Sorry for the delay. Not avoiding your post :]
I was unclear, I think. That was into Iran. The great majority - Iran is a large net gainer of those fleeing home.
Ah, I read too quickly.
Other than the (significant) relative differences in development between Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, we run headlong into another primary difference between state repression and state failure: the functioning state is typically much more discriminatory in who it harms. So while I have no doubt that a great many people prefer refuge in Iran to their alternatives in neighboring states, I also have to wonder if the people in the Ayatollah's dungeons wouldn't, for their part, prefer to take their chances in a failed state.
An unusual circumstance for a repressive, totalitarian state.
Maybe by contemporary standards. But then, there are a lot of unusual circumstances in the region in question, no?
But the common factor of US improvements by force, in the source countries, is perhaps part of the explanation?
Yes, and also the common factor of (actual or incipient) state failure that precipitated US intervention in the first place. In Iran the latter factor was pretty distant (WWII), but I can't say the same about Iraq or Afghanistan.
And it's not like Iran's policy towards Iraq from, say, 2003 until, say, 2006 wasn't designed to undermine the Iraqi state and create lots of refugees (not to mention casualties).
Agreed,with the proviso that the Iranians one meets in the West are not a random sample.
Indeed, they represent the demographic group that is most capable and motivated to leave. In repressive states, a key target for repression is the civil society, which represents the nation's capacity for democratic control of the state (and so, ultimately, all legitimacy). Civil society, of course, happens to have a large overlap with the more fortunate demographics. For which we can be thankful: it actually costs a lot more to escape a repressive state than a failed state (at least if you are the type of person that would be a target for repression, and have a family).
Refugees from other countries, on the other hand, rank low on the list of targets for a repressive state, and may even be useful for propaganda purposes, for a while anyway. Didn't they forcefully repatriate some 6-figure number of Afghan refugees in the past year or so?
But more than one person has argued - independently of our argument here - that the buck for the regrettable Khomeini himself goes back to the White House, as an unintended consequence that should have been better predicted after Cuba.
I've always thought it was clear that US policy on Iran was off-track with the whole Moussadeq coup-de-tat. Which roughly coincides with the very beginnings of the Cuban Revolution, IIRC? So, I'd say that "predicted" is putting it a bit mildly, unless you're referring to something else by "Cuba." :]
If the Iranians made a mistake, they were highly motivated to make it.
The mistake the Iranians made, if there was one, was the classic one: allowing a small, fanatical faction to sieze power in a Revolution. And, indeed, the political forces that favor such an outcome are highly motivating, to say the least (hence, "the classic").
Had they managed to come out of the deal with a government that was both more representative and less repressive than the Shah (and maybe siezed the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to do so and retain decent-or-better relations with the US, courtesy of limp-wrist Jimmy Carter and Iran-Contra Ronald Reagan), then it would all have been worth it. Probably everyone would have come out ahead.
They might still make it. But at least the United States gets to host Iran's best and brightest in the meantime.
And definitely White House actions have had a great effect on the way the Revolution has been treating the Iranians. The before and after picture in Iran seems at least as problematical as a broad overview or survey of refugees - where they come from, how many, where they go.
I never said it was without its own problems, but the idea is to judge the Revolution on its own terms. The US was supporting the Shah, a forcefully installed dictator who employed political and social repression, including torture and murder, to remain in power. Seems unjust enough, and the White House at the time even seemed sympathetic to that fact (which is a rarity). But the result is only marginally more representative, and even worse on the repression, torture and murder counts. It's not clear to me how that is to be attributed to the United States, at least in a first-order way. The brutalizing effect of mass conscription for the Iran-Iraq war?