Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

[Sarkus]

I guess that's a long-winded way of saying it's a purely philosophical question.

 

[iceaura]

I think some people might think that, but I don't. I see the two operating as a single whole, and I don't think you can necessarily separate them into two things

But you always describe them bottom up. You do not, in fact, see the quark behavior as determined by the dreams. If you did, it would immediately become obvious to you that dreams have effects - they are causes. And if such things as dreams, ideas, information, produce decisions and influence the will and determine behavior, their degrees of freedom become relevant.

Bottom up determinism suggests a causal heirarchy,

Which is inherent in your simultaneous description of atoms as actual components of an initial state, and observations or decisions of the conscious mind as illusions.

No, not illusions (at least not as I have been using, and repeatedly explaining my use of, the term) as that term is reserved for where the feeling of operation (i.e. being "free") runs contrary to the actual operation

Exactly. The feeling of an observer being fooled by an illusion runs contrary to the actual operation you describe.

I didn't begin with "oh, let's choose a notion of 'free' that is supernatural" as you imply

I don't "imply" - I point directly to the exact place in your argument in which you employ that assumption in order to draw a conclusion your stated premises do not support. I quote it.

The conclusion appears to be that such a notion is not compatible with determinism.

The conclusion was that free will is not compatible with determinism. That such a notion and nothing else is free will was an assumption.

Yet we have the feeling that we are able to do otherwise. I certainly have that feeling. So how can the two be reconciled?

First step would be to drop the assumption of supernatural freedom. There is no way to reconcile that with actual, existing freedom of will in a physical universe.
Then, look around for some less empty conception of freedom of the will - I suggested an obvious and immediate possibility, which you have yet to acknowledge.

 

[Sarkus]

But you always describe them bottom up. You do not, in fact, see the quark behavior as determined by the dreams. If you did, it would immediately become obvious to you that dreams have effects - they are causes. And if such things as dreams, ideas, information, produce decisions and influence the will and determine behavior, their degrees of freedom become relevant.
...
Which is inherent in your simultaneous description of atoms as actual components of an initial state, and observations or decisions of the conscious mind as illusions.

Then maybe I do assume bottom-up. As said, I haven't particularly explored that aspect, and I do not find it particularly relevant to the question in hand, once one begins with determinism. It is the nature of determinism itself, not necessarily what is determined, that is relevant.

Exactly. The feeling of an observer being fooled by an illusion runs contrary to the actual operation you describe.

How so? With free will there is the notion of "free" as in "able to do otherwise" - per the feeling our free will is free, per the operations it would seem not. Where is the equivalent with feelings? The word "feeling" simply doesn't have any meaning at the level of operation, so is only applicable as defined. The word "free" has meaning that can be applied to any object or process.

I don't "imply" - I point directly to the exact place in your argument in which you employ that assumption in order to draw a conclusion your stated premises do not support. I quote it.

You haven't done anything of the sort, I'm afraid. You have pointed to where the conclusion can be drawn that free will, to be free, perhaps requires a supernatural notion of "free". You have then stated that it is an assumption. But alas you have yet to show that it actually is an assumption.

The conclusion was that free will is not compatible with determinism. That such a notion and nothing else is free will was an assumption.

To be clear, "free will" is compatible but only with the illusion of being free. Free will remains a process that we all experience, regardless of whether one is a compatabilist or incompatibilist. And as far as the argument from determinism goes, it does not start with the assumption that "free" is supernatural, but it is perhaps a conclusion. It starts with a fairly reasonable notion and simply draws the conclusion that it is not compatible with determinism. If you wish to jump to the conclusion and go "Oh, well obviously you are assuming that free will is supernatural in your definition" then one can make the same claim that we are assuming from the outset that Socrates is mortal.

First step would be to drop the assumption of supernatural freedom.

There is no such assumption that "free" is supernatural.

There is no way to reconcile that with actual, existing freedom of will in a physical universe.

The issue is whether the will is actually free or not, not whether it has freedom along the lines of "degrees of freedom". A random number between 1 and 100 has a degree of freedom, after all. An object floating in space has several of them. It is how those end states are reached that, to the determinist argument, decides if something is free.

Then, look around for some less empty conception of freedom of the will - I suggested an obvious and immediate possibility, which you have yet to acknowledge.

I don't need to acknowledge anything. You want free will to be considered more than just an illusion of being free. I get it. So ignore the determinist argument. Ignore the notion of "free" that it uses (along the lines of ability to do otherwise). It doesn't have appeal to you. Great. As I have said: different notions, different conclusions. But at the moment it seems that all you want to do is shut down one perspective, one conclusion, and insist upon the notion and conclusion as used by the other. There are a myriad of views on the matter out there, and room for them all.

 

[Write4U]

If we are nothing but somehow a part of a deterministic nature, then I fail to see how we could possibly (actually) know anything at all. And if we don't, then how do we know we're a part of nature to begin with, or that we can only comply with its deterministic nature. That's a logical contradiction.

Yes, you just created it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

If that's what you understand and you're happy with that, great. Noone is saying it's wrong. Others just start with different perspectives.
How is it inconsistent to think of being free as being able to do otherwise?
I can't initially see why determinism should preclude knowledge, but perhaps you can enlighten me?
I think you have mistaken me for someone who says my view is the only view one can legitimately have. I think you've also confused me with someone who hasn't been stressing how the view one takes on free will is merely a matter of perspective, neither view (compatibilist or incompatibilist) any less correct than the other once you take into consideration what is meant by the terms each side use in their arguments.
I've never said we do know. But thanks for the strawman. The argument is if the universe is deterministic (or probabilistic - and evidence suggests it is probabilistic). If you don't think it is either then great, you can ignore the argument from that point on. If you don't know whether it is deterministic or not and don't want to explore the case of if it is then don't. Move on.
If the universe is deterministic then it is inescapable, regardless of what you think. If the universe is probabilistic then that, too, is inescapable, regardless of what you think, regardless of what your prima facie evidence might suggest.
But if you think that we can't possibly know what the universe ultimately is, that's great. If you think that the argument from determinism is thus unsound then that's great. But if you don't think the universe is deterministic, either strictly or probabilistically, then what do you think it is? If you are agnostic on the matter, that's fine. The deterministic argument still explores the deterministic scenario. If you want to reject it as a possibility because you dislike the conclusion, that's your call.
How so? Care to cite an example?
Alas, you haven't actually explained anything, but rather just stated your position.
If you think you have actual knowledge that you can do what you want it is because the definitions of the terms you have used to express that allow that to be the case. If you start from different views of what those words mean, you can end up with different conclusions.

But I need to ask again: why do you bother posting responses to someone who has no issue with your view (and I really don't), and you clearly have no interest in the position they're exploring, in the notion of the terms they are using? There are surely easier ways to get your post-count up?

I think you have everything you would need in my post to answer your own questions here. If it ain't enough, too bad. I'm not going to repeat myself.
EB

 

[Sarkus]

I think you have everything you would need in my post to answer your own questions here. If it ain't enough, too bad. I'm not going to repeat myself.

I'm not asking to repeat yourself, just to answer the questions, provide the explanations, the examples, that support your claims, etc. But if you can't be bothered then fair enough, there's no point in repeating what you've already provided: when you don't offer anything to begin with, no matter how many times you repeat it you still won't be offering anything.

 

[iceaura]

and I do not find it {bottom up} particularly relevant to the question in hand, once one begins with determinism. It is the nature of determinism itself, not necessarily what is determined, that is relevant.

Drop the supernatural assumption, and it's relevance becomes immediately obvious. Substrates do not determine patterns.

How so? With free will there is the notion of "free" as in "able to do otherwise" - per the feeling our free will is free, per the operations it would seem not. Where is the equivalent with feelings? The word "feeling" simply doesn't have any meaning at the level of operation, so is only applicable as defined.

You used the word feelings. I went along. My response was to your post, quoted, in your terms. I used the term as you did, in an attempt to communicate.

You have pointed to where the conclusion can be drawn that free will, to be free, perhaps requires a supernatural notion of "free".

No. I pointed to where your conclusion - that free will conflicts with a physically determined system - requires the assumption that only the supernatural is free. Without that assumption, your conclusion does not follow.

To be clear, "free will" is compatible but only with the illusion of being free.

There is no illusion, unless one assumes supernatural free will only.

The issue is whether the will is actually free or not, not whether it has freedom along the lines of "degrees of freedom".

Beg to differ. The issue is whether freedom of will exists.

It starts with a fairly reasonable notion and simply draws the conclusion that it is not compatible with determinism.

Your "reasonable notion" is that free will exists if and only if the will can act supernaturally - in defiance of natural law, cause and effect, and other physical determination. That is an assumption. Drop it, and all the crap about "illusions" vanishes.

You want free will to be considered more than just an illusion of being free. I get it. So ignore the determinist argument.

Why would I ignore the determinist observation? I agree with it, and argue from it - for one thing, it gets rid of the idea of "illusion", by locating it in the assumption of supernatural freedom.

I don't need to acknowledge anything.

So you haven't, as noted.

But at the moment it seems that all you want to do is shut down one perspective, one conclusion,

Yep. The assumption that freedom resides in defiance of physical law, abrogation of cause and effect, etc, has to go.

and insist upon the notion and conclusion as used by the other.

Not at all. It's just a suggestion.

There are a myriad of views on the matter out there, and room for them all.

A couple of invalid and empty ones have had enough play. Time to move on.

 

[DaveC426913]

Substrates do not determine patterns.

Defend this.

A substrate of two-dimensional cells will not spontaneously give rise to a three-dimensional pattern.
A seabed of sand will not give rise to sandy skyscrapers.

 

[TheFrogger]

Hi.

The scientific methodology requires the identification and removal of individual variables to determine cause and effect. If you could identify a cause and effect of (a) variable(s) then perhaps you could address the question of determinism. ☺

 

[James R]

Moderator note:

Posts discussing the question of whether reality is mathematics or whether mathematics is reality are off-topic for this thread, so have been split to a separate thread, here:

http://www.sciforums.com/threads/reality-is-mathematics-mathematics-is-reality.161386/

 

[Quantum Quack]

Galaxy Child ~ ZPT 2006

1st case
If we assume for a moment that the philosophy of Determinism has physical merit, that is to say it has real and tangible implications on human choices and decisions I would like to present a case that will show demonstrably that determinism actually gives rise to self determination (aka freewill)
Life cycle of human beings

Upon conception a new human being, starts a journey, if allowed, to:

• Develop early stages of self determination, typically before that humans first birthday.
• Goes on to acquire greater self determination as the child matures into a teenager. Via education and physical skill acquisition. Typically rebelling against perceived societal oppression, that is delivered by parents and said society.
• Typically learns the art of compromise by the time the teenager matures into a young adult. This compromising allows the person to optimize his /her ability to self determine in a society that has other humans similarilly disposed to furthering their self determination.
• Competing with regards to money and possessions all devoted to optimize self determination.
  
• Maturing typically to an optimum self determination, around the mid to late years (40-55) when wealth and knowledge are typically at their peak.
• After which a decline in self determination is evident as aging impacts or other wise degrades physical mobility, mental dexterity and security of health in general.
• Ultimately becoming dependent, no longer self determining except by the use of a proxy established during the 40-55 year phase. ( palliative, assisted care etc)
  
• Deceased

At all time the proposition of determinism is supposedly determining all events witnessed in the the conception , growth and eventual demise of a human beings self determination.
It is easy therefore to conclude, if one assumes a deterministic perspective that self determination is indeed determined to be a significant part of the human life cycle.
For example:
The tantrums typically experienced and expressed by young children in shopping environment is an outcome of deterministic influences that motive a child to seek a greater self determination and is fundamental to that child becoming a self determined individual for later in life cycle.

Summary:
There is no doubt that self determining behavior is demonstrated by human beings and there is ample empirical evidence to suggest strongly that if determinism was to be considered as valid then the self determinism demonstrated is generated by those deterministic factors.
====
2nd case:
The thread title has asked the question; Does physics disprove the existence of freewill?
The answer is obviously no. In fact physics or dare I say our understanding of the universe, regardless of how flawed or limited as it may be, does not in any way inhibit or disprove the existence of free-will ( aka self determination) in fact the so called "physics" as we know them are essential to not only human self determination it, by default of self evident and significant empirical evidence, encourages and facilitates self determination.

So short answer IMO is NO

Quite the opposite of disprove is true ( due to self evident and empirical evidence of the current and historical nature of human behavior.)
Because if "Physics" did indeed disprove the existence of self determination in humans then the existing self evident data and observation (re: life cycles and human impact on this world) would be non-existent.
Self determination is evident and Physics, whether we understand them or not, MUST eventually be able to prove the existence of what is self evident. We just simply do not know how at this stage.
Determinism as it stands is nothing more than a philosophical hypothetical at best or simply pseudo science seeking mainstream legitimacy at worst.

Determinism is not Physics IMO

 

[James R]

Sarkus:

It's been a while since I've read or posted to this thread, but essentially your argument remains the same as before. Please excuse me if I chop it up a bit to select out important points to which I want to respond.

]No, first you have to decide what it means for anything to be labelled "free". If you then wish to apply different criteria to the will, that would be the second step.

Right. Recall that I talked about ideas such as "degrees of freedom", for example. You, or somebody else, mentioned a train at one point in the discussion. Assume a train is on a single track. In the language of physics, it has one degree of freedom - it can move forwards or backwards along the track, and that's it. We can specify the state of the train on the track using a single variable whose value varies with time. Of course, if we wanted to describe the internal configuration of the train, and not just its motion along the track, we would necessarily have to introduce extra degrees of freedom. A human being making conscious, willed, choices, obviously would require a large number of variables to specify his or her state in the relevant way. The only level at which "free will" could possibly operate is the level at which conscious, willed, choices are being made, so we have established that many "degrees of freedom" are necessary, at least, for "free will".

Similarly, physicists often talk about a "free particle", by which they usually mean a particle acted on by no forces. The word "free" in this sense is not about "degrees of freedom" in the above sense. Rather, it refers to the absence of certain constraints, in this case constraints imposed on the object's possible motions by external forces. In practice, true "freedom" in this sense is impossible, since all particles are constrained by forces, or to put it in more general terms, by the immutable laws of physics. They are never "free" to transcend physical law.

Human beings making conscious, willed, choices, are no more "free" from the constraints of physical laws than are subatomic particles. There is no dispute on this point in this thread. Therefore, if I, or iceaura, or Yazata, or CC, or others, claim that free will exists, we cannot possibly be using the term "free" to mean free from the constraints of physical laws. We all recognise that human beings, including their wills, are constrained by physical laws.

You, on the other hand, insist on using the term "free" only to mean freedom from physical laws. Here's you referring to Baldeee's formulation, with which you agree:

The premisses provided by Baldeee were words to the effect that a deterministic interaction is not free, that a system built from such interactions is also deterministic, and that the will is such a system (built from deterministic interactions).
The conclusion is that the will is thus not free.

Note premise one: "A deterministic interaction is not free". That's not the conclusion. The conclusion is "the will is not free". The starting point that leads to the conclusion is that no deterministic process is free, in the sense in which you insist the word "free" must be used.

Since physical systems are all "deterministic" in the sense of being constrained by physical law, as we all agree, you therefore import from the start the notion that only supernatural interactions can be "free" in the sense you demand for "free" will. The only possible way around this, in your formulation, would be to point to some non-supernatural system that is non-deterministic (not constrained by physical law), and there appear to be no possible candidates for such a system.

It's no surprise that when you decided from the start that determinism rules out "free" will, you end up drawing the conclusion, after a number of irrelevant intermediate steps, that free will does not exist.

I assert that free will exists. Given the above, it must therefore be that I use the term "free" to mean something other than freedom from the constraints of physical law. There's no mystery about this, of course. I've already told you what I mean by "free" in the context of "free will", and so have a bunch of other people in a similar way.

I mean this:

By "will" I mean the capacity to make conscious choices and decisions, intentionally. By "free" I mean that those choices, decisions and intentions are unconstrained by any factors that would make them the choices, decisions or intentions of someone or something other than myself. This idea can be summed up as I did before, regarding any particular choice I might make: "I could have done something other than what I did if I had chosen to do that."

If you have no idea what "actual" free will might look like, how can you possibly decide that it doesn't already exist?

I don't need to know what an actual square-circle looks like, do I?

This is just further confirmation that you are begging the question. You start by assuming that there's no such thing as free will - you define the concept in such a way that it can't possibly exist, just like a square circle. Then, a bit of irrelevant waffle and - lo and behold - you conclude that free will doesn't exist!

And all the time, you miss the point by working with a definition of "free will" that in no way accords with the common understanding of what that term means, or what it feels like to exercise one's "free will".

You even go so far as to make this claim:

How would you tell the difference between not being able to make free choices and being able to make them?

From the determinist PoV I have never experienced the ability to make a free choice, and I never will. I can thus not tell what the difference might be.

You seriously expect us to believe that you've never had the experience of making a free choice? You've never pondered a thought similar to "will I have the wheaties for breakfast, or will I skip the wheaties and just have a coffee instead?" You've never followed through so far as to make the conscious, deliberate decision to have the wheaties after all? You've never thought, after drinking a bit too much, that maybe you should have (could have) made a different choice to the one you chose?

It beggars belief.

From the compatabilist PoV I have only ever made free choice, and only ever will, thus again can not tell what the difference might be.
Yes, I can tell the difference where the options are limited or many, but still free/not-free (depending on PoV).
So it is somewhat of a meaningless question.

It's the crux of the question, that I put to you previously: what does it mean for a choice to be "free". If you insist that "free" can only mean "supernatural" from the start, then you're barely starting to grapple with the relevant issues.

Why is it important whether we have free will, by the way? One of the the most important reasons to ask this question would appear to be that people should not be held responsible for actions they took under an "illusory" belief that they had a choice. If they had no choice in what they did, how can they possibly be held morally responsible for their actions? They were merely helpless puppets with something or somebody else pulling the strings. You can't blame them for that. It's a bit like an insanity plea: "Sorry, you Honour. I had no real choice. My brain made me do it!"

Once again, you can't refute a conclusion using one notion of "free" by using a different notion. You simply end up with different conclusions based on different views. One does not negate the other.

The problem is that the assumption that free will requires supernaturalism is that it doesn't take us anywhere towards addressing the really important problems of free will (such as the moral problem I just talked about).

If I ask you whether people should be held morally (or criminally) responsible for their crimes, what is your answer? If your answer is "they should", on what basis do you hold them morally responsible?

 

[James R]

One more example to take things away from the abstract:

Consider actually being confined to a prison cell. In such circumstances, the prisoner is not "free" to leave, according to the straightforward way that the word "free" is used in common language. The prisoner is physically constrained from leaving by external entities (the guards, the courts, the penal system as a whole, society, etc. etc.) But not only that, the prisoner has no free will to leave, either. He can form the intention to leave, or decide to leave, or choose to leave, at any time, but the result of those conscious activities will not be his leaving (in the short term). Not only is he physically constrained, but his will is also constrained, in that he is unable to apply his will to effect his desired outcome.

Suppose the prisoner says to himself "That's it! I've had enough. I'm going to leave this cell right now!" It matters not. The choice to leave is not open to him at this time. His will is constrained, not free to do as it chooses.

Suppose, on the other hand, the prisoner says to himself "Well, I'm going to put up with this until they let me out." That's no more an exercise of free will than deciding to leave, under these circumstances. The prisoner had no real choice. The decision that he should stay in the cell (for now) was made elsewhere. Moreover, he could not have done other than he did (i.e. stay and wait it out) even if he had chosen other than what he chose.

 

[Sarkus]

Human beings making conscious, willed, choices, are no more "free" from the constraints of physical laws than are subatomic particles. There is no dispute on this point in this thread. Therefore, if I, or iceaura, or Yazata, or CC, or others, claim that free will exists, we cannot possibly be using the term "free" to mean free from the constraints of physical laws. We all recognise that human beings, including their wills, are constrained by physical laws.

I have no doubt.

You, on the other hand, insist on using the term "free" only to mean freedom from physical laws. Here's you referring to Baldeee's formulation, with which you agree:

I, and I presume neither Baldeee as well, is using the term "only to mean freedom from physical laws". That is a possible conclusion, however, from the nature of "free" that I am using: able to do otherwise. If you conclude that "able to do otherwise", or "do other than it must", equates to "freedom from physical laws" then that is your conclusion.
And as said in many posts that I am presuming you haven't read: different notions reach different conclusions.
Personally I think "able to do otherwise" is a reasonable understanding of what it means for something to be free.

Note premise one: "A deterministic interaction is not free". That's not the conclusion. The conclusion is "the will is not free". The starting point that leads to the conclusion is that no deterministic process is free, in the sense in which you insist the word "free" must be used.

Since physical systems are all "deterministic" in the sense of being constrained by physical law, as we all agree, you therefore import from the start the notion that only supernatural interactions can be "free" in the sense you demand for "free" will.

This is your error, JamesR. I make no such assertion, or assumption, that physical systems are all deterministic. No such assumption or premise was included by Baldeee in his initial formulation, so I see no reason to bring it in. This is the assumption you seem to be including to reach the conclusion that the notion of "free" being is supernatural. Drop the notion that determinism equates to "constrained by physical law". It wasn't there to start with. A deterministic interaction is one where a given set of inputs always lead to the same output. That's it.

The only possible way around this, in your formulation, would be to point to some non-supernatural system that is non-deterministic (not constrained by physical law), and there appear to be no possible candidates for such a system.

No, the way around it is to simply to not add in the assumption that determinism equates to physical law. If you wish to equate the two then that is you adding in your own initial assumption.

It's no surprise that when you decided from the start that determinism rules out "free" will, you end up drawing the conclusion, after a number of irrelevant intermediate steps, that free will does not exist.

Again, your error in starting from different assumptions than I have.

I assert that free will exists. Given the above, it must therefore be that I use the term "free" to mean something other than freedom from the constraints of physical law.

How about "able to do otherwise"? It is, after all, the notion that I, and I believe Baldeee, have been alluding to from the get-go.

There's no mystery about this, of course. I've already told you what I mean by "free" in the context of "free will", and so have a bunch of other people in a similar way.

I mean this:

By "will" I mean the capacity to make conscious choices and decisions, intentionally. By "free" I mean that those choices, decisions and intentions are unconstrained by any factors that would make them the choices, decisions or intentions of someone or something other than myself. This idea can be summed up as I did before, regarding any particular choice I might make: "I could have done something other than what I did if I had chosen to do that."

Sure. I have no issue with that. As said, in many posts that you have clearly not read: different notions, different conclusions. The argument from determinism looks at whether one is truly able to do otherwise, not merely think or feel that they are able to. That's the angle. If you want to use a different notion of "free" - go for it. Noone is stopping you.
Although you are rather begging the question of what it means to choose, and you're never actually answering the question of whether the "choice" is one where you could actually do other than you choose. Other than that, you're all set to go.

This is just further confirmation that you are begging the question.

How is it confirmation, JamesR? You think that it is begging the question when you conclude that Socrates is mortal? Had I given the example of not needing to know what an immortal man looks like to know it doesn't exist, would that have been clearer for you?

You start by assuming that there's no such thing as free will - you define the concept in such a way that it can't possibly exist, just like a square circle.

I do no such thing. The argument takes what I see to be a reasonable understanding of "free" and runs with it from a determinist pov. There is no definition that says "oh, I'll define it so as not to exist, then I can show that it doesn't exist!". You have added an assumption, and from that you are reaching many different conclusions about the argument than are actually there.

Then, a bit of irrelevant waffle and - lo and behold - you conclude that free will doesn't exist!

Your patronising does you no favours, JamesR.

And all the time, you miss the point by working with a definition of "free will" that in no way accords with the common understanding of what that term means, or what it feels like to exercise one's "free will".

Shoot me for looking at things from a philosophical point of view. Again, not to beat you around the head with not having read the many posts since you were last here, or for that matter from before you merged threads, but I have repeatedly said that I am quite happy with the compatibilist notion of free will. It is the one we use day to day. But this is where we get to talk philosophical notions, JamesR. This shouldn't be where we get railroaded and hounded into holding certain views just to appease the masses. This is where we get to... you know... discuss things. And some of those things are the incompatibilist view of free will, the notion that free means "able to do otherwise", and the argument from determinism.

 

[Sarkus]

Response to JamesR... pt2

You even go so far as to make this claim:
...
You seriously expect us to believe that you've never had the experience of making a free choice? You've never pondered a thought similar to "will I have the wheaties for breakfast, or will I skip the wheaties and just have a coffee instead?" You've never followed through so far as to make the conscious, deliberate decision to have the wheaties after all? You've never thought, after drinking a bit too much, that maybe you should have (could have) made a different choice to the one you chose?



It beggars belief.

Your personal incredulity aside, you need to actually read what was written.

"From the determinist PoV..." i.e. from the perspective of making a choice that is "free" according to the argument from determinism... the argument that you said has effectively defined free will as being supernatural.

So I ask you, in all sincerity JamesR, when did you last experience a choice that was "free" in the sense of the word that it defies physical laws (since that is the meaning you have ascribed it from the determinist PoV)?

Or are you going to admit that you have simply knee-jerked a reactive comment? That actually you never have experienced such, either? And that what I thus said is, from the determinist PoV, quite accurate.

The only thing that beggars belief, JamesR, is your miscomprehension.

It's the crux of the question, that I put to you previously: what does it mean for a choice to be "free". If you insist that "free" can only mean "supernatural" from the start, then you're barely starting to grapple with the relevant issues.

I do not insist that "free" can only mean "supernatural". I insist that I am looking at the notion of being able to do otherwise. Yes, there is the sense of degrees of freedom, and in that way we are all free, like an object floating in space, and there is also the sense of actually being able to do otherwise at that moment. Could we, when we make a choice, at that precise moment the choice is made, could we have actually chosen otherwise. That is the crux, JamesR.

And your continued patronising is starting to wear thin.

Why is it important whether we have free will, by the way? One of the the most important reasons to ask this question would appear to be that people should not be held responsible for actions they took under an "illusory" belief that they had a choice. If they had no choice in what they did, how can they possibly be held morally responsible for their actions? They were merely helpless puppets with something or somebody else pulling the strings. You can't blame them for that. It's a bit like an insanity plea: "Sorry, you Honour. I had no real choice. My brain made me do it!"

We can blame them for that. And we do. Just as they might argue they have no real choice for their actions, so others have no real choice but to punish them. It is (usually) enough that they (all parties) think they have choice.

But questions of moral responsibility are simply an appeal to consequence, not to truth, of whether or not we have a genuine ability to do otherwise. Sure, we can define away the matter so that our language implies moral responsibility, and that is, to an extent, what we have done. But fortunately we are able to explore further than those mere implications.

The problem is that the assumption that free will requires supernaturalism is that it doesn't take us anywhere towards addressing the really important problems of free will (such as the moral problem I just talked about).



If I ask you whether people should be held morally (or criminally) responsible for their crimes, what is your answer? If your answer is "they should", on what basis do you hold them morally responsible?

Feel free to raise the question in another thread.

 

[iceaura]

I, and I presume neither Baldeee as well, is using the term "only to mean freedom from physical laws". That is a possible conclusion, however, from the nature of "free" that I am using: able to do otherwise

It's an assumption you make when concluding that a person is unable to do otherwise in a deterministic system, and therefore without free will.
You regard the observation that a person is in fact able to do otherwise as an "illusion", because such an ability would - by your assumption - require the abrogation of physical law, cause and effect, physical determinants of their behavior.

How about "able to do otherwise"? It is, after all, the notion that I, and I believe Baldeee, have been alluding to from the get-go.

And aside from alluding to it, refusing to consider it - especially the implications of the bottom up determinism behind the whole scene.
Hence the muddle of "illusion" and whatnot.

The argument takes what I see to be a reasonable understanding of "free" and runs with it from a determinist pov.

It's not a reasonable understanding of "free". It's a self-conflicted confusion based on assuming only the supernatural has freedom.
And you are refusing to acknowledge the implications of your bottom up determinist pov - such as the inconsistency of taking the observer to be real while the observations are illusions.

 

[Quantum Quack]

A deterministic interaction is one where a given set of inputs always lead to the same output. That's it.

and if a given set of inputs always leads to self determination ( aka freewill) what then?

 

[Write4U]

If I ask you whether people should be held morally (or criminally) responsible for their crimes, what is your answer? If your answer is "they should", on what basis do you hold them morally responsible?

Prevailing law is instrumental in the brain's decision making process. A socially moral person does not mentally feel the need to break the law, knowing the possible consequences. A socially criminal person does not care about the law, in spite of running the risk of arrest and involuntary incarceration for apparently more urgent personal motives which compel him to break the law.

Prison surely takes away free will, but so does the threat of prison influence decision making. Real or perceived, self-interest always overrides any other consideration and ultimately is the determining causality, even if there are other choices available, IMO.

It's a fundamental cosmic law of "movement in the direction of greatest satisfaction" in all universal functions, but especially in sentient beings.

Am I way out with this perspective?

 

[Quantum Quack]

Prevailing law is instrumental in the brain's decision making process. A socially moral person does not mentally feel the need to break the law, knowing the possible consequences. A socially criminal person does not care about the law, in spite of running the risk of arrest and involuntary incarceration for apparently more urgent personal motives which compel him to break the law.

Prison surely takes away free will, but so does the threat of prison influence decision making. Real or perceived, self-interest always overrides any other consideration and ultimately is the determining causality, even if there are other choices available, IMO.

Am I way out with this perspective?

reminded to mention a creed;
"Everything is allowed, everything is permitted"
I refers to the reality of what a legal and moral code indoctrinated upon a society actually is.
"A collectively agreed set of rules and regulations"
If you want to discuss blind "sheep" then by all means do so, but the reality affords a choice; participate as an informed member of a collective, voluntarily or not.

 

[Quantum Quack]

Prison surely takes away free will,

Prison does not take away freewill, it inhibits the exercising of the freewill that you have.
You could be hog tied to a post and even then you still have freewill but are severely restricted in exercising it.