Less than 10% of jobs are in the export sector.
That's because something like half of the jobs in China are still in
agriculture. Only something like 25% of Chinese jobs are in industry in the first place, so that 10% works out to something like
40% of all industrial jobs in China. More to the point, the current approach involves transitioning large numbers of those agricultural workers into the industrial sector (i.e., lots of the job
growth is in that "10%"), and that can't happen if the industrial sector isn't growing rapidly.
Also, I note that you omitted one of the final paragraphs in your reference:
"The biggest task for China is to find a new engine for future growth. It cannot rely on exports, nor can the investment stimulus be sustained for long. Without stronger consumer spending, China’s growth will be much slower than in recent years. Reforms to improve health care and the social safety net will take many years to encourage people to save less."
This is not a matter of simply providing consumer credit to Chinese people. The reasons that Chinese savings rates are so high are related to the expectation that they will have to pay their own way in retirement (insufficient government safety net, and not enough kids to rely on because of the one-child policy), and the undervalued Chinese currency (they can't afford the imported stuff they'd like to buy). The former issue is not easily solved - and even the difficult solutions require generational time spans to work. The latter issue could be addressed rather quickly - stop holding down the yuan - but the result would be to make Chinese manufacturing way less competitive (and so destroy lots of jobs and growth), and the resulting spending would fall too heavily in the import category for it to make up the difference.
PS to Quadraphonics. Yes Africa is poor (in your sense of term), but that is not the "wealth of Africa" I spoke of. It is Africa's ability (with Chinese help to be sure) to supply these three needs of China.
China has many more than just 3 needs. They also require big export markets, and sources of FDI, technology and management expertise.
Don't get me wrong: I expect that we will see expanding bilateral trade relationships between China and continents of the South. China will be happy to have cheap access to raw materials. But they will not add up to a replacement for the present export markets.
But I think that applies to the world's largest debitor, who needs to borrow (or simply print) trillions more every year for as far as one can foresee, and not to the world's largest saver,
There's an old saying: "If you owe the banker $1000, you are at his whim. If you owe the banker $100000, he is at your whim."
I.e., given that so much of China's savings is denominated in US dollars, printing them on a large scale amounts to wiping out the value of China's savings. If the dollar were to truly tank, China's foreign exchange reserves would likewise become worthless, destabilizing their currency and so economy. And that's without noting that the loss of the US export market would itself knock the bottom out of the value of Chinese manufactured output, in the first place. Having gotten into bed with us, they cannot afford to see us fail any more than we can. And attacking the dollar doesn't amount to getting out of bed with us: that's like setting the bed on fire, with both of us still in it.
And, again, don't get me wrong: I expect China to continue to develop, and fully expect to see China's total PPP GDP exceed that of the United States before a terribly long time goes by. The per-capita GDP, however, probably will not match that of the US any day soon, if ever. Possibly more interesting than either of those, however, is what the ER GDP will look like. I expect that even after China's PPP GDP reaches parity with the US, the ER GDP will still be far smaller, owing to currency manipulation to maintain the US and EU as substantial export markets. And that means continuing to support the dollar.
As the Chinese economy grows, export-led growth will become less and less sufficient (since the disproportion between Chinese and external consumption will ease), and China will pursue a gradual, cautious move towards a consumption-led economy. In addition to the mentioned changes to social security and consumer credit, this will involve a gradual, orderly unwinding of Chinese exchange rate policy (and, with it, the big trade surpluses and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves). The big question, then, is how much longer export-led growth can persist, what state Chinese society will be in by that time, and what plans they come up with for making the transition. And as of yet, nobody really have much idea about those issues.
And while I do expect them to work out some reasonable way forward, I do not expect that they will be able to count on double-digit growth, once their economy (including labor demographics and technology) comes more into line with developed countries. The model of leveraging cheap labor to use imported technology to produce goods for sale to gargantuan external markets, will not work once 40% of your workforce is no longer in subsistence agriculture, invention (as opposed to adoption) is the only path to improve manufacturing and business efficiency, and the export markets aren't orders of magnitude bigger than the internal one. After all, the present ranks of developed countries can't figure out how to grow that quickly, and it's not for lack of trying.
What I
don't expect to see is any sudden, unilateral Chinese move against the dollar (or Euro), or a tightening of trade and investment posture. That is suicide, and they know it as well as we do.
I also do not expect that economic parity (even in exchange-rate, per-capita terms) will result in a China that has comparable global influence to the United States. This is because China is a land power in Asia, surrounded by other titans, with a brittle foundation for political legitimacy (and serious issues in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan to worry about): they have to use a lot of their resources and clout just to maintain their own position. The United States, on the other hand, is effectively an island: almost all of our resources and clout can be expended on exerting global influence.