If something is knowable then you can assign likelihood
Modal verbs are always confusing, but I disagree. I don't think you can, at least not as a rule. I am not disputing one is capable of uttering a liklihood, but I see this as often mere speculation. Liklihoods, in this sense, are merely guesses from perspectives. I do not think they need to have any knowledge value at all. Some could, but not as a general rule.
I see this kind of loopiness in the thread on Aliens. People weighing in on liklihoods. IOW if we look at their arguments from a scientific empirical standpoint,. they carry no weight. They cannot be falsified. There is no control group. We have no way to limit or control parameters. If deduction from radically limited perspectives is OK, then non-theists would need to stop demanding evidence from theists for claims - for example.
Statíng a liklihood is a truth claim, just like a statemen of fact.
- but an unknowable you can't (or at least that is my view).
My point is that there is a hierarchy: a knowable for which there is zero evidence is, rationally, less likely than a knowable for which there is no evidence.
I get lost in this distinction.
An unknowable can have no evidence and therefore is incomparable - it is not sensible to say more or less likely (in my view).
I agree with this, given the definitions, not necessarily in how you would apply them. I am not sure how one knows what are unknowables. This seems to have hubris in it also.
Sure - but "a different species" or "entity" is a far cry from stating that a specific entity with specific characteristics exists. As soon as one starts assigning characteristics one opens up the possibilities to an almost infinite degree - and the chance of any one of an infinite....
And if we stick to specifics that are knowable then we can start to assign probabilities based on the evidence we have.
I understand this, but then I think this....
In such cases, the lack of evidence for them leads more strongly toward convincing of their non-existence than it would for something that we just can't know.
...is misleading. There are many things we had no evidence for - black holes, say - which we then found. But despite this the lack of evidence, according to the above, would have been more convincing - meaning we could be more sure of their non-existence than that of God's non-existence.
A good point - in that many consider agnositicism to be the shifting of belief from one thing (existence of God) to belief in another (the knowability of something).
In response I can only go with what I consider is rational...
i.e. the evidence I have does not support a knowable God.
Wouldn't the strong atheist say the evidence does not support a God, come on over to our team, if that is your reasoning?
Whether God is knowable or not would depend if someone can arrive at a concept of God that is knowable yet remain consistent with other evidence that is available.
Or does not contradict it. I am agnostic, myself, when it comes to this kind of deduction. I just find this kind of abstract deduction looks good on paper, but often does not work. The words make sense, but out in the real world.....To me it parallels the theists' deductive approaches to proving God.
So, to me, a God that interacts with the otherwise natural universe can only be observed by us if it is distinguishable from that natural universe.
Such a God becomes knowable... but there is no evidence of their existence (at least nothing I can rationally attribute to God).
Aren't we sort of like this? I mean, we are a bunch of atoms and then we can talk? I realize that many theists have trouble with immanent Gods but hey.
With such a God I am a "weak" agnostic - I have no personal evidence of it. But the lack of evidence is quite convincing, and in the absence of evidence one can take a rational position. (Note that rational does not mean true... it just means "given what I know, this (should) logically follows"
A God that creates the universe and then leaves it to run its natural course, with no intervention (a Deistic God, for example), however, is by definition unknowable - so I am strongly agnostic.
That always struck me as absurd, though as I write this, it fits fairlly well with simulation theories of our universe. Some physicists even believe that it is more likely we are in a simulation. Obviously this simulation would be in something real, but they figure the odds are most would end up being simulations. I can't say they are wrong given what we would likely do, should be get enormous computing powers, and I am sure many of the simulations we created would be left to their own devices a la some version of the prime directive.
But being a Deist. To me this is like saying you belong to the club of men who do not wear hats made of sunspots.
So one's position within the realm of agnosticism is, as it should be, dependent upon the specific concept in question.
It is a fallacy to say "I am strongly agnostic with regard this concept of God so therefore I am strongly agnostic with regard all concepts of God".
Yes, yes. My point was that similar epistemological arguments could be used. Not that you should be agnostic about everything.
I've probably rambled a bit - so apologies.
But it is difficult, and probably inappropriate, to apply a strict position to all concepts of God.
Agnosticism is (at least for me) based on rationality...
which is possibly a personal view - in that I don't have the same experiences as other, so I can only decide/determine what is a rational position for myself.
Amazing and nice to read, that bolded portion. Years of discussions with atheists and agnostics and this was treated time and again as a non-issue. IOW it seemed and was even stated that we both should reach the same rational opinion REGARDLESS of any differences in experience. I would try to show how this logic leads to all sorts of problems even within the history of science, but to know avail.