How exactly do you figure this a case of segregation? It is not, hence poor analogy.
It doesn't have to be segregation, it has to be a refusal of service based on incidental qualities. And it is.
You yourself have agreed that businesses have the right to refuse service for reasons other than discrimination. Granted, you think this is discrimination, but I have shown that to be fallacious by the fact that any other service would not have been denied this lesbian. Hence the specific request, not the person in general, was denied.
And
I have shown that
this argument is fallacious because 1) a person is still being denied service, and 2) they are still being denied a service based on their sexual orientation; it doesn't matter that they are allowed access to
some services regardless of their sexual orientation, because they are
denied access to another precisely because of it. Just like a black person in the 1960s deep south had access to the bus, just not some of the seats. The argument you present here suggests that the southern black man was not being discriminated against because not
all services were refused. I sincerely doubt you'd agree with that, so I suggest rethinking your position.
And apparently you only made the "semantics" accusation in an attempt to obfuscate your own. Either you are being intentionally obtuse by assuming I meant the Oregon law only covered sexual orientation, or you have once again forgotten the context of this thread. That law is, here, only applicable to sexual orientation. Since the person was not refused general service (i.e. solely for the reason of being gay), it was not a discrimination of the person.
Again, you aren't fooling anyone. The point of saying the law was "solely on the basis of sexual orientation" was obviously an ill-considered attempt to argue that it doesn't apply to something like refusing to make a cake for a gay wedding. But even if that isn't what you're saying, the claim that because they were allowed one service but not another means they weren't discriminated against for their orientation is blatantly fallacious. Imagine a woman being allowed to eat at a particular restaurant, but being told she couldn't eat at the counter with the male patrons. Your argument is that because she is allowed in the restaurant, her denial of a seat at the counter necessarily has nothing to do with her gender. But this, as I've explained several times, a fallacy. This argument has no more merit than the idea that freedom of oppression is an inalienable right or gay wedding cakes are a menu item. Three big swings and misses there, Syne.
I agree that sexual orientation is not incidental to gay marriage, but the gay individual is incidental to denying a service with moral implications.
No it isn't, because the moral implication is directly tied to their sexuality. Denying a gay couple a cake because they're going to use it to smother puppies is fine, but refusing them service because they're going to have a gay wedding isn't. That's the law.
A straight customer (like a wedding planner) would have been equally denied the service of a cake for a gay wedding. Or would you claim that discrimination by proxy?
The wedding planner works for the couple, and the money used to purchase the cake is the couple's. This would be no different than if the couple sent their adopted son to purchase the cake with their money. Now, if it were the
father buying the cake, I don't know how that would legally shake out. But it's important to remember (and you keep dismissing it) that a human being was refused service. You can dance around it all you like, but that's what happened.
The courts have not decided the issue yet, unless you can cite specific language in a law. So no, "the law has [not] already decided that it isn't a legally valid reason to refuse service".
Well, I suppose you never know which way a judge is going to go, but the idea that this is somehow different than other examples of discrimination is a false distinction, and one I've debunked repeatedly. So no, I don't need to cite court precedent, I simply need to cite the law. But if
you want to cite some decisions to support this distinction, feel free.
A gay wedding anniversary is a red herring, as no service can contribute to the morally questionable marriage after the fact. And it is only your straw man that seeks to broaden the definitions of "participation" and "acceptance" to such an extent.
Now you're contradicting yourself. You said earlier that purchasing of a blood diamond is a tacit acceptance of the practice. But buying a blood diamond doesn't contribute to the extraction of
that particular diamond anymore than allowing a gay wedding anniversary celebration at your restaurant contributes to the wedding that already happened. Clearly your point was that purchasing a blood diamond shows acceptance of the practice
in general, and the example of a wedding anniversary fits perfectly.
Ah, I see. You are arguing segregation by conflating access with service, which is fallacious. Seats or facilities are proffered for public accommodation, while the service in question was not.
Another false distinction. Both public transport and businesses like a bakery are considered in the law to be public accommodations. In fact, Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act is entitled "INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION"
Again, you accuse me of semantics immediately before losing yourself in those of your own making, and sounding idiotic to boot. Who said "a moral implication [could] request service"? Seems only a straw man appeal to ridicule, compounding fallacies.
I can understand why you think what I said absurd and idiotic. After all, I'm repeating your own words back to you. For example:
Syne said:
It was not the person being denied. It was the moral implication.
I'll wait for your apology.
A human being was denied a specific service, not discriminated in general.
Based on their sexuality. You're creating false distinctions here with no basis in law.
Please cite any precedent for a service that would be denied any customer, regardless of sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. being legal grounds for a discrimination charge.
Why would I do that? That's not what happened here. The refusal of service was not regardless of sex, race, sexual orientation, etc.. It was specifically because of the sexual orientation of the customer.
Great example, as a cake for any polygamous wedding would be denied, regardless of religion, whether Muslim, Mormon, or even secular. Again, specific service is denied to everyone equally, and it is incidental who happens to be affected by a lack of such services. The fact that the service is denied equally, regardless of any possible minority criteria for discrimination, means that it is not discriminatory.
You're swimming in logical fallacies. By your logic, the bakery could argue that because prayer is not specific to any particular religion, it is a legally sound reason to refuse service. Obviously, the key here is that polygamy is a part of the couple's faith, and therefore not a valid reason to refuse service. Just because a particular practice is shared by multiple faiths doesn't mean the refusal of service based on that practice is any less religious discrimination.