§outh§tar said:
Call me the last in Emma Goldman's bloodline.
You wish.
§outh§tar said:
Call me the last in Emma Goldman's bloodline.
Xerxes said:Sargentlard,
Tiassa basically said what I was aiming at:
As such, it has the effect of "cheapening human life".
If we consider human life to be 'sacred', what point is there in having more blood on our hands? Especially from such a low element of society..
The only time I'd consider the death penalty to be valid is when a person in authority supports or allows acts of atrocity (ie Stalin starving millions of Ukranians)
Remorse is a way to guage how much the person can be trusted not commit similar acts in the future. It has nothing to do with judging their worth as a human.No cheapening of human life really, more like a last resort measure to rid of those who show no remorse.
No, they only showcase it. You want to see cheap human life, look for sick mutants lining up to watch people get gassed by the state.Reality shows cheapen human life more than the death sentence.
Only a few cases. Manson was not in a position of extreme power and trust. Stalin was.So killing is then right in some cases? The human element is overshadowed by social status? Satlin was just as twisted as Manson...so why ok Stalin's offing when Manson still continues to live in his dellusional world.
talk2farley said:
Upheld the conviction and death sentence insofar as it was otherwise within the bounds of the law.
Declaring juvenile executions "cruel and unusual" in the absence of some superior evidence versus what was offered was improper in the extreme (Justice Scalia, speaking for the opposition, phrased it best when he said the court had determined that "the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant," while the view of "the so-called international community" had been "given center stage.")
As in Atkins, the objective indicia of national consensus here–the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice–provide sufficient evidence that today society views juveniles, in the words Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal,” 536 U.S., at 316. The evidence of such consensus is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evidence in Atkins ....
.... Although, by contrast to Atkins, the rate of change in reducing the incidence of the juvenile death penalty, or in taking specific steps to abolish it, has been less dramatic, the difference between this case and Atkins in that respect is counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the change toward abolition. Indeed, the slower pace here may be explained by the simple fact that the impropriety of executing juveniles between 16 and 18 years old gained wide recognition earlier than the impropriety of executing the mentally retarded ....
.... *The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 .... The United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile penalty. It does not lessen fidelity to the Constitution or pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.
Roper v. Simmons
There was no scientific or rational basis for the decision
When the court last considered juvenile executions in 1989 and left 16- and 17-year-olds eligible, much of that knowledge wasn't available.
But now, new research — some involving magnetic resonance imaging of the brain — has shown that critical parts of the mind develop later than previously believed, robbing even late-year teenagers of the impulse control and decision-making ability of people just a few years older ....
.... "Emerging from the neuropsychological research is a striking view of the brain and its gradual maturation, in far greater detail than seen before," the American Psychiatric Association said in its brief to the court. "Although the precise underlying mechanisms continue to be explored, what is certain is that, in late adolescence, important aspects of brain maturation remain incomplete, particularly those involving the brain's executive functions" ....
.... "Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished ... by reason of youth and immaturity," Kennedy wrote.
SeattleTimes.com
talk2farley said:
Issues of legislation are reserved under the Constitution to the people. Insofar as juvenile execution was otherwise legal under relevant local law, the Supreme Court was obligated not to overturn the conviction but to affirm it.
It is a fallacy of the most elementary kind to suggest that any popular consensus can provide confirmation for a given moral judgement, international or otherwise. That the United States is the only country in the world that gives the juvenile death penalty official sanction is similarly irrelevant. Irregardless, the Court is not empowered under the Constitution to cast such judgements. The great irony here is that THE PEOPLE OF THE EFFECTED STATES HAVE HAD THEIR OPINIONS CAST ASIDE BY THEIR OWN JUDICIARY IN FAVOR OF THE OPINIONS OF FOREIGNERS.
Questions of moral responsibility on the part of the defendant are irrelevant. The court did not rule on the legalities of trying juveniles as adults. The sole determination of this case was that, if convicted as adults, juveniles could not be sentenced to die, under 8th Amendment prohibitions on "cruel and unusual" punishments.
The accuracy of such evidence in no way implies that the application of the death penalty to juveniles is any more "cruel and unusual" than its application to adults.
The court, recognizing that there was no language under the Constitution prohibiting states from trying juveniles as adults (whether such a trial was morally accurate or otherwise), was then forced to invent some illusory foundation with which to veil their overtly legislative actions, hence turning to 8th amendement justifications in complete absence of evidence.
Irregardless of the moral accuracy, then, of the courts decision, this still represents a considerable breach of the peoples right to determine their own moral course in a democratic state, and it sets a dangerous and inherently totalitarian future precedent.
talk2farley said:
Incorrect. The Supreme Court's decision upholds and affirms a lower court's decision. Under state law (popular law), juvenile execution was legal. You're aware of the seperation of powers between judiciary and legislature, are you not?
Society holds, as Justice Scalia has said, that certain crimes are so heinous and indefensible as to be appreciable wrongs to even the juvenile mind. That is, a juvenile may not be of sufficient maturity to determine the value of a tattoo, but that does not necesitate his inability to appreciate the wrongness of binding a woman and throwing her in a river.
If it is the opinion of individuals within that society that this approach is incorrect, then the democratic nature of the state provides them with the means to exact change.
What this case has revealed is a hijacking of that democratic process by five lawyers, whose opinions can hardly be called representative of the general population.
It is not a question of retribution. By the courts own admission, the only issue is whether the application of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under 8th Amendment standards.
Bringing its independent judgment to bear on the permissibility of the death penalty for a 15-year-old offender, the Thompson plurality stressed that “[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Id., at 835. According to the plurality, the lesser culpability of offenders under 16 made the death penalty inappropriate as a form of retribution, while the low likelihood that offenders under 16 engaged in “the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution” made the death penalty ineffective as a means of deterrence. Id., at 836—838. With Justice O’Connor concurring in the judgment on narrower grounds, id., at 848—859, the Court set aside the death sentence that had been imposed on the 15-year-old offender ....
.... The inquiry into our society’s evolving standards of decency did not end there. The Atkins Court neither repeated nor relied upon the statement in Stanford that the Court’s independent judgment has no bearing on the acceptability of a particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Instead we returned to the rule, established in decisions predating Stanford, that “*‘the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.’*” 536 U.S., at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Mental retardation, the Court said, diminishes personal culpability even if the offender can distinguish right from wrong. 536 U.S., at 318. The impairments of mentally retarded offenders make it less defensible to impose the death penalty as retribution for past crimes and less likely that the death penalty will have a real deterrent effect. Id., at 319—320. Based on these considerations and on the finding of national consensus against executing the mentally retarded, the Court ruled that the death penalty constitutes an excessive sanction for the entire category of mentally retarded offenders, and that the Eighth Amendment “‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” Id., at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)) ....
.... Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults. We have held there are two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: “‘retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.’” Atkins, 536 U.S., at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). As for retribution, we remarked in Atkins that “if the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.” 536 U.S., at 319. The same conclusions follow from the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender. Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity ....
.... In concluding that neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders, we cannot deny or overlook the brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have committed ....
Kennedy, J.; Roper v. Simmons
But our decision in Atkins did not rest solely on this tentative conclusion. Rather, the Court’s independent moral judgment was dispositive. The Court observed that mentally retarded persons suffer from major cognitive and behavioral deficits, i.e., “subaverage intellectual functioning” and “significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18.” Id., at 318. “Because of their impairments, [such persons] by definition … have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” Ibid. We concluded that these deficits called into serious doubt whether the execution of mentally retarded offenders would measurably contribute to the principal penological goals that capital punishment is intended to serve–-retribution and deterrence.
O'Connor, J.; Roper v. Simmons
The Court’s contention that the goals of retribution and deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18 is also transparently false. The argument that “retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished,” ante, at 17, is simply an extension of the earlier, false generalization that youth always defeats culpability.
Scalia, J.; Roper v. Simmons
talk2farley said:"What should the Supreme Court have done?"
Upheld the conviction and death sentence insofar as it was otherwise within the bounds of the law. Declaring juvenile executions "cruel and unusual" in the absence of some superior evidence versus what was offered was improper in the extreme (Justice Scalia, speaking for the opposition, phrased it best when he said the court had determined that "the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant," while the view of "the so-called international community" had been "given center stage.") There was no scientific or rational basis for the decision; the defense offered was wholly popular and subjectively moral (see "evolving standards of decency" and "30 states now reject the death penalty," quoting Justice Kennedy who spoke for the majority). The court is making a mockery of itself.