tiassa:
Actually, I am arguing that the foundation of your moral argument is an aesthetic standard, and therefore no sound foundation for a moral assertion.
If you want the foundation of my argument, start with the Principle of Equal Consideration. Stated simply, it says: treat all lifeforms equally (in terms of rights and moral considerations) unless you can give a good reason for treating them differently.
This must be applied to each suggested right individually.
Example: consider the right to vote. By the Principle of Equal Consideration, cows should have the samel right to vote as human beings, unless a good reason can be given for them not to have that right. Now, given that cows cannot understand human politics (as far as I can tell), nor seem to care about them, it seems to me that it is unnecessary to extent the right to vote to cows.
Now consider the right not to be eaten for the pure selfish pleasure of another animal. This right, too, should be extended to cows if we are to extend it to humans, unless a compelling reason can be given not to do so. Can you think of one?
Now, I don't think this foundation is just an "aesthetic standard". Please correct me if I am wrong.
A very immediate ethical context, one that rejects considerations of the wellbeing of the species. As a tradeoff for the feelgood reward, it seems rather an unethical deal.
"The species" is an abstraction. You don't know what is and what is not for the ultimate wellbeing of the (human) species. And why concentrate on the wellbeing of the human species to the exclusion of the wellbeing of the cow species, for example? Speciesism?
Your moral assertion is not reasonably and rationally founded; your moral assertion would prefer to hide from many of its diverse facets than consider them.
Be specific. What is unreasonable and irrational about the foundation I have given above? What facets am I "hiding" from?
Given that you want to make a distinction between purportedly-moral argument which are actually aethetics, and actual moral arguments, perhaps you should give me a few examples of non-aestethic moral arguments, and some aesthetic ones, so I can understand your point better.
Why does sentience matter?
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What, to you, is the difference between eating a live prawn and a live head of lettuce? What is your criteria for discrimination between these two forms of life? Apparently, it is the perception of one organism's suffering and the lack thereof in the other. I'll allow you to explain for yourself, but it doesn't seem to be much more than aesthetics to me.
As you eat a live prawn, what does it do? Does it try to escape? Does it exhibit signs of pain? Does it seem to you to suffer? What about a lettuce? What about a dog? What about a human child?
See any differences, other than "aesthetics"?
Now, can we have a personal moment 'twixt us here? Seriously: how many times have I used the phrase "human endeavor" at Sciforums? It puzzles me that you would suddenly confuse that phrase for "human endeavors", which is the term you use in order to relegate the consideration to the realm of the mundane, and presumably not worth considering.
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Because that's exactly what your argument comes down to: Humanity should reduce itself in order that you might feel better about being human. That, frankly, is disturbing enough in and of itself, but here we come back to aesthetics. Humanity should reduce itself in order that you can feel better about being human all because of an aesthetic discord?
I can only repeat what I said before. I do not consider "the human endeavor" (there you go - singular - happy?) the be-all and end-all of everything.
Also, tell me why you think humanity would be "reduced" by becoming vegetarian. I say it would be improved. Your religious-style argument that human evolution is somehow pre-ordained, and humans making moral choices interferes with that pre-determined path for the worse, is perplexing, to say the least. I could even argue that it is "aesthetic".
We come back to considerations you've already chosen to cast aside: bovines make good steaks, good jackets, and great shoes.
So would human beings, I'm sure. So what?
This is what they're for in relation to humanity. If we find a better purpose for them, we will put them to it. If we find a more positive relationship between human and bovine, we will develop it.
What gives us the right to use cattle as we see fit? Just because we can? Might makes right? I ask again: Why do you consider that the only value in a cow is in its economic value to you? Has it no intrinsic value? And if not, why the double standard when we come to consider human beings?
You're the one who perceived Huxley's considerations an assertion of moral authority on his part; you're the one who has, thus far, argued that eating meat is too high a price for the human endeavor; you're the one basing right and wrong on what, sincerely, seems to be aesthetics. You reduce disagreement to mere greed, complain that disagreement is character assassination. There seems to be a simple, dualistic aspect to the moral assertion; either we agree with you, or we're wrong, greedy, and hateful. You're demonizing those who disagree with you instead of developing a rational foundation for your argument. Seriously, do you wonder why I compare your argument to certain religious discussions we're all familiar with? You would cast rape as something so simple as to be about mere pleasure? You would compare a body's sudden, unexpected demand for a food it has previously rejected to addiction? Either we agree with you, or we're wrong, and you'll say damn near anything in order to believe it.
Transcend that dualism and you will, first off, notice a reduction in that feeling that you're being persecuted or treated unfairly; secondly, you'll find that things are a lot more complex than you're casting them in order to foster your argument. You might even come to understand why the foundation of your argument is merely aesthetic.
Nice rhetorical flourish, but it doesn't hold much water. Some corrections:
1. I did not perceive Huxley's comments as an assertion of moral authority.
2. My argument is not based on "aethetics", in the sense that I understand that term.
3. You disagree with me AND you act immorally. One of these actions does not cause the other - they are separate.
4. My argument is perfectly rational. Despite a lot of waffling about this and that, you haven't yet shown any irrationality.
5. I have not cast rape as "about mere pleasure". That is a straw man.
6. I do not feel persecuted or "unfairly treated", as you put it.
Your comment regarding complexity is mere condescension. My argument is no more complex than it needs to be to get my point across. Additional complexity would amount to little more than obfuscation. If you feel that I am over-simplifying an issue which must be more complex, then get off your soap box and get down to business - point out the complexities you think are relevant, and explain.
the aesthetic value of watching the plant suffer would possibly have such impact on a moral vegetarian that their morals would be required to extend to plants; to do so, however, would be in vain, an accidental or perhaps narcissistic self-deception. "But the new self-denial would be as vain as the old," writes Huxley.
I examined Huxley's point in a previous post, and explained why I disagree with him. I do not think that watching a plant undergo the kind of "suffering" Huxley talks about would or should change a vegetarian's mind about where to draw the moral line. I do not think the focus in this debate should be on "life" versus "non-life" as creating the relevant moral imperative, and I certainly do not think that Huxley's attempt at redefinition of all things to be "alive" is helpful.
The selfishness of self-preservation and the species is something considerably different from the selfishness of smoking dope or casual sex.
What worries me about your abstraction of "the species" is that it removes all immediate moral responsibility back one step, so that no moral obligations are immediate and personal any more. Only things that are "good for the species" or "bad for the species" matter to you, you claim. What value then is an individual human life (let alone an animal's life)? Stack up any individual's interests against "the good of the species" and you can justify anything as being for the "good of the species".
Would it be for the "good of the species" to sterilise all Down's syndrome children, for example? Would it be for the "good of the species" to kill all disabled people who cannot or will not work for a living, and so are a drain on society?
How do you determine "the good of the species" in advance, tiassa?
You wrote, "The simple fact is that ... you value human life more than animal life, for no good reason." And truly, that verged on offensive. For no good reason? Who's ignoring what?
Ok. Tell me why (a sentence or two should be sufficient) it is acceptable to kill and eat a cow, but not a human being? What's a "good reason" for the distinction?
What about cutting certain explanations into shorter segments in order to disconnect the points from one another? About the only appearance of utility that manages is making it easier for you to offer shorter responses to the point. (See #1041466.) Would you not rebuke that behavior should, say, a Christian poster slice up your argument in order to miss the point and avoid the thematic issue?
I must respond to this, lest you accuse me of doing this in the current post.
I do not think I "disconnect points from one another". If you think I have not addressed "the thematic issues" in your posts, again I ask you to be specific about which thematic issues you feel have not been given sufficient attention. I admit that I occasionally carve up a paragraph when quoting. If I do so, it is almost invariably because several different issues are raised at once, and I want to deal with each one separately.
On a more personal note, I am sure that I will not be the first to point out to you that your posts tend to be wordy and convoluted - often unnecessarily so, in my opinion. Disagree if you like, but that is a common perception. If I skip parts of your posts and do not quote every sentence, it isn't because I am ignoring your points. Either I think I've answered them sufficiently while quoting enough context to make it clear what I am responding to, or else perhaps I regard the unquoted parts of your posts as diversionary tangents with little substance of consequence. My apologies for any offence this may cause you.
I'm aware the arguments you're encountering are problematic. It's just that, given the intelligence you've shown over time here, I wonder why you're so blazingly aggressive in this issue. Are you just an ass? I doubt it. Are you really this mean-spirited? I doubt it. We come back to the moralistic dualism: you're in the throes of a moral fervor that corrupts your sense of rationality.
It is interesting that in this, probably one of the longest ongoing interaction I have had with you on this forum in years, you regard my posts as "blazingly aggressive". Perhaps it is just that you are used to dealing with people whose arguments are more easily dismissed or derided, and your projecting your frustrations onto me. Or maybe you're right - maybe I really am in throes of an uncontrollable moral fervor which makes me stark raving mad.
To other readers, I say: judge by my posts. Ask yourselves: are the points I am making really irrational and fanatical? Or is it just that I am questioning some deeply-held assumptions of the people who feel compelled to participate in this discussion? (Or, maybe it's both...)
"Does 'Nature' have any rights? Only what she asserts."
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"After all, though many may write and speak of 'animal rights', who considers 'animal responsibilities'? On the one hand, when cows show rational contributions to the political discourse, or simply show the capability of voting, I will consider bovine suffrage. May they do better by the vote than we humans have done." At least they're consistent principles.
By the same argument, you ought to extend the right not to be killed and eaten to cows when they show the capability of suffering in a similar way that humans suffer when they are killed and eaten.
If the aliens come and decide to eat us, the aliens come and decide to eat us. Humans, however, will not go down without asserting ourselves.
Suppose we can do nothing to stop these aliens from eating us. We can run away, or try to fight, or whatever, but they'll get us if they want us. Does that make their actions morally acceptable, then?
Cows assert themselves as best they can against being killed, just as we would assert ourselves as best we could against vicious aliens.
So, do you have a double standard here - that the aliens would be doing evil to eat humans, but humans do not evil eating cows? Or does might make right again? (Or is there some other basis which makes human-munching aliens as moral as cow-munching humans?)
Secondly, to characterize ranching as an enterprise "solely for our pleasure in killing them" is just a bit inflammatory, don't you think?
It would be - if I had ever made that claim.
There are many reasons one might own a ranch. Taking pleasure in the killing of animals is only one possibility.
So ... why [does a Walrus love her offspring]? I would, honestly, dearly love to see a PET scan and other imagery on a walrus brain experiencing love. I can't tell you how much that would affect my understanding of nature.
If you're really interested, I suggest you buy a copy of Richard Dawkin's
The Selfish Gene. I could give you the summary, but it would take us too far afield in this thread, I fear.
Why ought all animals also have those same basic rights [as a human being]? And what are those rights? Human rights include a number of standards the animal world renders difficult.
Non-human animals ought to have basic rights as a result of the Principle of Equal Consideration, mentioned above. My default position is "extend the same rights unless there are good reasons not to", whereas yours seems to be "extend no rights unless they are won by strength of arms in a
tooth-and-nail fight".
Clearly, there are many human activities in which animals have no interest, or which do not affect animals positively or negatively. The right to bungy-jump at will is probably not going to be of concern to many non-human animals. Similarly, there are many activities of animals which need not concern humans. But there are also shared interests and similar activities, which ought to attract similar rights, barring compelling mitigating circumstances.
People have reasons for eating anmals, you know. That you disagree with those reasons hardly makes them arbitrary.
Forget arbitrary. Ask whether the reasons are morally defensible. That's what the thread is about.
I might also point out how much you've invested in the ugliness of suffering in your argument.
I specifically refuted that claim in my previous post. My argument is a moral one, not one based on "ugliness". Why try to slip this back in as if I hadn't refuted it?
And, if I might offer some unsolicited commentary re: slavery, You don't eat your slaves.
What do you do with slaves? Keep them imprisoned in one location against their will. Control their associations with other human beings. Force them to work for you, possibly against their will. Punish them on a whim. Treat them as property, to dispose of as you see fit.
What do you do with cattle? Keep them imprisoned in one location against their will. Control their associations with other human beings. Force them to work for you, possibly against their will. Punish them on a whim. Treat them as property, to dispose of as you see fit. Oh... and eat them.