Yazata said:
I'm inclined to agree with [JamesR]
If God knows at time1 that he's going to do A at time2, then could God do B at time2 instead, without contradicting his knowledge and hence his omniscience?
The OP is putting forward an explanation of divine action, and it is an explanation that excludes the awareness of the quality of action.
I didn't read JamesR as putting forward an explanation of anything. He was just pointing out what's arguably a logical inconsistency between omniscience and omnipotence. I think that there are a number of similar problems lurking among the various divine 'omni's'. Saturnine Pariah just quoted Epicurus pointing out another one, the famous problem of evil.
Interestingly, Epicurus lived from 341 - 270 BCE, so some of the omni-ideas were already bouncing around the Hellenistic Greek world centuries before the early Christian theologians adopted them.
Per definition, everything that God does, is good.
I squirm when people say things like that, because I don't see any way that a human being could possibly know that it's true. It's why I said that the 'omni's' seem motivated by piety, by religious devotees' emotional desire to invest whatever the object of their devotions is with all imaginable perfections.
But sure, we can accept it for purposes of argument.
Thus there is no need for God to change his mind, the way humans change their mind as they struggle to "do the right thing."
Ok, I won't argue with that.
But the issue James raised doesn't appear to be whether God will ever feel motivated to change his holy mind. (In the Judeo-Christian scheme, didn't he change his mind abut creation, when he sent down the flood?) The issue seems to be the rather different question of whether or not God
could change his mind, without contradicting and hence negating another of his divine attributes.
In the OP, as well as often theist/atheist exchanges, the understanding people tend to have of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence, along with free will, is anthropomorphic, shaped and limited by the usual human experience.
Yes. With a personal God, we don't seem to have any other choice, since our deities often seem to be made in our own human image. We humans are the only kind of 'persons' that we know.
Ie., it's the kind of understanding as "What would you do if you would be omnipotent/omniscient?"
It's true that people think that way, but I don't think that's the issue here. The problem seems to be more logical.
Our ordinary human free will is encapsulated into issues of whether we will be able to act on our plans or not, whether our plans will turn out to be actionable or not. Since we lack omniscience, we don't know whether what we set out to do will be possible to do or not: we have to actually do it before we can be sure whether it can be done or not, before we can be sure whether we have done it or not. Given that we lack omnipotence and omniscience, we are bound to sooner or later run into obstacles, difficulties, where we will change our minds, change our plans - give up on the old ones, design new ones.
Those are good points. Much of our thinking, planning, deciding, acting, observing, recalculating and adapting in light of our experience, takes place precisely because we aren't omniscient and omnipotent. Throughout our lives, we are constantly making pragmatic choices in conditions of imperfect information and improvising in the face of uncertainty. That's the human condition.
God, on the other hand, sets out to do things that He is able to do, and does not make mistakes.
Unlike we ordinary humans, God cannot misassess His abilities and resources.
Is God incapable of making a mistake, incapable of screwing up? What implications would that have for his omnipotence? More generally, can God learn? Can God grow? Can he change his mind? Can he be surprised?
If we take the divine attributes seriously (I'm not sure exactly why we should) it may very well be true that such a being's cognition and decision making might have to be radically different from those of frail, finite and temporally-embedded mortals like ourselves. So much so that it raises real questions about how much meaning there is in imagining God as a "person".