But we are slowly learning about what consciousness is.
Imagine you're at the controls of a train. Your "consciousness" determines which direction the next piece of track is laid in front of you for you to follow.
This seems like you are making a choice at a conscious level. Free-will?
But what if your body has actually already (subconsciously) determined which way, and has already laid the track ahead? Your consciousness is then only giving you the illusion of free-will, right at the last moment. But is it really free-will at the point of being conscious of it, given that your body has already determined it for you?
Anyhoo - enough rambling.
I find this quite a common position within philosophy departments now. It's as if dualism proper has been replaced by a kind of
physical dualism - 'the body' and 'the brain' as two distinct things with not much to do with each other. I think the first problem that crops up when you conceptualise consciousness this way (and you already outlined it very nicely) is that you immediately feel as though you dont have any free-will atall - the body is doing things, that
you (the brain) dont particularly want to do.
But this is all based upon the assumption that your body has nothing atall to do with who you are, or how you perceive yourself, and that everything that's tangibly 'you' is stored inside the brain - Something which ive never found particularly convincing. Assuming for example, that it were possible to keep me alive as a 'brain in a vat', I think my sense of self would be so radically altered that it would be meaningless to say i was the same person as when i was in possession of a body.
Eastern/zen philosophers always got this. A zen philosopher wouldnt say: "i hear a bird tweeting" theyd just say "bird tweeting" because that's all there is at that particular time - experiential content. There's no 'subject' and therefore no reason to posit an 'object' that's facilitating the experience.
So there's never really a need to for dualism in zen philosophy (physical, immaterial, or otherwise) because subject/object distinctions are seen for the linguistic contrivances they always are. It's taken western philosophy about 300 years to get to grips with that, and even now you still find endless varieties of dualism knocking round analytic philosophy departments.