Is eating meat morally wrong

[James R]

TW Scott:

Why do you claim anything has any inherent value at all. Is there value is a sociopathic murderer who has never given anything to society except fear and sadness? Is there any real value in acrilic paint on paper? Is there any value is a slab of stone carved in an aesthetically pleasing shape? Is there any value in deformed brain dead lamb?

Are you aware that even sociopathic murderers have rights, TW Scott? For example, they have the right to a fair trial, the right not to be arbitrarily killed and eaten etc. etc. This is a recognition of equal intrinsic value in terms of basic rights.

Last time I checked, acrilic paint and slabs of stone were not sentient beings.

As for the deformed brain-dead lamb, what about a deformed brain-dead human child? Any intrinsic value, there, do you think?

Strawman. No one made the claim of individuals in a society. This strictly species versus species, dragging in gender or ethnic issues is a pathetic attempt at a diversion.

I have already addressed your attempt to argue that some members of a species can "claim rights" on behalf of all members of the same species, whether or not those members actually have the requisite characteristic of being able to "claim rights" themselves. Please re-read my post on this issue above, since you haven't understood that you are begging the question. (While you're at it, you might need to look up "begging the question", too.)

A strange world you live in. Do you believe also that children should have all the rights and responsibilities of adults beginning at birth? If you are sane of course you answered no.

I have never claimed that children should have all the rights and responsibilities of adults at birth. In fact, it is your argument that pretends that children at birth have all the characteristics of adult human beings.

Humans are not "above" animals except in your twisted interpretation.

I never said humans are "above" animals. You did. I guess it is you who is "twisted".

However they are largely not a part of society. They are outside it. Even someone such as yourself recognizes that those outside of society only have what rights we choose to grant them.

Your assumption that some beings are automatically within the moral community, while others are automatically excluded, once again begs the question. Here, we are discussing what is required to be a member of the moral community. By starting from the assumption that animals are outside the category of morally significant beings, you dismiss the relevant issues before you even get started.

It is relevant to a point, but it is much like the concern you have for a stalk of corn. It is sad to a point but ultimately unimportant unless the animal suffering is my pet.

Why is your pet entitled to moral consideration, while other animals are not? This is a violation of the principle of equal consideration.

That said animal suffering is not pointless at times. I will admit that cosmetics testing on animals is barbaric, however medical testing is perfectly fine. Some may think that a double stnadard, but it isn't. Cosmetics testing has no real value to society, however Medical testing does.

Once again, you assume from the start that animals are just "things", or economic resources to be exploited by humans as means to and end. You deny them any intrinsic value in and of themselves. Here, you compare medical testing to cosmetic testing, not on the basis of any interest of the animals involved, but only on the interests of human beings who might benefit in the end. In other words, you assign zero intrinsic value to animals.

Species is a great way to draw boundaries as you encompass everything from the best to the worst.

Drawing the line by species is arbitrary, and unwarranted by any principle of morality. You protect the human sociopathic murderer, while at the same time you kill and eat an innocent animal, and on no other basis than the murderer is a member of one species while the animal is of a different species.

By your arbitrary code, you could equally draw a line between men and women, and promote sexism in all forms. Why? Because you are happy to deny equal consideration for no justifiable reason.

As explained above this is Species versus Species not Individual versus individual. You keep attempting to apeal to emotion by making it by individuals.

Each person is an individual. Every animal is individual. Every human is individual. We are talking here about individual basic rights - most especially the right not to be treated solely as the means to an end of another individual. You freely give that right to every individual human being, without question, yet you deny the same right to all animals, without question. And on what basis? None at all, except bigotted speciesism.

 

[James R]

dragon:

Eating meat is morally right. The human body was designed to include digestion of meat, thus it is moral for humans to eat meat.

This is the naturalistic or appeal to nature fallacy again. Please do me the courtesy of reading the entire thread, since this must be the 100th time I've pointed out the problem with this argument to one person or another.

The naturalistic fallacy lies in equating "morally right" with "natural".

The fallacy has been used historically to justify sexism, racism, homophobia, etc. For example: "Homosexuality is unnatural; therefore it is wrong."

One problem is in deciding what is "natural" and what is "unnatural" in the first place. If something occurs in nature, does that automatically make it natural? If so, it is hard to argue that homosexuality or vegetarianism is unnatural. Many animals and humans engage in homosexual behaviour. Many animals and humans are vegetarian. Therefore, we could argue that both of these things are just as "natural" as heterosexuality or meat-eating.

But the bigger problem is in assuming that what is natural is necessarily morally good and desirable. If homosexuality is, in fact, natural, does that mean it is automatically morally good? If it turns out that pedophilia is "natural" in a certain proportion of the human population, does that mean it is good? It certainly seems that war is a "natural" activity of human beings. Does that mean war is good, and we should all strive to have wars?

"Natural" simply does not imply "good" or "right".

 

[draqon]

Natural is what best proves to be the most efficient in a particular case, the choice that evolution has taken in majority. Natural it is to drink water when one is thirsty, unnatural it is to drink water at regular intervals without any regard to the feeling of thirst. Today eating meat is moral, majority of people who are the result of evolution have included meat in their diet and this practice was successfull. As human civilization progresses, then eating meat may not be moral since majority of people will not have a need for it. Morality is a justification humans have for anything that really proves to be the best practice of adaptation in a particular case.

natural does mean "right". homosexuality is wrong, not because of what homosexuals practice, but because homosexuality does not help society, but rather hurt it, by spreading STD's and not creating any new babies.

 

[James R]

dragon:

You're begging the question, too - i.e. assuming what it is that you are trying to prove.

You need to prove that natural = good and right. But you start by equating natural with good and right. It's like a person who goes into a "Natural foods" store and assumes without question that all the foods there must be good. (Are "natural foods" which have been processed really "natural"?)

Today eating meat is moral, majority of people who are the result of evolution have included meat in their diet and this practice was successful.

There are two things happening here. One is statements of fact: "the majority of people in the past ate meat; the majority of people today eat meat". The other is value judgments: "Eating meat is the morally right thing to do."

Can you not see that the value judgment does not flow automatically from the fact? So what if people in the past ate meat? So what if the majority today eat meat? They might all be acting immorally. It simply does not follow that everything "traditional" or "majority" is good and right.

As human civilization progresses, then eating meat may not be moral since majority of people will not have a need for it.

People don't need to eat meat now.

Morality is a justification humans have for anything that really proves to be the best practice of adaptation in a particular case.

This is a meta-ethical argument, which I would prefer to discuss in another thread, if you wish.

natural does mean "right". homosexuality is wrong, not because of what homosexuals practice, but because homosexuality does not help society, but rather hurt it, by spreading STD's and not creating any new babies.

Here, you equate "right" with "good for human society". As I have previously pointed out to tiassa, human society isn't the be-all and end-all. In fact, our recent actions as a society in terms of global warming, species destruction and so on, might have been good for human society, but they have been terrible for "nature".

Your comments on homosexuality are off-topic, so I don't want to spend much time on them here. Suffice it to say that most STDs, and especially AIDS, are spread by heterosexuals. Your assumption that creating more human babies is automatically a good thing is debateable. And, of course, most sex acts have nothing to do with making babies, anyway.

 

[Tiassa]

On the Principle of Equal Consideration:

re: #1055969​

Perhaps most concerning about the expression of the Principle of Equal Consideration is its insensitivity toward some of the most basic observable facts about life:

The Principle of Equal Consideration says that if we are going to take animal interests seriously and give any real content to prohibitions on inflicting unnecessary suffering, then we must extend the same protections to animal interests in not suffering as we extend to human interests, unless there is a good reason not to do so.

What defines “a good reason”? For some, the mere fact of species is sufficient. For others, species is just an artificial classification that ought to be observed when convenient and cast aside when it is not.

“Good reasons”, in the end, are left to the eye of the beholder. “God”, for some, is a good enough reason to demand vegetarianism, sanction murder, or give your daughters over to be gang-raped. For others, “God” is a stupid reason to do anything. But God is not observable; this is the problem with following God; one must follow what cannot be seen by means of faith in what can. Irenaeus of Lyon believed the Gospels were written by the apostles. He also believed that there should be four Gospels because of the significance of the number four (four compass points, &c.)

More observable than the existence of God is the apparent fact that life exists, and among life, humanity. It is philosophical speculation that doubts this apparent fact, and validly, but where does this doubt intrude on the seeming realities facing those that live? Does one person’s life really matter, whether given in suicide or stolen through murder? It does, generally, to the person doing the dying: the apparent reality of life speaks forcefully, and it is not relinquished easily.

Also observable is the apparent fact of the differentiation of species in nature. One can, of course, deny this apparent fact, or perhaps dismiss its significance, but such a denial only begs questions: What is the practical result of this abandonment of fact, of this dismissal of reality? The question of why one would deny what is so blatantly apparent in existence is also compelling, and not entirely confined to individual spheres of experience and influence. Nonetheless, the questions that arise most often involves presuppositions of their own: Why abandon the observable; to what end? What factual basis is there for such a dereliction? What cost, this faith?

The observable is often inconvenient. Whether it is the fact that, “The girl don’t want you”, or, “It’s raining”, the immediate interests of a given individual may be confined, reduced, or otherwise restricted by the observable. Among humans, of course, what is observable is no good reason to skip the undertaking in question.

But what is observable about life in terms relating to the Principle of Equal Consideration? What is significant about the simple facts of life and species?

"In fact, apples are made for us to eat . . . . Fruit-bearing trees bear fruit in order to propagate their seeds. An apple is made to be attractive to birds and insects, which the tree uses to disperse its seeds far and wide. It is no accident that humans like the taste of apples. They are "meant" to be tasty."​

Fruit-bearing trees bear fruit in order to propagate: is the effect of propagation somehow detached from the fact of species? Does an apple tree propagate its seeds in order to grow more orange trees? Are the biological processes of other species similar to humans? Is the result of consumption different among humans than other species? Are there acres of apple trees serving their interests in our sewers? When was the last time an apple tree sprang from any of our individual feces?

The processes of other species are specific to those species. Human processes are considerably different from birds or insects inasmuch as seed distribution is concerned. In the end, the apple tree is as much intended for human consumption and exploitation as the cow: it was raised in an orchard for the purpose of human consumption just as the cow was raised in some ranch system for human consumption.

That there is no accident that humans are receptive to apples may, in the end, be no different than the joy of orgasm: eating, like reproduction, is something we are supposed to do. Can you imagine if eating brought immediate suffering? If all humans were predisposed away from sexual communication?

Furthermore, not everybody on the planet likes apples. Some people just don’t. True, I don’t get it. Apples are good. Apples are tasty and nutritious, and yes, they help regulate the excretory functions in some people to hurry that seed through so that it can meet its destiny in the sewers under New York or Paris or Seattle or wherever.

More important, though, is the observable fact that the apple and its seed are the tree’s means of reproduction, and reproduction has the observable effect of adding to any given moment’s immediate number of apple trees. Would it be the least bit silly for an apple seed to grow an orange tree?

To give any “real content” to various concerns about the treatment of other species (e.g. cows, chickens, &c.) we must first determine why we have such concerns, and what degree of content is appropriate. A lofty assertion, such as, “Respecting certain rights of other species increases our understanding and respect for life in general, and thus helps the human species understand more about its role in the Universe,” is much better a reason than, “So I can feel better about my perception of my own place in the Universe.” The lofty assertion, at least, expresses some value beyond the individual self.

We do, then, encounter a problem when we come to the absolutism of the Principle of Equal Consideration: “Note that there is no middle ground. Either animal interests are morally significant, or animals are merely things which have no moral status.” Were morals of more substantive foundation, perhaps such a declaration might have some significance, but as it is, the Principle itself becomes a mere distraction under such duress. Unfounded assignations of value lead to skewed perspectives and hypotheses, confused classifications and conclusions. At the very least, we must find a conventional definition of the moral cornerstone before determining the moral significance of anything. Animal interests are morally significant: what does that even mean? By the Principle of Equal Consideration, as expressed, “morally significant” means “morally equal”. “No moral status”: the statement has no real value.

What right have any human being for interrupting or affecting the resource-distribution systems of any organism? We have no more right, according to the Principle of Equal Consideration, to demand that a plant allocate resources to repair damage according to our whim, will, or need, than we do to terminate the resource-allocation scheme of a cow or chicken or fish. To draw the line at central nervous systems and call it “suffering” is mere aesthetics; we give sympathy to what we think we understand, fear or resent what we do not. To address the issue of slaves: “ For example, in one slavery case in the US, a court ruled . . . .” Dark-skinned, African-descended human beings were considered “not human”; the assignation of a value equal to three-fifths of a person such as was eventually stricken from the United States Constitution, is for the purposes of taxation and apportionment. It was not a manner of figuring “how human” a black person was. The pretense of separation and the resulting lack of sympathy was, functionally, little different from drawing a line between plants and animals using a central nervous system as the criterion. It is an aesthetic assertion designed to pad the conscience against a “necessary sin”. Truly, ‘tis harder to see the similarity ‘twixt the plant and human, and the reminder of the anemia of such a classification much more subtle, but in the end, believing blacks a separate part of creation was a device that allowed slave owners and their ilk to ignore human suffering because they believed it wasn’t human suffering. It is all in the classifications we draw. Sometimes the boundaries have as much to do with what we want as with what really is.

The problem, then, with the Principle of Equal Consideration is twofold: first, it lacks any effective objective basis, and in doing so tends to ignore practical questions of intent, criteria, and result; secondly, its apathy toward criteria and result especially leave such notions as what is a good or compelling reason open to question. The facts of evolution and nature, for instance, are not compelling reasons when humanity can opt out of that system to a certain extent at will. But the details of evolution and nature, such as the declared importance of central nervous systems, become very compelling reasons when one decides it feels good.

At least the salmon and the apples abide by their place in nature. We humans, who can question our role as such, seem to stray farther and farther from the answer each time. We ought to have a better reason for our wanderings than, "Because I say so".

 

[Bells]

People don't need to eat meat now.

Some do. I am one of those people who ended up needing to eat meat. Not doing so not only put by child at risk (during my pregnancy), but it also put my health at risk also. That risk continued after I had given birth and continues today. Iron tablets and iron rich foods that does not comprise of red meat does not cut it. My only option would be to stop eating meat and live a life where constant blood transfusions become a reality. Now I can either become a vegetarian and have regular blood transfusions, or I can continue to eat meat, take the tablets and basically slowly build myself back up and keep myself and my blood count within a normal range. Hmmm.. for me the decision is an easy one.

Should I equate my need to eat red meat with any notion of morality? To tell you the truth I do not any longer. When I'd been told that I would have to start eating meat, I felt some guilt about it, but not any more. I've seen the difference it has made to my health and my life basically. I am no longer exhausted to the point of near collapse, I can now breath well without having to feel as though I'm living and breathing somewhere of high altitude. Do I beat myself up each time I take a bite out of a steak? No I do not. Why? Because I know what the reality will be for me if I don't take that bite.

I feed my son meat because children need iron, especially in his developmental stage. I will not deprive him of it. Am I breaking some moral rule in this regard? I do not think so and frankly, if people feel offended or think I am acting immorally, well stuff them. I do what is right for myself and for my child. I am not harming anyone or preventing any other person from living their lives as they so wish. I do not force my way of life and eating on anyone, and I expect the same in return. What I do not expect is to have people I do not know and have never met tell me that I am acting immorally or that my way of life is morally wrong. If you don't want to eat meat or think it wrong, then do not eat it. However I will say that I find it amazing how so many apply their own dietary beliefs to a notion of morality.

 

[nicholas1M7]

I find it to be ironic that this post is titled "Is eating meat morally wrong" and your name is Bells with an avatar of a guy looking at his balls. :m:

 

[VossistArts]

morals are just concept(s). they dont exist. staying alive is fine.

 

[Tiassa]

Some do . . . . Should I equate my need to eat red meat with any notion of morality? . . . . I feed my son meat because children need iron, especially in his developmental stage. I will not deprive him of it. Am I breaking some moral rule in this regard?

Indeed; no; and absolutely not. So says me. Big whoop, eh? But if I might exploit your situation for the purposes of illustrating my argument ....

Nature dictates that you are alive. The general, observable habit of nature is that organisms seek to remain alive at least until they have accomplished their purpose. Human aspect: Why do health risks increase in old age? Is it simply the fact of being old? What does it mean to be "old"? Especially in the case of women, who eventually cease cycling ova: does the cessation or for men, diminishing) of reproductive value have anything to do with the decline? How many annual plants in the garden are designed by nature to complete their life cycle without attempting to reproduce?

Natural demand reflects historical precedent in that meat is a specific food source recognized by the human body. Would we suggest that lactose intolerance is, in fact, a higher form of evolved human? Why treat it like a disability? In the case of meat as a general argument, I don't understand in any affecting manner the objection. Specific meat sources? I judge them on a case-by-case basis. That I won't eat Andouille sausage is purely an aesthetic thing; I cannot advocate the end of something simply because I find it aesthetically revolting. That I won't eat veal? It's economics and then morals, or at least a moral argument considering economics before aesthetics, but there is an aesthetic aspect. But it's how I feel, and I'm not going to condemn my host for offering me veal; if polite declination offends, I don't care. Cannibalism? While my consideration of cannibalism is on record already (#1051621), I would go so far as to say that if your body's demand included actual human blood, I could not find an objection inasmuch as there is much blood lost to age and waste in our emergency supplies, and if we only get around to fixing that problem in order to assert morally against necessary vampiric consumption, then we've got a whole lot worse going on than vampirism. Bottom line: there is no moral question involved in the natural demand of animal flesh itself. Yes, we all know about wretched conditions and moral questions aplenty about the production system, but that is a moral, ethical, or merely systemic question entirely separate from natural demand.

Perpetuity is the inclination of species. Sometimes people object to this notion because so few people consider the future of all humanity mid-thrust, or even post-coitus. But even the quaint notions of stereotypical pre-motherhood ("I just want my child to be happy, healthy, and maybe find a way to do some good in the world") lean heavily toward the communal future. Is it merely a sublimated aversion toward the apparent pointlessness and uselessness of humanity, a blind rebuke of the Absurd? Could evolution rely so heavily on the complex banalities of human fancy? It's possible. And while I sometimes wonder about those who simply turn away entirely from the issue, or else are incapable of seeing it at all, it seems more probable to me that the "blind rebuke" is not necessarily so blind, and not necessarily a rebuke. We yearn, as a species, for a future. Any one will do, and we hope for the best for the future, but why, oh why, short of pure selfishness, would any rational person want children in the first place? Of course, we are irrational creatures. And so our expressions of the rational reason for wanting children become muddled in irrationality. There is always an undercurrent of the future. What future? The future of humanity. The tendency of species. Whether we intend or not, our actions have effects on the future of humanity. Perhaps murder is symptomatic of natural selection. Perhaps justice is a complex balance also tending toward natural selection. Our children are our contribution to species. In the case of, say, feeding a child meat (as opposed to, say, arranging for a competeting cheerleader's mother to be killed so your own daughter can make the squad) the moral burden is on anyone who would challenge the facts of life and species. As such, it is enough to say that those who decide for themselves and their offspring that vegetarianism is the appropriate component to their contribution to the species (e.g. right thing for their lives) have the right to enforce that deviation. The only moral issue arises in the context of a specific and immediate medical issue, but this, too, can be written to natural selection if we care to be liberal with the idea. (Think in terms of the results of natural selection, not whether the wolf ate the jackrabbit or the meteorite killed the wolf. And really, a meteor in the ass? Wouldn't that just fry the ego? That nature selected you so forcefully that it put a meteor in your ass?)​

A point would be wonderful, eh, to make this exploitation complete?

Regardless of what we decide for our own selves, the choice to assert our priority for the rest of humanity (e.g. a moral obligation) invokes a new set of questions regarding the propriety of our proposition. Blood type and diet correspond at least as specifically as different kinds of noodles, different kinds of rice. It seems to me that proposing any uniform solution affecting diet ought to be undertaken very cautiously. What, after all, are the immediate consequences? And what are the long-term considerations? It is easy enough, in a moral fervor, to claim to not care about the long-term; but this is the problem with moral fervor.

When the proposition has to do with sexuality, for instance, things can get very muddled. 'Tis true, for instance, that Americans have a warped sense of sexuality; that we are so severely delicate about consensual sex makes us doubly confused with what is deemed criminal. But a "clean" sexuality helps the odds of healthy reproduction, while a "moral" sexuality tends toward proprietary attitudes that set off enormous, complex, and subtly diverse effects in terms of socialization as an evolutionary consideration. Murder and rape as natural selection, and all because people aren't thinking straight in the first place? Maybe it sounds preposterous, but such are the complexities of hanky-panky.

When the proposition has to do with a more fundamental object like species diet ("reproduction" would be its equivalent consideration in the above; "sexuality" would have more to do with "artsy food" and "obesity") things are at least slightly more clear. Issues of livestock welfare, for instance, have as much to do with the future of our species--whether understood and intended by the political actors or not--as with whatever cause or trend brought the regulations about. Look, we don't like to let people torture animals because we fear that coldness toward suffering is contagious and aggressive. And because we can sympathize with the ants and the slugs and the worms-on-the-hooks. (Ever hear the old stoner classic about the ant? "Do you ever wonder if, like, he had time to think, 'Oh shit'?" It's not that people are always so callous, but rather that our ability to anthropomorphize other organisms is diverse and inherent.) We see in the "hideous" conditions at chicken farms a reflection of that shadowy, aggressive contagion. It is easy to overstate the suffering we perceive; exaggeration is a tendency of the significant in human experience. Exaggerated projections are among the reasons so many people with no better reason than wanting to own dogs. Exaggerated projections are why I like having cats around. (Having no mice around is nice, but that's rarely the fault of the cat. She's probably brought me more mice from the field as prizes than she's chased out of the house. And she doesn't really hunt that much. These days I rent; my cat is supposed to stay inside. She better not be catching mice these days. So what, other than exaggerated projections of my cat's experience in life, even attempts to justify feeding and brushing her and cleaning up her litter box? It's nice that she sticks around, but ....) Is it really wise, in the end, to assert regarding something as fundamental as species diet based on aesthetics and exaggeration? What is the argument that reducing the spectrum of the human diet is even a neutral outcome, much less a positive one? For aesthetics? No.

I think those animal-rights folks pushing the more controversial ideas overstate the cases even worse than the tree-huggers. But that's just me. One of these days, one of them might put in front of me a rational explanation that pretty much sets the case, but in the meantime, the result of such assertions as the Principle of Equal Consideration that are so inconsiderate of observable, fundamental truths in the living scheme they purport to effect is to further marginalize animal-rights representation as irrational.

But that's just me. Or ... something.

 

[Tiassa]

On Plants vs. Animals

re: #1055995​

Wow.

I won't quibble definitions.

How, exactly should a plant behave to indicate it feels pain?

Scream? Roll around on the ground, holding its hands to its head, shouting, "Moo! Moooooo!"

Maybe beg for its life?

What?

 

[Tiassa]

On Claiming Our Rights

re: #1055999​

Nearly shocking, but weak:

It has been argued in this thread that animals have no rights or intrinsic value because they have not "claimed their rights".

The point that they have not "claimed their rights" is demonstrative that they are, as a species, incapable of doing so. Did you see those three words, "as a species"?

This fails as a viable reason for denying equal consideration to animals because it sets up a double standard. Many human beings have never "claimed their rights". We recognise the rights of human children, disabled human beings and so on, not to be treated as things, but as beings who have intrinsic value ....

.... It has been asserted that membership of the human species is enough to give human babies basic rights. Human babies, even though they do not possess the special characteristic that is supposed to give rights (i.e. that they have "claimed their rights"), supposedly should still be treated as though they possess the required characteristic.

But this is simply begging the question. The issue here is to name a characteristic that ALL humans possess but which animals do not, which justifies us giving rights to all humans but to no animals. Pretending that all humans have a particular characteristic when some in fact do not, and when some animals may in fact possess the characteristic, doesn't overcome the inconsistencies of this argument.

The characteristic is that all humans are human. Our first concern is human. Our care for the environment stems from the recognition that continued abuse will hurt the future of our species. Our social structures were originally designed around the protection and perpetuity of human communities. And, though financial profit seems almost a spectral taint on the present, our social structures still do operate around the protection and perpetuity of human communities. When we understand fully the implications of the rights we have reserved for ourselves, then we can start considering rationally who else gets into the club, or whether anyone can be blackballed. We are human beings, not chimpanzees, not cows. Humans. It is so important a fact in history that we have fought, and still do fight, over who is and is not human. And if it is not a compelling, special, or distinctive quality that all humans posses, if the fact of our humanity is insufficient to qualify us as empowered to establish these rights at all, there is no other fact I can offer.

We're humans. Get over it.

 

[Tiassa]

On this matter, though, I still find it hard to believe that you would truly regard my eating your tomato as raising the same set of moral concerns as my eating your cat, say.

You still don't get it, do you? My cat has greater value according to my priorities than the tomato. My cat is not intended as food. My tomato is not intended to be my cat. Farging eat my tomato for all I care. There are more reasons for me to not eat my cat than there are in favor of kitty stew.

If the only difference for me is whether the cat or the tomato would suffer at all, wouldn't that suggest something hideously skewed about my perspective? I mean, come on: by the time we get to "suffering", the argument and the sauce would be done.

There's irony here, is there not?

Depends on your experience and perspective. Or did you mean the irony of commenting on irony in order to avoid considering a point? Quite ironic. Tip my hat to you, old boy. Not often you can outfox a man who terrorizes cows, eh? (At least it's not sheep.)

Who suggested making the problems of animals more important than the problems of humans? Another "straw man" stamp for you.

"(Blank) a l'orange. That's the clue. (Blank) a l'orange."

The way I look at it, when we figure out how to treat one another as humans, then we can worry about everything else. Do you have any idea how big of a change the world will undertake for the benefit of a moral assertion? I mean, f@ck, we're going to do for the chipmunks what we can't do for ourselves? Do they get charge cards? Housing assistance? Small rodents can be trained. What's the union representation like over at the electric plant, where the city's millions of squirrels and chipmunks run two-hour shifts on millions of little hamster-wheels and produce enough electricity to light one Broadway marquee for a tenth of a second? We can, therefore we are obliged to do. What if they don't follow the little signs to the Chipmunk Job Training Facility? Are they just loafers? Should we lock 'em up? Kick 'em out? Oh, they don't ... they don't understand their rights and obligations? Oh, I see. So we treat them kinda "special" like. No? Oh, I see. We just recognize them as equal to humans and therefore we're obliged to help them until they can make the same money we do and all that I mean really can you imagine a freaking squirrel making forty a year with benefits including health for the wife and kids? Will the gay penguins at the zoo have to sue for their joint policy coverage? Will they still be allowed access to the young?

What you intend and what you accomplish are two different things. Maybe I should have left it at that, eh? I mean, really. Gay penguins. No, they won't be allowed access to the young. With this kind of moral license, we will have shot them for being gay.

This is either another misrepresentation or misunderstanding of an issue - I'm not sure which.

I'll take your word for it.

So, it appears there can be differences between caring for a pet and owning an animal you intend to sell for meat. Could this have something to do with intrinsic value and a double-standard, do you think?

The cat has specific value to me beyond its weight in steaks.

It's no double-standard. It's a myriad standard. I have a nearly religious affection for ladybugs; talk about silly reasons for favoritism. The last ladybug I know of killing I gave a funeral. I have a stupid revulsion of spiders that makes them more liable to meet their deaths in my proximity than is fair. But I also know that stars sing, and this makes them important to me.

Do you get it? I'm human.

I despise mushrooms unless they make me see colors for hours. They're either candy, or mold.

I don't eat tripe. Wouldn't even know why. It just looks revolting to me. I have no idea what it tastes like. Don't ever want to find out. I learned my lesson with escargot. ("If it's really that revolting to you, there's a reason.")

I think this has more to do with your opinion of people than your regard for animals.

Back at you. I think you don't appreciate what cows are actually like. I doubt you've spent much, if any, time with cows. You probably think they are like grass-munching automatons.

I also know they're a tremendous potential energy source, but you'd probably call the bottling process cruel, too.

 

[Tiassa]

A quote I found yesterday in a book I'm reading at present:

By the late eighteenth century, most Americans ... shared a mistrust of intellectual authorities inherited from previous generations and a belief that true knowledge arose from the use of one's own senses--whether the external senses for information about nature and society or the moral sense for ethical and aesthetic judgments. (Noll, 11)​

How many times do I have to make the point that morals are shaky propositions in the first place? The moral standard I advocate invites, at least for most, more questions than it offers answers. Morals are not inherently supposed to be convenient; that's the problem people have with living morally; I know people who treat their bodies according to a moral standard that has erased entirely the joy of eating. (Hosting these folks for dinner is an interesting experience.) But you and I alike know far more people who don't torture themselves for morals, who have sex when the opportunity and desire coincide, and sack what God says; who will cheat the cable company whent the opportunity arises, and "it's not really stealing". I know a guy who claims to not masturbate, and while that's all well and fine, he is also one of the most tortured and overstressed souls I know of in terms of the small daggers of everyday life that pierce and bleed the spirit. It is easier to just cut to the chase and go to war than it is to answer the world while you follow the moral route to war; it is easier to do what you do and call it moral than it is to understand what is moral and follow that path.

And as long as this is the way of things, moral assertions will be especially suspect. An asserted Principle that examines the Universe in terms of its separate objects and cares nothing for how those elements interact is no rational or objective basis for morality. It is, instead, a convenient buoy to cling to amid an uncertain and undefined sea.

To reconsider morality in terms of what is real and what that reality tells us in the most basic and objective terms brings at least a hope of discovering a rational seed from which the moral flower might bloom, and perhaps that flower will bear fruit. Untimely heat or cold, passion or indifference, will stunt the moral flower as surely as the weather can blitz the garden.

What is the reality according to which the moral assertion is conceived? What is the reality into which it will be inserted? What is the reality of its effect? Is a moral assertion with no care for the future anything more than a situational ethic? If we trump our moral propriety, are our morals true, or are they just something by which we can feel better about ourselves?

The argument against consumption of meat according to the Principle of Equal Consideration brings unsatisfactory answers on all counts, at least as it has been presented in this discussion. Ignoring our humanity in order to feel better about being human is, in the end, a futile exercise akin to drug abuse: sooner or later we must face what we have created, and rarely are the results palatable.
____________________

Notes:

Noll, Mark A. America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. (p. 11)​

 

[James R]

tiassa:

I will respond to your posts in the order you posted them. Again, since there is a lot to respond to, forgive me if I extract what I consider to be the important points and themes.

What defines “a good reason” [not to apply the principle of equal consideration]? For some, the mere fact of species is sufficient. For others, species is just an artificial classification that ought to be observed when convenient and cast aside when it is not.

By "good reason", I mean logically defensible - grounded in reality, as you would put it.

Speciesism as a basis for morality is arbitrary. It simply says "I'm human and you are not; therefore I can treat you as a resource for my exploitation." The problem here is that the conclusion doesn't follow in any logical way from the premise, when we are considering the ethics of this exploitation.

“Good reasons”, in the end, are left to the eye of the beholder. “God”, for some, is a good enough reason to demand vegetarianism, sanction murder, or give your daughters over to be gang-raped. For others, “God” is a stupid reason to do anything.

No. Some ethical arguments are superior to others, as I have said. Religious prescriptions on morality may or may not be logically defensible, but this is a separate matter for discussion on individual issues.

More observable than the existence of God is the apparent fact that life exists, and among life, humanity. It is philosophical speculation that doubts this apparent fact, and validly, but where does this doubt intrude on the seeming realities facing those that live? Does one person’s life really matter, whether given in suicide or stolen through murder? It does, generally, to the person doing the dying: the apparent reality of life speaks forcefully, and it is not relinquished easily.

And does an animal's life really matter? It does to the animal. So, why deny equal consideration and intrinsic value? On what basis?

Also observable is the apparent fact of the differentiation of species in nature. One can, of course, deny this apparent fact, or perhaps dismiss its significance, but such a denial only begs questions: What is the practical result of this abandonment of fact, of this dismissal of reality?

Species, as I have clearly explained previously, is an arbitrary and unsupportable characteristic on which to deny equal intrinsic value with regard to basic rights.

But what is observable about life in terms relating to the Principle of Equal Consideration? What is significant about the simple facts of life and species?

It is observed that animals suffer in the same way that humans do. But I won't repeat myself again. Please review my previous posts.

The processes of other species are specific to those species. Human processes are considerably different from birds or insects inasmuch as seed distribution is concerned.

The Principle of Equal Consideration says to treat like things alike. The fact of animal suffering and human suffering is like and like, and demands equal consideration. As I said before, animals have some interests that are unlike human interests, and vice versa. But where the interests are the same, so should be the treatment.

In the end, the apple tree is as much intended for human consumption and exploitation as the cow: it was raised in an orchard for the purpose of human consumption just as the cow was raised in some ranch system for human consumption.

You are begging the question. The issue is whether plants or animals can be justifiably treated as mere economic resources for human exploitation. You simply assume from the start the answer to that moral question.

To give any “real content” to various concerns about the treatment of other species (e.g. cows, chickens, &c.) we must first determine why we have such concerns, and what degree of content is appropriate. A lofty assertion, such as, “Respecting certain rights of other species increases our understanding and respect for life in general, and thus helps the human species understand more about its role in the Universe,” is much better a reason than, “So I can feel better about my perception of my own place in the Universe.” The lofty assertion, at least, expresses some value beyond the individual self.

Once again, when you talk about increasing "our understanding and respect for life", you refer to human beings, and assume that the only relevant value an animal might have is in its value to human beings in one way or another. You disregard its intrinsic value.

Is it because you think animals actually have no intrinsic value that you are so concerned with the effects of moral decisions on the human species?

We do, then, encounter a problem when we come to the absolutism of the Principle of Equal Consideration: “Note that there is no middle ground. Either animal interests are morally significant, or animals are merely things which have no moral status.” Were morals of more substantive foundation, perhaps such a declaration might have some significance, but as it is, the Principle itself becomes a mere distraction under such duress.

The fact is: you automatically accord a certain intrinsic value to all human beings, while denying intrinsic value to animals. And why? For no reason, that I can discern. Instead, you try to avoid the moral issue by introducing meta-ethics - arguments about the very basis of morality itself.

The thing is: I am sure you hold moral views on certain matters. Yet you appear to argue in the current thread that ethics is a useless subject, since all moral principles are ultimately baseless. I wonder why you cannot face the actual issues of this thread face-on, rather than seeking to skirt around them. Note that I have previously invited you to a discussion of meta-ethics in a separate thread, if you wish to pursue that diversion as a separate matter.

At the very least, we must find a conventional definition of the moral cornerstone before determining the moral significance of anything. Animal interests are morally significant: what does that even mean?

Why don't you take as a starting point the set of basic rights you agree that all humans possess? From there, you can consider whether there are any viable arguments for conveying the same rights on animals, or denying them.

If you wish to step back even further and question why humans have any basic rights, then I suggest we start a separate thread.

What right have any human being for interrupting or affecting the resource-distribution systems of any organism? We have no more right, according to the Principle of Equal Consideration, to demand that a plant allocate resources to repair damage according to our whim, will, or need, than we do to terminate the resource-allocation scheme of a cow or chicken or fish. To draw the line at central nervous systems and call it “suffering” is mere aesthetics; we give sympathy to what we think we understand, fear or resent what we do not.

Questions of "resource distribution", as you put it, start from a presumption that animals are resources, which, as I keep pointing out, begs the question we are trying to address in this thread.

To address the issue of slaves: “ For example, in one slavery case in the US, a court ruled . . . .” Dark-skinned, African-descended human beings were considered “not human”; the assignation of a value equal to three-fifths of a person such as was eventually stricken from the United States Constitution, is for the purposes of taxation and apportionment. It was not a manner of figuring “how human” a black person was.

Right. The decision that certain humans could viably be treated merely as the means to ends of other people had already been decided, before any legislation was enacted. Slaves were designated "things" rather than persons.

The pretense of separation and the resulting lack of sympathy was, functionally, little different from drawing a line between plants and animals using a central nervous system as the criterion. It is an aesthetic assertion designed to pad the conscience against a “necessary sin”. Truly, ‘tis harder to see the similarity ‘twixt the plant and human, and the reminder of the anemia of such a classification much more subtle, but in the end, believing blacks a separate part of creation was a device that allowed slave owners and their ilk to ignore human suffering because they believed it wasn’t human suffering. It is all in the classifications we draw. Sometimes the boundaries have as much to do with what we want as with what really is.

Does this not point at the objective basis you keep going on about? It is objectively wrong to "aesthetically" imagine that slaves are non-human, since the objective fact is that there is no meaningful biological difference between slaves and non-slaves. Compare the situations with animals and humans. Compare animals with plants.

The problem, then, with the Principle of Equal Consideration is twofold: first, it lacks any effective objective basis, and in doing so tends to ignore practical questions of intent, criteria, and result; secondly, its apathy toward criteria and result especially leave such notions as what is a good or compelling reason open to question.

On the first point, by your argument, it seems to me that all morals lack an objective basis. On the contrary, I argue that while it is impossible to "prove" an ethical principle, that does not mean that some ethics are not objectively better than others. We can judge different ethics by their practical outcomes, their logical foundation, and so on, as your favorite quote says.

As to the second point, it seems obvious that the result of the application of the principle is inherent within it: like is treated the same as like.

 

[James R]

Natural demand reflects historical precedent in that meat is a specific food source recognized by the human body. ...

Bottom line: there is no moral question involved in the natural demand of animal flesh itself. Yes, we all know about wretched conditions and moral questions aplenty about the production system, but that is a moral, ethical, or merely systemic question entirely separate from natural demand.

See my previous posts on the appeal to nature fallacy.

We yearn, as a species, for a future. Any one will do, and we hope for the best for the future, but why, oh why, short of pure selfishness, would any rational person want children in the first place? Of course, we are irrational creatures. And so our expressions of the rational reason for wanting children become muddled in irrationality. There is always an undercurrent of the future. What future? The future of humanity. The tendency of species. Whether we intend or not, our actions have effects on the future of humanity. Perhaps murder is symptomatic of natural selection. Perhaps justice is a complex balance also tending toward natural selection. Our children are our contribution to species. In the case of, say, feeding a child meat (as opposed to, say, arranging for a competeting cheerleader's mother to be killed so your own daughter can make the squad) the moral burden is on anyone who would challenge the facts of life and species.

How this is relevant to the question of whether the intrinsic value of non-human animals should or should not be recognised is unclear to me.

Regardless of what we decide for our own selves, the choice to assert our priority for the rest of humanity (e.g. a moral obligation) invokes a new set of questions regarding the propriety of our proposition.

We make laws for our societies specifically to regulate the behaviours of members of our societies, all the time. We live in a world, which includes human society as one aspect. We do not live in a world in which nobody has any obligations to other people.

Why are you so ready to accept the obligations of human beings to each other, but to deny any obligations of human beings towards other creatures?

Issues of livestock welfare, for instance, have as much to do with the future of our species--whether understood and intended by the political actors or not--as with whatever cause or trend brought the regulations about. Look, we don't like to let people torture animals because we fear that coldness toward suffering is contagious and aggressive. And because we can sympathize with the ants and the slugs and the worms-on-the-hooks.

Is that all?

You're like the court which said slaves shouldn't be beaten in public, not because of any intrinsic value of the slaves themselves, but only because public beatings are distasteful to the non-slave members of society who witness them.

Do you really think the only possible reason for humane treatment laws is in relation to human sensibilities and economic benefit? Do animals have any inherent interests at all?

 

[James R]

On Plants vs. Animals

How, exactly should a plant behave to indicate it feels pain?

Scream? Roll around on the ground, holding its hands to its head, shouting, "Moo! Moooooo!"

Maybe beg for its life?

Plants don't feel pain.

On Claiming Our Rights

The point that they have not "claimed their rights" is demonstrative that they are, as a species, incapable of doing so. Did you see those three words, "as a species"?

Yes, and I addressed that argument.

The characteristic is that all humans are human. Our first concern is human. Our care for the environment stems from the recognition that continued abuse will hurt the future of our species. Our social structures were originally designed around the protection and perpetuity of human communities. And, though financial profit seems almost a spectral taint on the present, our social structures still do operate around the protection and perpetuity of human communities.

This is your view. A little self-reflection wouldn't go astray, tiassa.

Your first concern, quite obviously, is yourself, and your species as a convenient abstraction. The only things which you consider important, as is clear from your posts here, are things which affect humans. Only humans have intrinsic value, according to your world view. And therefore, only human interests are worthy of recognition. Save the rainforests? Only if not doing so would adversely impact the "human species", or economic concerns thereof. There's no intrinsic value in a forest.

We are human beings, not chimpanzees, not cows. Humans. It is so important a fact in history that we have fought, and still do fight, over who is and is not human.

Slaves were considered sub-human. Women were, and still are in some places, considered sub-human. Different racial groups were and are considered sub-human. And it goes without saying that animals have been and still are considered sub-human by the majority of people alive today.

Who put humans, and certain sub-groups of humans, on a pedestal? And was it, and is it, justifiable? Or should we "get over it"?

 

[James R]

You still don't get it, do you? My cat has greater value according to my priorities than the tomato. My cat is not intended as food. My tomato is not intended to be my cat. Farging eat my tomato for all I care. There are more reasons for me to not eat my cat than there are in favor of kitty stew.

I get it perfectly. Your cat is valuable only in so far as it is valuable to you. It has no intrinsic value.

The way I look at it, when we figure out how to treat one another as humans, then we can worry about everything else.

I've already commented on this, too. It is illogical to think that we need to tackle moral issues one by one, and not start to make amends for one wrong until we have made amends for other wrongs which we rank as a "higher priority". We can try to address multiple injustices at once. We can multi-task.

Do you have any idea how big of a change the world will undertake for the benefit of a moral assertion?

Potential difficulties in implementing a course of action which is hard doesn't mean you should not do that. Sometimes, morality demands we take the hard choices rather than the easy ones.

I mean, f@ck, we're going to do for the chipmunks what we can't do for ourselves? Do they get charge cards? Housing assistance? Small rodents can be trained. What's the union representation like over at the electric plant, where the city's millions of squirrels and chipmunks run two-hour shifts on millions of little hamster-wheels and produce enough electricity to light one Broadway marquee for a tenth of a second? We can, therefore we are obliged to do. What if they don't follow the little signs to the Chipmunk Job Training Facility? Are they just loafers? Should we lock 'em up? Kick 'em out? Oh, they don't ... they don't understand their rights and obligations? Oh, I see. So we treat them kinda "special" like. No? Oh, I see. We just recognize them as equal to humans and therefore we're obliged to help them until they can make the same money we do and all that I mean really can you imagine a freaking squirrel making forty a year with benefits including health for the wife and kids? Will the gay penguins at the zoo have to sue for their joint policy coverage? Will they still be allowed access to the young?

Nice rant, but nobody is arguing that we give chipmunks equal rights and obligations to humans. Nobody said chipmunks are the same in all respects as humans.

 

[Tiassa]

I'll try to make a more detailed examination of your posts later. In the meantime, I think you're overlooking something:

If no absolutes exist that transcend humanity, then nothing exists that could possibly be drawing humanity in any particular direction. Without a goal, motion is meaningless. If Portland is your goal, you can make progress by driving down the road toward Portland, but if you have no goal, then driving a mile in the direction of Portland or in any other direction is meaningless motion, not progress. That "man sets his own goals" is an evasion, because human goals shift frequently and radically. One may make progress in terms of this or that limited goal, but unless there is a general and final goal, it is not possible to speak of progress overall. (Burton, 20-21)​

I suppose the first question is whether or not you can hold with that assertion, or perhaps you would like to claim that wandering aimlessly equals deliberate progress. Secondly, I wonder whether or not you can explain your presupposition of Equal Consideration according to any real standard that would make your vegetarian hopes for the species applicable toward some sort of "general or final goal"; presently, I see it as a "limited goal", since it does not seem to pertain to any objective root. What is the center of your moral structure? Feeling better about your own place in the Universe, or something more significant?
_____________________

Notes:

Russell, Jeffrey B. Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984.​

 

[Tiassa]

Cute PECs, but no substance

By "good reason", I mean logically defensible - grounded in reality, as you would put it.

Speciesism as a basis for morality is arbitrary. It simply says "I'm human and you are not; therefore I can treat you as a resource for my exploitation." The problem here is that the conclusion doesn't follow in any logical way from the premise, when we are considering the ethics of this exploitation.

"Grounded in reality" is an interesting phrase, isn't it? Consider your assertion that "speciesism as a basis for morality is arbitrary": while your definition of what constitutes speciesism is, as your example makes clear, rather sensitive, neither your assessment of my position nor the Principle of Equal Consideration is "grounded in reality". Your assignation of speciesism tells more about your view of other people and their opinions--e.g. how contemptible you find them--than it does about the actual issue in question.

Your PEC assigns an arbitrary value (e.g. "equal") to all things subject to its breadth. If we view these things in and of themselves, that is, as individual objects bearing no relationship whatsoever to one another, then the PEC makes sense. But reality does not suggest that lack of relationship. For the benefit of what species would you permit or advocate the extinction of humanity? Do you consider it an "extreme" question? All things being equal, why is the fact that bacteria don't suffer or feel pain justification for antibiotic treatment of an infection in humans? We call it disease, but the microorganism, if it could call it anything, would call it "life" or "survival". Equally considered, the microorganism has as much right to devour you as you have to devour the carrot. Is "self" the compelling reason to fight what humans call "disease"?

The Principle of Equal Consideration, as you have defined it, is as arbitrary as could be: you have drawn the line where it is convenient for your moral assertion. In this case, you have proscribed reality to fit your moral choice, rather than drawn your morals from what reality dictates.

That you think so lowly of your human neighbors on the planet as your characterizations suggest explains much about the irrationality of your argument, such as:

Some ethical arguments are superior to others

Based on what? Specifically, what are the criteria upon which that superiority hinges? So far you've given nothing but aesthetics and the fact that you say it is so.

And does an animal's life really matter? It does to the animal. So, why deny equal consideration and intrinsic value? On what basis?

That's rather a silly assertion. I do not believe for a moment that a cow being herded into the box undergoes the same processes as a human "dead man walking" to the execution chamber. You are extrapolating tremendously the nature of animals to resemble children's barnyard cartoons. If my daughter chooses to not eat bacon because it reminds her of an unreal representation of pigs (e.g. Charlotte's Web) would that be a satisfactory outcome for you? The idea of whatever irrationality works, as long as it gets you the outcome you want?

Species, as I have clearly explained previously, is an arbitrary and unsupportable characteristic on which to deny equal intrinsic value with regard to basic rights.

Stop trying to simplify what you don't understand, and instead understand what is really that simple: Species is an observable fact in nature. Do you deny this?

It is observed that animals suffer in the same way that humans do.

My cat once brought a prize mouse into the house to play with until she got bored. She did not finish the kill, for which I lectured her sternly. When I took the mouse outside to put it out of its misery, it neither begged for its life nor thanked me for ending its misery. "Animals suffer in the same way that humans do" is as subjective as the suffering of plants that you reject.

But I won't repeat myself again. Please review my previous posts.

Cha! You're repeating yourself like a religious zealot. Reviewing your previous posts will do nothing to clarify the matter, since your previous posts aren't clear on certain specific issues.

The Principle of Equal Consideration says to treat like things alike.

You need to learn a few things about what constitutes equal. Just because we have to change a retarded boy's diaper doesn't mean we should have to change yours. But then again, if you want to be equal to the retarded boy, as such, just keep heaping up that crap.

The fact of animal suffering and human suffering is like and like, and demands equal consideration.

Only what you consider relevant; we've already tried giving the animals equal consideration, and you, too, reject that outcome. (Remember the squirrels?)

The issue is whether plants or animals can be justifiably treated as mere economic resources for human exploitation. You simply assume from the start the answer to that moral question.

Actually, I start with a different set of presuppositions that lead to a different conclusion. I figured you were capable of understanding that aspect. Sorry. I shouldn't figure so irresponsibly.

Once again, when you talk about increasing "our understanding and respect for life", you refer to human beings, and assume that the only relevant value an animal might have is in its value to human beings in one way or another. You disregard its intrinsic value.

And you disregard the intrinsic value of a plant or a rock. I have repeatedly stated to you that species is an important, observable fact that my outlook respects, and you seem to look at that notion as simple snobbery. When you are prepared to consider the implications of reality, we might break this impasse. In the meantime, however, we're stuck at my repeated assertion that the relationships between objects in the Universe is important to understanding nature, and you seem to disagree.

Is it because you think animals actually have no intrinsic value that you are so concerned with the effects of moral decisions on the human species?

Specifically, it is the confines presented by a narrowminded fantasy of morality. The intrinsic value of animals is its own issue: they are part of the Universe and therefore serve a role in reality. What that role is we might reasonably debate, but not as long as you insist on giving two fingers to the observable facts of reality.

The fact is: you automatically accord a certain intrinsic value to all human beings, while denying intrinsic value to animals. And why? For no reason, that I can discern.

That you cannot discern the reason is your own problem and fault. I do not deny intrinsic value to animals; rather, that value reflects itself, and does not bow to moral fancies or aesthetic affinities.

Instead, you try to avoid the moral issue by introducing meta-ethics - arguments about the very basis of morality itself.

Morals without basis are essentially cheap religion.

Okay, try this: The Christian zealot claims, "Without God, there is no morality." I won't suppose that you've never encountered such an argument either here at Sciforums or elsewhere in your life. Maybe I'm wrong, and you've never heard anything remotely approaching this notion. But atheists, for instance, tend to get really steamed about those kinds of assertions. And well they ought to. Here's an interesting question, though: "Without God, what is the basis for morality?" What is the objective center upon which all morality is justified? Read through the Russell quote in my prior post with that question in mind.

You seem to be starting with a moral assertion and declaring it self-evident according to the Principle of Equal Consideration. I do not see the moral assertion as self-evident, and perceive that the PEC ignores basic relationships between objects in the Universe. Aesthetic surrgoate classifications such as central nervous systems serve as immediate justifiers to limited and limiting assertions that attach themselves to no other truth than, "Because I say so."

Conceptual equality is different from practical equality. You are equal to the rock inasmuch as you exist. I don't think you would tell me, though, that you and the rock are truly equal or the same or alike.

The thing is: I am sure you hold moral views on certain matters. Yet you appear to argue in the current thread that ethics is a useless subject, since all moral principles are ultimately baseless. I wonder why you cannot face the actual issues of this thread face-on, rather than seeking to skirt around them. Note that I have previously invited you to a discussion of meta-ethics in a separate thread, if you wish to pursue that diversion as a separate matter.

I have referred on a number of occasions to my statement regarding the morality and functional propriety of morals (see #1007746). If all you can draw from that is that "ethics is a useless subject, since all moral principles are ultimately baseless", I am going to have to recalibrate my assessment of your intelligence considerably downward. Need I apologize when I say I know you're smarter than that?

I'm sorry if you found my contribution to the "Absolute vs. Relative Morality" discussion (#1054740) unsatisfactory.

I suppose I'm just not smart enough to figure out what you already know so well. Please, then, enlighten me: What about the human capacity to observe facts and make judgments means we should ignore observable facts?

Why don't you take as a starting point the set of basic rights you agree that all humans possess?

Because those rights are determined by convention. Here, let's try a Battlestar Galactica issue. In the opening miniseries, the Commander and the President argue about the best course of action; the military man wants to get into the fight, while the civilian leader wants to run and preserve what's left of the civilization. In the end, Commander Adama gives over to the President's logic. Standing on the bridge of his battlestar, conferring with his officers, he catches sight of a couple in the midst of awkward early flirtation and courtship. He echoes the President: "They better start having babies." The executive officer turns, looks at the couple, then looks back to the Commander. "Is that an order?" he asks, to which Commander Adama replies, "It might be, before too long."

Now, I extend to humans the right of personal determination. I cannot force a woman to have a baby, and I cannot force her to have an abortion. But this moral conviction will disappear the day the human species is threatened. It is only a luxury of our present condition as a species or, more specifically, a society within a species, that makes such a right of personal determination possible. Ever seen housecats have sex? I've made jokes about rape among fruit flies before. Yet the latter, rape among fruit flies, is a feminist assertion I found in an anthropology text over a decade ago. Am I being speciesist if I think it absurd should we delegate a police unit to solving rape cases among cats and fruit flies?

Rights are subject to the most basic facts of existence.

If you wish to step back even further and question why humans have any basic rights, then I suggest we start a separate thread.

Fine, you can fly. Go to the nearest tall building and try it. If you wish to step back even further and debate physics, then I suggest we start a separate thread. We must question why humans have any rights, and we can certainly start whatever topic suits the need. But your proposition of extending the basic set supposed for humans to animals that meet your criteria encounters serious functional problems at the outset.

Questions of "resource distribution", as you put it, start from a presumption that animals are resources, which, as I keep pointing out, begs the question we are trying to address in this thread.

Okay, James: Wake up!

Seriously, snap out of it. Your point has nothing to do with the "resource distribution" you responded to. To clarify: How does your body heal a small cut? Generally speaking, it devotes specific resources to the task. Specifically, we can get into platelets &c. ....

Right. The decision that certain humans could viably be treated merely as the means to ends of other people had already been decided, before any legislation was enacted. Slaves were designated "things" rather than persons ....

.... Does this not point at the objective basis you keep going on about? It is objectively wrong to "aesthetically" imagine that slaves are non-human, since the objective fact is that there is no meaningful biological difference between slaves and non-slaves. Compare the situations with animals and humans. Compare animals with plants.

You're making the same division the slave-owners did, James. You're making an aesthetic division to justify your argument. When you've figured out a little more about resource allocation, we might be able to make some progress.

On the first point, by your argument, it seems to me that all morals lack an objective basis.

Most do. But you've been so caught up in your equality fantasy that you're missing something a little more subtle.

On the contrary, I argue that while it is impossible to "prove" an ethical principle, that does not mean that some ethics are not objectively better than others. We can judge different ethics by their practical outcomes, their logical foundation, and so on, as your favorite quote says.

The Principle of Equal Consideration has no objective foundation. "Because God says so" is a logical foundation until we consider the reality of God. The PEC, much like theocentric morality, falls off the cliff before it reaches the shining city of Observable Reality.

As to the second point, it seems obvious that the result of the application of the principle is inherent within it: like is treated the same as like.

"Like", as you would have it, is defined by aesthetics.

* * *​

See my previous posts on the appeal to nature fallacy.

Aw, gee, do I have to? Scream "fallacy" some more. Somebody might care. Someday.

How this is relevant to the question of whether the intrinsic value of non-human animals should or should not be recognised is unclear to me.

Doesn't surprise me.

We make laws for our societies specifically to regulate the behaviours of members of our societies, all the time. We live in a world, which includes human society as one aspect. We do not live in a world in which nobody has any obligations to other people.

I'm sure that had a point you figured was relevant.

Why are you so ready to accept the obligations of human beings to each other, but to deny any obligations of human beings towards other creatures?

You've been doing so well at answering your own questions; I'll leave you to it.

Really, if you're going to tell me what I think, do a better job about it.

Is that all?

If that's all you're getting from it, that's all you're getting.

You're like the court which said slaves shouldn't be beaten in public, not because of any intrinsic value of the slaves themselves, but only because public beatings are distasteful to the non-slave members of society who witness them.

Another one of those odd parities you'll say you didn't argue.

Do you really think the only possible reason for humane treatment laws is in relation to human sensibilities and economic benefit? Do animals have any inherent interests at all?

Nature asserts her interests. I've already said that. As to reasons for humane treatment laws, well, yeah. That is, unfortunately, the way it works out. We humans do evolve, and perhaps we'll finish the transition from this dark age. But we're not going to do it seeking to give ourselves warm-fuzzies about our moral superiority.

* * *​

Plants don't feel pain.

When you've figured out a little more about resource allocation, we might be able to make some progress.

This is your view. A little self-reflection wouldn't go astray, tiassa.

Questions for review:

(1) Are all human beings human? (Yes/No)
(2) For whose benefit did human society evolve? (Humans/Other Creatures)
(3) For what species' benefit would you permit the extinction of humanity? (Free essay)​

Considering that "intrinsic value" is a human assignation ...? Why would you save the rainforest? Not for the plants. They don't meet your criteria for equality. How about the bugs and snakes and fish and furry or winged things that live there? Now, why do those things get more consideration than the things we displace that aren't in rainforests? Your simplistic attitude toward human benefit really does make me wonder for what you would permit or advocate human extinction.

Nothing is as black-and-white, James, as you need it to be for your argument.

Slaves were considered sub-human. Women were, and still are in some places, considered sub-human. Different racial groups were and are considered sub-human. And it goes without saying that animals have been and still are considered sub-human by the majority of people alive today.

Yeah, well, animals are not human. And by observable criteria, they accomplish less in general than humans. Sure, the ants and cockroaches can build some impressive stuff, but nothing like a supermall or football stadium.

As to sub-human people ... I realize I'm a terrible person because I think it more important that we get people to stop fighting over what humans are human than to decide what other species get human rights. But that's just something I'll have to live with.

In the meantime, we don't fight nearly as much over who is or isn't a cow.

Who put humans, and certain sub-groups of humans, on a pedestal? And was it, and is it, justifiable? Or should we "get over it"?

God, nature, the Universe ... whatever. Is it justifiable? Is anything justifiable?

* * *​

I get it perfectly. Your cat is valuable only in so far as it is valuable to you. It has no intrinsic value.

Cats have an intrinsic value determined by their place in nature. My cat is more important to me than other cats, true. But my cat is also family, which you might or might not have a hard time understanding. Do you really need things to be so simplistic as you're stating them in order to understand the discussion?

I've already commented on this, too. It is illogical to think that we need to tackle moral issues one by one, and not start to make amends for one wrong until we have made amends for other wrongs which we rank as a "higher priority". We can try to address multiple injustices at once. We can multi-task.

There is a difference between multitasking and stumbling blindly in the dark until we fall on our asses.

Or do you disagree?

Consider personal determination, discussed above. Isn't it a bit hard to extend to a cow a right that we have not adequately defined for ourselves? ("Here, cow. We don't know quite what it is, but, heck, we'd feel guilty if we didn't give it to you, as well." Or, perhaps, let's say my daughter sees a faith healer on television, figures she can do that before she actually knows what she's doing, so she walks up to you, smacks you in the head, and shouts, "Glory be to God!" Are you going to thank her?)

Potential difficulties in implementing a course of action which is hard doesn't mean you should not do that. Sometimes, morality demands we take the hard choices rather than the easy ones.

Questions for review:

(4) Diet is a _____ consideration of any given species. (Vital/Worthless)
(5) Morals should be based on what makes us feel better about ourselves right now. (True/False)​

Nice rant, but nobody is arguing that we give chipmunks equal rights and obligations to humans. Nobody said chipmunks are the same in all respects as humans.

Where we choose to draw the line is a very important consideration. But, as you say, "like is treated the same as like". It's just a matter of what like or unlike is important to who. Or whom. Whatever.

* * *​

Just a last little bit for my satisfaction, so I know I've at least tried to get through:

Do you understand "resource allocation" in terms of a single organism or system? When you have a cold, your body allocates resources toward system wellness. When you break a bone, your body allocates resources toward healing the damage. When you injure a plant, the plant allocates resources of its own system toward healing the damage. Easy enough to start? Hope so.

Now, when you make such a big deal about the fact that "plants don't feel pain", you're looking solely at what pain is, and not what it suggests. Damage has taken place, damage must be addressed. A plant responds to injury by addressing the injury. Do you disagree with this last sentence?

What right do we have to demand that a plant allocate resources to addressing an injury? What right have we to make that address futile (e.g. killing the plant)?

If the only standard separating the plant's address of injury and the animal's is pain as humans understand and project it onto other animals, the separation is mere aesthetics.

When the cow is dead, it's effing dead, and doesn't hurt anymore. There is no cow heaven. Exploitative exaggerations of projected experiences do not make a strong foundation for moral assertion.​

As I've said before:

I think those animal-rights folks pushing the more controversial ideas overstate the cases even worse than the tree-huggers .... One of these days, one of them might put in front of me a rational explanation that pretty much sets the case, but in the meantime, the result of such assertions as the Principle of Equal Consideration that are so inconsiderate of observable, fundamental truths in the living scheme they purport to effect is to further marginalize animal-rights representation as irrational.​

 

[Sgal]

I think eating meat was just a way to survive, and now has become a way of life for humans. Now people have choices and people are picking all different kinds. Some go completely vegetarian, some stick with meat and some are somewhere in between, like eating only chicken or fish.