Weak Atheist vs. Agnostic

@Sarkus --

Concepts can be thought of without being taught, else there would never be any scientific breakthroughs, but it is far easier to be taught than it is to come up with it on your own. Perhaps I should have been more careful with my word selection.

In the case of the god concept, it likely wasn't a "first person" but a first group that thought of it. And the origin is almost assuredly an outgrowth of our natural pattern recognition and agency detection software.
 
^ :D I was being somewhat flippant and facetious. ;)

I can imagine the first person/group either didn't quite understand the power of the concept they created, or were just awestruck with it that they consider it, from then on, as self-evident (in the absence of more detailed knowledge).

I guess there's the possibility that there is an argument for the God-gene that we do have such software that, in the absence of the concept of God, would always eventually give rise to such a general concept (if not specifics). And if such genetics do always give rise to the concept of God, it could be considered a "God-gene".
 
But why must there be an assertion?

Because many theists tend to be pushy, to the point of being willing to stigmatize, ostracize, torture and even kill those who are "not with them."


The only thing to withstand a position seems to be yet another position - and not a lack of position.
 
On the whole, I'm not in favor of the concepts of "atheism" and "agnosticism about God" as such, because they are both reactive or defensive positions.

Ie. they are not stand-alone positions, but stand or fall along with that which they are reacting to or defending against.

I think it is better to have a position that is neither reactive nor defensive, but is proactive or expansive.
 
Because many theists tend to be pushy, to the point of being willing to stigmatize, ostracize, torture and even kill those who are "not with them."


The only thing to withstand a position seems to be yet another position - and not a lack of position.

So atheists are only atheists because they buckle under pressure? I don't believe that.

The position that there is insufficient evidence is not the lack of position, and it is defensible, no matter how pushy a theist may be. Just don't let them bully you into jumping to unfounded conclusions.

I found this, and it's kinda what I'm getting at.

"There may be fairies at the bottom of the garden. There is no evidence for it, but you can't prove that there aren't any, so shouldn't we be agnostic with respect to fairies?" - Richard Dawkins
 
"There may be fairies at the bottom of the garden. There is no evidence for it, but you can't prove that there aren't any, so shouldn't we be agnostic with respect to fairies?" - Richard Dawkins
Dawkins' quote relies on people thinking that agnosticism is akin to "sitting on the fence", rather than being any more serious a philosophical position with issues of epistemology at its core.

Not everyone agrees with his usage of the term, and to be honest I would not take his view as being authoritative, given his undoubted agenda.

Agnosticism (at the stronger level), as I understand it, is about whether you consider a concept to be knowable or not... i.e. if it existed would we be able to know it.
Many, like myself, would consider God to be unknowable even if it existed.

Fairies don't fall in that same category - in that if they exist it would be possible for us to know them.
In such cases, the lack of evidence for them leads more strongly toward convincing of their non-existence than it would for something that we just can't know.

I.e. if we consider X unknowable then the lack of evidence of X would be expected whether it existed or not.
But if we consider X to be knowable, then lack of evidence of X can gradually convince (not prove, just convince) people that X does not exist.
 
Fairies don't fall in that same category - in that if they exist it would be possible for us to know them.
In such cases, the lack of evidence for them leads more strongly toward convincing of their non-existence than it would for something that we just can't know.
Wouldn't this make it more likely there is a God than a new species of marsupial being found?
 
Why? We have knowledge of marsupials in general. We have knowledge of finding new species of marsupials in general and we have knowledge of how likely that might be.
Therefore, the existence of a new species is knowable and with supporting evidence (e.g. behind its frequency, what a marsupial is etc).

And given that God is deemed, by strong agnostics, to be unknowable then it is just not sensible to assign probability. How could you justify any probability with regard something that is utterly unknown.
To assign any probability in the unknown infers belief (one way or another) in the unknown... which is a separate matter to agnosticism.
 
The position that there is insufficient evidence is not the lack of position, and it is defensible, no matter how pushy a theist may be. Just don't let them bully you into jumping to unfounded conclusions.

Well, yes ...

There can be no communication with a bully other than one where the bully wins and one loses.
If one simply persists talking to a bully, the bully will win and one will have been bullied.
Unless, of course, one becomes a bully oneself.
 
Dawkins' quote relies on people thinking that agnosticism is akin to "sitting on the fence", rather than being any more serious a philosophical position with issues of epistemology at its core.

That concept of "sitting on the fence" implies something else: that jumping on either side and staying there is an act of faith - that everything we consider certainty is actually an act of faith, nothing more.

Talk to a theist long enough, and he'll make clear it's all faith to him, not certainty - even if at the beginning, he claimed to be certain.

There is something utterly deflating about talking to a theist who started out with "I know God exists" but who ends with "I'm a seeker just like you."
 
Why? We have knowledge of marsupials in general. We have knowledge of finding new species of marsupials in general and we have knowledge of how likely that might be.
Therefore, the existence of a new species is knowable and with supporting evidence (e.g. behind its frequency, what a marsupial is etc).
I was specifically claiming that a new species is knowable, that was the point. It's potential for being known seemed to reduce its likelihood in your earlier formulation.

On a different note: I could replace the term 'species' with 'entity'. We have found entites with almost nothing in common with previous entities - they shared the fact that they were found (by science, that is). So we have precedent for finding entities that are radically different from everything known before.



And given that God is deemed, by strong agnostics, to be unknowable then it is just not sensible to assign probability. How could you justify any probability with regard something that is utterly unknown.
How can an agnostic be sure about what cannot be knowable? It seems to me an agnostic already has in place ideas that support agnosticism on this issue as well.
To assign any probability in the unknown infers belief (one way or another) in the unknown... which is a separate matter to agnosticism.
I agree with this.
 
I was specifically claiming that a new species is knowable, that was the point. It's potential for being known seemed to reduce its likelihood in your earlier formulation.
If something is knowable then you can assign likelihood - but an unknowable you can't (or at least that is my view).
My point is that there is a hierarchy: a knowable for which there is zero evidence is, rationally, less likely than a knowable for which there is no evidence. (edited)
An unknowable can have no evidence and therefore is incomparable - it is not sensible to say more or less likely (in my view).

On a different note: I could replace the term 'species' with 'entity'. We have found entites with almost nothing in common with previous entities - they shared the fact that they were found (by science, that is). So we have precedent for finding entities that are radically different from everything known before.
Sure - but "a different species" or "entity" is a far cry from stating that a specific entity with specific characteristics exists. As soon as one starts assigning characteristics one opens up the possibilities to an almost infinite degree - and the chance of any one of an infinite....
And if we stick to specifics that are knowable then we can start to assign probabilities based on the evidence we have.

How can an agnostic be sure about what cannot be knowable? It seems to me an agnostic already has in place ideas that support agnosticism on this issue as well.
A good point - in that many consider agnositicism to be the shifting of belief from one thing (existence of God) to belief in another (the knowability of something).

In response I can only go with what I consider is rational...
i.e. the evidence I have does not support a knowable God.
Whether God is knowable or not would depend if someone can arrive at a concept of God that is knowable yet remain consistent with other evidence that is available.

So, to me, a God that interacts with the otherwise natural universe can only be observed by us if it is distinguishable from that natural universe.
Such a God becomes knowable... but there is no evidence of their existence (at least nothing I can rationally attribute to God). With such a God I am a "weak" agnostic - I have no personal evidence of it. But the lack of evidence is quite convincing, and in the absence of evidence one can take a rational position. (Note that rational does not mean true... it just means "given what I know, this (should) logically follows"
A God that creates the universe and then leaves it to run its natural course, with no intervention (a Deistic God, for example), however, is by definition unknowable - so I am strongly agnostic.

So one's position within the realm of agnosticism is, as it should be, dependent upon the specific concept in question.
It is a fallacy to say "I am strongly agnostic with regard this concept of God so therefore I am strongly agnostic with regard all concepts of God".

I've probably rambled a bit - so apologies. :)
But it is difficult, and probably inappropriate, to apply a strict position to all concepts of God.
Agnosticism is (at least for me) based on rationality... which is possibly a personal view - in that I don't have the same experiences as other, so I can only decide/determine what is a rational position for myself.
 
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On the whole, I'm not in favor of the concepts of "atheism" and "agnosticism about God" as such, because they are both reactive or defensive positions.

Ie. they are not stand-alone positions, but stand or fall along with that which they are reacting to or defending against.

I think it is better to have a position that is neither reactive nor defensive, but is proactive or expansive.

That's not a position though. That's an ideology.
 
If something is knowable then you can assign likelihood
Modal verbs are always confusing, but I disagree. I don't think you can, at least not as a rule. I am not disputing one is capable of uttering a liklihood, but I see this as often mere speculation. Liklihoods, in this sense, are merely guesses from perspectives. I do not think they need to have any knowledge value at all. Some could, but not as a general rule.

I see this kind of loopiness in the thread on Aliens. People weighing in on liklihoods. IOW if we look at their arguments from a scientific empirical standpoint,. they carry no weight. They cannot be falsified. There is no control group. We have no way to limit or control parameters. If deduction from radically limited perspectives is OK, then non-theists would need to stop demanding evidence from theists for claims - for example.

Statíng a liklihood is a truth claim, just like a statemen of fact.

- but an unknowable you can't (or at least that is my view).
My point is that there is a hierarchy: a knowable for which there is zero evidence is, rationally, less likely than a knowable for which there is no evidence.
I get lost in this distinction.

An unknowable can have no evidence and therefore is incomparable - it is not sensible to say more or less likely (in my view).
I agree with this, given the definitions, not necessarily in how you would apply them. I am not sure how one knows what are unknowables. This seems to have hubris in it also.

Sure - but "a different species" or "entity" is a far cry from stating that a specific entity with specific characteristics exists. As soon as one starts assigning characteristics one opens up the possibilities to an almost infinite degree - and the chance of any one of an infinite....
And if we stick to specifics that are knowable then we can start to assign probabilities based on the evidence we have.
I understand this, but then I think this....

In such cases, the lack of evidence for them leads more strongly toward convincing of their non-existence than it would for something that we just can't know.
...is misleading. There are many things we had no evidence for - black holes, say - which we then found. But despite this the lack of evidence, according to the above, would have been more convincing - meaning we could be more sure of their non-existence than that of God's non-existence.

A good point - in that many consider agnositicism to be the shifting of belief from one thing (existence of God) to belief in another (the knowability of something).

In response I can only go with what I consider is rational...
i.e. the evidence I have does not support a knowable God.
Wouldn't the strong atheist say the evidence does not support a God, come on over to our team, if that is your reasoning?
Whether God is knowable or not would depend if someone can arrive at a concept of God that is knowable yet remain consistent with other evidence that is available.
Or does not contradict it. I am agnostic, myself, when it comes to this kind of deduction. I just find this kind of abstract deduction looks good on paper, but often does not work. The words make sense, but out in the real world.....To me it parallels the theists' deductive approaches to proving God.

So, to me, a God that interacts with the otherwise natural universe can only be observed by us if it is distinguishable from that natural universe.
Such a God becomes knowable... but there is no evidence of their existence (at least nothing I can rationally attribute to God).
Aren't we sort of like this? I mean, we are a bunch of atoms and then we can talk? I realize that many theists have trouble with immanent Gods but hey.

With such a God I am a "weak" agnostic - I have no personal evidence of it. But the lack of evidence is quite convincing, and in the absence of evidence one can take a rational position. (Note that rational does not mean true... it just means "given what I know, this (should) logically follows"
A God that creates the universe and then leaves it to run its natural course, with no intervention (a Deistic God, for example), however, is by definition unknowable - so I am strongly agnostic.
That always struck me as absurd, though as I write this, it fits fairlly well with simulation theories of our universe. Some physicists even believe that it is more likely we are in a simulation. Obviously this simulation would be in something real, but they figure the odds are most would end up being simulations. I can't say they are wrong given what we would likely do, should be get enormous computing powers, and I am sure many of the simulations we created would be left to their own devices a la some version of the prime directive.

But being a Deist. To me this is like saying you belong to the club of men who do not wear hats made of sunspots.

So one's position within the realm of agnosticism is, as it should be, dependent upon the specific concept in question.
It is a fallacy to say "I am strongly agnostic with regard this concept of God so therefore I am strongly agnostic with regard all concepts of God".
Yes, yes. My point was that similar epistemological arguments could be used. Not that you should be agnostic about everything.

I've probably rambled a bit - so apologies. :)
But it is difficult, and probably inappropriate, to apply a strict position to all concepts of God.
Agnosticism is (at least for me) based on rationality... which is possibly a personal view - in that I don't have the same experiences as other, so I can only decide/determine what is a rational position for myself.
Amazing and nice to read, that bolded portion. Years of discussions with atheists and agnostics and this was treated time and again as a non-issue. IOW it seemed and was even stated that we both should reach the same rational opinion REGARDLESS of any differences in experience. I would try to show how this logic leads to all sorts of problems even within the history of science, but to know avail.
 
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@Pineal --

There are many things we had no evidence for - black holes, say - which we then found. But despite this the lack of evidence, according to the above, would have been more convincing - meaning we could be more sure of their non-existence than that of God's non-existence.

Yes, there's always new evidence coming in, this always leaves open the possibility that we will find evidence that a god or gods exist. However to take this and say categorically that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence is fallacious reasoning. Absence of evidence is, indeed, evidence of absence if, and only if, the evidence should be there.

If god answers the prayers of believers, as the bible(ask and it shall be given) and the koran say, then there should be some kind of evidence for this. Whether that evidence is that believers are healthier than the average(prayers for good health are very common in almost all religions and thus make a good base to judge the evidence on) or that believers are more wealthy than average(not so good a base, but still quite common among the religious), the evidence should be there. That it isn't is evidence that god does not answer prayers(or that he doesn't exist, but that's a stretch).

The same goes for intelligent design and special creation. There should be a marked difference between creatures that god specially created and designed in his own image, and those that weren't. Not only do we not find such a marked difference but we find non-specially created animals that are much better suited for survival in all environments than we are(ever seen a tardigrade? They can survive exposure to hard vacuum for over an hour). Again, absence of the evidence that should be there is evidence of absence.
 
Yes, there's always new evidence coming in, this always leaves open the possibility that we will find evidence that a god or gods exist. However to take this and say categorically that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence is fallacious reasoning. Absence of evidence is, indeed, evidence of absence if, and only if, the evidence should be there.
I am not making the case you are arguing against. I was responding to specific things that Sarkus was saying. This is taking my statments out of that context and making them a freestanding argument for a position I do not have.

As did the rest.
 
@Pineal --

Sorry if that's what I did, but the lack of clarity(to ensure such things didn't happen) wasn't my fault.
 
@Pineal --

Sorry if that's what I did, but the lack of clarity(to ensure such things didn't happen) wasn't my fault.
Actually, I think it was. I was referring to specific things Sarkus said over series of posts. I was clearly trying to point out what I thought were problematic conclusions of his statements.

my now added bold below

There are many things we had no evidence for - black holes, say - which we then found. But despite this the lack of evidence, according to the above, would have been more convincing - meaning we could be more sure of their non-existence than that of God's non-existence.
[the above being his quote above which I had copied into the post]

in reponse to his....

In such cases, the lack of evidence for them leads more strongly toward convincing of their non-existence than it would for something that we just can't know.

I repeat the original quote of his that I was responding to and take up the argument from there. He is saying that a lack of evidence of something knowable is more damning then a lack of evidence for something unknowable, in this case God. I think this leads to some odd conclusions FOR AN AGNOSTIC. Because it means one ends up with two liklihoods, one for God and one for knowable things - of which it is likely we will find new examples of, for which we have no current evidence - with theism coming out as less damaged by a lack of evidence.

It was approaching a relative, if weak, support for belief in God, and that is what I was arguing against. (despite the fact that I am a theist)
 
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