Empirical Evidence of God

An elephant is an elephant. Do I have to explain the metaphor to you? The claim was that God is so obvious that you can't avoid seeing him. If he's that obvious, show us ANY obvious aspect.
As I said, wrong thread.
That "show" was in the other thread.
A lot of people there were whining in the same manner as you are now.
So Bowser started this thread, the "show-me-what-you-want-to-stop-you-whining thread".
So in that context, your contribution at the moment is "Gee, I dunno." (Spoken in a whiny voice, perhaps)
 
I haven't made any claims of "prove".
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You have just simply made claims, like the following, which are unproven .....

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I just said that the Universe is the same with or without God.
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As long as you are "just sayin' ..." without the expectation that your words reflect anything related to what has been previously floated in regards to evidence, meaning and/or truth, I guess that's fine.

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The drugs are needed to make up "God".
Drugs are kind of special in that they empower fabrication on a wide range of subjects.
 
If you imagine a Universe, where it is a fact that there is no God, how would it be any difference from the Universe that we experience?
 
In response to the opening post, here's something I wrote in a different thread (link).

I can only speak personally about this, because every atheist is different.

The first thing I'd say is that any acceptance of God on my part would be predicated on the same kind of reasoning as any other belief I accept. I am a trained scientist and critical thinker, so I realise that even the facts that seem most solid and immovable are, when it comes down to it, provisional. One must always be open to changing one's mind in the light of new evidence. In short, doubt is a healthy attitude to have about everything.

I believe that trees exist. I believe that because I see them, I can touch them, other people around me speak and write about them and agree with me that they perceive them in a similar way that I do, and so on and so forth. It is possible that trees do not actually exist. I could be a brain in a vat, so that every tree I have ever perceived is just a computer simulation fed directly into my brain. But, based on the evidence available to me, I accept provisionally that trees are real, understanding that it is possible (though in this case I think it extremely unlikely) that I will have to change my opinion in the future.

So, God. As I understand the concept, God is supposed to care personally about human beings, at least to the extent of interacting with them in various ways. God is supposed to know everything, and God can do anything. There is, of course, the deist conceptions of God as a Creator who basically creates a clockwork universe then does nothing after that. It makes no practical difference whether I accept the existence of that kind of God or not, so I don't really want to discuss evidences for that kind of God here, now. So let's think about this personal, interventionist God that the major religions talk about.

That kind of God could easily talk to me if he wanted to. he could appear in front of me in any convenient form and start up a conversation. Or he could speak directly into my mind. If such a God were to appear and to speak to me, I would be inclined to believe in him. Of course, it would be good to check that I wasn't hallucinating. Preferably, this God should also communicate to other people as well, so we can compare notes about what he had to say. If he appeared to a crowd of people instead of just to me individually, and we all agreed that his appearance was miraculous, then I'd be more likely to believe. I'd also be more likely to believe if God told me things that I couldn't (easily) know through other means. That is, God would need to say more than "I love you. I've got your back" and such platitudes. He could easily convey private or previously-unknown information that could not be obtained (easily, or at all) by other means.

I would also probably accept God if he were to appear and do an impressive miracle of some kind. For example, if he were to lift a mountain into the air and suspend it there, whole, in front of myself and other witnesses then I'd have little choice but to accept that, at the least, a being with incomprehensible power was present and active in the world. Similarly if he brought the long-dead back to life. Really, any reasonable miracle would go a long way to convincing me.

As a wise man once said, any sufficiently-advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic, so it is true that mountain-lifting or resurrection might be achieved by super-advanced aliens and it might not actually require supernatural omnipotence. But such aliens would be hard to distinguish from gods, anyway, so it couldn't hurt to accept, at least, that god-like powers were on display.

God could break the laws of physics if he wanted to. It wouldn't be hard for him to arrange some convenient demonstration for my benefit, I'm sure. That would be quite convincing evidence of his existence, as far as I'm concerned. (With the proviso about advanced alien technologies and yet-to-be-discovered physics, of course.)

Speaking personally, there is sufficient evidence to suggest to me that trees exist. I therefore believe in trees, wholeheartedly. I could be wrong. Maybe there are no trees after all, but the evidence I am aware of sure looks convincing to me.

Similarly, I can imagine all kinds of evidences that would be sufficient to convince me that God exists. Again, I could conceivably mistake certain evidences as evidence for God, when in fact they were evidence of advanced aliens, or whatever. But I can still imagine circumstances in which I would happily concede that I believe in God, because the evidence sure looks convincing to me.

Theists like Jan Ardena, of course, believe in God in the absence of any of the kinds of evidence I used as examples above. The kinds of things that present-day theists claim as evidence of God inevitably turn out, upon examination, to be equivocal and/or unconfirmed and/or purely subjective. So much so, in fact, that people like Jan are forced to concede that there is no good evidence for God at all.

This is why theists say that you just have to open yourself up to God, accept God regardless of evidence. Because the evidence doesn't stack up. Something needs to stand in place of evidence to justify the belief. That something is "faith".
This is obviously not the place to go in to detail, but there are examples within scripture of great personalties exhibiting "godlike" powers who were adverse to God. IOW what to speak of being God, there is no guarentee that displaying "superhuman" powers even makes one saintly.
 
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If you imagine a Universe, where it is a fact that there is no God, how would it be any difference from the Universe that we experience?
Well I guess the real detail here we would have to examine is what you are imagining God and/or the universe to be.

Given that detractors of God display an illustrated bias towards a souped up universe and a dumbed down God, the answer is obviously "nothing".

If we want to move in to the realm of "imagining facts" a lot of things will start to look really groovy.
 
Well I guess the real detail here we would have to examine is what you are imagining God and/or the universe to be.

Given that detractors of God display an illustrated bias towards a souped up universe and a dumbed down God, the answer is obviously "nothing".

If we want to move in to the realm of "imagining facts" a lot of things will start to look really groovy.
What if we just stick with (unimagined) facts?
 
JamesR said:
Theists like Jan Ardena, of course, believe in God in the absence of any of the kinds of evidence I used as examples above. The kinds of things that present-day theists claim as evidence of God inevitably turn out, upon examination, to be equivocal and/or unconfirmed and/or purely subjective. So much so, in fact, that people like Jan are forced to concede that there is no good evidence for God at all.

James why do you lie so much.
Having a discussion with a person that blatantly tells lies, is a pointless pursuit.
:rolleyes:


Jan.
 
If you imagine a Universe, where it is a fact that there is no God, how would it be any difference from the Universe that we experience?

What are you prepared to accept about God now, in order to take a guess?
For example, would we be humans?

Jan.
 
That's fair enough if believe God does not exist anyway.
If yes. What is the point of the question?

jan.
It was in response to the question about "what would it take for you to acknowledge that God exists" or whatever the question was.
 
So we have much to say on the subject of God, but I'm curious what would serve as empirical evidence for those who don't believe in God. What is it that you need to prove God's existence?

It's kind of instructive to think about what satisfactory evidence of God might be. Good thread topic.

'Empirical' can mean 'experience' in a broad sense, or 'sensory experience' in a narrower sense. I suppose that interpreting the word the first way would leave open the possibility of extra-sensory religious experiences of some mystical sort. I don't want to close the door on the possibility of these. The possibility might conceivably exist that some religious experiences are self-confirming (at least for the individual having the experience). The problem there is that the person who has the experience might sound a bit crazy to others.

But if we stick to sensory experience, I'm just like Baldeee (in post #24 as I recall). I can't think of anything that would convince me that I'd experienced something divine, a god, or even Jan's 'the God'.

I can imagine inexplicable events and I can imagine astounding light shows in the sky. I can imagine space-aliens as far beyond human cognition as humans are beyond dogs. So incomprehensibility and seeming omniscience and omnipotence couldn't be the criterion.

I call this the Independence Day Problem, from that 1990's alien invasion movie. The problem is that no matter how amazing the light-show, the powers responsible still might not be suitable objects of religious worship.

There seems to be an additional ingredient necessary in a proper god, something that the Christian tradition calls 'Holiness'. In order to be a suitable object of worship, something can't just be a super-space-alien. It has to be truly Holy.

So, how do human beings recognize that?? How do we recognize holiness? I don't think that it's anything that we see, hear, touch or smell. Our senses aren't how we detect it (assuming that we do, which is questionable). It's more of an emotional feeling, a reaction that we have to things.

So, does that suggest that our determination of divinity is purely subjective and there isn't any objective way to distinguish divinity at all? Is labeling something 'divine' or 'holy' as much about us and our feelings as it is about the 'something' receiving the title?

At this point, I'm inclined to say 'yes'. That places the 'divine' alongside the 'good' and the 'beautiful' with regard to perhaps being more subjective than objective.

People are asking for evidence, but I'm not certain what it is exactly that would satisfy their needs. ???

I don't think that they know either. Maybe they mean something like: 'If you want me to believe, then you will have to convince me!' Leaving open what the convincing might be and how it might occur. Whatever it is, they will know it when they experience it, assuming it convinces them.
 
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Is there any argument that can be made in support of the existence of God that cannot equally validly be made in support of the existence of the Cosmic Unicorn?

If I were to say "all the stuff I see around me was put there by the CU", is that sufficient for theists for accept it as objectively true for other people beyond myself?

If not, what's the difference?
 
Is there any argument that can be made in support of the existence of God that cannot equally validly be made in support of the existence of the Cosmic Unicorn?

If I were to say "all the stuff I see around me was put there by the CU", is that sufficient for theists for accept it as objectively true for other people beyond myself?

If not, what's the difference?
You mean aside from the fact you would be mirroring the exact same arguments by persons who make no reference to unicorns, cosmic or otherwise?

By the same token, I could do the exact same thing with science by replacing key terms with the names of Disney characters. I am not sure how doing so would signify anything greater than my powers of semantic mix n matching.
 
You mean aside from the fact you would be mirroring the exact same arguments by persons who make no reference to unicorns, cosmic or otherwise?
Right. My point is simply that, without appealing to extant evidence (that third parties can analyze for themselves to verify its validity), any claim is as valid as another. Or invalid.
The claim of God's existence is no more valid than the claim of the CU's existence - if one dispenses with the notion of independent validation of evidence.

By the same token, I could do the exact same thing with science by replacing key terms with the names of Disney characters. I am not sure how doing so would signify anything greater than my powers of semantic mix n matching.
Precisely my point. Arguing God without producing independently verifiable evidence is tantamount to semantic mix n matching - leaving God no more valid an assertion than the CU.
 
Right. My point is simply that, without appealing to extant evidence (that third parties can analyze for themselves to verify its validity), any claim is as valid as another. Or invalid.
The claim of God's existence is no more valid than the claim of the CU's existence - if one dispenses with the notion of independent validation of evidence.


Precisely my point. Arguing God without producing independently verifiable evidence is tantamount to semantic mix n matching - leaving God no more valid an assertion than the CU.
But you are appealing to extant evidence. You are simply swapping nouns for promoting ideas that are already present. Granted you are of the opinion that such a body of work, in its original form, doesn't constitute extant evidence, but you don't lend weight to your challenge any more than labelling energy, mass and the speed of light as Huey, Dewey and Louie changes anything specific in Einstein's work.
 
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