Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[Baldeee]

It's misplaced. You are in a state of confusion regarding what determinism "entails".

No, I'm not.
There is but one notion of determinism at play, although many notions of "freedom".
I am quite clear, and unconfused, as to what determinism entails.
It does not entail any quantum mechanics at the level of a local universe; it does not entail any randomness; or any probabilistic outcome for effects.
It does entail a universe whose future is entirely predetermined from any previous state.

It does not, for example, "entail" an absence of nonsupernatural freedom of will.

I have never said that it does entail that, thanks.
I could label a teddybear in that universe as "freedom of will" and lo and behold it would exist.
But what determinism entails does not change.
What changes is what our definition / notion of "freedom of will" entails.
And the question is whether that notion is compatible with what determinism entails.
Change the notion of "freedom of will" and what it entails you can reach either side of the debate.
But throughout, the notion of determinism, and what that entails, remains constant... at least for most of us who understand what determinism means.

So please put your straw man back in the cupboard to keep company the others you have previously raised.

Only supernatural freedom of will is affected by assuming a deterministic universe.

If one wishes to assert that a notion of freedom of will exists in an environment that it is incompatible with then one would have to assert that its existence is supernatural.
Otherwise the notion is simply nonexistent within that environment.
To be supernatural it has to exist contrary to the environment (i.e. laws of physics, nature of the universe etc).
Since noone on the Incompatibilist side of the debate is claiming it to exist, it is not supernatural - unless you are saying that that notion of freedom of will exists?

 

[Baldeee]

no you don't... for if you did then you would acknowledge at the very least that freewill may be possible in a deterministic universe.

Once again you prove that you don't actually understand the debate that you are trying to debate.
On both sides of the In/Compatibilist debate is the same notion of determinism.
What differs is the understanding of what it means to have "free will".
You don't start with "free will" and try to find a nature of the universe that fits it.
Your positioning is quite simply perverse.
You are starting with the assumption that everyone has the same notion of "free will".
You are then trying to come up with a notion of determinism that allows it.
You have the argument in reverse: determinism is the unchangeable part of the equation, and the argument is really what notion of free will is compatible with that determinism

The version you are premising this thread on is most likely Hard determinism with it's inherent fatalism.

Hard Determinism is, again, nothing per se to do with the nature of determinism but with the relationship between that determinism and free will.
The Hard Determinist holds that a genuine free will is incompatible with determinism, and also that ethical accountability does not exist in a deterministic universe.
Again, this is nothing to do with what is meant or understood by Determinism per se.
I thought you would have grasped this when I explained to you what Soft Determinism is.

Personally I am not a Hard Determinist but rather tend toward being a Narrow Incompatibilist.
I will leave you to look up what that means, so that you can start to understand that all the labels you see in the chart have the same understanding of what determinism is (and thus what indeterminism is).
There are no "versions" of determinism.
Just determinism.
The label is all about the relationship one sees between a deterministic universe and free will.

If you wish to discuss how impossible freewill is for Hard Determinism... well good for you....but at least be honest enough to declare that is what you are discussing.

When you finally (or if you finally) start to understand that there is only one version of determinism being discussed, irrespective of the label applied regarding one's view of the relationship between that determinism with freewill, I will be more than happy to continue debating with you, Quantum Quack.
The debate is then about what your own view of that relationship is, and what you see free will to be such that you hold the view you do.
But for now you are trying to alter the wrong part of the debate: i.e. you are trying to change what determinism means and keep "free will" as a constant.
Determinism is the constant between the views.
Please learn that, understand that.

 

[Baldeee]

Are you saying that Compatabilism is not about a deterministic universe?

No, I am not saying that at all.
Compatibilism says that freewill is compatible with determinism, but the notion (or understanding) of freewill that the compatibilists say is compatible is different to the one that the incompatibilists say does not exist.

Again you are arguing the fatalistic hard determinist case and calling it the premise of this thread, which it is not.

No, I am not.

Free will apparently is argued to exist in a compatabilistic deterministic universe.

Yes.
They claim free will (or at least their notion of it) is compatible with a deterministic universe.

It could also be argued , which as yet it hasnt been, that freewill is possible in a Co-determined deterministic universe.

Until you have adequately explained how a "co-determined deterministic universe" is in any way different to what is simply referred to as a "deterministic universe", which pages upon pages of your previous thread showed quite evidently that you can not, there is no reason to take the notion of "co-determined deterministic universe" seriously.

It also arguably exists in a few other versions of determinism...

And what are these "other versions of determinism" that you speak of?

So why are you premising this thread on only one of them...

Because there is only one version of determinism.
Something is either deterministic or it is not.
End of.

If you asked the question :
"Is free will possible in a fatalistic hard deterministic universe?"

The answer of course is no.... because that is what makes hard determinism eh... uhm.... "hard".

You still don't grasp that there is only the one version of determinism being discussed, and that "hard determinism" is a label for the view that determinism is incompatible with both freewill and ethical responsibility.
What determinism is doesn't change depending on whether one is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist.
What changes is the understanding of freewill that one has, and thus how that understanding of freewill fits, or doesn't fit, within the deterministic universe.

So really there is nothing to discuss if the thread is premised as you indicate.

I have indicated nothing with regard premises.
Determinism has been premised and it is what it is.
The difference between me/Cap/DaveC and the likes of CC and iceaura is what we consider "freedom of will" to require.
Still the same version of determinism, though.

Fortunately the thread is not premised on hard determinism. This is a good thing because this allows discussion and possibility.

The thread is premised on determinism, Quantum Quack.
Please try to learn what determinism means, and what it entails.
When you have done that, try to see if what you think freewill to be is compatible with determinism or not.
That is what this thread is debating.
Not the nature of determinism.
Determinism is what it is.
So come up with what you consider freewill, or freedom of will, to be, and see if it is compatible or not with determinism.
Your approach thus far is to try to change the nature of determinism.
That is an absurd approach, because something either is deterministic or it is not.

You really have to think a bit deeper before you destroy any intellectual/ethical credibility you may have remaining.

Aw, how adorable and funny.
Like a child telling a parent they're being stupid for not thinking that 2+2=5.

 

[Quantum Quack]

No, I am not saying that at all.
Compatibilism says that freewill is compatible with determinism, but the notion (or understanding) of freewill that the compatibilists say is compatible is different to the one that the incompatibilists say does not exist.
No, I am not.
Yes.
They claim free will (or at least their notion of it) is compatible with a deterministic universe.
Until you have adequately explained how a "co-determined deterministic universe" is in any way different to what is simply referred to as a "deterministic universe", which pages upon pages of your previous thread showed quite evidently that you can not, there is no reason to take the notion of "co-determined deterministic universe" seriously.
And what are these "other versions of determinism" that you speak of?
Because there is only one version of determinism.
Something is either deterministic or it is not.
End of.
You still don't grasp that there is only the one version of determinism being discussed, and that "hard determinism" is a label for the view that determinism is incompatible with both freewill and ethical responsibility.
What determinism is doesn't change depending on whether one is a compatibilist or an incompatibilist.
What changes is the understanding of freewill that one has, and thus how that understanding of freewill fits, or doesn't fit, within the deterministic universe.
I have indicated nothing with regard premises.
Determinism has been premised and it is what it is.
The difference between me/Cap/DaveC and the likes of CC and iceaura is what we consider "freedom of will" to require.
Still the same version of determinism, though.
The thread is premised on determinism, Quantum Quack.
Please try to learn what determinism means, and what it entails.
When you have done that, try to see if what you think freewill to be is compatible with determinism or not.
That is what this thread is debating.
Not the nature of determinism.
Determinism is what it is.
So come up with what you consider freewill, or freedom of will, to be, and see if it is compatible or not with determinism.
Your approach thus far is to try to change the nature of determinism.
That is an absurd approach, because something either is deterministic or it is not.
Aw, how adorable and funny.
Like a child telling a parent they're being stupid for not thinking that 2+2=5.

So is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

 

[iceaura]

I am quite clear, and unconfused, as to what determinism entails.

No, you aren't. You have made a complete mess of the topic, and derailed several threads with repetitive and elementary errors of reasoning.

If one wishes to assert that a notion of freedom of will exists in an environment that it is incompatible with then one would have to assert that its existence is supernatural.

(Notice the syntax falling apart - the issue is existence of freedom of will, not the existence of "notions")
And vice versa, as in your posting.
Nobody but the deluded materialist crowd has made either assertion here.
I recommend ceasing to make such assertions, in either direction of implication, and attending more to the contents of the posts to which you reply.

Since noone on the Incompatibilist side of the debate is claiming it to exist, it is not supernatural

? Whatever led you to post that embarrassing non sequitur is not your ally here.

To restore the point: On this forum and in this thread, according to your posting as quoted and examined many times, freedom of will is being denied existence - by you and several others - on the grounds that it would have to be supernatural. You "argue" from supernatural to nonexistent - not the other way around.

You have flailed around using several different terms for that characteristic - "genuine" seems to be a recent favorite of your crowd - but defiance of physical law, escape from determination of event, independence from natural cause/effect, and so forth, is assumed of freedom of will in all of your posting. That is an assumption you have made, you have not supported it (failure to recognize things like that cripples reasoning), and it is not granted.

Furthermore: As noted, your assumption of only and necessarily supernatural freedom has crippled your subsequent reasoning. It has led you to deny observed physical realities that imply other freedoms - such as the existence of capabilities in human beings, available for choice, regardless of their eventual future use at any specific future time - and reverse the timeline of causation - such as your claim that events in the future affect current physical reality - and make other similarly flagrant and elementary errors.

It does not, for example, "entail" an absence of nonsupernatural freedom of will."
I have never said that it does entail that, thanks.

You have, many times, including in the very post I am quoting now (the nonexistence of the "notion", etc, above - like this:

Otherwise the notion is simply nonexistent within that environment.

). And you have seen several of them not only pointed out to you like that but analyzed for you (I no longer bother).
The net lesson of your posting has been that - apparently - you object to the term "supernatural". You prefer euphemisms and vague references ("genuine", "actual", etc).
I prefer more direct language. It favors my arguments, as vagueness and euphemism favor your attempts.

But throughout, the notion of determinism, and what that entails, remains constant... at least for most of us who understand what determinism means.

Constancy in error and confusion is hardly a bragging point.
You have posted, repeated, and defended against objection, a good deal of confused nonsense on that topic - your apparently oblivious inversion of the defining timeline of causation perhaps the most striking.

Meanwhile, you seem to think you have made some kind of basis of argument out of your restriction of "freedom of will" to your preconceptions of its relationship with a causally deterministic physical reality (it cannot exist in such a reality, you assert, excluded by the very properties of that reality that define it as causally deterministic- thereby making the supernatural assumption you then deny making). Predefining the very terms under discussion to exclude obvious possibilities is not sound reasoning, after all. It certainly isn't an argument against freedom of will in general, especially not its possibility.

For starters: as simple things have simple degrees of freedom in their behavior (see any elementary class in statistical analysis), so more complex things engaged in higher order behaviors - choosing from among various capabilities according to internal criteria and abstract models of the future, say - have the corresponding degrees of freedom inherent in theirs. These are largely unexplored, theoretically - afaik not even the necessary math has been well established - but nevertheless available to intuitive observation and consideration. We can, for example, note that these degrees of freedom will by necessity and definition exist at the same logical level as the mental activities and criteria and so forth to which they apply: that would include such things as dreams, memories, and abstract models of a future incompletely known.

We're a long way from bricks, thermostats, and orbiting Teslas. But we do have a simple illustration or two to guide inquiry: "A driver approaches a traffic light - - - - "

 

[Baldeee]

No, you aren't. You have made a complete mess of the topic, and derailed several threads with repetitive and elementary errors of reasoning.

Nonsense.
The reasoning is quite clear, supported, and followed by others capable of understanding it.
It doesn't agree with your reasoning, because we require different things from our notion of "freedom of will".

(Notice the syntax falling apart - the issue is existence of freedom of will, not the existence of "notions")

No syntax falling apart, just clarity that when one refers to "freedom of will" there are several competing notions as to what is meant.
Your inability to accept that, and to discuss with that in mind, is no failure of mine.

And vice versa, as in your posting.
Nobody but the deluded materialist crowd has made either assertion here.

In fact noone has made the assertion at all.
There are also no "deluded materialists" here.
Please put your strawmen away.

I recommend ceasing to make such assertions, in either direction of implication, and attending more to the contents of the posts to which you reply.

I can not cease making that which I have not yet made.

? Whatever led you to post that embarrassing non sequitur is not your ally here.

No non sequitur, just reminding you that in order to be supernatural one must first claim that it exists, and does so contrary to our understanding of the nature of the universe (laws of physics, etc)
Thus your claims that we are referring to a supernatural freewill are bogus, since noone is claiming it to exist.
That you seem to start with the assumption that free will exists, and thus see any conclusion that free will does not exist as being based on the assumption of a supernatural freewill, is your issue to contend with, not those who conclude that such free will does not exist.

To restore the point: On this forum and in this thread, according to your posting as quoted and examined many times, freedom of will is being denied existence - by you and several others - on the grounds that it would have to be supernatural. You "argue" from supernatural to nonexistent - not the other way around.

Nonsense.
We argue to it being nonexistent by comparing the qualities expected of the notion of freewill we have with what is possible in the confines of a deterministic universe.
We find them incompatible.
We thus find that in a deterministic universe there is no such freewill - it is non-existent.
At that point, if one wishes to see how that notion of free will might exist while being incompatible, sure, bring in the supernatural to your heart's content.
We don't do that.
There is no need.
It is sufficient to stop once it is concluded that it doesn't exist.
The bee you have in your bonnet about the supernatural is what has been most distracting in this thread, and every other thread you have raised the rather pathetic criticism.
To clarify it for you yet again, given that it has been explained numerous times by people already and still you seem incapable of grasping: the notion of freewill used is neutral in the argument: there is no assumption from the outset that it does or doesn't exist.
All there is is an understanding of what we (those who use the particular notion) expect from freedom of will - such as genuine alternatives.
From there we examine whether that notion is compatible with determinism.
We find / conclude that it is not.
End of story.
Your efforts to claim that we argue from the supernatural to the non-existent is ridiculous.
The two are synonymous with regard existence: neither exist.
The notion of freedom used itself makes no assumption of existence.
Only when coupled with the premise of the deterministic universe can one claim non-existence.

You have flailed around using several different terms for that characteristic - "genuine" seems to be a recent favorite of your crowd - but defiance of physical law, escape from determination of event, independence from natural cause/effect, and so forth, is assumed of freedom of will in all of your posting. That is an assumption you have made, you have not supported it (failure to recognize things like that cripples reasoning), and it is not granted.

You are confusing between the neutral (with regard whether it can exist or not) properties of "freedom" in the notion used, and the conclusion people reach about what would require it to exist in a deterministic universe.
That inability to differentiate, your own slippage in your ability to keep track, is what cripples your reasoning.
But lo and behold that becomes our fault.
And I accept that the notion of freedom that we run with is not granted by everyone.
As I have always stated, from the outset of the first thread of this type, that if you start with a different notion of free will you can reach different conclusions.

Furthermore: As noted, your assumption of only and necessarily supernatural freedom has crippled your subsequent reasoning.

Even ignoring your persistently flawed claim of what is being assumed, the notion of freedom we run with has no crippling effect on any subsequent reason....

It has led you to deny observed physical realities that imply other freedoms - such as the existence of capabilities in human beings, available for choice, regardless of their eventual future use at any specific future time - and reverse the timeline of causation - such as your claim that events in the future affect current physical reality - and make other similarly flagrant and elementary errors.

There is no denial of the processes involved that you are describing.
Just the freedom involved.
Yes, "degrees of freedom" exist, as in bricks, cars etc.
Yes, "freewill" exists in as much as the process of our will operates in an unimpeded manner.
None of these are disputed, or denied.

And I have not once stated that events in the future affect current physical reality.
Current physical reality is what it is, it is the specific link in the predetermined causal chain that we are on at this time.
What you are referring to as "physical reality" is actually just an imagined reality of what you think you are capable of.
You might think, perhaps, that at a specific time in the future you could do A, or you could do B.
But you can't.
In a deterministic universe it is ALREADY predetermined what you will do at that time.
There is nothing you can do to escape that.
Any claim that current physical reality is a capability to do one of a number of as yet undetermined things in the future is wrong.
The key thing, though, is that you aren't aware of what you are predetermined to do, and the best we can do is imagine what the future might hold.
We don't know that we will do A, but we can imagine us doing A or B, or C....
What we imagine of the future is not physical reality.

You have, many times, including in the very post I am quoting now (the nonexistence of the "notion", etc, above - like this:
).
And you have seen several of them not only pointed out to you like that but analyzed for you (I no longer bother).

Given that I think that it can include some notions of freewill that are nonsupernatural, how am I asserting that determinism entails an absence of nonsupernatural freedom of will?
I could define a chair as "freedom of will", after all.
You have slipped from a rebuttal about a claim of absolute to treating it as a rebuttal about every notion of freedom of will.
Why?

 

[Baldeee]

The net lesson of your posting has been that - apparently - you object to the term "supernatural".

I don't object to the term at all - it simply has no place in a correct analysis of what has been argued.
I object to you raising it because your analysis of what has been argued is flawed, as explained numerous times, as seemingly ignored by you numerous times.

You prefer euphemisms and vague references ("genuine", "actual", etc).

Nothing vague about them.
One can only see whether a process that allows for them is compatible with determinism once you have introduced the premise of determinism.
You jump to the conclusion, see that we're concluding the notion of free will doesn't exist, and then claim we're assuming the supernatural.
That is the crippling, tiresome, flaw in your analysis.
Yet you persist.

I prefer more direct language. It favors my arguments, as vagueness and euphemism favor your attempts.

And you introduce a term that can only be given relevance if you jump to the conclusion and rehash the argument to make it an assumption.
But this has been explained to you numerous times.

Constancy in error and confusion is hardly a bragging point.

Then I suggest you don't.

You have posted, repeated, and defended against objection, a good deal of confused nonsense on that topic ...

There is no confusion in anything other than your understanding of it.

- your apparently oblivious inversion of the defining timeline of causation perhaps the most striking.

Just more evidence of your misunderstanding of what people are saying.

Meanwhile, you seem to think you have made some kind of basis of argument out of your restriction of "freedom of will" to your preconceptions of its relationship with a causally deterministic physical reality (it cannot exist in such a reality, you assert, excluded by the very properties of that reality that define it as causally deterministic- thereby making the supernatural assumption you then deny making). Predefining the very terms under discussion to exclude obvious possibilities is not sound reasoning, after all. It certainly isn't an argument against freedom of will in general, especially not its possibility.

Once again you can't help misunderstand the difference between conclusion and assumption.
You've continued to do it in countless threads thus far so I guess it shouldn't surprise me that you're still making the mistake.
Also, as explained from the outset, and again many times in this thread, and again seemingly ignored by you: if you start with a different notion of what free will is, you will end with a different conclusion.
To me free will requires the existence of genuine alternatives to an action.
To you perhaps it doesn't.
It is only when one couples a notion of free will with the determninistic universe can one conclude that the two are in/compatible.
I have always been comfortable with the fact that if you change what you mean by freewill then you can reach a different conclusion.

For starters:
...
But we do have a simple illustration or two to guide inquiry: "A driver approaches a traffic light - - - - "

Blah blah blah
Appeal to complexity it is, then.

Since it is clear that that is all you have, that and your continued bleating about "supernatural assumption", I guess I'll revert to putting you on ignore.

 

[iceaura]

Given that I think that it can include some notions of freewill that are nonsupernatural, how am I asserting that determinism entails an absence of nonsupernatural freedom of will?

By asserting that freedom of will and a causally deterministic universe are incompatible. You even drew that as a conclusion, an explicit entailment.

It doesn't agree with your reasoning, because we require different things from our notion of "freedom of will".

Yep.
You require it to be supernatural. I do not.
Here, for example:

It is only when one couples a notion of free will with the determninistic universe can one conclude that the two are in/compatible.

The conclusion of incompatibility - your conclusion - requires a supernatural notion of free will. No such conclusion follows from a nonsupernatural notion of freedom of will. Nonsupernatural freedom does not conflict with a deterministic universe.
The fact that you conclude incompatibility demonstrates - for the thirtieth time or more - that you are assuming any freedom of will would have to be, necessarily, supernatural.

Once again you can't help misunderstand the difference between conclusion and assumption.

I keep quoting you making the assumption. You keep denying your own posting. So it goes.

You jump to the conclusion, see that we're concluding the notion of free will doesn't exist, and then claim we're assuming the supernatural.

No, I don't.
The notion of free will exists regardless of anything. Your language is slippery.
It's the freedom itself, and in your case the will, that is up for discussion.
You assume that only the supernatural can have freedom in a deterministic universe. You do that explicitly, and I have quoted many examples of you doing that for you to examine - and, of course, deny.

Appeal to complexity it is, then

Yep. Something directly relevant to nonsupernatural degrees of freedom, and something you can observe existing, whenever you get your head out of your ass.
I know it's beyond your current comprehension, but logical levels and other complexities do in fact exist out here in the big world. That's where a discussion of freedom of will would find its substance, its real world relevance - if one were ever launched here.

I have always been comfortable with the fact that if you change what you mean by freewill then you can reach a different conclusion.

Dropping the supernatural assumption is the change involved.
I don't believe you are comfortable with that. I think you will continue to refuse to even consider doing that.

 

[iceaura]

To me free will requires the existence of genuine alternatives to an action.

Which are of course observed. The driver approaches the traffic light, not yet decided on whether to stop or go - - -

So that's settled.

Except for the fact that you meant something quite different than what "genuine" normally means. As noted: You are wise to avoid clear language. Replace "genuine" with "supernatural", the more direct term, and your entire argument falls apart.

 

[Capracus]

As has been explained to you several times, that is irrelevant. It is completely beside the point.
You aren't paying attention.
Nobody here is discussing the free will of the universe as a whole. Nobody. Ever.
Nobody is bothering with "indeterminate" anything, since we agreed not to many months ago.

The discussion is about the nature of the human will, including the degrees of freedom and so forth available to a human being making choices from among their capabilities.

Because humans are a constituent element of the universe, whatever is true for the universe is true for humans as well.

Why yes, he does. Still. After all this time and trouble trying to clear the debris of the supernatural assumption off the table.
We are attempting to deal with physical and theoretical reality, not fantasies of perpetual motion machines and identical rewinds and other theoretical (as well as practical) impossibilities. Real freedom, in the real world - the world of observation, experience, and theoretical possibility.

You do understand that any theoretical analysis involves the ability to examine or simulate the chronology of a given event. You think that all of the data coming out of the Large Hadron Collider is only viewed in real time? You don’t think the physicists run that data backwards and forwards, and condition it for use in various simulations? Or that the same is done in regards to cosmological observation and theory? How dare someone suggest that a hypothetical chronological analysis of any process might yield constructive insight.

"Driver approaches traffic light" - - remember?
Human decision, human will, human choice, human capability, is the immediately dominant - almost sole - factor in many of the situations you describe as a "script". It is the direct and verifiable means by which the "universe as a whole" - in physical fact, in the real world - determines many aspects of that human being's future and the future of everything connected with that human being.

That's its "part" - that's what it does. No golf ball does anything remotely corresponding or similar.

You need to keep all of this in the universal perspective when discussing universal determinism. The universe is responsible for every material aspect of of a human being, from the tissue composition of the brain, to the chemistry involved in every thought. The universe is employing the same deterministic script for every other constituent entity, including golf balls. If a human hits a golf ball, it’s because the universe determined that act, it doesn’t matter how much detail is described, or how the act is labeled, it’s still just another example of universal determined action. The human had to act precisely as the universe determined, just as the golf ball had to follow its precise universal determined path.

The evaluation of a driver approaching a traffic light is not based on incomplete knowledge. At the time of assessment the driver is capable of both stop and go, simultaneously, and will decide between these two alternatives in the future - these are objectively observable, physical, facts. That is not an "interpretation", and it is not "subjective" - it's recordable via machine, for chrissake.

The neurology involved in all human action is as sequentially rigid as the orbital mechanics of a planet, or the aerodynamic behavior of a golf ball. The universal determined neurological calculation made at the traffic light is cognically experience by the driver, and may have involved a perception of possibilities, but it was always destined to result in a specific universal determined outcome. The only reason that a calculation would entertain possibilities is because the requisite knowledge needed for an ideal solutrion is insufficient. A poker player holding a royal flush in spades doesn’t entertain other possibilities.

The simultaneous existence of various mutually exclusive (in the future) human capabilities is an observed, objectively established, repeatedly verified, and physically recorded fact. Future events do not affect the current status of present capabilities - causation does not act backwards in time.

Complete knowledge of all universal action will yield only single universal determined outcomes for any circumstance. Back to a poker example, when you know where all of the cards are, there is no possibilities regarding any players hand, there is just the known hands as dealt.

Nobody I’m aware of is claiming that future events determine past events, only that present events are causally determined by past events. And since the present is sequentially the future of the past, the past can be completely revealed(determined) by a complete examination of its future(the present).

You are screwing up the very notions of time and sequence you need for your causal determinism in the first place.

No, you’re simply confused by your misinterpretation of terminology.

Yep. By producing a human being capable of making decisions, willing behavior, and choosing from alternatives for that behavior. So that's settled, ok?

From a universal perspective, humans don’t make decisions, they only express behavior determined by the universal whole. There are no alternatives in a universally determined system.

Look: human decisions are physical events. The human mind exists in physical reality. Physical reality therefore includes "high" or "more inclusive" or "mental" organizations. Parts of it are capable of modeling, abstracting, and predicting the future of, other parts. Such high levels of logical organization, and the phenomena they produce in this universe, are at least as real as atoms (since atoms are an abstraction of the human mind, an analytical invention or tactic of the human mind, the mind is probably more real - that's another discussion). No golf ball can produce anything corresponding to a human decision, any more than it can open a pickle jar - it lacks the capability. It has no opposable thumbs, and no mind of its own. Human beings have both.

Like I mentioned earlier, the perceived complexity of an entity is irrelevant when that entity is a dependent constituent of a wholly determined system. The universe expresses rigidly determined action through all of its constituent entities. Human being or golf ball, it doesn’t matter which has more bells and whistles, because it’s the determined nature of the universe that makes any of those bells and whistles sound off.

Human beings have minds of their own.

Or it could be stated that minds have human beings of their own, and neurons have minds of their own, and proteins have neurons of their own, and carbon atoms have proteins of their own. From this list of narrow perspectives, we could argue that carbons atoms are the determining factor in human behavior. As the carbon atom goes, so goes the human mind. If we want to truly describe the complete picture of human behavior, we need to take a universal perspective.

 

[Baldeee]

By asserting that freedom of will and a causally deterministic universe are incompatible. You even drew that as a conclusion, an explicit entailment.

The notion of freedom of will that I am using yes, not the notion that you and others perhaps use.
How many times do I need to explain that I am quite comfortable with different notions of freedom of will resulting in different conclusions?

Yep.
You require it to be supernatural. I do not.

No requirement to be supernatural.
It just happens that the requirement is not compatible with a deterministic universe.

Here, for example:

The conclusion of incompatibility - your conclusion - requires a supernatural notion of free will.

No, it requires a notion of freewill that I consider to be appropriate for freewill.
That is all that is required.
The rest is simply a conclusion of that requirement when coupled with the assumption of the deterministic universe.

No such conclusion follows from a nonsupernatural notion of freedom of will. Nonsupernatural freedom does not conflict with a deterministic universe. The fact that you conclude incompatibility demonstrates - for the thirtieth time or more - that you are assuming any freedom of will would have to be, necessarily, supernatural.

And in saying that you confirm yet again that you are jumping to the conclusion and assuming the notion of freewill was chosen in order to reach that conclusion, and by referring to it as supernatural you are assuming also that it is being claimed to nonetheless exist.
That is simply absurd on your part, and you are clearly oblivious to you being so.
It is certainly true that any valid conclusion reached that X is incompatible with Y means that the assumed X is indeed incompatible with Y, but that is very different from assuming any X would have to be incompatible.
The former is to make no assumption whatsoever about the compatibility of the specific X with Y, and the latter is to state that X is chosen up front, with foreknowledge, that it is incompatible.
Absurdist nonsense on your part.
Assumptions come before the analysis - and I make no such assumption that you keep inanely bleating about - I merely conclude it, based on a notion of free will, and the deterministic universe.

I keep quoting you making the assumption. You keep denying your own posting. So it goes.

When you finally understand what has actually been posted, rather than merely what you think has been posted, let me know and we can pick up this again.

No, I don't.

Yes, you do, as explained almost every time you have done it.
And every time it falls on deaf ears.

The notion of free will exists regardless of anything. Your language is slippery.

Oh, for Pete's sake.
To quote even wiki on the matter: "There are numerous different concerns about threats to the possibility of free will, varying by how exactly it is conceived, which is a matter of some debate."

It's the freedom itself, and in your case the will, that is up for discussion.

And since the freedom within "free will" is rather a key point, ones view of what "freedom" is leads to different notions of free will.
So no, the notion of free will does not exist regardless of anything.
It differs with every different notion of what constitutes "freedom".

You assume that only the supernatural can have freedom in a deterministic universe. You do that explicitly, and I have quoted many examples of you doing that for you to examine - and, of course, deny.

I do not do that explicitly, or implicitly, as explained, and as you seem incapable of grasping.
I have explained it many times now, and of course you simply ignore the explanation.
Do you honestly not see the difference in order between assuming and concluding?
How assumptions come first, then the logic, then the conclusion?
There is simply zero assumption that "only the supernatural can have freedom in a deterministic universe".
That is the conclusion based on a fairly reasonable notion of what freedom is.
Start with the notion of free will, no assumption as to existence or not; then apply it to the deterministic universe; reach your conclusion.

Yep. Something directly relevant to nonsupernatural degrees of freedom, and something you can observe existing, whenever you get your head out of your ass.

I've never denied them existing.
I just find them trivial and no closer to getting to the issue of whether the will is what I consider to be truly free or not (i.e. involves genuine ability to do otherwise).

I know it's beyond your current comprehension, but logical levels and other complexities do in fact exist out here in the big world. That's where a discussion of freedom of will would find its substance, its real world relevance - if one were ever launched here.

If it makes you warm and fuzzy to think that then feel free.
All you have offered is an appeal to complexity, an appeal to logical levels.
Starting with rather trivial notions of "freedom".
As for the discussion you seek, feel free to launch one in a thread that assumes a compatibilist notion of free will.

Dropping the supernatural assumption is the change involved.

No such assumption to drop, as explained, and as you will continue to ignore.
I don't believe you are comfortable with that. I think you will continue to refuse to even consider doing that.[/QUOTE]If by "comfortable" you mean "interested" then you'd be right.
I find it to be trivial, as mentioned to you numerous times, and which you have also clearly chosen to forget.
I.e. I find it to involve trivial notions of freedom found in bricks, Teslas, etc, with as yet noone able to explain how that leads to a genuine ability to do otherwise, and just appeals to complexity, appeals to logical levels.
I would actually be genuinely interested if you ever did offer an actual argument to support your case, without such informal fallacies, and if it addressed an actual ability to do otherwise, i.e. genuine alternatives, and not merely a perceived counterfactual alternative (not that you seem capable of comprehending what they are).

I await your bleating about traffic lights, driver, and everything else you consistently spout forth as being evidence, and your continued fallacious claims that I/we assume a supernatural notiong of freewill.

 

[Baldeee]

And as if on cue...

Which are of course observed. The driver approaches the traffic light, not yet decided on whether to stop or go - - -

So that's settled.

Well, it would be if only you understood that what you are observing are not genuine alternatives but simply imagined counterafactual alternatives.
I know it's beyond your current comprehension, though, so I guess that settles that.

Except for the fact that you meant something quite different than what "genuine" normally means.

I mean it in the sense of being factual, true, not fake, not simply imagined.
Since the universe, including all human activity, is predetermined, all future activity is set in stone.
There is only one path in the future that is thus factual.
Any other alternative is not factual, thus not genuine.
We do however come up with counterfactual alternatives, through what we imagine.

As noted: You are wise to avoid clear language.

The language is clear.
Your lack of comprehension is likewise clear.

Replace "genuine" with "supernatural", the more direct term, and your entire argument falls apart.

It's not a more direct term at all.
It is a term that can only be applied, if at all (given that there is no need even once one concludes its non-existence) once the conclusion is reached, not as part of the argument, as you are trying to suggest.
Your comprehension of the matter is woeful, or deliberately misrepresentative.
For the time being I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and just say your understanding is clearly inadequate.

 

[Write4U]

Which are of course observed. The driver approaches the traffic light, not yet decided on whether to stop or go - - -So that's settled

I'm sorry but that doesn't settle anything. You have not decided to stop or go because not all the facts are known at that time. The traffic light is determined (timed) so it will display green, yellow or red when you get to the intersection.
Remember, only if all facts are known the result can be predicted.

If you get to the intersection and the light is red, you will stop, unless you have a more important reason that "compels" you to break the law (wife is having a baby). In any case the action is pre-determined but as yet "unknown" by the color of the light, when you get there.

 

[river]

Moderator note:

The first 91 posts of this thread were split from a separate thread, which can be found here:

http://www.sciforums.com/threads/co-determinism-and-the-reality-of-free-will.161757

The discussion in the current thread started in a different thread, which can be found here:

http://www.sciforums.com/threads/does-physics-disprove-the-existence-of-free-will.161342/
----

It's more that I find only a trivial sense of "freedom" within a deterministic system. I don't think anything is possible through supernatural means... the supernatural does not exist, thus nothing is possible through it. If there is a non-trivial sense of "freedom" to be found, then I have yet to come across it. As for what I mean by trivial, it is the same notion of freedom to be found in a thermostat, or other such examples that have been given, then I would deem it trivial.

To those who have experienced the supernatural , the supernatural exists .

 

[Quantum Quack]

To those who have experienced the supernatural , the supernatural exists .

lol

so perhaps the thread title should have been:
"Is the super natural possible in a deterministic universe...?"

obviously it must be... lol

seriously though,

I would like to ask the question of Baldeee, and Capracus :

"Is objectivity possible in a deterministic universe?"

 

[Quantum Quack]

Well, it would be if only you understood that what you are observing are not genuine alternatives but simply imagined counterafactual alternatives.

so according to you, objective assessment is unavailable to the driver... yes?

Is objective science possible in your limited version of a deterministic universe?

 

[river]

lol

so perhaps the thread title should have been:
"Is the super natural possible in a deterministic universe...?"

obviously it must be... lol

seriously though,

I would like to ask the question of Baldeee, and Capracus :

"Is objectivity possible in a deterministic universe?"

Of course the supernatural is possible in a deterministic Universe , it is this determinism of this Universe which allows life to exist in the first place . And it is life that is supernatural .

 

[Write4U]

And it is life that is supernatural .

According to whom?

Are you proposing humans are supernatural?

Are you proposing humans are gods?

 

[river]

Of course the supernatural is possible in a deterministic Universe , it is this determinism of this Universe which allows life to exist in the first place . And it is life that is supernatural .

According to whom?

Are you proposing humans are supernatural?

Are you proposing humans are gods?

According to those who experience supernatural phenomena

Some are , though the thinking is not limited to the some that are conscious that they are .

No

But through transformation can be , we all can be .

 

[Write4U]

According to those who experience supernatural phenomena
Some are , though the thinking is not limited to the some that are conscious that they are .

How do they know objectively that they are experiencing supernatural phenomona?

No

You just said life is supernatural. Are humans alive? Therefore are they supernatural?

But through transformation can be, we all can be .

Transformation into what ? Spirits? Angels? Demons?