Write4U
Valued Senior Member
Why not?
I can conceive of the universe as a metaphysical set of dimensional patterns. I'm sure you can too.
From Webster;
Like the Platonic solids.
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Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?
- Thread starter M.I.D
- Start date
I can conceive of the universe as a metaphysical set of dimensional patterns. I'm sure you can too.
From Webster;
DaveC426913
Valued Senior Member
i.e. the universe is your set. There is only one.
It contains things that have self-similarity (patterns).
I grow weary of calling you out, and wasting pages on it, every time you try to weasel around with words.
Speakpigeon
Valued Senior Member
Using any label doesn't make it true. You just said "I know". Well, just using this label doesn't make it true... you know?
And so on.
So, you're argument, if it was one, is going nowhere.
You would need instead to explain how the way people use the word "free" is contradicted by facts. For example, given the meaning of the expression "square circle", the fact that nobody see anything that looks like it's both a square and a circle, suggests there's no such a thing as a square circle (beside the fact that it's apparently an illogical concept).
So, now, you're turn. Using the meaning of the word "free", as most people use it, can you point to facts that show conclusively that no one is free to do what they want?
EB
Speakpigeon
Valued Senior Member
They disagree with me but I will insist to the last that they should be free to disagree with me.
Not quite what Voltaire said, though.
EB
Speakpigeon
Valued Senior Member
If ever we get to build machines that can do the same things as humans do, most people will see them as being free provided these machines are not coerced, i.e. provided they are free to do what they want in the same way that we do.
We definitely see animals as having a degree of freedom and this degree will mostly be in line with their position in the evolutionary tree. Freedom is in effect understood in the physical sense, just as you would talk of the degree of freedom of a mechanical piece. Freedom is a physical property.
Most people use the notion of free will pretty much in the same way. You should pay attention to this very telling fact. People disagree about God. They don't disagree about free will. This can only be because they make the same observation. There is a capability they all have and they call it "free will". There's a reason that most people call oranges "oranges". And it's not because of some metaphysical quality that would be suggested by the word "orange" that they would see in oranges. Rather, it's because there's something physical we can observe and all agree exists, namely oranges, and usage ended up with the word "orange". Same for free will. You are arguing against some metaphysical interpretation of free will. Just calm down and look at the facts on the ground. Everybody will call "free will" a capability they feel they have. Asking whether free will is really free is like asking whether red is really red. Well, we now know there ain't anything really red out there in the physical world, only electromagnetic waves, if that. Does that make any substantial difference to the fact that humans experience these electromagnetic waves as red? There isn't anything in the physical world that's really like we imagine it is. Big deal.
We call "red" whatever it is in the physical world that makes us experience redness. We call "free will" whatever it is in reality that makes us experience free will. As I understand it, this capability is the degree of freedom of the individual human being, degree of freedom understood in the physical sense.
Tell me, are you also questioning the reality of people experiencing pain whenever they happen to be tortured?!
Feel free to disagree.
Feel free to try torture on yourself to see if you're correct.
EB
I guess I have just got to cease being concerned about how many years you have spent arguing your point about the freewill of humans with out going any where. I recall many years ago (13?) having virtually this same discussion with you and while I may have progressed in my thoughts you seem stuck in the same circle that you were back then.
As then and now you still refuse to concede that when discussing free will you are discussing humans, you are discussing the "who", yet you maintain you wish to discuss cause and effect as determining factors with out acknowledging that humans, while being effected are also demonstrably self caused thus self determined.
So I guess I shall cease attempting to suggest ways you can get out of the circular trap you seem to be obsessed with.
Meanwhile there are others on the board who may wish to discuss HUMAN free will and do so in a way that affords progress.
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just thought...
So once you see the conclusion (that it is not free) which goes against what you want the conclusion to be (that it is free), you alter what it means to be free so that we can conclude that it is indeed free.
Understood.
And deterministic was defined for purposes of that argument, along the lines of only being able to do what it must.
To me that means not free.
Do you think that something that is strictly deterministic, that can only do as it must, as it is obligated, has no capability of doing anything else, can be considered free?
I deny making the assumption that to be free something must go against physics, must be supernatural, as you have repeatedly claimed me to do.
The premise that a deterministic interaction is one that can only do what it must is consistent with one that is not free.
If you wish to argue that a deterministic interaction is free then do so.
If you wish to argue that a system built from such interactions is not itself deterministic do so.
If you wish to argue that the will is somehow not such a system, do so.
If you see as free something that can only do what it must do, then please argue that.
That would at least be honest, rather than continually asserting that I'm including an assumption that I'm clearly not.
I don't assume that physics is only deterministic (as far as I know it isn't) or even only probabilistic, or even a combination of the two.
You are seeing assumptions that simply aren't there.
No "tracking" needed.
No locating of anything needed.
Simple valid logic is all that is required.
But, again, I get that you don't want to conclude that for something to do as it must is somehow not free.
Only once you alter what it means to be free so that you can start to conclude that such a system is "free".
That starts from the a priori assumption that the will is free, and thus requires a notion of "free" that allows it to be so.
Not start there, and what you see as being involved really aren't from the perspective of the argument from determinism.
I get that.
It is what compatabilists rely on.
That is not in dispute.
This argument, however, takes a notion of free - that for something to do as it must it is not considered free - and runs with it.
And under this argument the will is not free.
It seems to be, but it isn't, and thus free will is considered an illusion.
Once again you show that you aren't comprehending what it means for something to be an illusion.
Something is an illusion if it operates contrary to the way it is perceived.
Knowledge doesn't do that.
A system that is claimed to be free yet operates in a non-free manner, however, does.
That first bit you've replied to was actually something I said, but no matter, i'll let you run with it.
I guess it is if you're not willing to show how the will actually is free, using the term as the determinist is using it. Or do you accept the determinist argument that the will is not free? That for the will to be "free" we must use a different notion of what the term means?
It's a bug-bear of mine, but please can you use the correct "you're" v "your"? Thanks.
As for what you say here, I have no issue, have never had an issue, with the compatabilist argument using different notions of the terms. If you had bothered to read the thread in its entirety, before it was merged with the one from the physics sub-forum, you would have seen that I was advocating for a working definition of terms so as to avoid this very situation. But it is what it is, and I have continued since the merger of the threads to argue from the determinist PoV, because people have been questioning it. As such I am using, have used, and will use, the meaning of the terms as used within those arguments in those responses.
So, no, I don't really give a rat's ass what most people mean by the term, as the term has effectively been defined within the argument, i.e. if something can only do what it must then it is not free. This is not an unreasonable understanding of the term, and if you asked most people if they would consider something so restrained as being free I would wager that most would say no. So if you are not able to counter the argument from determinism using that notion, then don't bother responding. If you are then still not able to accept that what we then call "free will" is not actually free, using that notion of what it means to be free, then again don't bother responding to it as you'll have nothing to add other than your personal incredulity. If you wish to counter the validity of the logic, or the soundness of the premises, then by all means we can discuss it.
Otherwise you're just spouting oranges when others are talking apples.
Apples and oranges.
Come back when and if you want to discuss apples.
Stop the patronising. You should pay attention to this being the philosophy forum, that people are allowed and able to argue various positions. The issue is whether what we sense as free is actually free. Not how most people use the term, not the practical implications, not arguments from consensus, appeals to consequence, personal incredulity etc. Is that really how you intend to build an argument?
Philsohers have disagreed about free will for quite a while. If you wish to simply reject all such disagreements out of hand then I look forward to your papers being published and your inevitable plaudits.
From a practical point of view you are correct. The question at hand is whether this capability is "free".
Same for the sense of free will, yes. The question is whether this sense of free will is actually free or not, or just an illusion of being free.
Again with the patronising.
If you feel the premises presented in the argument are unsound, and don't follow fact, then please state that, and please provide correction, with accompanying evidence if you can. That would be a start. Appealing to consensus? Not so much.
Indeed.
Nice strawman. Thanks.
No one has said that it makes any practical difference at all, or to the way it is experienced. There may be some who act differently with an understanding that they are not truly free, but the majority who understands it do not, outside of philosophical discussions, that is.
Agreed. Now it's just a matter of whether this free will is actually free.
That's your understanding. No problem with that at all. It is not the understanding in the deterministic argument. As said: apples and oranges.
Why should I? Does pain claim to be something it is not? Does it allude to one thing and yet operate as another? The questioning of free will lies in the "free"... the allusion to being "free" and the argument that suggests it is not. The discussion lies on the philosophy of that.
But hey, if you're happy to admit that free will is really just the feeling of our choice being free, then we can agree to disagree as to what that "free" means, or at least, perhaps, agree that the opposing views use different notions of the term. That would at least be an improvement from your patronising and condescending efforts thus far.
I can only do what I end up doing.
It's kind of funny you know after all the research into determinism theory, not once has there been a definition of "free" given as per said theory.
In philosophy "free will" is defined as follows ( by most if not all sources)
According to determinism precognition would actually be possible...
Example: SCIFI movie Minority Report staring Tom Cruise.
So what does a determinist define free as?
and how does it relate to the philosophical definition?
to act voluntarily......hmmmm
If I am self-determined to act voluntarily then do I have freewill?
I would think the answer is yes
In philosophy "free will" is defined as follows ( by most if not all sources)
The ability to choose, think, and act voluntarily. For many philosophers, to believe in free will is to believe that human beings can be the authors of their own actions and to reject the idea that human actions are determined by external conditions or fate. (See determinism, fatalism, and predestination.)
Notice the reference to fatalism and predestination...According to determinism precognition would actually be possible...
Example: SCIFI movie Minority Report staring Tom Cruise.
So what does a determinist define free as?
and how does it relate to the philosophical definition?
to act voluntarily......hmmmm
If I am self-determined to act voluntarily then do I have freewill?
I would think the answer is yes
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Don't fool yourself, QQ. You didn't comprehend it then, you don't comprehend it now. If you honestly think you have progressed then I am pleased for you, but then even those who are lost can claim they are still moving forward.
When you can successfully argue for its relevance, maybe you'll have something to offer. But for now you're simply in your own little whirlpool, thinking you having something of importance to say, when you really don't.
There is no circular trap. It is a perspective. It is a philosophical position one can take. It is neither right nor wrong but simply a viewpoint. It has worth even if it is not practical to think in the terms it does. And to be dismissed so casually by you says more about you than it does the argument itself. And not in a good way.
Then discuss that. Don't keep trying to rebut what you clearly don't understand. In this thread, before JamesR merged threads, you will recall I was trying to get people to be clear from the outset about the notion of free will (and thus the notion of free in that context) that they wanted to focus on here. And let's be clear about this: you and MR, among others, wouldn't let that happen, and instead effectively sought me out to attack the determinist view and have me defend it. (JamesR compounded the issue by merging this thread with another where I was already defending it, but it is what it is.) But you, QQ, seem incapable of attacking the position you sought to attack; you lack sufficient comprehension of it to do so.
So yes, concentrate on the Compatabilist view. I am/was happy to do the same, until you decided to focus on the incompatabilist view for whatever reason.
Please can you define it in a way that doesn't beg the question?
What do you think "voluntarily" means, for example?
The first definition for it I googled offers: "of one's own free will".
So are you offering a definition of free will as follows: "able to act of ones own free will"?
I would hope not.
Further, your entire point here is fallacious.
While I used "do other than one must" the more standard phraseology is "has freedom to do otherwise" and there is copious amounts of debate around this very notion.
Maybe as a start you should go here.
Speakpigeon
Valued Senior Member
Sorry, but it's my own bug-bear that people should keep making inapt comments. It was obviously a simple typo, not any improper use of a word as suggested by your comment.
If you don't understand this, you may just as well stop reading the rest.
Free
a. Not imprisoned or confined: walked out of prison a free man; set the birds free.
b. Not controlled by obligation or the will of another: felt free to go.
That's what the term "free" means to most people when they think about whether they are free to do what they want.
Determinists have their own definition of "free"?!
Would it make sense for an atheist to use his own definition of God to discuss its existence? There's no atheist's definition of God. It just wouldn't make sense.
There's also no dictionary definition of "free" I could find that would be specifically used in the context of determinism.
So, as far as I can tell, you're just making up your own definition.
I could make up my own definition of the word "determism" as referring to the metaphysical view that everything is determined by fate and go on a rampage arguing that determinism is an obscurantist doctrine. I won't do that because it would be absurd.
I'm responding to your post, not to the entire thread. If you can't debate on this basis, you're welcome to ignore my posts.
Science is not an ontology. It doesn't claim there are things that exist. Science is agnostic as to the putative existence of things like trees and people and atoms. All science is interested in are past observations of phenomena and a theory to predict future observations of same. And outside of science, all you have is your own experience and that reported by other people. So, there's no scientific concept of things only doing what they "must" do. So, I don't think there's any rational concept of "things", not even observers, that would only do what they must do.
So, sorry, I can only discuss free will as people understand the term according to dictionary definitions.
Anything else would be a waste of time.
I'm talking about free will as most people understand the idea. You're talking from the pulpit.
EB
AH I think I worked out one of the logic traps involved with this discussion of determinism.
It can be portrayed via a question:
If the human will is determined to be free can it be considered as free?
Determination and free are not in opposition to each other yet the discussion provided so far is premised on the notion that anything determined can not be free. Even if free is what is being determined.
example:
"It has been determined over millions of years that humans evolve to self determine"
extended:
the so called big bang led to humans evolving freewill...
hee hee
It can be portrayed via a question:
If the human will is determined to be free can it be considered as free?
Determination and free are not in opposition to each other yet the discussion provided so far is premised on the notion that anything determined can not be free. Even if free is what is being determined.
example:
"It has been determined over millions of years that humans evolve to self determine"
extended:
the so called big bang led to humans evolving freewill...
hee hee
Motive wasn't in question, just the fact of repeated usage.
Most people also accept that if something is effectively forced into a course of action, one is not free. Most people would accept that if something has only one option ahead of it, it is not free. Do you dispute either of these notions?
No one is making up definitions, just applying different notions that already exist in common understanding. But if you see having only one option available to you as being free, by all means dismiss the argument on that basis.
Then I guess you should also look at the link that Baldee provided to QQ above.
You'll do as you do.
If you can't debate posts in their rightful context, I probably will.
Where have I suggested otherwise?
So scientific laws mean nothing to you? That figures, I guess.
So you disagree with the concept of determinism, then? Or perhaps you think that randomness within a probabilistic function allows for something to have the freedom to do otherwise? I'm just trying to narrow down your actual objection rather than bluster you've offered so far.
So you think that if something has only one option ahead of it, can always only ever take a certain course, then it is free? Okay. We differ on that.
As am I, but without the assumption that it is anything more than a feeling of being free as opposed to actually being free. The rest is simply discussion. No pulpit necessary or used. If you can't raise your game to the same then fair enough, feel free not to respond.
Yazata
Valued Senior Member
Yes, I agree with that. It's a good definition, very succinct.
Yes, precognition certainly seems to be implied by determinism. If an individual's actions are determined by preexisting states of the universe and by some laws of physics, then complete and perfect knowledge of those states and laws should allow such an omniscient knower to know all of the individual's future actions. That's why I put some emphasis on predictability earlier.
The deterministic incompatibilists deny freedom and dismiss it as an illusion.
(Compatibilists define it much as your source did. I'm a compatibilist and that's what I tried to do.)
The deterministic incompatibilists deny that the philosophical definition holds true of anything.
My strategy in earlier posts was to address your definition this way:
"For many philosophers, to believe in free will is to believe that human beings can be the authors of their own actions"
I rejected the idea that this implies a causal vacuum. (The idea that free-will can only occur in the absence of causes.) I accept the idea that the human mind is an emergent property of the human nervous system and hence causal at its machine language level. So my task is to provide a halfway plausible argument for how free-will can happen in the presence of causes.
I think of human beings as being embedded in a causal matrix. There's causality on the molecular level, on the cellular level, on the organismic level and on the emergent 'mental' level. What we do when we label something a "human being", a "self" or "me" is draw a rather arbitrary circle around some of it. We sometimes use the human body for that, sometimes the sphere of consciousness. But however we do it, what's inside the circle is going to be interacting causally with what's outside.
So when we say that "human beings can be the authors of their own actions", we are saying that the actions originated within the circle, even if it was an internal causal process of some sort that generated it.
"and to reject the idea that human actions are determined by external conditions or fate."
That's the idea that human beings are merely puppets, with all of their thoughts, decisions and actions predetermined by their environments and by the universe's previous history.
The "If A then B" idea kind of suggests that. Given the state of the universe at A along with the laws of physics that somehow connect A to B, and B can't be anything other than what it is. A determines B. So writ large, expanding that vision to the cosmic scale, everything that happens in such a way (if A, then B) can't be anything other than what it is. It's all predetermined by prior states of the universe and ultimately by the universe's initial state and by the laws of physics. It's creationism in a new guise, whether we attribute the initial state and the laws of physics to God or to chance.
I'm skeptical about that. Frankly, I don't picture the universe operating that way. Whether true or not, it seems to be a speculative metaphysical theory.
My discussion of probabilistic causality was meant to challenge that kind of determinism. A and the laws of physics may indeed predetermine immediately proximate B to a high degree of accuracy (but perhaps not quite perfectly, especially on the microscale). But A and the laws of physics might not determine temporally distant Z at all. There might not be any cosmic 'If A then Z' function. On the bigger scales things might just unfold unpredictably. I'm inclined to think of the universe and its evolution as the mother of all chaotic systems.
Note that I'm not challenging causation per-se. Each event has a preceding cause in an unbroken chain all the way back to the beginning. Each event can be given a scientific explanation by citing the immediately prior cause.
So where does that leave our human being? Our little causal system surrounded by its arbitrary circle. Its actions are going to be determined by what goes on inside that circle. (We can call some of those events in the circle 'beliefs' and 'intentions' and various psychologistic terms like that.) An adherent of free will doesn't want to deny that human actions are the result of the actor's beliefs and intentions. Free will isn't just a bunch of random uncaused movements. That's convulsions, not free-will.
And I think that we can agree that the human being's actions are going to be influenced (but perhaps not determined) by the being's immediate environment. The human perceives, and that involves interactions with the surrounding world. He forms beliefs about the world. Circumstances constrain him. (He isn't free to jump over the Moon.) Social mores influence him. He visits the fridge because he's hungry and because he believes there's food there. We might not be able to precisely predict his actions by knowing his proximate environment and history (including the inner psychological bits), but we can put strong constraints around what's going to happen. My claim is that conceding that doesn't do fatal harm to the idea of free-will, since free-will adherents don't want to deny that a person's actions come as the result of his beliefs, desires and motivations in whatever situation he finds himself.
But while the human being's immediate short-range environment influence him greatly, that's progressively less so for environments 100, 1000 or a million years ago. I'm skeptical that knowledge of the initial state of the universe at the big bang, or knowledge of all of the laws of physics, however precise and complete that knowledge (to the point of complete omniscience), would permit any prediction of what our human chooses to do today. The idea that it would, even in principle (if not practically) is where determinism strikes me as speculative metaphysical belief about the nature of reality and how it behaves.
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