountability gaps is the only way to save this nation from some problem which has yet to be established, then I think it's time to lay off those weeds you're so fond of smoking.
 
tiassa said:
(1) How is judicial review "anti-Constitutional"?
(2) How will removing judicial review save the government from ... well ...
(3) How does judicial review lead to tyranny and slavery?​
Do what attorneys, legal scholars, and historians have been unable to.

The case already mostly has been made by "attorneys, legal scholars, and historians". Let us do not pretend otherwise.

Here are just a few of references:
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/Armstrongwilliams/aw20050307.shtml
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2005/2/7/81548.shtml
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20050308.shtm
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/ts20050309.shtml
http://www.nrbookservice.com/BookPage.asp?prod_cd=c6606
http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/levin200502010802.asp

My contribution is the connecting the dots, the pointing out that in ALL cases of Judicial tyrannic activity the culprit is ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL ability of courts to judge "constitutionality" of the laws.
It is not in the Constitution, it undermines the separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution, and it infringes on peoples' Freedom to make decisions in the democratic fashion.
This amounts to its ANTI-CONSTITUTIONALITY.

Farthermore, I point out that to save our system of government from degenerating into tyranny and slavery, we can and must deny Judciary ability to judge "constitutionality" of the laws.


e :cool: s
 
Muhlenberg said:
While SCOTUS assumed the power to decide constitutional issues in Marbury (1803) it did not negate a legislative act of Congress until 1857.

In that case, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ruled the 1820 Missouri Compromise to be unconstitutional. The decision made slavery legal in all states, stated that slaves were not citizens of the United States, could not become citizens of the United States and had no right to sue for anything in Federal courts.

That is undoubted the worst example of judicial tyranny in American history as it ignited the Civil War but there are many other instances of Judges usurping power, violating inalienable rights and/or creating law from the Bench--Plessy vs. Ferguson (1892); Wickard v. Filburn (1942); Everson v. Board of Education (1947) Roe v. Wade(1972) to mention just a few.

Thomas Jefferson and his congress got so tired of judges usurping power, they abolished nearly half the Federal courts in the nation and suspended the U.S. Supreme Court for two sessions (for 14 months, the USA did not have a sitting Supreme Court).
You see, extrasense? It is possible to make an argument, with examples (which was basically what I asked you for). Your repeated statement that "the judicial power to judge the constitutionality of law is itself unconstitutional" which I do not believe even your townhall.com conservatives would accept, is not sufficient.
 
Silas said:
statement that "the judicial power to judge the constitutionality of law is itself unconstitutional" is

Actually, it is ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL.

It ends up as an activity intended to circumvent the Constitution, by the judges that were sworn to uphold it - essentially a criminal activity.

e :cool: s
 
Mystech said:
Honestly Tiassa, if you can't see by now how putting more power in the hands of ever fewer people with less oversight and more accountability gaps is the only way to save this nation from some problem which has yet to be established, then I think it's time to lay off those weeds you're so fond of smoking.

Like I pointed out, though, I don't expect the case to be made. I don't think it can.

As a general point, though, I think Extrasense owes us at least that attempt. After all, as our fellow states, "My contribution is the connecting the dots, the pointing out that in ALL cases of Judicial tyrannic activity the culprit is ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL ability of courts to judge "constitutionality" of the laws."

Actually, no, it's not. He has not made those connections. He hasn't even tried.

The idea of posting links without any real comment is no more effective than putting a Bible in front of someone and saying, "Read this and interpret it exactly like I do."

While that's inadvisable from the outset, it's even moreso when one gives so few cues as to what that interpretation looks like.

It's an unrealistic expectation in pursuit of an unrealistic political goal. All I'm after is that if Extrasense wants to continue making his point about what is or isn't ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL, he's going to have to start making a case at some point.

You'll notice he won't even respond to the basic points against his argument, and merely reiterates his block-capital accusation of ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL courts.

In the meantime, I'm going to review his links, and barring some blatantly clear explanation of the anti-constitutional issue marked with neon signs, I'll give some consideration to getting out my green hat and closing this topic for lack of substantive purpose.

As to your comment itself, Mystech ... um, I just don't see what you're referring to. It seems an internal of my own conflict though, so I must ask for clarification: I'm sure there's something I'm overlooking.
 
The idea of posting links without any real comment is no more effective than putting a Bible in front of someone and saying, "Read this and interpret it exactly like I do."
It was posted in response to your general claim that the issue of judicial tyranny is not mainstream. Those are importent liks that are needed to bring everybody up to speed.

es
 
Asguard said:

tiassa he is being sarcastic, mystech i mean

Damn sobriety. I should pledge to not post in the future until I'm somehow intoxicated. Or maybe I should just wait until I've had some and then think about it again ....

• • •​

Extrasense said:
It was posted in response to your general claim that the issue of judicial tyranny is not mainstream. Those are importent liks that are needed to bring everybody up to speed.

I think there's an extra "r" in the second sentence. Oh, and the missing "n", of course. In the meantime, I'll be getting back to you in more detail, well, hopefully this evening.

The early, interrupted version has only gotten through the first part, but reads something like this:

To start at the top of the list:

Williams, Armstrong. "Judicial Tyranny". Townhall.com. March 7, 2005. See http://www.townhall.com/columnists/Armstrongwilliams/aw20050307.shtml

Supporting any political case with reference to Armstrong Williams is simply inadvisable. He is, by his own admission, a businessman and not a journalist, and his product is subject to that consideration. As Leonard Pitts explained in his column, "So as for not thinking of himself as a journalist, (Armstrong) needn't worry. No one will ever mistake him for one again."

Apparently, Mr. Pitts was incorrect on that count.

Nonetheless, Mr. Williams' credibility issues do not rule out the possibility that he has something worthwhile to contribute to the debate. Thus we ought to examine the article:

The court has long construed the 8th amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in light of "evolving standards of decency that marked the progress of a maturing society." The Supreme Court had recognized in the 1950s that "evolving standards" ought to be determined by reference to international as well as domestic measures. And in this case, the majority stressed that eliminating the death penalty for juveniles is consistent with international opinion, and is supported by a majority of Americans.*

A majority of Americans?* Do you think a majority of Americans would have supported the death penalty for Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, after they stalked through the halls of Columbine High murdering classmates? What about for DC sniper Lee Boyd Malvo? He was 17 years old when he participated in a shooting spree that left ten people dead. Are these the whimsical acts of a minor? Or are they calculated acts of brutality deserving the full extension of criminal punishment?* I think a majority of Americans would find it acceptable to punish these juveniles to the full extent of the law. I think they would do so because that’s what these criminals deserve.

Somehow the Supreme Court missed this point. Somehow they failed to realize that making sure that criminals--even juveniles--get what they deserve is a moral imperative.


Armstrong Williams

Williams ignores the Court's point: "Somehow they failed to realize that making sure that criminals--even juveniles--get what they deserve is a moral imperative."

This is a subtle distortion, really, and not one I'll blame entirely on the fact that Williams is sold to his politics instead of reality. It is similar to the idea that the Miranda Act is intended to "give rights to criminals". Both Williams and the classic complaint against the Miranda Act ignore considerations of criminality. In the case of the Miranda Act, it protects the rights of an individual not yet convicted of a crime. So if we honor the classifications within the complaint, Robert Blake, acquitted of murdering his wife, should be considered a criminal. In the case of juveniles and capital punishment, the court has established a separate classification of culpability. If Armstrong wishes to protest this, he certainly ought to, but the blanket apathy toward determining criminality in the first place in order to determine what the criminals deserve is problematic.

And the general definition of what is criminal is suspect at its heart. We have a jury system that, despite how one feels about Scott Peterson, admitted to convicting and condemning him on a gut instinct, and not on the evidence.

In Texas, under Governor Bush, making sure criminals get what they deserve resulted in an innocent man dying in prison. The governor's office, being aware that the inmate was innocent of the crime, chose not to intervene because it was not their role. We need not pick the nit of whether or not a governor who claims responsibility for the crime rate in a state in which he is so impotent should do so, but we can certainly off our congratulations to Mr. Williams, as it looks like another "criminal" got "what he deserved".

That's the problem: he's treating the idea of criminal by a uniform presumption that the system works. That he's a black man has nothing to do with it: if he's awake and paying attention, he ought to know the danger of that presumption. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is, in fact, trying to make sure criminals get what they deserve.

What would happen to the country if we treated people like they were dogs? Three fights and you're put down. We'd be regularly executing or exempting from the law members of our military for their barfights on R&R. Children would be executed regularly, or else exempted according to age. So what happens there?

And that's an incomplete response to the first link. People like Mr. Williams (and also Mr. Sowell) tend to--ah--"ignore the obvious", as such. Rather, that's putting it kindly. It's very easy to agree with what they say if reality isn't particularly important. I mean, there's a point in arguing the detail of the historical record where I respect those who disagree with my interpretation, but Messrs. Sowell and Williams both cross the line between politics determined by one's interpretation of history and allowing one's interpretation of history to be determined by politics.

Sowell asks, "What do pretty words like "evolving standards" mean except that some people agree with you, even if the law says nothing of the sort?" And yet the answer is right there in the decision, as I've quoted before: "It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime".

Or Williams: "Do you think a majority of Americans would have supported the death penalty for Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, after they stalked through the halls of Columbine High murdering classmates? What about for DC sniper Lee Boyd Malvo? .... I think a majority of Americans would find it acceptable to punish these juveniles to the full extent of the law. I think they would do so because that’s what these criminals deserve." What these criminals deserve is exactly the question at hand: there's nothing like standing on the presupposition in question--What do these criminals deserve?

The problem, then, is that what seems quite obvious to you, what seems to paint the picture clearly in support of your assertion of judicial review being "anti-constitutional" (you're safer, within sight of terra firma, as such, if you leave it as it was in the topic post, at "unconstitutional". There at least, there's an argument to be had, or so it seems, that the Constitution was designed so that its checks and balances were ineffective. I'm not a fan of the thesis that the founding fathers intentionally sabotaged future generations, though, so I do feel a bit generous even in that assessment of the argument against judicial review).

You say you're connecting the dots, but the picture you're painting is still one in which conservatives gamble on ignorance in order to misconstrue circumstances and events in order to justify a preordained conclusion and a superficial interpretation of the political scoreboard.

Remember what it is in the end that annoys those who cry foul: women in control of their bodies, a refusal to commit unnecessary homicide, equality before the law. It's pretty rhetoric, but what of the issues it's meant to advance? When one cannot claim unjust advantage is a just right, it's judicial "tyranny".

Perhaps you'd be so kind as to consider a question I asked earlier:

If it's really "judicial tyranny", what's to stop Congress from

banning handguns?
making Sunday the official holy day of the United States?
invalidating marriages between differing races or ethnicities?
coercing you into a false confession of criminal activity?​

___________________

Notes:

Williams, Armstrong. "Judicial tyranny". Townhall.com. March 7, 2005. See http://www.townhall.com/columnists/Armstrongwilliams/aw20050307.shtml
 
"Judicial Tyranny" vs. "Congressional Tyranny"
What is the measure of balance?

The latest accusation of judicial tyranny comes, ironically enough, from the debate over Theresa Schiavo:

"This is a clear cut case of judicial tyranny. All the judges who have ruled against Terri are tyrants, and we fully expected this decision," said Tammy Melton, 37, a high school teacher from Monterey, Tenn.

WashingtonPost.com

Let's get this straight: If Congress oversteps its bounds, orders the court to make certain findings, and this is still insufficient to get what you want, it must be because judges are tyrants.

How about this way: If Congress sets fire to due process, and in your specially-awarded do-over, you still fail to make your case, it must be the judges.

After all, it couldn't possibly be, as was suggested by analysts last evening, that the plaintiffs, being handed a special privilege that nobody else gets to have, failed to use it properly? (We'll get to that later today when transcripts of yesterday's news and commentary cycles are available.)

One can only hope Ms. Melton doesn't teach social studies.

• • •​

What would constitute a lack of judicial tyranny?

Should the courts hear only the cases that Congress wants on a day-by-day basis? Should the courts only rule according to what Congress tells them to rule? What's the point of considering the merits of a case if the conclusion is foregone? What's the point of due process if it can be thrown out on a whim?

None yet have answered the question:

If it's really "judicial tyranny", what's to stop Congress from

banning handguns?
making Sunday the official holy day of the United States?
invalidating marriages between differing races or ethnicities?
coercing you into a false confession of criminal activity?​

• • •​

I do not know Michael Schiavo. But I do know that he has been slandered. I do know that Congressmen, who can say whatever they want without a concern for slander, have inappropriately accused "murder". I do know the family, in a last-ditch attempt to save Mrs. Schiavo's life, has accused Mr. Schiavo of abusing his wife and causing her heart attack. I do know that Senator (Dr.) Frist, despite his committed rhetoric, hasn't a clue what he's talking about.°

Perhaps it is an unfortunate coincidence that this issue comes about now, at a time when political conservatives in the United States were falsely lamenting "judicial tyranny". In the argumentative sense, however, this act of Congressional tyranny provides a clear example: Only the courts can stop Congress' rejection of due process.

And here's the sad thing about the pro-life case: the court didn't need to. Given a second chance, the plaintiffs presented so poor a case that the judge was able to duck the Constitutional issues.

In the meantime, those who complain of judicial tyranny would be wise to watch this dispute carefully. "Tyranny" is not embodied in the condition of not getting what you want. Rather, it is embodied by the usurpation of due process fostered by the 109th Congress.

If the courts can't stop Congress on this aberration, how can they possibly defend the people against Congress when the underlying questions aren't so clear?

So let's revisit the question one more time:

• If Congress were to ban handguns, will you accept it, turn to the judicial tyrants to save you, or just start shooting people?
• If Congress suppresses Sabbatarians in favor of a National Sunday Law, will you turn to the judicial tyrants, or wait for God to check in?
• If Congress invalidates marriages between ethnicities, will you turn to the judicial tyrants, or say goodbye to your spouse?
• If you are beaten or otherwise coerced into confessing criminal activity you did not commit, will you look to the judicial tyrants to save you, or simply bend over and grit your teeth when the time comes?​

It sounds a bit like the question about the police. Who do the anti-police people call when they're robbed? Of course, there is a vital difference: the anti-police people complained when cops broke the law; the anti-judiciary folks complain when the judges follow the Supreme Law of the Land.

And that's a big difference.

Should the time come, who you gonna call? Ghostbusters won't do squat for you this time out.
_____________________

Notes:

Haines, Errin. "Schiavo's Parents' Appeal Rejected". WashingtonPost.com. March 23, 2005. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58819-2005Mar23.html
 
Back
Top