I see the brain as the processor and the body as the input/output mechanism.
hmm. this seems a rather archaic perspective, and i'm inclined to agree with heliocentric's assessment that one dualism has simply been swapped for another. certainly, that's an oversimplification but it's captured the gist of it. (see post on maturena and varela in "my problems with empiricism thread")
If you swap the mechanism for an artificial one that provides exactly the same inputs and outputs to the brain, do you really think "you" would be any different. You would still feel the same, see the same things, hear the same things - all of which are interpreted (as far as we know) within the brain. So if you can provide the same input but from an artificial mechanism (e.g. Brain in a vat) - I would say you would still be you.
obviously this can't be tested (although i suppose one day it might be), but i'm not so sure that such would be the case. certainly the brain is inextricable bound with the rest of "you" by virtue of the nervous system, but isn't everything else? sure, you can remove a hand, a leg, replace an organ, and still feel that you are "you"; though many do in fact feel a difference. do you think this difference is exclusively by virtue of the replacement (well, if their is one) not being an exact duplicate of the original? this is indeed a factor, but is it the only one? the argument that the brain is the only organ, which if replaced would, uh,
redifine you isn't all that compelling, because we don't
know this with absolute certainty.
partial lobotomies--of essential and active regions of the brain--have been performed, and the individual still (usually) feels mostly "himself." and then there have been lobotomies performed, along with radical e.c.t. "treatment," for which the individual no longer feels "himself"--though traces and reminders may surface.
this is speculation based on intuition, and it hasn't really been "established," but don't you often feel that you are thinking with your hands, or your gut, or your ??? one might argue that these are "figures of speech" and their meaning is limited and contingent, but again, individuals have undergone replacement surgeries and claimed that they no longer feel wholly themselves.
But can you differentiate "you" from the relationship between your inputs and outputs - i.e. the mechanism that is your brain?
do you mean differentiate "you" from the relationship between the inputs/outputs (body and experiential "device"
and the brain rather? i suspect not, but i also think that thinking in this fashion--of inputs/outputs--is flawed.
moreover, i think that "you" are also inextricably bound to your environment and context. obviously, a person is constantly put into new contexts, and some radically different, perhaps even apparently "immediately," contexts all the time, but the contexts are still enormously significant not only for "defining" one's world but for defining oneself. as an example of the seemingly "immediate" change of contexts, i'm epileptic and my consciousness has lapsed from anywhere from seconds to days--and i still perform in my world, IOW i am unconscious, but i am still carrying out my routines, and sometimes my "routines" are hardly routine--i've "awakened" to find myself in a completely different place, sometimes hundreds of miles from the place which i last recollect, and this is alarming and disconcerting in more ways than the obvious ones: i am sometimes (often, really) so discombobulated that i do not recognize "myself" as "myself," and it takes some time before i am able to recognize myself.