Here are somewhat lengthy definitions quoted from A Dictionary of Philosophy, (Anthony Flew) and are offered as “food for thought” --and for the benefit of any reader who might appreciate some clarification on how some modern thinkers understand and apply these terms.
Freewill and Determinism
“Two apparently opposed philosophical concepts: the former postulating that man is able to choose and act according to the dictates of his own will, the latter that all events including human actions, are predetermined. Perplexities arise for both the secularist and still more the theist. We cannot but assume in most everyday life that on many occasions we are free agents, able to do or to abstain from doing this or that at will. Yet it may also seem to be both a presupposition and an implication of the achievements of the sciences, and most importantly of the aspiring sciences of man, that there are in truth no such alternatives; and that everything, human conduct not excluded, really happens with absolute inevitability.
The philosophical problem is to discover what the presuppositions and implications of the two areas are, and whether they can or cannot be reconciled. Adherents of the one view are compatibilists, of the other incompatibilists. The special theist problem substitute the existence of God for the achievements of the sciences; if the doctrine of creation is true, then can this leave any room for human responsibility and choice? In the theistic context it is usual to speak of predestination, implying that everything, including particularly every choice, has been fixed in advance by divine decree.
The philosophical issues are indeed philosophical, and hence concerned with logical presuppositions and logical implications, logical compatibilities and logical incompatibilities. To often they are prejudicially misrepresented to take incompatibility answers for granted, leaving open only the factual and not philosophical questions of which of the two incompatibles is true. In particular the terms “freewill” and “determinism” are frequently so defined that one explicitly excludes the other. No philosophical dispute is settled, of course, by appeal to authority. Yet it is worthwhile, precisely and only in order to dissolve such prejudice, to notice that many--perhaps most--of those classical philosophers who published in this area were compatibilists: Hobbes, Leibniz, Locke, and Hume.
Ordinarily we contrast acting of our own freewill with acting under compulsion. But even the person who acts under compulsion is an agent, whereas the person who is simply picked up by main force and thrown as a missile victim is not. The crux here is what is essentially involved in action, not freewill in the everyday sense. Determinism too may be considered only in terms of physical causes necessitating their effects. But it is also possible to speak of conduct determined by the agent’s motives; and to say this is not so is clearly to imply that there was no alternative.
Modern problems in this area have centred round the claim that human actions are, or are capable of being (had we the knowledge), causally explained; that is they either (a)fall under (causal) physical laws, or (b) are physically determined (in the sense that the movements of inanimate objects are held to be physically determined). This might mean, of a given event c(falling under a law), that its effect e (a) could have been predicted, or (b) could not but have happened. When e is a human action, the tension is between describing it as voluntary--if this means ‘within our power to do or not to do, as we choose’ --and claiming that it could have been predicted, or (given circumstance c) e could not but have happened. But to deny that human actions fall into the realm of causality as ordinarily understood creates problems. In what sense then can we be said to cause our own actions (and hence be responsible for them, as the concept of freewill is said to imply) --rather than have them accidentally happen to us? Compatibilists believe that the concept of freewill must involve causality.
omnipotence, paradox of. The difficulty arising when, for example, it is claimed that God, having given man freedom, cannot prevent, and is therefore not responsible for, its misuse. Can God then create what he cannot thereafter control? Either answer seems inconsistent with God’s omnipotence, and hence an apparent need for some modification of our simple concept of omnipotence as capacity to do anything logically possible.
omniscience, paradoxes of. Problems arising over how God’s omniscience can be consistent with his timelessness or his granting freewill to Mankind, given that omniscience included fore-knowledge of future events (including human actions). It has been variously argued that foreknowledge cannot meaningfully be ascribed to the timeless, hence our concept of omniscience must be modified; that foreknowledge of actions is consistent with their freedom; or that even God cannot foreknow genuinely free actions, but has thus limited his own omniscience as a condition of granting human freedom.
~~~
And much of what is stated here is in line with what Cris and others have already pointed out on these threads. Their statements, arguments, or explanations are a good reflection of what these terms are generally understood to mean. As humans communicate with “language” (in this case written) it may be helpful for those who truly do wish to understand --or to be understood--to have a bit of reference. Helpful when trying to stick to the point, and helpful for any who wish to be taken seriously.
~~~
Counterbalance
), and fewer people believing in gods and such, people have shifted their explanation to encompass things like quantum theories just so their religions are not left behind in the dust. But, again, the word "god" is a type of spirit and only that. It does not refer to any single entity or force, no matter how people would like to twist the language. (Yes, I prefer older meanings to many words, I don't like modern twists.)
