The Principle of Equal Consideration: Basic rights and equal inherent value
A right is the recognition of an interest. To say that an interest is protected by a right is to say that the interest cannot legitimately be abrogated merely to benefit somebody else.
The fundamental consequence of any recognition of rights is that we recognise a basic right not to be treated exclusively as the means to the end of another person. This is a basic right, and a prerequisite to any legal system of rights. If we don't have this right, then all other supposed rights become completely meaningless.
Another way of stating the right not to be treated as means to an end is to say that there is a right not to be considered solely as a resource for somebody else to use as they see fit. Without this right, no human being can be a legal or moral person within society. Without the right, the human being is not a person, but a thing.
If the value of a human being is only as a resource for others, then by definition the Principle of Equal Consideration (treat like things alike) is not applied. Thus, any logically defensible moral system must incorporate the Principle of Equal Consideration as part of its set of basic principles.
This concept of basic rights is well established in philosophy. For example, Immanuel Kant maintained that there is one innate, pre-legal right - the right of innate equality or "a human being's quality of being his own master". Kant said that this right "grounds our right to have other rights". Innate equality in turn demands that we apply the Principle of Equal Consideration.
The difference between a basic right and other rights is that non-basic rights may be sacrificed in order to secure basic rights, but not vice-versa. Sacrificing a basic right to secure other rights would be a self-defeating process, since no other rights can be truly enjoyed in the absence of the basic right. Those other rights would in fact be illusory.
To give another example, one commonly-cited example of a basic right is the right to physical security - the right not to be subject to murder, torture, rape or assault. It would make no sense to suggest that we sacrifice this right for a non-basic right, such as the right to vote. What use is being able to vote if you can't guarantee you won't be murdered?
The basic right not to be treated solely as a resource for others guarantees that humans cannot be bought and sold, used for biological experiments without their consent, killed and used to make clothing, hunted for sport, or killed and eaten.
An equivalent formulation of the idea that humans cannot be treated solely as the resources of others is to say that we recognise that all human beings, regardless of their personal characteristics, have inherent value beyond their value as a resource for other people. This is sometimes called the inherent or intrinsic value concept. Recognition of intrinsic value means we have a right not to be treated as a thing, but as a person. Things, as opposed to persons, only have extrinsic value - they are only valuable in so far as somebody else regards them as a valuable resource. Persons have intrinsic value.
Consider slavery. Slave owners were often advised to treat their slaves "humanely". Why? Not because of any rights of the slaves, but only due to the charity of the slave owners. Slaves are accorded no intrinsic value; their only value is as a resource for exploitation by their owners. An owner might treat his slaves humanely to protect his economic investment, but this is not a recognition of intrinsic value or rights of the slaves.
For example, in one slavery case in the US, a court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to try a slave owner who beat his slaves with "rods, whips and sticks", even if the beatings were administered "wilfully and maliciously, violently, cruelly, immoderately and excessively". The slaves had no rights; they were the resources of the owner, to do with as he pleased. The only exception to this was if the beatings were administered in public rather than in private "not because it was a slave who was beaten, nor because the act was unprovoked or cruel; but because ipso facto it disturbed the harmony of society; was offensive to public decency, and directly tended to breach the peace. The same would be the law, if a horse had been so beaten." In other words, the court would consider the sensibilities of people who had rights not to be offended by witnessing a beating, but would not accord any rights to the subjects of the beatings themselves.
Now, consider animal rights. The Principle of Equal Consideration says that if we are going to take animal interests seriously and give any real content to prohibitions on inflicting unnecessary suffering, then we must extend the same protections to animal interests in not suffering as we extend to human interests, unless there is a good reason not to do so. Note that there is no middle ground. Either animal interests are morally significant, or animals are merely things which have no moral status. It might be economically "better" to not to treat animals cruelly, just as it might have been economically "better" to beat slaves only twice a week instead of five times a week, but this notion of "better" did not remove slaves from the category of "things".
Much of the argument in this thread has been concerned with potential excuses for not recognising the equal inherent value of animals in not suffering, and therefore denying that the basic right of equal consideration applies to animals. Examples: "Animals aren't as smart as humans", "Animals haven't claimed their rights in the way humans have". These are given as reasons to deny equal consideration to animals. In the following posts I may discuss these objections in more detail. There is a lot of territory to cover here, so I am approaching this bit by bit.
A right is the recognition of an interest. To say that an interest is protected by a right is to say that the interest cannot legitimately be abrogated merely to benefit somebody else.
The fundamental consequence of any recognition of rights is that we recognise a basic right not to be treated exclusively as the means to the end of another person. This is a basic right, and a prerequisite to any legal system of rights. If we don't have this right, then all other supposed rights become completely meaningless.
Another way of stating the right not to be treated as means to an end is to say that there is a right not to be considered solely as a resource for somebody else to use as they see fit. Without this right, no human being can be a legal or moral person within society. Without the right, the human being is not a person, but a thing.
If the value of a human being is only as a resource for others, then by definition the Principle of Equal Consideration (treat like things alike) is not applied. Thus, any logically defensible moral system must incorporate the Principle of Equal Consideration as part of its set of basic principles.
This concept of basic rights is well established in philosophy. For example, Immanuel Kant maintained that there is one innate, pre-legal right - the right of innate equality or "a human being's quality of being his own master". Kant said that this right "grounds our right to have other rights". Innate equality in turn demands that we apply the Principle of Equal Consideration.
The difference between a basic right and other rights is that non-basic rights may be sacrificed in order to secure basic rights, but not vice-versa. Sacrificing a basic right to secure other rights would be a self-defeating process, since no other rights can be truly enjoyed in the absence of the basic right. Those other rights would in fact be illusory.
To give another example, one commonly-cited example of a basic right is the right to physical security - the right not to be subject to murder, torture, rape or assault. It would make no sense to suggest that we sacrifice this right for a non-basic right, such as the right to vote. What use is being able to vote if you can't guarantee you won't be murdered?
The basic right not to be treated solely as a resource for others guarantees that humans cannot be bought and sold, used for biological experiments without their consent, killed and used to make clothing, hunted for sport, or killed and eaten.
An equivalent formulation of the idea that humans cannot be treated solely as the resources of others is to say that we recognise that all human beings, regardless of their personal characteristics, have inherent value beyond their value as a resource for other people. This is sometimes called the inherent or intrinsic value concept. Recognition of intrinsic value means we have a right not to be treated as a thing, but as a person. Things, as opposed to persons, only have extrinsic value - they are only valuable in so far as somebody else regards them as a valuable resource. Persons have intrinsic value.
Consider slavery. Slave owners were often advised to treat their slaves "humanely". Why? Not because of any rights of the slaves, but only due to the charity of the slave owners. Slaves are accorded no intrinsic value; their only value is as a resource for exploitation by their owners. An owner might treat his slaves humanely to protect his economic investment, but this is not a recognition of intrinsic value or rights of the slaves.
For example, in one slavery case in the US, a court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to try a slave owner who beat his slaves with "rods, whips and sticks", even if the beatings were administered "wilfully and maliciously, violently, cruelly, immoderately and excessively". The slaves had no rights; they were the resources of the owner, to do with as he pleased. The only exception to this was if the beatings were administered in public rather than in private "not because it was a slave who was beaten, nor because the act was unprovoked or cruel; but because ipso facto it disturbed the harmony of society; was offensive to public decency, and directly tended to breach the peace. The same would be the law, if a horse had been so beaten." In other words, the court would consider the sensibilities of people who had rights not to be offended by witnessing a beating, but would not accord any rights to the subjects of the beatings themselves.
Now, consider animal rights. The Principle of Equal Consideration says that if we are going to take animal interests seriously and give any real content to prohibitions on inflicting unnecessary suffering, then we must extend the same protections to animal interests in not suffering as we extend to human interests, unless there is a good reason not to do so. Note that there is no middle ground. Either animal interests are morally significant, or animals are merely things which have no moral status. It might be economically "better" to not to treat animals cruelly, just as it might have been economically "better" to beat slaves only twice a week instead of five times a week, but this notion of "better" did not remove slaves from the category of "things".
Much of the argument in this thread has been concerned with potential excuses for not recognising the equal inherent value of animals in not suffering, and therefore denying that the basic right of equal consideration applies to animals. Examples: "Animals aren't as smart as humans", "Animals haven't claimed their rights in the way humans have". These are given as reasons to deny equal consideration to animals. In the following posts I may discuss these objections in more detail. There is a lot of territory to cover here, so I am approaching this bit by bit.