Omniscience and Omnipotence are incompatible

Given that everything God does, is good, then there is no need for Him to change His mind.
Wynn, your opponents are correct.

Whether or not God changes his mind, JamesR's postualte asserts that he cannot be both omniscient and omnipotent. Your suggestion that God "won't" act does not address the postulate. Therefore, you are conceding that it stands until falsified.
 
Wynn, your opponents are correct.

Whether or not God changes his mind, JamesR's postualte asserts that he cannot be both omniscient and omnipotent. Your suggestion that God "won't" act does not address the postulate. Therefore, you are conceding that it stands until falsified.

You really like to put words into people's mouths, and assume yourself victorious, eh?
Looks like you've spent some time with The Art of Being Right.




While you're at it, explain why you avoid to focus on the quality of an action.

For all practical intents and purposes, it is precisely the quality of an action that makes all the difference, and not so much whether it was done in free will or not etc.
 
You really like to put words into people's mouths, and assume yourself victorious, eh?
Looks like you've spent some time with The Art of Being Right.

Says the woman who has never conceded a point on this forum. Ever. :shrug:
 
So it's merely a question just for sake of asking a question.
It certainly appears that way if you refuse to address it, but instead change it to something that suits you instead.

"Sir, I did get the right answer on my exam paper... just to a different question than the one you asked!"

So again, the question was raised not with regard God wants to, needs to, does do or doesn't do, but with whether God is able to.
 
Rav,

No. The subject matter is a hypothetical entity, or transcendent reality, that is entirely beyond anyone's comprehension.
The rest is a religious and/or personal embellishment of such.

Wrong. It's a question regarding, whatever, about God.
For some, comprehension which falls beyond the purview of human gross sense awareness is irrelevant. And there is nothing religious about the question, unless it is to do with one own religion. But in the same breath it can have nothing to do with ones own, or any religion. It is entirely personal


I think you meant to point out that the reality of the nature of an existent entity is not dependent on the definitions given.

No. I meant what I said.

Reality supersedes any individual or collective speculation. And guess what? That includes yours. More so than most, actually.

Oh! So you know reality? Not just yours, everyone else's?
Spill!


Absolute nonsense. Your conception of God derives from religion. The ideas of omnipotence and omniscience derive from religion. Religion has everything to do with this.


Then explain to me my conception of God, from a religious perspective?

Both omni's represent the ultimate state of being, with or without the notion of God.
One needs not know anything about God to consider them.


Demonstrate that omnipotence and omniscience necessary follow from transcendence.

If God knows everything, and is the most powerful, He precedes everything. It's as simple as that.

jan.
 
It certainly appears that way if you refuse to address it, but instead change it to something that suits you instead.

"Sir, I did get the right answer on my exam paper... just to a different question than the one you asked!"

So again, the question was raised not with regard God wants to, needs to, does do or doesn't do, but with whether God is able to.

If you look at the OP, you will not that it includes:

Omnipotence means that God is all-powerful, and is able to do anything he likes.

This therefore includes if ''God wants to''.

jan.
 
If something like a god exists, it will be whatever it is. Some transcendent and immutable state from which all quality emerges perhaps. But the moment we project human abstractions and embellishments onto the idea is the moment we, well, fuck it up.

I'm very strongly inclined to agree with you.

But an argument can also be made we humans can't think about anything, in conceptual terms at least, unless we imagine the object of our thoughts as having some qualities that individuate the concept and make it distinct from other concepts. Even if we are operating by pure ostension, by the equivalent of pointing at something and saying 'THAT, whatever the hell it is', we still have to have some means of fixing the reference so we aren't just pointing at random.

Those kind of semantic processes work well enough with the everyday objects of experience. But can they work with transcendent beings?

It's conceivable that the world's contemplative traditions might possess meditative techniques to 'tune into' - how can we say it?... reality's Source or something (if such a thing exists) - in non-conceptual and non-cognitive ways. In these cases, ostensive reference, the direction we are pointing, might be established by the technique.

Traditional religious conceptions of God don't make sense because they're basically just inventing the details as they go along. In fact we've all seen details get invented on the fly in these very forums in response to critical evaluation. It basically goes "God can't be Y, because X", and the response is "well, maybe God isn't Y, but Z". And then weeks later, "God is Z".

Yeah, that's the way it seems to work.

I think that people hold onto their concepts of God largely for psychological reasons. The contents of the concept are drawn from early childhood religious teachings, from more formal study of the traditions, from pious desires to exalt the object of belief with perfections, from thinking about problems such as the one raised in this thread, and from considering other people's ideas and reshaping their own in response.

Philosophical theology tries to systematize all that, tries to reduce it to a formula, generating a concept of God that's resistant to the kind of philosophical problems that we are discussing in this thread, that's consistent with tradition and with the contents of what are believed to be revealed scriptures, and emotionally satisfactory to religious believers. Predictably, they haven't had a whole lot of success, but seeing as how the Christian theologians have been at it for almost 2,000 years now, they've inevitably generated a lot of ideas and written a lot of books.

If religious people would just stop making claims that they can't possibly be qualified to make, and admit that it's just a mystery, I doubt that my atheism would ever really show. In fact in that context, I'm not even really an atheist at all, more of an agnostic.

I think the same way.

Here are some of the reasons why I tend to like the religiously motivated agnostic non-cognitivism that we sometimes encounter in the world's mystical traditions. They are taken from an earlier thread about theistic agnosticism. Of course, my saying that I'm fond of this kind of religiosity doesn't necessarily commit me to believing that its supposed transcendent object actually exists or that the mystics indeed have established some kind of non-conceptual contact with it. I'm actually still kind of skeptical about that. But I don't 100% reject the idea either. I haven't experienced the Jhanas or the Samadhis for myself.

I will say that I consider the mystical and contemplative traditions to be a higher and more sophisticated form of religiosity than the more familiar, highly conceptual doctrinal forms.

Why do I like them?

Believing that God is ultimately unknowable in a cognitive, propositional sense, they typically make fewer claims about God than other theists do.

That involves them in fewer epistemological difficulties.

They are less likely to set themselves up as God's earthly mouthpiece, proclaiming the minute details of what God supposedly thinks and commands.

They are less likely to proselytize.

Their emphasis on personal experience means that they often recognize that everyone needs to experience things for themselves and hance has their own path to follow.

They are far less apt to anthropomorphize God, to imagine God as if God was a human personality blown up really large.

Hence their non-conceptual concept of God (so to speak) seems to me to be more likely to be true and accurate when it's applied to the transcendent dimension of life and to whatever it is that may or may not ultimately account for the universe and Being itself. Whatever lies out there (if anything does) is probably something very unlike us and unlike anything we've ever imagined.

They acknowledge and speak to the emotional and spiritual side of life in ways that others don't.

They help show us a hermeneutical way to 'read' the world's various religious traditions in such a way as to preserve what's good in them, their art, their beauty and their wisdom, without throwing it all away in a fit of atheistic anger.

They show a way that the worlds religions, so different and so inconsistent on the doctrinal level, can be reconciled at a higher experiential level that transcends words.

There's less chance of them getting into any turf-battles with science.

They teach and practice contemplative and meditative disciplines that I think can be very valuable.

Perhaps as a result of that, their inner peace and calm, their depth and emotional resonance, and their ethical behavior sometimes impress me.​
 
It certainly appears that way if you refuse to address it, but instead change it to something that suits you instead.

"Sir, I did get the right answer on my exam paper... just to a different question than the one you asked!"

So again, the question was raised not with regard God wants to, needs to, does do or doesn't do, but with whether God is able to.

A question implies particular assumptions. Sometimes, to address that question, those assumptions need to be addressed first.
So sometimes, the right approach is to reformulate the question and then answer that reformulated question.
As I did in this thread.

The assumption in the OP question is that the quality of the action does not matter.
I pointed out that it does matter.



As already noted, God is unable to make mistakes, and God is also unable to change His mind. But in God's case, the inability to change His mind does not automatically indicate a lack of free will, as we already noted that God that God does not operate within the kind of constraints that humans do. Human free will is faced with different problems than God's free will, so we can't measure God's free will by the same criteria we measure human free will.
 
"omnipotence and omniscience"

"The other is that our understanding of God's omnipotence and omniscience is wrong, and those words - as applied to God - mean something different than the usual understanding - and then provide evidence / proof / support for their position."

That's a good pace to start. But lets take it further and presume that all religion is false until some form of religion is able to "provide evidence / proof / support for their position" Of course this is about the only thing both science and religion agree on or presume to be the case. That is no such direct cause and effect proof of God is possible. Convenient for religion as it maintains the status quo of the existing faith paradigm that leads nowhere. Similarly so for science as it continues to provide the critical self scrutiny of religious ideas that religion fails to impose upon itself.

Of course the only reason this conversation is taking part at all is that religion cannot offer the means to demonstrate that "omnipotence and omniscience" potential. And yet since the discoveries of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Nag Hammadi LIbrary of Gnostic Gospels, a great deal of new material now exists, that strongly suggests that such a direct demonstration is all too possible. And once ones mind is free of the dogma and doctrine of existing tradition and the prejudices of materialist science against such potential, imagining such 'truth' is in principle not so difficult. And one that meets all the criteria of Enlightenment scrutiny!

Consider 'religion' but not as we understand it, as an act [test] of faith in that "omnipotence and omniscience" potential, which would lead to a change our moral conduct, consciousness and perception. Realigning our moral compass so to speak. Change that could demonstrate it's own efficacy.

Of course such a proof would leave religious tradition starring into the abyss and humble any secular speculation. So such a proof won't be coming from either of them. But as a catalyst for change that the world is becoming desperate for, such a confirmation of reality would of course change the entire conversation of what it means to be human. And maybe that is necessary if we are to save the planet from ourselves?
 
James R is correct, these qualities are mutually incompatible, or as Burroughs says, "If control is absolute, why does control need to control?".
 
It is commonly claimed that God is both omniscient and omnipotent. I don't think that God can be both at the same time.

Omnipotence means that God is all-powerful, and is able to do anything he likes. Omniscience means that God knows everything.

Now, if God is omniscient, then He already knows at any given time what he will do in the future, because he can see the future. He's all-seeing, after all.

But if God already knows what he will do at every moment in the future, then God has no free will. He cannot choose to do something different from what he already knows he will do. And therefore, he is not all-powerful. In fact, it could be argued that He has no power at all.

Your thoughts?
first the disclaimer..
these descriptions are assigned by man.(won't go into my other opinions about it)

that said...

the comparison is, does all knowing negate all powerfull..

does the knowledge of what he would do influence what he can do?

i don't think it is mutually exclusive..

knowledge doesn't negate his power..it would only negate what he would do,not his ability to do it..

he can still have the power to do an action even though he would choose to not do it..

and yes if he is all knowing then he would be able to consider ALL courses of action and decide which action would be best to proceed with..
now let me anticipate your response..
you will pry argue that that course of action is what he would see and be cemented to that action, meaning he would have no choice but to do that action..
(i think i am stepping into it again..)

here is where my argument about human nature and the unpredictability and illogicalness of it would play into it..(he is all knowing..he would know irregardless of any illogic or unpredictability)

can God be surprised?
All knowing prevents this.

Does God have free will?
could this be the real question?

Does all knowing include knowing about himself?
if not, then he would not be 'all' knowing

what would be the implications of God not having free will?
he could still be all powerful even if he did not exercise that power.

(i am thinking in a loop now..i'm gonna stop now..)
 
If you look at the OP, you will not that it includes:

Omnipotence means that God is all-powerful, and is able to do anything he likes.

This therefore includes if ''God wants to''.
It certainly includes that, but is not limited to that, which is what you seem to want to do.

If God is all-powerful, he should be able to do anything he likes. But he should also be able to anything else as well.


Or is your argument that "omnipotence" is merely "able to do what one wishes to do"?
It would certainly be an interesting interpretation of the term, and one that might avoid the paradox.
But it is what is meant by "all-powerful"?
 
I'm very strongly inclined to agree with you.

But an argument can also be made we humans can't think about anything, in conceptual terms at least, unless we imagine the object of our thoughts as having some qualities that individuate the concept and make it distinct from other concepts. Even if we are operating by pure ostension, by the equivalent of pointing at something and saying 'THAT, whatever the hell it is', we still have to have some means of fixing the reference so we aren't just pointing at random.

Those kind of semantic processes work well enough with the everyday objects of experience. But can they work with transcendent beings?
/.../

Why not see conversations on the topic of God as a form of dialectic - ie. a means of arriving at truth via conversation between two or more parties who hold different stances and who try to resolve their disagreement?


I think that people hold onto their concepts of God largely for psychological reasons.

This is often said, but I'm not sure how it actually explains anything.

I really don't think that after being told something like -
"God truly loves and cares about you. You are unique. You are special - because you are His and because our Lord Jesus Christ suffered so that there would be no taint against you. God knows the real you and loves you as you are."
anyone feels any better.

"I'm afraid, and so in order to deal with my fear, I shall believe in magical stories" - really, you think this is how it works for people?

If the idea is that "people hold onto their concepts of God largely for psychological reasons," then this seems to imply that a healthy / ideal person without psychopathology would have no beliefs, no hopes, no expectations, no concerns!


Philosophical theology tries to systematize all that, tries to reduce it to a formula, generating a concept of God that's resistant to the kind of philosophical problems that we are discussing in this thread, that's consistent with tradition and with the contents of what are believed to be revealed scriptures, and emotionally satisfactory to religious believers. Predictably, they haven't had a whole lot of success, but seeing as how the Christian theologians have been at it for almost 2,000 years now, they've inevitably generated a lot of ideas and written a lot of books.

Perhaps it is the dialectic process in philosophical theology that actually matters in all this.


Here are some of the reasons why I tend to like the religiously motivated agnostic non-cognitivism that we sometimes encounter in the world's mystical traditions.

As much as I am favorably inclined toward mysticism, I do find that its idiosyncratic nature is leaning into effectual solipsism.


Believing that God is ultimately unknowable in a cognitive, propositional sense, they typically make fewer claims about God than other theists do.

I think there is at least one other reason for making fewer claims about God: namely, that God is knowable, in a cognitive, propositional sense, but that the process of obtaining this knowledge is very complex, and so cannot be presented in a few sentences, especially not to an unqualified listener.
 
A question implies particular assumptions. Sometimes, to address that question, those assumptions need to be addressed first.
So sometimes, the right approach is to reformulate the question and then answer that reformulated question.
As I did in this thread.
I have no issue with addressing the assumptions - but that does not require reformulating the question. It merely requires parking the question to one side while one addresses the assumption.
The assumption in the OP question is that the quality of the action does not matter.
I pointed out that it does matter.
You have pointed out that you think it matters. Others might not agree.
And there are more appropriate ways of responding to questions than reformulating them... e.g. if you feel the assumptions are incorrect then put the question aside and address the assumptions; or if you think that the scope is too wide, or you have an answer for part of the scope, then qualify an answer with the assumption of the reduced scope.

But to wholescale reformulate the question is potentially nothing short of answering an entirely different issue, depending upon how much explanation one gives for the reformulation.

As already noted, God is unable to make mistakes, and God is also unable to change His mind. But in God's case, the inability to change His mind does not automatically indicate a lack of free will, as we already noted that God that God does not operate within the kind of constraints that humans do. Human free will is faced with different problems than God's free will, so we can't measure God's free will by the same criteria we measure human free will.
Yet this doesn't speak to whether God is all-powerful or not.
True, you have indicated a potential argument and put forth a pre-emptive counter, but the question is still with regard whether God is all-powerful, not whether he is infallible.
i.e. even if he wanted to, is there anything God could not do?
 
If God is all-powerful, he should be able to do anything he likes. But he should also be able to anything else as well.

God should be able to do things He doesn't like??
If God isn't able to act against His preferences, then He is not omnipotent?

These are just square circles again.


Or is your argument that "omnipotence" is merely "able to do what one wishes to do"?
It would certainly be an interesting interpretation of the term, and one that might avoid the paradox.
But it is what is meant by "all-powerful"?

That is so in God's case.
But God's case is unique: Of course, since God is not limited in His resources the way humans are in theirs, God's output is vastly different than that of humans.
 
God should be able to do things He doesn't like??
If omnipotent, yes. Unless you have some other definition / understanding of omnipotence?
Bear in mind that "...should be able to do..." is not the same as "...should do...": I have the ability to drive to Wales at this moment. I choose not to... it is not something I would like to do. But I have the ability. (Although this does raise the issue of what free-will is... but I'll leave that to another thread!)
If God isn't able to act against His preferences, then He is not omnipotent?
Very much so, if it is merely a preference.
These are just square circles again.
You mean another thing that God can not do? :eek:

My view in all of this is that omnipotence is generally understood as one thing (able to do anything and everything), but when applied to God it must be restricted so as not to produce paradoxes... but the question then is what limitations.

That is so in God's case.
According to...? (i.e. is there scripture that supports this understanding above others?)
 
My view in all of this is that omnipotence is generally understood as one thing (able to do anything and everything), but when applied to God it must be restricted so as not to produce paradoxes... but the question then is what limitations.


so omnipotence in general allows for a square circle?
 
so omnipotence in general allows for a square circle?
Some would use the "square circle" as an example of the meaninglessness of the concept of omnipotence in general.

Others, who wish to use omnipotence as a meaningful concept, have to define it in such a way as to avoid such issues.
And as applied to God I don't think it is any different - that it needs to be defined so as to avoid paradoxes and remain meaningful.

But I don't see restricting it to merely "that which God likes/wants" is warranted either, at least not without further definition / understanding / explanation of what that actually means and entails.
 
But I don't see restricting it to merely "that which God likes/wants" is warranted either, at least not without further definition / understanding / explanation of what that actually means and entails.


most likely a bunch of cringe worthy presumptions :)
 
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