Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

[Write4U]

You're missing the point of the analogy. If you say you have the freedom to act as you intend, but then say you have no freedom about what you intend, then you don't have freedom.

Right, that is what I am saying....... Think about it, its true. We always only respond to our best guess of external input, which does not allow for choice. We cannot choose what to believe. We "believe it, or not"......

 

[Sarkus]

It sounds like you think that free will might be possible if the universe is not "just" deterministic. You also make it sound as if the universe not being deterministic is a possibility you haven't ruled out.

I haven't ruled it out, and I also don't think it is strictly deterministic.

We probably need to get something out of the way first. Earlier in the thread, including in my posts, there was some discussion of quantum randomness. Do you think that might be a source of this non-determinism that you suspect the universe might have?

A source, yes.

My problems with quantum randomness are twofold. First, quantum mechanics is deterministic, is that the wave function (if you like) of anything evolves according to entirely deterministic physical laws (Schrodinger equation, for example).

I'm not sure it's entirely correct to say that QM is deterministic. While many interpretations might suggest this, there are some interpretations (at least as far as I am aware), for example, that include the notion of uncaused events. Which is contradictory to determinism.

This is conceptually no different to a classical particle obeying Newton's second law of motion. You might argue that when a measurement is made, the outcome is random according to quantum mechanics (although determined to the extent that the wave function defines the probabilities). But do you think this is enough to save free will?

Probabilistic interpretations of QM (involving inherent randomness in actual outcome) are not, in my opinion, enough to save free will from not being free.

Second - and this is more a more fundamental objection - I don't think that any random process, quantum mechanical or otherwise, can be considered to be the operation of a conscious, willed choice, such as would be required for free will. Random outcomes are random, not choices.

Agreed.

So, coming back to your view, you say that you do not assume that the universe is "only deterministic", and you imply that, if it isn't, free will might be possible. In that light, I need to ask you whether you have any particular candidates for non-deterministic processes in the universe in mind, such as might save free will. Presumably you have something in mind other than the supernatural, since you are quite insistent that the right kind of non-determinism is possible without invoking the supernatural.

Please don't put words in my mouth, JamesR. I have never said it is possible, only that it might be possible. There is a difference. One is a claim of possibility, the other is more agnostic on the matter - i.e. I just don't know. ​

Over to you, then, to outline your non-deterministic ideas that are in accordance with physical laws. Which of these ideas might make somebody "able to do otherwise", as you put it?

It's not over to me at all. It is surely over to anyone who wants to challenge the premises of the argument. The argument asserts a few things about deterministic processes, and asserts the will to be such a process. If one wishes to add in the premise that all laws are deterministic (or random) then one can further conclude that to be "free" (within the context of the argument) is to defy the laws of nature. The argument doesn't do that, though. I don't do that. I don't need to provide you with anything to either support or overturn the additional premises you wish to add.

If you have no viable candidates for these non-deterministic processes you allude to, then it would seem that your de facto position is that free will is impossible in the absence of the supernatural, regardless of what you claim to believe.

No. "Impossibility" requires the assumption that the laws of the universe are only as assumed within the argument. The argument makes no assumption in that regard. I don't. The fact that I can't provide example of any alternative is pretty much irrelevant. I might tend toward that belief (that they are deterministic or probabilistic) but that is an external assumption to the argument, and ultimately irrelevant to argument. If you want to firm up that assumption, that is on you. That is then your assumption, and it would be in addition to those of the argument that was presented.

I fail to see how it could mean anything else, from your point of view. But I'll wait to hear your explanation.

Because you are adding in an assumption that I am not. I am treating the argument in isolation, treating it on the assumptions given and not adding in my own.

Please don't patronise me. You complain when you perceive that from iceaura or myself, so do unto others. I have read and understood all of your posts, although I have requested that you expand on your argument on various points.

I consider patronising is to treat someone like a child. I merely considered you to have skim-read. If, as you say, you had read and understood all of the posts then you wouldn't be trying to effectively argue that by using a different notion you end up with a different conclusion, and do so as if it wasn't something I have repeatedly stated. I do not consider it patronising to thus infer that you simply hadn't read/understood the posts. If you find that patronising then apologies.

In what sense am I not able to do otherwise when I choose wheaties over corn flakes for breakfast?

At the point of making the choice, given the inputs to the process, could you have come up with a different outcome? You might say yes, but I would argue that that is because when you are concluding that you could have done different you are only looking at the fairly meta-scale influences. In concluding that you could, you would not actually be considering the same inputs at all. The sense of "free" we get is because we only consider those "causes", those inputs to the decision-making process that we are aware of. Not the actual inputs.
But again, this is different notions of what the words mean, resulting in different conclusions.

Did somebody other than me really make the choice? Was it the will of somebody other than me that I chose wheaties, say?

Different notions, different conclusions. There's no issue with that.

I have given you my description of free will several times now. I could have done otherwise, if that was the choice I had made. Under this formulation, my will is free as long as it is me who is doing the willing, and not some external force or person. My will is free if my actions are determined by my choices, and not the choices of some other person, entity or thing.

Sure. I have no issue with it. Other than your choices are not "determined" if the same inputs to your decision making process can lead to different outputs. To me that is a misnomer. It is the epitome of an indeterministic process for the same inputs to be able to lead to different outputs.
That aside, I have no issue with people who want to define "free will", and "free", in a way that means we can talk about our free will being free. Personally I don't see it as being free if the universe is deterministic. Or even probabilistic. But that is because my notion of what it means to be free is different to the one that you would be using in describing free will as being free.

You do have an issue with that [the formulation I expressed in the preceding paragraph]. You keep telling us that this kind of free will is not "true" free will, but merely the appearance or feeling or illusion of free will.

Yes, using the definition/notion/understanding of "free" that I use, I do not see your "free" as being truly free but merely the conscious appearance of being free.

We're telling you that this is actual free will.

Free will is the process. I have no issue with that. Whether it is free or not, whether one is truly able to do otherwise, that is a different matter.

More importantly, we're telling you that if you don't regard this kind of will as free, then it appears that the only kind of will that could be free, according to you, would be the supernatural kind that can defy physical law. You say there's a third path, but we're yet to get any description of that from you.

I don't say there's a third path, so please stop putting words in my mouth. I say I don't rule out there being more than just deterministic and probabilistic. There is a difference. Compare "there is a third path" with "I don't know if there is or not, but I don't rule it out".
Moreover, the argument as presented doesn't make the assumption that there is or is not another path. It is agnostic on the issue.

 

[iceaura]

While many interpretations might suggest this, there are some interpretations (at least as far as I am aware), for example, that include the notion of uncaused events. Which is contradictory to determinism.

How does an "uncaused" - but inevitable - event contradict determinism as you have described it here?

The argument asserts a few things about deterministic processes, and asserts the will to be such a process. If one wishes to add in the premise that all laws are deterministic (or random) then one can further conclude that to be "free" (within the context of the argument) is to defy the laws of nature.

The posts from me rest only on your assumption that the will, to be free, would have to be able to contravene the known laws of nature, including deterministic chains of cause and effect.
You have in fact made that assumption, repeatedly. Then you have denied making it, which indicates a fundamental confusion.

Whether it is free or not, whether one is truly able to do otherwise, that is a different matter.

Do you agree that someone approaching a traffic light has the ability to stop, and the ability to not stop, both, depending on information they have not yet acquired?

 

[Sarkus]

(continued...)

It has been pointed out many times that this misses the point. We're telling you that even if the universe and ourselves is entirely deterministic, we still have "true" free will in the only sense that matters - i.e. being able to act as we intend.

But that doesn't answer the question of whether that is actually free or not. It only answers the question of whether we appear to act as we appear to intend.

When I choose to eat wheaties for breakfast, I don't merely imagine that I can choose to eat them. I actually make the choice and actually eat them. Where's the illusion in that? Where's the lack of "truth"?

If the universe is strictly deterministic then those actions of yours, your apparent "choice" and your ultimate decision, were written in stone at the start of time. You were quite categorically not able to do anything different. Anything you think is "free" along the path is thus just a feeling with no truth in objective reality. Yes, we can (and do) define words that make sense to us on a practical level. We think/feel we have freedom so that is how we use the term in practical terms. But when you look at things with a philosophical hat on, some come at it from a very different angle, and they are entitled to do so.
What is most galling here is that this debate has been going on for a significant length of time by more than just armchair philosophers. Yet despite that, despite the arguments and viewpoints put forth over the years, here are a bunch of people on an internet forum effectively saying "incompatbilism is wrong". You yourself say "We're telling you that this is actual free will." You are doing nothing but asserting your philosophical view.

What do you think it means to choose? On the one hand, you appear to think that if your atoms made you do it, then you didn't really choose at all. On the other hand, you try to leave the door open by suggesting that there is some non-supernatural process that would allow you to "really" choose, after all, despite your atoms. I think it is you who needs to sort out what it means to choose, not me.

No, I don't. I really don't. I merely need to show that if one accepts that the will is a deterministic process then it is difficult to see how one can actually do otherwise than what they do, irrespective of what they think they are doing.​

What do you think the rest of us are doing here?

I'm still trying to work that one out. But this thread so far does not feel like a discussion.

You don't sound happy with it. You sound like you think that it only describes the illusion of free will, and not the real thing.

The illusion of being free. Free will is, I think, pretty much the same process whichever position one takes. It is the question of whether that process is free or not. I see the compatabilist view as more or less saying that we can take the same inputs (thoughts, dreams, desires, feelings etc) and reach different outputs. This is indeterministic. Yet if one assumes that the process is deterministic then the same inputs should lead to the same outputs. This suggests that you can have an indeterministic process from deterministic interactions. If this is the view then it would be a criticism of the argument put forth. But noone has disputed that assumption. So you then end up with the feeling of a process being indeterministic when actually it is deterministic (again, assuming the process is deterministic). And the feeling is thus illusory (i.e. it seems to be one thing when it is actually another).

I think that's what we're discussing, aren't we? I understand your frustration. Probably you're wondering why iceaura and I are making such a big deal out of your insistence that free will doesn't require the supernatural. Our problem is that the implications of what you write are that there is no other viable option, given your working notion of what free will is.

There are no implications unless you add in additional assumptions, which it is clear you (and iceaura) are doing but which are not there in the argument put forth. As an analogy, it is like you are assuming that if I don't have belief that God exists then I must have belief God does not exist. Simply put, the argument sets up some assumptions, and the conclusion only applies those assumptions. The frustration stems from conclusions being drawn that sneak in other assumptions as if they were always there, when they are not.

It's not about railroading you into holding a certain view. It's about exploring possible inconsistencies in your own position. It goes both ways, of course.

Sure. But there need be no inconsistencies in either view. If you start with different notions of what "free" means, for example, then you can lead to two independently consistent views but nonetheless apparently competing, when actually they aren't. They just hinge on different views and notions of what things mean. ​

Is this you agreeing with me then? It doesn't sound like it, from the rest of your postings.

No, I'm simply saying that you have replied without reading what you have replied to.

I have nowhere argued that free choice requires the defiance of physical laws. Quite the opposite. I have argued that choices are freely made all the time, without the need for the supernatural.

Again, read the question. I haven't said that you have argued that "free" requires the defiance of physical laws. I am asking if you have ever experienced a choice that was "free" IF "free" is taken to mean defiance of physical laws (i.e. your interpretation of the determinist PoV). You haven't. Nor have I.
So when you asked me: "How would you tell the difference between not being able to make free choices and being able to make them?" I quite accurately stated "From the determinist PoV I have never experienced the ability to make a free choice, and I never will. I can thus not tell what the difference might be." To which you then knee-jerked a reaction because you didn't pick up on the "From the determinist PoV".​

Isn't moral or criminal responsibility predicated on the basis that people make free choices about how they act? If you say that their choices aren't really free at all, doesn't it strike you as nonsensical to punish them for failing to be able to act other than they must?

To a point. An interesting area to move the conversation to, though. It's not really something I've considered too deeply, to be honest. It's a matter of consequence rather than the argument itself, which is where my main focus has been.
In answer to your question, though, if one looks at moral or criminal responsibility being a matter of character, it doesn't really matter how that character came about, rather it is justifiable to punish those whose actions define them as a criminal character.

Just like you need to decide what "real" free will would look like, I think you also need to decide what makes a person morally responsible for his or her own actions. The two questions are rather intimately related.

I don't need to decide what "real" free will would look like. It is enough to conclude that it is not compatible with a determinism, and that the process under consideration is deterministic etc. The rest stems from that. And I try not to appeal to consequence.

Notice that we routinely mitigate responsibility for people who are perceived not to have made a free choice to commit a crime, on grounds such as diminished mental capacity, insanity, coercion and so on.

Sure. At some point even the illusion might appear to offer limited "choices". ​

Under the no-free-will argument, people are essentially automatons - puppets of their atoms and the physical laws that govern them. They have no "real" choices, but merely do as they must. Should their crimes not be excused on the same grounds, then?

It would be nice to get a simple answer from you in this thread.

It would also be nice for people to respond to the argument actually raised without the addition of steal premises.
Are you struggling with comprehending what I say? Which part, exactly?

Should people be held morally (or criminally) liable for their crimes, if free will is merely an illusion?

An interesting enough question, which you might want to raise in a different thread. Or maybe you can explain what it has to do with whether physics has or has not disproved the existence of free will? Unless you're looking to argue from consequence?
Or were you looking for a simple yes/no to the red herring?

 

[Sarkus]

How does an "uncaused" - but inevitable - event contradict determinism as you have described it here?

If an event is uncaused, how can it be considered inevitable?

The posts from me rest only on your assumption that the will, to be free, would have to be able to contravene the known laws of nature, including deterministic chains of cause and effect.
You have in fact made that assumption, repeatedly. Then you have denied making it, which indicates a fundamental confusion.

:yawn: The confusion is on your side. I have been quite clear and consistent in using only the assumptions given by Baldeee in his formulation. You have yet to show how / where the additional assumption comes in other than if you include further stealth assumptions. If you remain confused then apologies but I really can't be arsed to respond to you further on this issue and will duly ignore.

Do you agree that someone approaching a traffic light has the ability to stop, and the ability to not stop, both, depending on information they have not yet acquired?

From the strictly deterministic PoV one would say no: the "information they have not yet acquired" is already inherent within the current state of things. What they have, though, by not being consciously aware of that information, is a thought/belief that they have the ability to do either. However their actual action taken, in a strictly deterministic set-up, is already determined. They just aren't aware of it. Up until they take the action they will possibly retain the thought/belief that they have the ability to do either.

 

[Quantum Quack]

rom the strictly deterministic PoV one would say no: the "information they have not yet acquired" is already inherent within the current state of things. What they have, though, by not being consciously aware of that information, is a thought/belief that they have the ability to do either. However their actual action taken, in a strictly deterministic set-up, is already determined. They just aren't aware of it. Up until they take the action they will possibly retain the thought/belief that they have the ability to do either.

Except we have the ability to determine for ourselves.... our own determinism...our own causality...like taking a tablet for a headache or slicing our own wrists.
Until the "Human" is seriously considered in this debate the whole deterministic argument is a void regarding HUMAN freewill.

 

[Write4U]

In what sense am I not able to do otherwise when I choose wheaties over corn flakes for breakfast? Did somebody other than me really make the choice? Was it the will of somebody other than me that I chose wheaties, say?

What compelled you to choose wheaties?.....because you could eat them?.......

 

[Quantum Quack]

What compelled you to choose wheaties?.....because you could?.......

His own determinism, his own causality...

 

[Write4U]

As usual Carlin has a brilliant parody on human choices and behaviors.

(warning: crude language)

 

[iceaura]

From the strictly deterministic PoV one would say no: the "information they have not yet acquired" is already inherent within the current state of things.

But it's not inherent within the entity making the decision and acting by will. The decision event and subsequent act of will await its acquisition - meanwhile, the ability to stop and the ability to not stop exist simultaneously in that entity.

We are not inquiring after freedom of will possessed by the universe itself, after all. Just people, etc.

What they have, though, by not being consciously aware of that information, is a thought/belief that they have the ability to do either.

They have the observation of the ability to do either - which can be verified in a laboratory setting.

However their actual action taken, in a strictly deterministic set-up, is already determined.

That's not true if the information will be created by quantum phenomena. According to physics, anyway. It will only be determined when it happens.

If an event is uncaused, how can it be considered inevitable?

It matches one of your two descriptions of "deterministic": produces the same output for given input.
(which is normally circular, btw, but in a hidden way: it's used to define what a given input is, and what an event is).
btw: Events that are "caused" are not usually made inevitable thereby - various probabilities come into play. The term "cause" is very slippery, and in this thread almost too vague to employ with meaning. Traffic lights do not actually cause people to stop, for example - much less not stop.

I have been quite clear and consistent in using only the assumptions given by Baldeee in his formulation.

Yes. Baldee's argument was the one I used, since you had endorsed it and the assumption of supernatural freedom only was so clearly marked in the drawing of the conclusion. I quoted it, linked to it, etc, when pointing the assumption out to you. Several times.

 

[Sarkus]

But it's not inherent within the entity making the decision and acting by will. The decision event and subsequent act of will await its acquisition - meanwhile, the ability to stop and the ability to not stop exist simultaneously in that entity.

In a strictly deterministic universe it is inherent in the current state. The future "decision" is already part of the existing state. If one knows the current state one knows the future perfectly. The ability is simply an sensation of having the ability to stop and not stop. All future information that we become aware of is already within the existing state, as is our becoming aware of it, our use of that information in our decision making process, and the eventual decision.
But it is true, that if we don't examine the current state such that we know the future (in a strictly deterministic universe), then all we are left with is what we are consciously aware of. And as such we believe there is a probability that at some time in the future there is a probability that we might stop, or not stop. But that is simply a projection based on the information we have, because we don't know everything about the current state, and we can not use the information we have to know the future.

We are not inquiring after freedom of will possessed by the universe itself, after all. Just people, etc.

Whether it is free or not is a question applicable to peoples' freedom of will.

They have the observation of the ability to do either - which can be verified in a laboratory setting.

No, they have the observation of a process that appears to suggest the ability to do either, but which is similarly hamstrung by the lack of total knowledge of the current state. As said, I do not think the process of free will is in debate. We can identify that process, as you suggest.
But what is in question is whether at the time of the decision we are genuinely capable of doing otherwise. Up until that point we simply have the belief that we do, based on future projections in the absence of full information.

That's not true if the information will be created by quantum phenomena. According to physics, anyway. It will only be determined when it happens.

As said, their actual action taken, in a strictly deterministic set-up, is already determined. Quantum phenomena are seemingly probabilistic. They introduce randomness into the equation. However, some believe QM to be deterministic as a whole - i.e. a single wave-function determining our universe, with every probability within that wave-function being another universe within the multiverse, etc. Or at least as far as my limited understanding goes.

It matches one of your two descriptions of "deterministic": produces the same output for given input.

There is no input with an uncaused event, so how can it match the description? An uncaused event and determinism are mutually exclusive.

(which is normally circular, btw, but in a hidden way: it's used to define what a given input is, and what an event is).

I am not sure of your point here?

btw: Events that are "caused" are not usually made inevitable thereby - various probabilities come into play.

Not in a strictly deterministic universe. Let's at least get your issues with the strictly deterministic scenario resolved before you attempt anything further.

The term "cause" is very slippery, and in this thread almost too vague to employ with meaning. Traffic lights do not actually cause people to stop, for example - much less not stop.

If you only talk about meta-scale cause and effect (i.e. those things of which we can be aware, such as traffic lights, dreams, the weather, our emotions, etc) and not at the fundamental level of activity then you will end up with the mess of apparent indeterminism arising from otherwise strictly deterministic processes: e.g. same "cause" but different outputs possible. Which is contradictory, unless you consider any appearance of "indeterminism" being simply an issue of lack of awareness of the actual inputs, and simplifying them.

 

[Yazata]

Second - and this is more a more fundamental objection - I don't think that any random process, quantum mechanical or otherwise, can be considered to be the operation of a conscious, willed choice, such as would be required for free will. Random outcomes are random, not choices.

Agreed.

I agree too. But introducing random processes might (arguably) serve the purpose of subverting a particular mental image of determinism, by cutting the one-to-one mapping between prior states and present events.

In which case we might be faced with a 'free-will vs random' question, as opposed to 'free-will vs determinism'.

This is where the stuff about free choices being choices made in accordance with our own understanding, intentions, values and moods, in accordance with our own mental states in other words (in distinction to any kind of external coercion) becomes so important. Free-will can't deny mental causation or even determinism entirely. It needs to make a distinction between different kinds of determinism. (That's probably a job for cognitive science.)

I have given you my description of free will several times now. I could have done otherwise, if that was the choice I had made. Under this formulation, my will is free as long as it is me who is doing the willing, and not some external force or person. My will is free if my actions are determined by my choices, and not the choices of some other person, entity or thing.

Well said and I agree.

I guess that the remaining problem there is where our own choices and other mental states come from. If they are determined entirely by our surrounding external environment, even if that environment is evolving unpredictably, then people would still seem to be puppets. And we can't deny that our external environment exerts great influence over our decisions. We make our 'free' decisions every day in what response to the situations in which we find ourselves. So it gets blurry.

We are sometimes faced with forced-choices, such as when somebody holds a gun to our heads. The resulting decision might still be the result of our own understanding, intentions and moods, and hence an exercise of 'free-will' as I would define it. But if the desire to live overwhelms everything else, it's a forced choice and not free in that respect. Of course, a few people might be motivated more by their values and put honor before life. (Think Japanese samurai.) That's still an option that they have.

Our determinists seem to want to say something stronger than this. They seem to want to insist that if you put anyone into the situation in which a person finds him/herself, that new person will behave the same way. Of course in order to make that credible, 'situation' might have to be expanded a great deal. Put anyone into the same family, the same life history and all of the same experiences, then he or she will behave identically.

I'm not sure how plausible that is, but it might be true. Interestingly, it brings the 'free-will vs determinism' problem together with the philosophical problem of 'personal identity'. If we could somehow download your memories, habits, predispositions and whatnot into a body cloned from your cells, would that individual still be you? We get the familiar (to philosophers) problems of branching identities and so on. So we might want to argue that if an individual underwent your entire history, living all of the same life experiences that you did, that individual wouldn't be 'somebody else' at all, that individual would be 'you'. Your personal identity doesn't consist of anything more than that. (It isn't defined by the unique possession of a substantial soul.)

And that defines the me in JamesR's "my will is free as long as it is me who is doing the willing, and not some external force or person."

 

[Write4U]

A quote by David Bohm.

“freedom is the creative perception of a new order of necessity.”

“We have to be able to think on this clearly; even though, as I said, that by itself won’t really change the reflexes. But if we don’t think of it clearly then all our attempts to get into this will go wrong. Clear thinking implies that we are in some way awakened a little bit. Perhaps there is something beyond the reflex which is at work – in other words, something unconditioned.”

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/09/david-bohm-on-free-will.html

I am not sure what to make of that...is there "something unconditioned"?...

 

[iceaura]

In a strictly deterministic universe it is inherent in the current state.

The current state of what?
Not the current state of the entity about to make a decision.

All future information that we become aware of is already within the existing state,

No, it isn't. Information only becomes information when it is perceived ("information" exists within a relationship between systems, a "difference that makes a difference") and many of the things that are going to be (possibly) perceived do not yet exist - such as the future state of the traffic light.

Whether it is free or not is a question applicable to peoples' freedom of will.

Yep. So you can't wave your hands at the state of the universe, and deny attributes of that entity within it.

No, they have the observation of a process that appears to suggest the ability to do either,

They have made the observation that they can, they have the ability, to either stop or not stop for the light, depending on what they will perceive to be its color in the future. We can, and have, verified in the laboratory that they have both abilities - to stop, and go - and that they do in fact choose between them based on the color of the light. Their observation is accurate, in other words.
Are you denying the findings of careful research and solid data analysis?

"btw: Events that are "caused" are not usually made inevitable thereby - various probabilities come into play."
Not in a strictly deterministic universe. Let's at least get your issues with the strictly deterministic scenario resolved before you attempt anything further.

Any time you want to attempt a resolution of your basic confusions in that matter would be none too soon.

There is no input with an uncaused event, so how can it match the description? An uncaused event and determinism are mutually exclusive.

Now you are claiming any input is a cause.
And the vague concept of "cause" is the bedrock concept of this version of your determinism (something you denied, earlier, when I pointed out your list of "causes" was consistently missing significant causes directly at issue).

As said, their actual action taken, in a strictly deterministic set-up, is already determined.

So time does not exist?
Or is it that people and decisions do not exist - that all the entities we are discussing are illusions, including the illusions.
Either that, or you are denying we live in a physically deterministic universe (due to quantum theory, chaos, etc

If you only talk about meta-scale cause and effect (i.e. those things of which we can be aware, such as traffic lights, dreams, the weather, our emotions, etc) and not at the fundamental level of activity then you will end up with the mess of apparent indeterminism arising from otherwise strictly deterministic processes: e.g. same "cause" but different outputs possible.

No, I won't. I will end up with exactly your version 2 of determinism - identical inputs yielding identical outputs, just as stipulated in all my posts.
And that error illustrates this:

"(which is normally circular, btw, but in a hidden way: it's used to define what a given input is, and what an event is)."
I am not sure of your point here?

To reword, from a different angle: My point is that your attempted classification of causes into categories such as "fundamental" and "meta-scale" and so forth is arbitrary and unjustified. There's nothing "fundamental" about a damn electron - it's a high level mental abstraction, on the one hand, and just another pattern within the big universe, on the other. Likewise with atoms, and molecules - they are patterns in substrates themselves, and constituents of substrates for higher level patterns in a fifteen billion year stacking of emergent logical levels: that's all. The very real and very influential patterns we call "dreams" kick them around like dry leaves on the grass.

 

[Quantum Quack]

The very real and very influential patterns we call "dreams" kick them around like dry leaves on the grass.

hee hee.. I like this... can I quote you?

 

[Write4U]

Sarkus said:
All future information that we become aware of is already within the existing state,

I believe Bohm called this the Implicate or enfolded order.

 

[Write4U]

they have both abilities - to stop, and go - and that they do in fact choose between them based on the color of the light.

But is that not determinism? Red light ...stop. Green light ...go.
You cannot wish the light to change to suit your choice. Your response is to suit the command inherent in the color of the light displayed when you approach the intersection.

 

[iceaura]

But is that not determinism? Red light ...stop. Green light ...go.

Sure, if you want your determinism to include such decisions as "causes". So?

You cannot wish the light to change to suit your choice.

Of course not. You choose - from among the several responses you have the ability to make - using the color of the light as information. You make an informed choice from among alternatives. You have the ability to do that.

Your response is to suit the command inherent in the color of the light displayed when you approach the intersection.

The light does not "command". The light is a simple piece of machinery run by a switch. It just lights up, in one of three colors.

 

[Write4U]

Sure, if you want your determinism to include such decisions as "causes". So?

Yes, the color of the light is the causality.

Of course not. You choose - from among the several responses you have the ability to make - using the color of the light as information. You make an informed choice from among alternatives. You have the ability to do that.

Correct, but always in the direction of your greatest satisfaction. That is the compulsory part.

The light does not "command". The light is a simple piece of machinery run by a switch. It just lights up, in one of three colors.

The light most certainly is a command in context of stopping or not. The driver's manual actually tells you to you stop on red. It's written in the traffic laws.

You are correct that the light is a piece of "timed" machinery, but that translates into the high probability that the light will turn a specific color at a specific time in the future and is an Implicate order extending into the future at which time you will need to obey the red light command on threat of a ticket.

You are free to break the law on penalty of becoming incarcerated, but only when you have an overriding causal motive will you choose to break the law. But then we're back to your choice being compelled.
The one true problem would be choosing between "damned if you do and damned if you don't".
You would still make your choice in direction what you intuitively feel is the right action, based on your "best guess". Your choice is never "uncaused" or "unmotivated".

Even if you make a coin flip, if you feel disappointed when the wrong side comes up the coin flip was contrary to your internal desire and your action would be compelled by the flip result.

At all times you have the ability to choose, but each time the prevailing conditions compel your choice a single specific course of action. Ultimately there is no difference between the choices you make and what an ant makes.

What if I told you that every decision of yours is based on the motives you are not even aware of?
Different people will always attribute their reasoning to different driving forces, or motivations, for them to be working toward.

https://www.learning-mind.com/what-are-the-actual-motives-behind-your-decisions/

 

[Quantum Quack]

Correct, but always in the direction of your greatest satisfaction. That is the compulsory part.

Perhaps. But it is the YOU that decides what is the more satifying is it not?
And if it is the YOU then the freedom to choose rests with the YOU and not with the light.
How the causality of the light affects YOU is up to the YOU.