No it's not.
The original poster seemed to claim that there was evidence that indicated it was LIKELY that he didn't do it.
Right, and as I said: that is a distraction. The issue is what standard of evidence is appropriate for capital punishment. Do you want to live in a society where the state can kill you on the say-so of a couple of people?
I wanted to know what the basis was for that claim.
That you had some motivation for contributing to a distracting issue, does not disqualify it as a distraction. It just qualifies you as motivated to pursue a distraction.
People who said back then that they said they saw him do it, and then 20 years later say they weren't sure it was him, does not indicate that he didn't do it since other people who saw it and testified that he was the shooter haven't changed their position.
People said more than that they "weren't sure." They said that they had been coerced into lying by the police (under threat of prosecution or parole violation), and that another of the witnesses had subsequently confessed to the crime to them. One of them recanted during the original trial, under cross-examination.
So, again - is one or two people saying that you did it sufficient basis to convict and execute someone? Especially when such a large percentage of witnesses in the case ended up recanting? Especially when there is evidence that one of the people saying you did it, is himself the culprit? You wouldn't demand some kind of corroborating physical evidence, to feel comfortable killing someone?
The system that convicted him used the convention of beyond a reasonable doubt and that conviction was then reviewed by higher courts, indeed, all the way to the Supreme Court (something not done in 50 years) and none of the higher courts that heard the actual evidence felt that the conviction and sentence should not stand.
There are plenty of authorities who felt otherwise - William S. Sessions (former FBI director and judge), for example.
And I'll note that what the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Davis (by 7 to 2), although only on the more procedural question that was actually before them (i.e., that the District Court in question needed to hold a new hearing to examine new evidence).