Logical proofs demonstrate the deductive connection between a set of premises and some conclusion. In this religious case, the truth of the premises is going to be contested.
I will argue that religious truths (ie. truths about religious topics) are categorically different than ordinary empirical amd philosophical truths. I think that religious truths are not intended to be contested, nor to be tested. This is not to say that they are meant to be blindly accepted or blindly rejected. I think religious truths are essentially a matter of "either you have it, or you don't," ie. religious statements have the nature of being experienced as apriori true or as apriori false.
And what's more, an argument ad populum isn't a deductively valid argument form.
Indeed, generally, it is not. Nor are religious truths intended to be accepted "because so many people believe them."
Having said that, I agree that probably the majority of the empirical evidence backing up our individual beliefs isn't the product of our own personal experience. I'm told that there's this city called 'Paris' that's the capital of some country called 'France'. I've never been to either one. Nevertheless, I'm reasonably confident that others have and I trust their word and believe that Paris is indeed the capital of France.
And even if you would go to Paris, France, you would still rely on the claims of others to be sure that you indeed arrived there.
The argument can be made that religious truths are the only ones which can eventually be personally realized, while all others are in one way or another dependent on other people or culture at large.
IOW, religious truths pertain to our true self, and as such, are things we merely re-discover, as opposed to learning them anew for the first time.
I'm more inclined to think that philosophical and empirical methods are elaborations on common sense. They arise from our psychology, from how our human cognitive apparatus functions.
Sure. I think that religion is not like that.
I don't entirely dismiss arguments from authority. (The argument from popularity is just an argument from authority applied to groups collectively.) But there's a vital question in there that must be asked -- How is it that the purported authority knows whatever it is that he/she (or in this case they) say they know?
And conversely -
Why do I feel the pull to submit to someone who claims to be an authority?
Submission to some (purported) authority is inevitable.
We live in a tug of war on the one side being pulled by the desire to submit to someone else's authority, and on the other side being pulled by the desire to be our own authority.
How is it that the purported authority knows whatever it is that he/she (or in this case they) say they know?
The consequent skeptic, in the pursuit of a satisfactory answer this question, would have to attain at least that same level of authority.
As the claims that the purported authorities are making become less and less likely on their face, and more and more at variance with the rest of our everyday experience, the more pressing that 'how do they know' question becomes. Jesus is supposed to represent an absolutely unique intervention in human history by a god. So the burden of proof with Jesus is going to be a little higher than it is with Paris.
Here, I am interested to know
1. what the skeptic thinks is the relationship between him and the purported authority,
2. what the skeptic's intentions in this communication are.
I think that the bottomline of many of these discussions/debates is that people engage in communications in which they would actually rather not engage in - and they are not aware of this. And so topics are brought up that get valued simply because the people involved have brought them up, not because the people involved would actually value those topics.
Just like one can physically walk off a cliff or into quick sand, so one can mentally venture into mental situations that are the equivalent of falling off cliffs, getting pulled into quicksand and such. We'd like to think it's all "just thoughts," and that we can pull ourselves back or out anytime, at will - but real life experience shows that this is often not the case.
Basically, if one engages in discussion or debate on religious topics because one is bored, or wants to escape thinking about some other problems in one's life, or has an old grudge to vent, then one is up for trouble.
In short, I think that a person who is paying attention to their life as it is, in the present moment, would not be troubled about the bold claims that some people make, nor would such a person get into apparently endless exchanges on religious topics.
See the Water Snake Simile.