BenTheMan:
I'm glad to see you're putting some thought and effort into this.
The philosophy of the "animal liberation movement" is based largely on the book by Peter Singer, aptly named "Animal Liberation".
Actually, it goes back quite a bit further than that. Jeremy Bentham was the first to promote a basic idea of animal rights, based on the capacity of animals to suffer. Nevertheless, you are true that the modern revival of animal rights gained a boost from Singer's landmark book.
Besides being the animal liberator's manifesto, the book presents the Principle of Equal Consideration, which essentially states that every sentient being is entitled to some basic rights, specifically the right not to be exploited for use by other sentient beings. Sentient, used herein, is generally taken to mean able to feel pain.
The basic principle is that no sentient being should be allowed to be used merely as the means to an end of another being. The right is a recognition of the autonomy-based interest of an individual. Exactly the same principle underlies the ethical judgment against human slavery.
Never mind that this argument and definitions seem to be constructed ex post facto. Further, if "sentient" is taken to mean that it can feel pleasure instead of pain, the argument that animals deserve rights generally crumbles.
Grabbing the nearest dictionary I have to hand, "sentience" is defined to mean "consciously perceiving". In terms of cruelty to animals, obviously the conscious perception of pain is more relevant than the conscious perception of pleasure. No animal feels pleasure as it is being slaughtered, I'll wager.
This idea is ostensibly based in utilitarian principles. Utilitarianism is the idea that one should take the interests of all into account when making decisions, and make decisions in such a way that maximizes the total happiness.
The
net happiness. A balancing of happiness vs. unhappiness is needed.
The first issue that one should realize is that maximizing happiness isn't something that can be done in a quantitative manner, and there exists no calculus for determining when happiness is maximized. For example, does my love of steak outweigh a cow's right to live? If the cow lived a pain free existence, and died a pain free death, then surely one cannot object to the fact that the amount of net happiness is increased if I kill and eat the cow.
Did you wait for the cow to die a natural death, or did you kill it?
Surely, the most fundamental prerequisite of happiness for an individual creature is its continued existence (excepting certain special cases).
Suppose we apply your argument to other human beings. Suppose you love eating human beings, because you just adore the taste. Are you then justified in killing other human beings and cannibalising them? Would it be ok if they lived a pain-free existence, and died a pain-free death? Would net happiness increase as a result?
One also could imagine extending this argument and justifying things like torture. If I know that a terrorist has information that would save many lives from a very painful death, then presumably the utilitarian will have no problems with me torturing the terrorist.
On the most basic utilitarian view, it is always acceptable to kill one in order to save many, where the lives involved are treated as fungibles. This is one of the problems with this most basic forms of utilitarianism.
However, the argument doesn't apply to your love-of-meat argument, since we have to weigh up the value of a life against your mere selfish desire for momentary pleasure. The answer, even on a basic utilitarian basis, is obvious.
I am sure that James will insert a reply here that asserts something along the lines of me missing the point. For example, it may be that the Principle of Equal Consideration is more stringent than the utilitarianism on which it is based.
I'm not sure that the Principle of Equal Consideration is based on utilitarianism. It is based on a recognition of inherent value of the individual as a person, not on their market value as a commodity of value to other people.
The closest comparison I can think of to the animal rights case is the case of human slavery.
Then, James may say, "We must increase the happiness so long as that increase doesn't infringe on another's 'right to be' ".
I think what is needed is that we determine what value a "right to be" has, in the utilitarian calculus.
My problem with your approach is that you place a very high value on a human being's "right to be", while placing little to no value on a non-human animal's "right to be", yet with no apparent justification for the double standard. And that's what Equal Consideration is all about.
The main argument that I will advance for not granting animals rights is that they are not functioning members of society. Humans are extended a certain set of rights because of their membership in the human race. We are rational beings, largely capable of adhering to a moral code. There is a contract, of sorts, between each member of society and the rest of society. If each party holds up their respective ends of the bargain, then society functions and all is good. When one member of society cannot abide by the contract, they are isolated. Animals, a priori cannot adhere by any moral codes and thus cannot be members of society. Because they are not members of society, they do not necessarily deserve the same basic rights as humans do.
The obvious contention that one will raise is as follows. What about babies and severely retarded people?
You're completely correct. That is the obvious rejoinder. You are quite happy to grant all kinds of rights to human beings, regardless of any present capacity they have to "adhere to a moral code". You would support, I assume, a retarded person's right not to be killed so somebody else could eat them. You would support such a right for a six-month old baby, too. Yet neither of these human beings have the capacity to "adhere to a moral code". They can't understand what a moral code is.
So, again, you need to justify your double standard. Why grant the right not to be arbitrarily killed to a six-month old baby, say, yet not grant the same right to a chimpanzee who in fact has a greater capacity to meet your criterion for adhering to a moral code?
There are two answers to this. The first one is that the normal human can contribute to society, and there are no grounds for separating humans out simply based on their physical or mental conditions. The average human can certainly contribute to society in a way that the average animal, no matter his specie, never can. If, for example, we found a few chimpanzees who was capable of following our moral codes, and contributing to society, then we should grant all chimpanzees a basic set of rights.
Why should we judge non-human animals by human standards? Why does an animal have to act the same way that a human acts before it becomes eligible for moral consideration from you? Why don't
you have to conform to chimpanzee moral codes instead?
You're just begging the question here. You are saying "I won't recognise any rights for animals unless they prove that they are indistinguishable from human beings". But on what basis ought humans to have special rights in the first place, that only apply to beings with human capacities?
As far as I can see, the only basis is speciesism for its own sake. You
start from the position that humans deserve special treatment, then you exclude everything that isn't human simply on the basis that it isn't human.
What characteristics of human beings make them deserving of special treatment? In particular, can you point to ONE or perhaps a few criteria that ALL human beings possess that makes them worthy of moral consideration, and that NO non-human animal possesses, so that you can exclude the animals from your moral framework
a priori?
The second rebuttal that I will offer is that babies have the potential to contribute to society, as do severely retarded people. A baby has potential to become a functioning member of society, and all but the most severely retarded can contribute to society in some facitility.
Would it be acceptable to kill severely retarded human beings and eat them, then? I presume your answer would be "no". But why?
Your argument about "potential" also has more serious flaws, which I will examine later if necessary.
I certainly don't want to be seen as an advocate of animal cruelty. I have not led a sheltered life, as James thinks. I have a dog named Lefty (see the "Praise your Dog" thread).
And yet, you claimed above that "Lefty" has no capacity to feel pain.
Do you want to retract that claim now? It's patently silly, isn't it?
I have spent my youth fishing in Galveston, and hunting in South Texas. But I see no reason that animals should be granted any specific rights, per se. Because I see no moral basis for granting animals rights, I can take no issue with hunting, or eating meat, or using an animals skin to make boots, even if I wouldn't eat my dog.
I think you're deluding yourself. You just put your own pleasure in hunting, eating meat, wearing animal-skin boots and the like above any petty moral concerns that might be raised about the animals who need their skins to live, for example. Your joy in shooting an un-armed creature is far more important than any interest that creature might have in continuing to enjoy its life, right?
Why wouldn't you eat your dog, by the way?
