Yazata said:
If people are just puppets, if all of their behavior is fully determined by the details of their external environment, by things other than themselves in other words, then there's an obvious difficulty in explaining how a human being can be said to be responsible for anything.
Easy to explain... if people are just puppets... then they are not responsible for anythang.!!!
The difficulty that I was talking about is the difficulty in making the idea that people are nothing more than puppets consistent with ethics, and more broadly, with how we all seem to understand both ourselves and the actions of other people.
Yes strong determinism may not be true... but do you thank the "small indeterminacies" have causes... or are random...
I think that there very well might be some fundamental randomness built into a great deal of causality. I'm thinking of the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics and stuff like that.
It's important to the point that I was making earlier to recognize that causality isn't necessarily the same thing as determinism. Causality says that every event has a preceeding cause. Determinism says that the state of the universe at time A determines the state of the universe at time B. My speculation is that that at least some of that causal determination is probabilistic. In other words, causality defines a range of possible outcomes and assigns likelihoods of each one occurring. And as the time interval between A and B increases, those indeterminacies might increase as well, and the probabilities with which accurate predictions can be made of B from A decrease towards chance.
an how do you define "possibility-space".???
The abstract space composed of all possible states of affairs, all the states that the universe might be in, that are consistent with things like logic and the so-called 'laws of nature', I guess.
Since the 'big bang' the universe has evolved (in the sense of temporal change) from that initial state to the state that the universe has right now. We can imagine that evolution as a line, a path that the state of the universe has taken through possibility space.
My speculation is that the path that the evolution of the universe has taken is fundamentally unpredictable. In other words, if we ran the 'big bang' all over again, with all of the same initial conditions (as close as they can be physically specified, which might not be entirely precise if things like quantum indeterminacy hold), the evolution of the universe would likely follow an entirely different trajectory the second time. Things might turn out very different.
What determines what the "onboard data-processors" goals and purposes are... other than influences from the causal chain.???
My choices are the result of my understanding of the situations that I find myself in, along with my existing goals, purposes, emotions, knowledge base, and stuff like that. All of that stuff comes together in some as-yet little-understood cognitive and volitional process. My own belief is that it will all turn out to be naturalistic and neurophysiological in nature.
I should add that when I use words like 'my' and 'myself', I'm not talking about 'the human soul' or Descartes' 'mind substance' or anything like that. I use those words to refer to my own on-board cognitive and volitional process.
Are my internal states caused? Sure. I think that they almost certainly are.
Are they determined? Probably 'yes' with a high degree of accuracy if we are talking about the states and experiences that immediately preceeded them, but probably less accurately if we are talking about how things were a week ago or ten years ago. And I don't really buy the idea that everything I think and do now was already determined long before I was born.
How does thinking about causality and determinism this way preserve free-will? Because we typically define free-will as choosing our behavior through our own personal decisions, as opposed to having our behavior imposed on us by outside forces.
That doesn't mean that causal processes can't be how those decisions are made. Nor does it mean that our inner states don't determine our behavior. Moving my arm by free-will isn't the same thing as watching it jerk convulsively. The exercise of free-will demands that my moving my arm be the result of my own decision. And that decision isn't just a random event, it needs to have arisen as the result of my own beliefs, goals and purposes. Far from being inconsistent with local determinism, free-will seems to demand it.
It's only when people start insisting that all of our behavior is fully determined by the external environment, by things entirely other than ourselves, that the free-will problems start to arise.