TEGMARK ... 9:14 mark: Waves have properties like wavelength, and frequency, and speed, and we can describe them really, really accurately with equations, even without knowing what kind of substance are waves in. So these waves take their life on their own above and beyond the substrate. [...] Computation is also rather substrate-independent...
[...] I think that consciousness is the way information feels when it's been processed in certain complex ways. So this means that it's substrate-independent, and this also means that is only the structure of the information processing that matters, not the structure of the matter that's doing the information processing. In other words, we have the laws of physics...
Minus an add-on of speculative theories, however, "information processing" is just matter being manipulated by procedure. "Information" is a practical concept whose values are mapped upon the "stuff" and its arrangement to denote a functional purpose for humans, as well as to keep track of it. Crudely similar to how one calls a ribbon of asphalt a highway (i.e. the latter is still ordinary matter -- its purpose of being a roadway for vehicles is external in origin, not intrinsic). Or akin to falsely attributing language symbols with meanings that are actually extrinsic (from us) rather than inherent in the symbols.
IOW, what Tegmark seems to be saying rests upon the ongoing issue of whether information is just a useful, abstraction we project upon matter states and configurations. Or... alternatively, whether there actually is some foundational level where matter arises from literal, primal units of physical information. (It from bit?)
If the latter, then -- to explain qualia or the overall manifestations of consciousness -- tacked onto those elemental information states is a dual-aspect manner of existing where they're conceived as having both a basic quantitative character and a basic qualitative character. From the former everything physics deals with incrementally arises. And from the latter the complex manifestations of the brain arise. But for which there is no accompanying phenomenological science available for dealing with their regulating principles and how they relationally combine to create different modes of experience.
One thing would be for sure: At that foundational level a precursor for experience would not remotely qualify for the psychological slash subjective classification it achieves at the stratum of the brain (it's manipulation by the processes up there). It would be ontological at that level rather than mental.
That's why advocates of panpsychism need to abandon the "psyche" combining form in the term and replace it with just about anything else, as it etymologically implies cognitive activity. Which is not present at the subatomic scale, the complexity isn't possible there, even if there was some non-biological evolutionary process and a competitive quantum environment to output such over millions of years.
The classic approach doesn't really narrow down to the idea of information being what's primary -- and having a dual character from which both matter and experience arises from. But it's a possibility, if there were information entities more fundamental than anything else. It's one of the options that can be plugged into neutral monism's placeholder:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/
Lee Smolin:
The problem of consciousness [feelings, manifestations] is an aspect of the question of what the world really is. We don't know what a rock really is, or an atom, or an electron. We can only observe how they interact with other things and thereby describe their relational properties. Perhaps everything has external and internal aspects. The external properties are those that science can capture and describe through interactions, in terms of relationships. The internal aspect is the intrinsic essence; it is the reality that is not expressible in the language of interactions and relations. Consciousness, whatever it is, is an aspect of the intrinsic essence of brains. --Time Reborn ... page 270
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